

BOOK REVIEWS*

Ahmet Davutođlu, **Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu**, İstanbul, Küre Yayınları, 2001, xiii + 584 pages.

For the last several decades Turkey, with her strict adherence to maintain status quo, has been trying to adjust to a world where the conditions for the traditional foreign policy making has been undergoing a radical change. Despite the historical, geographical and cultural richness, Turkey, without systematic and long-term political preferences, appears to be far from pursuing a foreign policy which would take the advantage of emerging opportunities. Ahmet Davutoglu, in his book, *Stratejik Derinlik* is aiming to offer new alternatives to Turkish foreign policy.

In this book, drawing predominantly on a neorealist-idealist approach, new definitions and alternative approaches to the theory of international relations as well as Turkish foreign policy are introduced. As far as terminology is concerned, the book contains several "firsts". For example new definitions to the terms of sphere (*havza*), border

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(*şimşir*) and political cultural line (*hat*) have been coined. The term of culture was taken as an encompassing and uniting element, close to the Ottoman and American understanding, rather than a dividing one as is understood in today's Europe. On the contrary the artificially drawn political maps of the Middle East, Asia and Afro-Eurasia, were reinvestigated, with a new perspective by bringing the natural geographical and cultural elements to the forefront. Again the type of explanation, "strategic triangles" used in explaining Turkey's Eastern Policies had never been used until today. From this perspective the book can be considered as an original piece of work.

The book essentially consists of three main sections. In the first section, a new theory, new definitions, and encompassing definitions of history, which is different from the classical theory of international relations, are developed. According to Davutoğlu, to be able to understand and interpret the incidents, five main approaches need to be adopted; description (to understand the incident one needs several pictures taken from different angles rather than one picture), explanation, understanding (the effort of learning, understanding the incidents by getting into the world of definitions of somebody else), giving meaning (to offer a natural perspective from the real values of our own world,) and direction (to form solutions or alternatives from the data which we obtain from all these perspectives).

In the first section while defining the national power parameters of a country, geography (pp. 17-20), people and culture (pp. 23, 34-36) and strategic mentality (pp. 29-31) elements come to the forefront. Again Davutoğlu, in the first section, by touching upon the lack of strategic theory in Turkey, studies the effect of historical inheritance on the internal and external political parameters, which influence the international relations. According to the author, the countries can be grouped into four categories depending on their ability of strategic and tactical maneuvering: Super-powers trying to enlarge their hinterland; the Major Powers trying to strengthen their positions and enlarge their domains, in front of the superpower(s) by internal agreements; the Regional Power, which has to develop, policies commensurate with the policies of superpowers to which they belong and if they fail in this they get punished by the superpower (Like Turkey's punishment by the embargo after the 1974 Cyprus Operation); and the small powers whose abilities of maneuvering are very limited (pp. 74-79).

In the second section, in rather intensive fashion, it was touched upon the strategic analysis, which was tried to be explained by geographical depth. In the book, the domains, which were formed by intersection of geo-politic, geo-cultural and geo-economics lines, were defined as the main spheres, which influence the international policies of the states (pp. 21). As a first in the geography of international relations, Near Land Sphere, Balkans, Middle East and Caucasia (pp.119-150); Near Sea Sphere, Black Sea, Adriatic Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, Gulf and Caspian Sea (pp.151-182); and Near Continent Sphere, Europe, North America, Southern, Central and Eastern Asia (pp.183-213) are defined. First, the properties of these regions are critically studied. Second extensive explanations about the strategies and external policies followed by Turkey in these regions are provided. For example, while former USSR's Northern, Baltic, Pacific and Black Sea fleets are a consequence of following such a policy (pp.156), Turkey could not formulate a coherent total strategy; she followed a sea strategy, which can be defined as incoherent tactical steps (pp.157). To the author, Cyprus, because of its strategic location, should be among Turkey's main policies even if not a single Turk lived on it, just like strategic policies adopted by the USA about Cuba despite the fact that not a single American lived on it (pp.179). During the cold war era, again, because the Turkish foreign policy was focused on Greece, she was unable to follow a policy beyond her region (pp.184).

Turkey's falling into the Western Block, which was formed by the former colonial powers against whom Turkey gave the struggle of independence only 70 years ago, is one of the strange paradoxes of Turkish history (pp. 207). Soon after the cold war era was over, Europe return to the international relations stage by expanding her traditional borders eastward. In this new world order, Turkey as a bridge between all spheres and cultures has to formulate a new, real foreign policy taking into account all of these elements (pp. 201-202). Turkey cannot refrain from having relations with Europe but, following a foreign policy with strict adherence to the Europe and Atlantic parameters would inevitably make her policies short sighted (pp. 218). At this point, Turkey has some common interest areas with USA in, on one side, Black Sea Sphere through connections with Ukraine and Moldavia, and on the other side Adriatic Sphere with

Middle East and Eastern European connections. Turkey, while maintaining mutual diplomatic relations with the states of these spheres, has to adopt and follow multidimensional policies, which seek harmony and balance between with the superpowers following their own policies in this same region. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in the Black Sea Region can achieve this balance (pp. 214).

