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Date
2002
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Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Abstract
This study is concerned with the effect of dual-executive bodies on democratic performance as a political institution. Dual executive bodies have two distinguishing features. The first defining criterion is that the government is depended on the confident of the assemly (except impeachment process); the second one is that the head of the state has quiet considerable powers competing those of the head of government. Dual executive bodies do not require the head of the slate is elected directly by the people. This is the point that differentiates the system from semi-presidential systems which had been defined by Duverger's innovative article in 1980. The reason for such a choice is that the conflict potential inherent to those systems comes from their two headed nature. Having a head of state elected by the assembly with quiet considerable powers competing those of the head of government, it does not necessarily have greater conflict potential when compared to another dual exucutive system having a head of state elected directly by the people but with only symbolic powers. Then, the point is not the direct election criterion but competing powers. And in a group of political systems the potential of conflict is greater than all others. The systems which give the president the powers to appoint and dismiss the cabinet which will be depended to parliamentary confidence are called unipolar-dual executive bodies. The reason for that naming is that in these systems the president is the only pole of the system considering his other appointment powers, legislative powers (that enables him to by pass the parliament), executive powers and so on. Weimar Republic (1919-1933), Sri Lanka, Portugal (1976-1982), Russia Federation(1993) are the examples of unipolar-dual executive bodies. The other group of dual executive bodies which we call as pure ones do not give the president the power to say last word on the formation of the cabinet. Yet the systems giving quite considerable powers to presidents differs in practice as government-dominant forms, president-dominant forms and which the dominant form is indefinite or unfixed. We examined Austria, Iceland, Ireland and Bulgaria as examples of government-dominant forms, Finland and France as examples of un fixed/indefinite-dominant forms and we yet could not se an example of president-dominated dual executive body. We concluded that the government-dominant forms practicing the parliamentary rule are only seemingly dual-executive while the others are real dual-executive. In result, we can say that our thesis relating that the main defining criterion is not direct election of the president but competing power in both parts of the executive is proved to be true. 220
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