Sartre felsefesi'nde ben'in olanaksızlığı olarak mauvaıse foı
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2015
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Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Abstract
This thesis aims to articulate within the light of the debate in the existing literature that the concept of mauvaise foi (bad faith), which has a central role in Sartre's philosophy of freedom, shows the ego's ontological impossibility and ambiguity between (ethically) self-deception and (ontologically) belief. The thought of the impossibility of ego comes to the light with Sartre's debate on transcendental ego with, especially Husserl, and then Descartes, Kant. For Sartre, ego is not transcendental; yet, it is a transcendence. That is to say, ego is not either a connector or a substance, neither is a content of consciousness. For Sartre, ego is a transcendence and also an object just like any other external beings. The very being of transcendence of ego, with its being imaginative and unreal, manifests itself in an ontological impossibility. The being of ego is revealed only in a reflection with the other's being. In mauvaise foi, one who is actually a nothingness and a freedom comprehends himself as a being, as an identity and positions this faith as reality. In the literature, Sartre's conception of mauvaise foi is also regarded as a self-deception in addition to a belief. The reason behind is because foi /or faith has a double meaning. Along with highlighting a belief regarding the being of ego, mauvaise foi, as a self-deception, describes the escape from the responsibility of freedom.
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Felsefe