It seems that especially at the third section of the book after pointing out the past events and possibilities of the future, there is tendency towards "ideal-politic." The author first discusses the issues of NATO, ECO, OIC, BSEC, D-8, and G-20, which are known as the strategic instruments of Turkey, later proposes alternative politics while evaluating Turkey's Balkan, Middle East, Central Asia and EU politics. He argues that the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) can only change from reactionary mode to actionary mode of politics by changing the institutions from subjective form, which based on categorization, to a rational form, which bases on population proportion of the member countries. (pp. 265, 255). The author puts forward that ECO is an organization, which holds the most important strategic position in the new world order (pp. 268). Success of this organization to some extent depends on replacement of the nostalgic ties with rational and psychological elements. (pp. 272) The main reason for the failure of the BSEC countries, which are mostly ex-socialists except Turkey and Greece, is their struggle to expand too fast and too deep without control. The best way of reviving BSEC is to find a common sphere of economic interests between Turkey and Russia while also giving Ukraine an important partnership role just like Germany and France (pp. 278, 280).

According to Davutoğlu, the Dayton Agreement while putting Bosnia under Croatian control gives Serbians and Croatians statehoods, and creating the unequal status, been an agreement based on temporary "freezing" (pp. 303, 307). To substantiate the agreement, the city of Mostar, Drina, Srajevo-Brocko and Bosnia-Bihac, which had the worst ethnic cleansing at the time of the civil war, should be given to the Muslim control.

The countries, which have the manifesting strategies in the international relations at global level, determine the options of potential tension and war in the parts of the world. (pp. 341) With this policy,

USA by the Gulf War not only punished Saddam, but also conveyed a message to the rising powers of Germany and Japan. (pp. 344) According to author, two overlapping triangles can determine the international balance in the Middle East: Egypt-Turkey-Iran "outer triangle," Syria-Iraq-Saudi Arabia "inner triangle" (pp. 357). As long as, outer triangle is in balance, Middle Eastern teeterboard will be in balance. In this triangle one of the three countries is always alienated, the other two are always supported. Today, the USA is supporting the wave of Arabic nationalism to maintain the balance of the inner-triangle and to curb the growing of Islamic opposition (pp. 367). The main struggle of the peoples of the Arabic countries main struggle has transformed into securing the life's basic needs without conflicting with their political leaders. (pp. 370) There are two major crisis areas in the Middle East: Palestine and Iraq. According to Davutoğlu, there can be stability in Israel, as long as the state of Palestine is established on the bases of territorial integrity, economical independence and equal distribution of wealth. (pp. 392).

Iraq has her own idiosyncrasies in the Middle East in that despite all the authentic cultural and denominational differences of the Turkmen, Kurt, Arab, Achem, Sunni and Shia can all live together. However, Iraq has a chronic problem of being in continuous dispute with Western Powers; this is somewhat a desired situation from vantage point of the USA interests in the region. The author offers two basic political solutions to the region countries (not for only Iraq) for the Kurdish problem: to strengthen people's feeling of belongingness with the Kurdish, and the other is to invoke the equal citizenship awareness without outside interventions. (pp. 449).

According to the author, Central Asia, which has been characterized by high level of immigration, will most likely to be a magnet region in the coming century. This region is under a wave of economic exploitation because of its rich national resources (pp. 465). Turkey could not improve her Central Asia strategies because of traditional status quo policies, the existing state establishment favoring the West and sluggishness that comes from the Cold War Era (pp. 488). If Turkey aspires to be effective in this region, she has to improve her relations with Iran-Russia dual (pp. 498).

EU and Turkey relations with the Customs Union, made Turkey handicapped in her economic relations with the third parties jeopardizing her economic interests (pp. 513). As EU under the leadership of Germany, increased her economic and military influence, and followed their national interests (pp. 526), Turkey within the framework of NATO becomes even much closer to the USA. The author reminds us that EU did not consider Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" mentality, when evaluating the membership of Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, but she brought it to forefront when Turkey's membership was on the table (pp. 542). In the light of these policies, the author alleges that EU will not accept Turkey in full-membership, but implies that she will follow the policies to keep her at the bay (pp. 549). As an alternative policy, he is touching upon the importance of Turkey producing policies which takes EU into account, but does not see EU as the only alternative.

"A tree which has received various grafting with rich and different soils at its roots becomes a rich tree with plentiful and variety of fruits" (pp. 554). The author makes an analogy resembling Turkey to such a tree, with her richness stemming from her cultural, human, geographical and historical perspectives. According to him, although at present Turkey is going through difficult time, she will eventually be able to produce a strong and stable system once these hardships are over just like Pax-Britannica and France did. Turkey too, by virtue of producing strong and unique foreign policies will move to a position of a pivotal country from her previously inactive situation.

With its comprehensive topics and alternative approaches, *Stratejik Derinlik* could serve a major complementary guide in undergraduate and graduate courses in the fields of International Relations and Turkish Foreign Policy. To this end, the next edition should be written in a more plain language to be able to address to a wider audience. While the book provides detailed information about geographic areas on which little is known; it would be highly suggested that the relevant parts should be accompanied with maps, explanatory figures and illustrations. A comprehensive bibliography section would serve particularly useful, especially for those who would be interested in doing further research in this area.

The significant novelty of the book lies in its original approach and alternative solutions to inactive state of Turkish Foreign Policy, as well as its introduction of new definitions to the theory of international relations. All in all, *Stratejik Derinlik* is a provocative book, which I personally recommend as a reference book and should be read by those who are interested in international relations.

M. CÜNEYT YENİGÜN*

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William Hale, **Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000** (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000).

Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000 is an extremely well written book on Turkey's foreign relations by one of the prominent experts on Turkish politics/Turkish foreign policy. It is a comprehensive, critical, thoroughly researched, and enjoyable account of Turkey's external relations since 1774. Hale's tome could be used as a textbook, as well as a reference volume. Whatever purpose the book would be used for, the reader would take pleasure in the author's meticulous attention to detail, and avoidance of a descriptive style, characteristic of many works on Turkey's diplomatic history.

William Hale is Professor at the Department of Political Studies of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He published extensively on Turkey's domestic politics as well as on its foreign relations. Among Hale's publications one should mention *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (1981), and *Turkish Politics and the Military* (1994). His ability to converse and do research in Ottoman, and in Turkish is impressive. Hale is an avid student of Turkey: He is well informed about historical and

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contemporary events; he is objective and scrupulous in his handling of details and facts.

The book consists of ten chapters. The first chapter deals with the challenges the late Ottoman Empire faced, and Istanbul's policies adopted to weather them. The author focuses on the period between 1774-1918, examining the various means with which Istanbul tried to cope with the challenges the "sick man" faced. The remaining chapters deal with events during the war of independence (1918-1922), and the factors that have influenced Republican Turkey's foreign policy.

Hale typifies the late Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey as "middle powers," which could oblige other states to take actions that they would not otherwise have taken, and to resist pressure to do so from other powers. According to Hale, middle powers could affect regional events, yet they are capable to influence global politics only marginally. Hence, he argues, if such states are threatened by a major power, they either seek alliance with another major power or neutrality. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy since the 19th century has consisted of attempts to answer the question of whether Turkish security could best be enhanced by alliance, or neutrality. Hale maintains that the Turkish choice depended on the nature of the international system, and the country's position in it. A more or less well functioning balance of power system -- as was the case in the 19th century Europe -- enabled Turkey to play one power off against the other(s), postponing its inevitable demise. This mode of behavior increasingly became untenable towards the late 19th century and the early 20th century when two major alliances emerged on the continent.

Hale uses the factor of the international system to explain the changes and the continuities in Turkey's external relations. Thus Turkey felt compelled to join NATO when bi-polarity was at its zenith, and distanced itself from too close an association with the U.S. when détente characterized super power relations. However, as Hale also makes clear, such bilateral factors as perceived Soviet threat in the immediate post-1945 years and the deterioration of the Turco-American relations in the wake of the 1964 Cyprus crisis also influenced Ankara's moves.

Hale suggests that strategic importance is both an asset and a liability, which set Turkey apart from other middle powers. It is an asset because, compared to other middle powers, Turkey enjoys more bargaining power and flexibility in its dealings with the super powers. Turkey's geopolitical position allows it to influence events in such locations as southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Transcaucasus, and the northern Middle East, and enables this country to acquire economic, military and political benefits from such outsiders as the U.S. and the EU. Yet strategic importance is also a liability because Turkey inevitably gets involved in great power, or regional conflicts. Throughout the book, Hale draws the reader's attention to Turkey's geopolitical position to explain why/how Turkey was easily drawn into conflicts, and why/how outside players desired Turkey to support their policies in the region.

Hale points to two lessons the Kemalists drew from the late Ottoman experience, which guided them through various crises in the Republican period: 1) Turkey should be a nation state, avoiding substantial presence of minorities within its borders; 2) Articulation of ethnic and religious grievances by the remaining minority communities in Turkey should be perceived negatively. This was not due to innate prejudice, but due to the belief that such communities had been used by the European powers to mask their imperialistic designs. Throughout most of the post-1923 period, the Turkish elite abided by these principles. Instances indicating the relevance of such lessons include the Turkish reluctance to grab a portion of the Iraqi territory – in spite of the then President Turgut Özal's temporary enthusiasm for it – in the wake of the Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War in 1991. The Turks also looked skeptically upon most Europeans' criticism of Turkey's restriction of human rights, including those of ethnic minorities.

Hale assigned nine chapters to the discussion of the post-1918 foreign policy issues. Each chapter focuses on an era that has characteristics differentiating it from the next era. The second chapter of the book deals with the 1918-1939 period when Turkey was mostly preoccupied with reconstruction and nation building. Hale diligently links Atatürk's various foreign policy maneuvers to the then existing multi-polar states system, which enabled Turkey to adopt neutrality, reminiscent of the traits of Abdülhamid II's diplomacy during the last quarter of the 19th century.

The third chapter covers Turkey's diplomacy during World War II, when Ankara was consistently pressured by the Allies to live up to its pre-war commitments, and by the Axis to stay neutral. The author does an excellent job arguing how the various phases of the war compelled President İnönü to use a variety of means to postpone the undesirable: Turkey's belligerence. Hale examines the initiatives of the Allies and the Axis as they relate to Turkey, and how the Turks fine-tuned their responses to these initiatives in conformity with the fortunes of the war.

The fourth chapter covers the Turkish foreign policymaking during the peak years of the Cold War, 1945-1963. Hale discusses the various facets of the İnönü and Menderes administrations' frenetic efforts to acquire the support of the U.S. in withstanding perceived Soviet expansionism. The author also makes use of the findings of recent research on the Menderes Government's involvement in the Middle East in the 1950s. Hale tells us that it was the Menderes Government that desired a more assertive marketing of the Baghdad Pact to the Arab countries, and not the U.S. as conventionally assumed. The U.S. was also wary of antagonizing the Arab states, fearing that excessive posturing of the West in the region could lead to an increase in Soviet influence. Hence, more than once, the U.S. tried to prevent Menderes from dispatching troops to intervene militarily in neighboring Arab countries.

The fifth chapter examines the various turning points in Turkey's foreign policy between 1964-1990 by focusing on super power politics as well as on regional conflicts. Among others, Hale discusses such events as the three Cyprus crises, the Turco-American problems, the Iran-Iraq war, and Turkey's relations with the European Union. As in other chapters, the author makes use of a very rich array of recent research, and does a good job in offering sound and sensible accounts for why/how Turkey acted the way it did.

The remaining four chapters discuss the post-Cold War environment that Turkey found itself in, concentrating on the interplay of domestic problems – including human rights violations, and the PKK revolt – and foreign policy issues. The author examines how these domestic problems affected Turkey's relations with its

southeastern neighbors, as well as the EU. Such events as the Gulf War, the emergence of European defense structures, the ups and down of Turkey's relations with the EU, and the Balkan and the Transcaucasian crises are analyzed to determine the logic of the foreign policy decisions of the Turks between 1990-2000.

Unlike the book's first five chapters, discussion of the topics in the latter half of the book (dealing with the 1990-2000 period) is poorly focused at times. There are too many facts, and too many issues to talk about. Nevertheless, this book is still a well-written one. It is comprehensive, objective, and displays empathy about Turkey's troubles. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* is a substantial contribution to the literature on Turkish politics and foreign policy. It is a must for the academically inclined, as well as for the layman who harbors a curiosity about Turkey's foreign policy.

SÜHA BÖLÜKBAŞI*

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Ergun Özbudun, **Contemporary Turkish Politics. Challenges to Democratic Consolidation**, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, 171 pages.

Although the literature on transition to and consolidation of liberal democracy had already begun to emerge from 1960 onwards, particularly with regard to Latin America and Southern Europe, it has flourished since the former Socialist states decided to move towards democracy and market economy after the end of the cold war in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The literature on comparative democratization is now more sophisticated in analyzing and comparing

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democratizations, which mean transition to and consolidation of democracy, in different parts of the world. However, concerning democracy and democratization in Turkey, the literature is not large enough to deal with all aspects; Very few comparative studies have been done so far that can successfully situate Turkey into a comparative analysis. Comparative studies on the Middle East generally exclude Turkey and systematically concentrate on Arab countries and Iran. Similarly, comparative studies on democratizations in the Southern Europe normally do not focus on Turkish political regime. In addition, Turkey, with its Muslim population and *alla Turca* secularism, appears to have different cultural, social and political characteristics from any of its neighbors. Özbudun's recent book on democratization in Turkey was written to fill the gaps mentioned above: analyzing democracy and democratization in Turkey in comparative approach.

Without doubt, the study, with its comparative, compact, and lucid style, is an extremely valuable contribution to both democratization studies and also Turkish politics. The book has seven chapters. The author clearly describes his 'problematique' in "Introduction", focusing particularly on the conceptualization of democratic consolidation. In doing so, he draws heavily his conceptual tools regarding the consolidation of democracy from Linz and Stepan's influential book, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*¹. He applies this conceptualization to the Turkish case successfully. The second chapter analyzes democratic transitions, breakdowns and restorations in comparative perspective. Democracy in Turkey has been interrupted three times (1960, 1971 and 1980) by military interventions. It seems that the author prefers elite-centered conceptual framework in his explanations of transitions, breakdowns and re-equilibrations in Turkish democracy, following actor-dominated theory of transition and breakdown which developed mostly by Rustow², Linz, O'Donnell, and Schmitter, to other theories of democratic transition which highlight international or structural factors

¹Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

²Dankwart A Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy. Toward a Dynamic Model" *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, 1970, pp. 337-363.

in their analyses. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, developed fifteen indices of sociopolitical development and applied these to explain the dynamics of the developed democracies in West Europe and North America, and unstable democracies and authoritarian regimes in non-Western part of the world. According to Lipset, "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."³ Özbudun concludes in this regard that "... none of the three breakdowns of democracy in Turkey seem to be the inevitable outcome of deep-seated structural or sociological causes. In all cases the behavior of the leaders of political parties looms large as a factor leading to the breakdown" (p. 43).

The third chapter tackles the politics of constitution making in Turkey. As a Professor of Constitution, Özbudun deals thoroughly with the politics of the constitution making in 1924, 1961, 1982; 1971 and 1973 constitutional revisions and post-1983 constitutional amendments, comparing them with the politics of constitution making in France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. The author, in light of this comparative outlook, reaches a conclusion that "... none of the three republican constitutions was made by a broadly representative Constituent Assembly through a process of negotiations, bargaining, and compromise. In all three cases, as well as in the extensive constitutional revisions in 1971 and 1973, the influence of state elites was predominant in constitutional making, and the role of civil society institutions was correspondingly negligible. Therefore, all three constitutions had weak political legitimacy, and judged by the frequency of military intervention in politics, none produced a fully consolidated democratic regime" (pp. 68-69). Özbudun's conclusion is very important to understand the reasons why democracy in Turkey has not been consolidated yet in spite of its relatively long history.

The author analyzes the institutional aspect of the Turkish politics in the fourth chapter, which, is well written and has insightful analyses. According to Özbudun, the basic characteristics (or maladies) of the party system and parties in Turkey have been volatility, fragmentation and ideological polarization since 1970s, which have damaged to Turkish democracy heavily. Özbudun believes

³Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man. The Social Basis of Politics*, (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 31

that increasing weakening of “moderate center-right and center-left tendencies” is another worrisome change in the current party system (p. 78), along with the “organizational weakening of parties and of party identification ties” (p. 79). It can be extracted from the book that the real cause behind the maladies of the party system and parties in Turkey is the military interventions, which destroyed the traditions of parties and party system in Turkey. The author also examines organizational characteristics of Turkish political parties, and concludes “most Turkish parties combine some characteristics of cadre and catchall parties, with some elements of cartel parties” (p. 86). Özbudun particularly focuses on the rise of the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*), which represented political Islam in Turkey.

Military, which has been very influential on politics in Turkey, is dealt with in the fifth chapter. This chapter is, again, full of new and original comparative analyses with respect of civil-military relations in Turkey. The author refers to the analytical tools, including “exit guarantees” and “reserved domains” to explain the Turkish case in comparative perspective. He also describes the comments of the students of Turkish politics that civil-military relations in Turkey came close to the liberal democratic model as “prematurely optimistic” and argues that “the military’s behavior during the 1997 crisis suggests that it still sees itself in a guardianship role against threats to its deeply felt values, such as the indivisibility of the state and its secular character” (p. 120). Özbudun reaches the conclusion that if the indivisible integrity and secular character of the state are challenged, another military intervention in Turkey would be likely. The last chapter of the book is about the nature of state-civil society relations in Turkey and “new challenges” to consolidation of Turkish democracy. This chapter, in fact, provides a historical background that is absent in the other parts of the book. A study on Turkish politics would not be explanatory enough without taking into account of the historical aspect of the state-society relations in Turkey. Four basic characters of this relation, which are not mutually exclusive, can be noticed: the strong state tradition, weak civil society, corporatist political culture and center-periphery relations.⁴ The author employs these historical factors

⁴Metin Hepar, “The ‘Strong State’ and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective,” S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *Democracy and Modernity*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), pp. 142-163.

to explain the socio-cultural and economic aspects of the state-society relations. He aptly concludes that the strong state tradition and corporatist political culture have historically dominated the Turkish society and thus even the big business circles have not been able to escape this tradition. He also asserts that "the growing power of civil society was best manifested in the role civil society organizations played in the so-called 28 February process", referring to the support of the presidents of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türk-İş*) and the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (*DİSK*), the Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime Trade and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (*TOBB*), and the Turkish Confederation of Small Traders and Artisans (*TESK*) to the National Security Council resolution in February 28th, 1997. However, this comment has one serious shortcoming: Can all these organizations be considered within the sphere of "civil society" and are they really "civil"? It can be argued that all these organizations are not in fact "civil" *per se* in the sense that they do not have freedom of maneuver *vis à vis* the state. They all have strong and organic relations with the state. Moreover, with their oligarchic nature, they do not represent their real grassroots.

Özbudun's book provides valuable insights into the basic problems of democracy and democratization in Turkey. Particularly, his application of O'Donnell's "delegative democracy"⁵ to Turkey seems fruitful in explaining to some extent, why democracy in Turkey has not been consolidated. However, it seems that the author could have discussed the Kurdish problem of Turkey and the political Islam in a more comprehensive manner. And since the book was written prior the election held on April 18, 1999, the author did not find a chance to discuss post-election developments. Nevertheless, this book is particularly to the libraries of the students of comparative democratization, Middle East in general and Turkish Politics in particular.

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⁵Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.5, No.1, 1994, pp. 59-60.

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Turkey's Transformation and American Politics, edited by Morton Abramowitz, New York: Century Foundation Press, 2001, 298pp.

Morton Abramowitz, the editor of the *Turkey's Transformation and American Politics*, has been the American ambassador to Turkey 1989-91 and assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research 1985-89. The book starts with his article that explains the aims of the book while presenting an overview of the Turkish contemporary history and development of the internal actors within the Turkish political and economic arena with respect to its relations with the US and the EU by the help of writers' comments that contributed to the book.

According to Abramowitz, the year 1999 is a corner stone for Turkey in determining several blueprints such as, the approval of the EU candidate status in the Helsinki Summit, the capture of the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan, the visit of Clinton to Turkey in the aftermath of the disastrous earthquake. The book tries to cover several issues that they believe are of high importance in regard to Turkey's relations with the Western world.

The book could be separated into two parts. The first three articles following Abramowitz's introductory article deal with internal factors such as political structure of Turkey by Health W. Lowry, the Kurdish problem by Philip Robins and the economic problems within the context of structural adjustment programs by Ziya Öniş. The next four articles focus rather on Turkish-American relations. While Cengiz Çandar presents an overview of how Turkish elite and military see the US and motives of anti-americanism, Morton Abramowitz deals with the hurdles that face American policy makers vis-a-vis Turkey. M. James Wilkinson's article is about the relations between Turkey and Greece and therefore Cyprus and the role of the US in this context that prevents worse case scenarios. Alan Makovsky contributes a more general picture of Turkish-American relations while taking into consideration Turkey's relations with her neighbourhood (Israel, Iran, Iraq).

Speaking generally, writers of this book seem to converge on several points. Most of them underlines the need for further reform in the Turkish politics and economics. According to contributors, Turkey has to solve problems such as the Kurdish one, ensuring political stability, controlling chronic inflation, dealing with the political Islam etc. However, Abramowitz says that the US' attitude in this respect is rather indistinct while the EU is more determined to push Turkey in ameliorating these deficiencies. For instance, according to Abramowitz, the US supports Turkey's efforts to join the EU that is stricter concerning Turkey meeting the human rights criteria. The author also says that the Greeks and the Armenians have been lobbying against Turkey while the Jewish lobbies, defense industry and oil companies have been supporting her. This is one of the reasons why American foreign policies towards Turkey consist of zigzags. Otherwise, the biggest and only rupture in relations between two countries happened to be in the aftermath of Johnson's letter in 1964 and American embargo when Turkey intervened Cyprus in 1974. Indeed, Turkish-American relations are more complex in the era of post-cold war, for in addition to the factors like the position of NATO in their relations, Turkey's approval of the use of American bases in Turkish territories remained the same; there are additional factors that need to be taken into consideration such as the growing interest of both countries in the Central Asian region and Caucasus and the issue of Kurds in Iraq. For instance, Makovsky (he shares the ideas of the American government) says that the crucial issue is Iraq for Turkish politicians do not like the idea of American approach to the issue. But Abramowitz says that Iran, Iraq and Syria are not fond of Turkey, thus Turkey's suspicious approach is understandable.

Ziya Öniş discusses the liberal economic reforms undertaken by Özal in the 1980's that have increased exports, decreased inflation and led to economic growth. They were accompanied by inadequate amounts of privatisation, limited investment and the continuation of income inequality among classes and regions. The 1994 crisis emanated from fiscal disequilibrium caused by increased public spending and decreased public investment that's how, Turkey's credit rating fell. However, this crisis was overcome at the expense of cutting wages of the lower classes.

According to Cengiz Çandar, Johnson's letter has never been forgotten therefore, created a kind of paranoia in Turkish minds that is still relevant. Another contributor, Robins argues that Turkish people have a complex in addition to the paranoia. "Sevre complex" is argued to be the part of this paranoia that induces Turkish elite see in very issue a similar antagonist approach to the period of Turkish fight against European troops that invaded the territories in 1920s. While Abramowitz argues that the majority of Turkish people are against joining the EU which doesn't seem to be a convincing datum for according to the statistics, the majority in Turkey wants to be considered as European.

Concerning the specific issues, some of the authors give prescriptions in their articles. Among the ones that drive one's attention are Robins' that claims that Kurdish problem should be overcome by the help of Öcalan that –naturally- changed of rhetoric when he was captured. In order to achieve a sustainable reform, Abramowitz says that Turkish administrative elite within the administration, politics and the military should commit itself to it. In other words, he believes that reforms could be sustained by an intervention from the top. That makes one wonder about the position of the civil society. According to Lowry, civil society remains to be silent and groups that raise their voice harmonize themselves with the army's opinion. Concerning the fundamentalist threat, although he agrees that the threat is serious, he claims that radical secularism can foment radical Islamism. He also claims that the answer is to secure the continuity of the effects of Turgut Özal (he argues that he is misunderstood in Turkey) in the mentality of the society. Cengiz Çandar says that Özal is the most attractive example of pro-American Turkish leader. He also disagrees with Robins and says that Sevre sendrom is not an inferiority complex for Turkey has never been a colony like Mexico. Although he doesn't reject the idea of Turkish elite being suspicious vis-a-vis the US, most of the time after the 1990's the US has been the most reliable ally of Turkey.

In sum, although there are some exceptions on specific issues, most of the contributors agree that Turkey has a way to go concerning the reform process that started with Özal. However, most of them

argue that Turkey could not follow the example of Özal the way it should have been according to them.

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Olson, Robert, **Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, 1991-2000: The Kurdish and Islamist Questions**, California, Mazda Publishers, 2001. 204pp.

Robert Olson, in his recent book *Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, 1991-2000*, analyzes Turkey's relations with these four states in the last decade with a special reference to the Kurdish and Islamist questions. The first point, which attracts the attention of the reader, is that the content of the book seems to have been designed according to the availability of research on the issue rather than the necessity. This impression is further strengthened by the fact that the chapter two and chapter six have already been published as articles in academic journals¹. Even if we suppose for a moment that the content is arranged intentionally in this way, then such a broad scope of bilateral relations of countries would surely render a more systematic organization and in-depth analysis of topics for better understanding of the readers. Moreover, the allocation of the chapters according to the number of the countries and issues is asymmetrical as the first three chapters were allocated for Turco-Iranian relations from 1979 until 2000, whereas Turco-Syrian, Turco-Israeli and Turco-

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¹“Turkey-Iran Relations, 1997 to 2000: the Kurdish and Islamist Questions”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2000 and “Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies, 1991-1997: The Kurdish and Chechnya Questions”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1998.

Russian relationships occupy one chapter each. Similarly, he devotes the first three chapters for Islamist and the Kurdish questions in Turco-Iranian relations, while deals only with the Kurdish issue in chapters four, five and six in Turco-Syrian, Turco-Israeli and Turkish-Russian relations respectively; No mention of Islam in these chapters as it does not play a role in Turkey's relations with these countries. Finally, it is difficult to understand why the author left Iraq out of a book that he discusses the effects of the "Kurdish Question" on Turkey's relations with its neighbors. Even though the title defines the time frame for the book from 1991 to 2000, Olson prefers to analyze the bilateral relations at certain periods –such as Turco-Syrian relations between 1997-2000 and Turco-Israeli relations between 1995-2000.

In addition to organizational problems, one of the main problems of the book is its lack of background information on the topics it aims to analyze. Olson's numerous books and studies can be considered, in a way, as sequels of each other. Thus, Olson may have already written about the background of events on the related topics in his previous books or articles and, consequently, may have not considered as important to repeat those facts in his latest book over again. But his analysis on particular events in this book without providing the background information is misleading and confusing for the occasional reader or a newcomer.

Olson's main argument is that Turkey, Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia made reasonable tradeoffs with regard to the roles played by the Kurdish and Islamist questions in their relations. He believes that Turkey emerged stronger in its tradeoffs vis-à-vis Iran and Syria, obtained a balance to its advantage in its relations with Israel and broke even in its relations with Russia (p. 204). It must be emphasized that while it is correct to say that Turkey emerged stronger in its tradeoffs vis-à-vis Iran and Syria, its relations with Israel exceed far more than obtaining a balance to its advantage. As for Russia, due to its structural changes from being a global to a regional power, it is possible to say that its interests did not permit its leaders to allow the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan to stay in the country at the expense of better relations with Turkey. Correct this analysis may have been, the organizational weaknesses of the book emerges again and again as the reader passes from one chapter to another. While Turkey's relations with Iran may have been colored both the "Kurdish and Islamist

Questions,” fitting to the sub-title of the book, Islam has not played the role that it played in Turco-Iranian relations, in Turkey’s relations with Syria, Israel and Russia, while it would be a great exaggeration to argue that the Kurdish issue played a major role in the development of the Turco-Israeli alliance (see below).

Coming to the individual chapters, in chapter two, Olson points out the importance of Islamic and the Kurdish cards in Iran’s hand against Turkey and provides information about the recent developments such as “Kavakçı Scandal” in Turkey and how, from time to time, both cards have been played at the same time by the Iranian government (pp. 51-52). While explaining the use of the PKK by Iran, Olson argues that despite the significance of the Kurdish question, it did not dominate the larger geopolitical and geostrategic interests of either Iran or Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s (p. 91). He argues that neither country wanted the PKK issue to dominate their wider foreign and domestic agendas and neither of them wanted it to result in armed conflict. Despite its extreme importance for Turkey in terms of its geopolitical and geostrategic interests and even though both Syria and Iran went on supporting the PKK starting from the early 1980s, they played the card very carefully against Turkey. When the tension increased, both kept a low profile for a while, but as soon as the crisis calmed down they continued to cooperate with the PKK in full steam. It is true that although Turkey never declared a war against these countries, yet when it was necessary, nothing prevented Turkey from using its armed forces. In addition to almost regular incursions into northern Iraq, it is known that, the Turkish security forces in June 1996 had operations within the Iranian soil, and opened gunfire to the areas that were suspected as the PKK enclaves.

Another point that needs to be discussed is the Turkish-Israeli cooperation. As Olson discusses the implications of the alliance between Turkey and Israel and the Jewish Americans since 1995, he points out the timing of the declaration of the Turco-Israeli alliance, which was almost at the same period with the peak of the PKK’s operations in Hatay. However, in his analysis Olson, considers Hatay as a city rather than a territory and this leads him to paint an

incomplete picture. According to the Turkish (and Kurdish) sources,² the PKK has been operating in that territory including the city of Hatay, since 1983, which had been the most suitable gate for the PKK to enter from Syria to Turkey. As a matter of fact, the territory, including Hatay, is described as “southwestern province” (it includes other cities of the west of the Euphrates river, such as Gaziantep, Maraş and Adıyaman) by the PKK in their documents. In the Turkish press, the news concerning the PKK activities in the region has been published starting from early 1980s. Olson also emphasizes the declaration of the Turco-Israeli alliance as a result of the PKK activities in Hatay and the possibility that the PKK would spread its influence along Turkey’s Mediterranean coastline, in the cities teeming with Kurdish refugees fleeing the “ethnic cleansing practices” of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in the southeast and east of the country in 1996 (p. xviii and 202). Apart from the fact that the author does not provide any example or evidence to substantiate his accusations on the so called “ethnic cleansing practices” of the TAF, the lack of background information on this particular incident is rather confusing for the reader. It is known that Israel and Turkey came together to discuss and to cooperate on the terrorism issue back in 1993 and both Syria and the PKK were well aware of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin’s reason of visiting Israel. When Çetin visited Israel, Syria increased its support of the PKK and let the PKK open the Party Training Center in Syria in October 1993, where 1000 militants were trained until 1994.³

While it is correct that the PKK played a significant role in the development of Turkish-Israeli alliance, there were other reasons that contributed the formation of the alliance. In the mid-1990s, Turkey was not able to receive much support as it expected from Europe coupled with its rejection of the EU candidacy status in Luxembourg Summit in 1997, Greek and Armenian lobbies in the States and deficits

²Abdullah Öcalan, *Parti Önderliğinin Ocak Çözümlemeleri* (The Analysis of the Party Leadership in January), 15-31 January 1989, p. 331; *The Province Report Submitted to the 5th Congress*, Damascus, Vol. 2, 1995; Starting from the early 1980s, the news about the killings of the PKK terrorists in the province appeared in the newspapers. For example, there was news published in *Cumhuriyet* (daily) on 13 October 1984 on the killings of two terrorists in Adıyaman.

³*The Province Report Submitted to the 5th Congress*, Damascus, Vol. 2, 1995, p. 805.

of Turkish lobby forced Turkey to seek a new regional partner, as well as a new weapons' supplier. The Turkish generals especially thought that their pursuit of security and defense cooperation with Israel could offer them new and sophisticated weapons systems as well as a powerful voice in Washington. In its troubled weapons and procurement program with the US mainly due to the human rights issue, Israeli military technology was one of the best resources for the growing Turkish military needs. Consequently, Jerusalem and Ankara have signed several contracts that could transform Israel into a major supplier of arms and technology for Turkey. Also as Olson emphasizes, to gain the support of the Jewish lobby in the United States was very important for Turkey. In addition, the trade prospects between two countries have been promising.

According to Olson, the Kurdish problem in Turkey and Russia's war against Chechnya in the 1990s and extending into 2000 were linked more closely (especially from 1991 to 1996) than is generally realized and acknowledged. It is true that Turkey's preoccupation with its war against the PKK weakened Turkey's foreign policy leverage with Russia, especially with regard to its war against Chechnya. Russia, in turn, has used the Kurdish card to reduce substantially Turkey's ability to influence developments in Chechnya (p. 166). Olson is also correct in underlining the fact that the Kurdish and the Chechen cards were played reciprocally by both countries to prevent the other from meddling its "domestic" problems. Yet again, to remind that Russia's support for the PKK did not start with the Chechen question would make the issue clearer for the readers. According to Celal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which is one of the two most important Kurdish parties in the northern Iraq,⁴ the relation between Russia and the PKK started in 1979 with Primakov's help to Öcalan in the organization of his travel to Syria. During that period, Primakov was so called "the representative of Pravda in the Middle East", indeed a covert official of KGB in the region. Thus, years later in 1998, Öcalan, when he was forced to leave Syria under Turkish pressure, went straight to Russia relying on his friendship with Primakov.

⁴The interview of *Al-Wasat* (No. 355, 356 and 357) with Celal Talabani, reprinted in Turkish in the journal *Serbesti*, February 1999, p. 54-74.

Another point of note is the sources that Olson utilized in his book. As a Turkish speaker, Olson used the news that was published in the Turkish press in his research and heavily depended on them. However, he did not present an objective view by presenting more than one comment on the same news from different sources. Thus even though it is very useful for the reader to be able to follow the news from the related country's press, at the same time, it limits the analysis since only one or two sources -most of the time same newspapers and commentators- are provided in that language. It also leads the author to analyze the situation through the glasses of few journalists rather than the facts themselves.

Olson's book in general is valuable for the informed reader since it tries to connect the significance of the Kurdish and Islamist questions to diverse aspects of Turkey's relations, not just with Iran, Iraq or Syria but also with Russia and Israel. It also provides a good chronological order of incidents; establishes links between the domestic events and foreign affairs; questions the effects of the domestic policy on the foreign policy and vice versa. Yet, the book lacks a general framework as it tries to connect five countries through two unrelated issues without much analysis and leaves a less than satisfactory after taste. Thus, it is not a good point to start reading about neither Turkish foreign policy nor the impact of Kurdish and Islamist questions on it. But it would be a valuable source for the experts and the students who already have some knowledge on the subject.

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Türkkaya Ataöv, **Discrimination and Conflict**, The Netherlands, Sota, 2000, 161 pp.

The end of the Cold War, also marked the return of intra-state conflicts often dubbed as ethnic ones. While dealing with the increasing number of conflicts many scholars reached to the conclusion that ethnicity and nationality had emerged as the most potent forces in the global era that cause instability and conflict all over the world. The post-Wall world picture was quite different from the previous one that many different interpretations emerged. *Discrimination and Conflict* puts its emphasis upon 'discrimination' within societies and shows it as one of the main reasons behind conflicts all over the globe.

The emergence of the nation-states and the nation-state system in the 16th century also points to the emergence of minorities. As the ethnic, national and territorial boundaries do not necessarily overlap, there emerged many minorities and thus majorities within the nation-states. Indeed there are very few countries, which do not have any minorities that are: Iceland, Malta in Europe and the Cook Islands, the Pitcairn Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu in Ocenia (p. 156). If there are two different groups in a society, there can emerge many consequences from the interaction of different religious, ethnic, national and racial groups. Such interactions may last with processes of integration, assimilation, discrimination or conflict. Even within the countries that are ethnically homogenous the potential of discrimination and conflict is always there, since homogeneity does not mean uniformity. In other words the dichotomy of identity and difference is always there where there are at least two people.

Conflicts can be rooted in many facts and conditions. One and the most important of those reasons is the discrimination that takes place within a society or a state. The author defines discrimination as 'the denial to some members of a state or society certain rights and/or privileges which other members enjoy' (p. 1) and presents it as the source of national and/or international conflict in many cases. As the late twentieth century has witnesses internal conflicts in many cases can become international since they carry the potential of spill over. The targets of discrimination may be the co-ethnics of neighbouring states, some others may want to intervene because of humanitarian

reasons or to gain or enhance power. Thus internal problems, as in the example of Bangladesh in 1971, may often lead to international crises. In this respect the book aims to analyse discrimination in many aspects both practically and theoretically.

Regarding the role of international organizations in the international arena, the first chapter is concentrated on the United Nations and measures taken by its branches. Deep information is given in terms of international treaties and regulations. Thus the insufficiency of the regulations in international law is exposed. International law, regarding the minority issues, genocide, ethnic cleansing, in other words regarding the spectrum of discrimination and problems rooted in it, fails to produce solutions. The genocide in Rwanda is the most important example of this, where an ethnic group was entirely killed, in front of the eyes of the world.

In the second chapter, minority populations, especially the indigenous people are handled since at the collective level discrimination is mostly targeted against them. The development of human rights and minority rights as well as the established protection systems are followed by regional analyses where the author handles the problems of each region of the world regarding the problems of discrimination and conflict.

In the following chapters the book provides analyses of seven regions that are North America; Central and South America and the Caribbean; Western Europe; Eastern Europe and the Balkans; Russia, Ukraine and Belarus; Caucasia and Central Asia; the Middle East; South Asia; South East Asia; the Pacific Rim and Africa. In each of these regions and countries within them, the official measures that were taken in order to prevent discrimination are explained as well as being criticized.

Other than the regional analysis the book handles the situation of women and refugees and migrant workers in special chapters since they constitute special cases themselves. This is due to their being targets of discrimination wherever they live, whatever they believe, what nationality they have and what colour their skin is.

The book seems to handle almost all issues concerning discrimination all over the world in general. It does not deal with any case specifically but rather it gives brief, general but wide information about the cases from all over the world. In other words its spectrum is wide but the analyses are not deep. For the experts of the issues regarding discrimination and conflict, the book can be regarded as superficial, less analytical than many others and descriptive. Regarding the wideness of the spectrum that the book deals with, it can be regarded as short as well. However regarding the wideness of the issues, it can also be assessed as limited in a logical and useful way.

In this respect it is a handbook, a guideline, a perfect start to deal with the issues of discrimination and conflict. It is highly recommendable for those who are interested in peace and conflict studies and do not know where to start.

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