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**INVOLVEMENT OF NON-EU
EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS IN
COMMON SECURITY AND
DEFENSE POLICY: THE
TURKISH CASE**

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**Involvement of Non-EU European NATO Members in Common
Security and Defense Policy: The Turkish Case**

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CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	VI
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	VII
INTRODUCTION.....	1

FIRST CHAPTER THEORETICAL APPROACHES

1.1. Constructivist Approach as Explanatory Framework.....	25
1.2. Complementary Approaches.....	35
1.2.1. Realism.....	35
1.2.2. Institutionalism.....	41

SECOND CHAPTER EXPLAINING THE PRINCIPLES OF INVOLVEMENT OF NON-EU EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS IN CSDP ACTIVITIES

2.1. Development of CSDP and NATO-EU Relations.....	45
2.1.1. From ESDI to CSDP.....	45
2.1.2. The Context of NATO-EU Cooperation.....	59
2.2. The Principles of the Involvement Issue.....	72
2.2.1. The Way to Determine the Principles of Involving Non-EU European NATO Members in CSDP.....	72
2.2.2. The Nice Implementation Document: Setting the Main Principles of Non-EU NATO Members Involvement.....	75
2.3. Difficulties Regarding Non-EU European NATO Members' Involvement in the CSDP Activities.....	79
2.4. Indicative Examples on the Existing Difficulties of Non-EU European NATO Members' Involvement.....	83

THIRD CHAPTER
FACTORS SHAPING TURKEY’S SECURITY POLICIES

3.1. General Parameters of Turkish Security Perceptions	85
3.2. Turkey’s Geographical Location as One of the Determiner of Its Security Perceptions.....	92
3.3. Westernization of Turkish Security Discourse	99
3.4. Turkey’s Position in NATO	107
3.4.1. Turkey’s Contributions to NATO	108
3.4.2. Turkey’s Position During the Preparations of NATO’s New Strategic Concept	115

FOURTH CHAPTER
ANALYZING TURKEY’S EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE CSDP

4.1. The Core of the Problem	119
4.2. Turkey and the Western European Union	126
4.2.1. The Role Assumed by the WEU in the European Security Architecture	127
4.2.2. Turkey’s Rights Stemming From its Associate Membership Status in the WEU	134
4.2.3. Was Turkey Satisfied With its Associate Membership Status in the WEU?	138
4.3. Comparing Turkey’s and the European Union’s Security Policies	142
4.4. Analyzing the Involvement of Non-EU NATO Members in CSDP Through Turkish Experience.....	145
4.4.1. Different Interpretations of the NATO’s Washington Summit Communiqué.....	145
4.4.2. Influences on the Operational Side	147
4.4.3. Turkey’s Exclusion From European Defence Industry Cooperation Projects	151
4.4.4. Why Can Turkey Not Conclude a Security Agreement With the EU?	155

4.5. NATO-EU Cooperation	157
4.5.1. NATO-EU Relations Within the NATO's New Strategic Concept....	157
4.5.2. The Cases Related With the NATO-EU Cooperation	161
4.5.2.1. NATO-EU Cooperation and the Cyprus Question	161
4.5.2.2. Reflections of the Different Working Cultures of the EU and NATO	167
4.5.2.3. Reading the Concept of NATO-EU Cooperation Differently	171
CONCLUSIONS	175
BIBLIOGRAHPY	181
APPENDICES	205
- Main Questions Asked at the Interviews	205
- List Of The Persons Interviewed	207

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries.....	112
Table 2. NATO Countries' Armed Forces - Annual Strength.....	114

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CESDP : Common European Security and Defense Policy
CJTF : Combined Joint Task Forces
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CONOPS: Concept of Operations
CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy
DSACEUR: Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe
EDA: European Defence Agency
ESDI: European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: European Union
EUMC: European Union Military Committee
HR: High Representative
IR: International Relations
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
MD: Mediterranean Dialogue
NAC: North Atlantic Council
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF: NATO Response Force
OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP: Partnership for Peace
PMF: Political-Military Framework
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC: Political and Security Committee
SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TGNA: Turkish Grand National Assembly
UN: United Nations
WEAG: Western European Armaments Group
WEAO: Western European Armaments Organization
WEU: Western European Union

INTRODUCTION*

The European Union (EU) has been building its security and defense policy since the 1990s. The evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)¹ process has affected the non-EU European NATO members' position in the European security architecture. The differences in the compositions of NATO and EU members have created undesired issues in terms of participation in the CSDP activities. As a staunch NATO member and an accession country to the EU, Turkey has also been affected by the developments in the CSDP. This dissertation takes Turkey as a case study in analyzing the state of affairs on the involvement of non-EU European NATO members in the CSDP.

NATO and the EU have 21 common members. Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Albania, Croatia² and the United States are members of NATO, but not of the EU. Among these, except for Canada and the United States, five countries are non-EU European NATO members and certain principles apply to their participation in the CSDP. The issue of involving those countries fully in CSDP has been on the agenda since the beginning of the process.

Case study Turkey's relations with the security institutions in Europe constitute an important aspect of its security policies and the balance created in terms of Turkey's participation in the

* Views expressed here represent the author's own opinions and assessments.

¹ With the entry into force of Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was renamed as Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In this dissertation we will refer to the term ESDP where necessary.

²Croatia is set to join the European Union on 1 July 2013.

European security architecture need to be tackled. Turkey, supporter of transatlantic relations, is convinced that the Europeans should play an increasing role in security and defense affairs. Turkey supported the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the EU and it has taken part in all of the Berlin Plus operations and all CSDP activities to which it has been invited. However, there are unfavorable circumstances on the way of elevating Turkey's participation in CSDP activities to a desired level.

Research Problem

The main question of this research is 'How does the restrictive approach of the EU effect the implementation of the principles of involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities?' The research studies Turkey's case in detail to answer this question. The research attempts to find concrete answers to this question through analyzing the policies and practices of Turkey and the EU from the outset of the process. The study asserts that a meaningful level of involvement in CSDP activities is essential for a non-EU European NATO member like Turkey. It is argued that the level of involvement of non-EU NATO members in CSDP activities affects the balance on which NATO-EU relations are established as well.

Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Albania and Croatia are non-EU European NATO members. The 'Annex II' of the Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions of 24-25 October 2002 under the title "ESDP: Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies" set the principles for involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities. This document, widely known as 'Nice Implementation Document' cleared the modalities for participation in EU-led operations through making a distinction between an *'EU-led operation using NATO assets and*

capabilities’ and ‘EU-led operations not requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities’ (para.11 and 12.)³

The modalities of NATO-EU cooperation were established in the year 2003 through a mutually agreed set of documents and they constitute the “agreed framework” of NATO-EU relations. This agreed framework for the ‘Strategic Partnership’ between NATO and EU was established with an exchange of letters and consist of the Berlin Plus agreement, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Decision of 13 December 2002 and the Nice Implementation Document.

Despite the delicate balance created through certain modalities between NATO and EU on the participation of non-EU European Allies in CSDP, the practices show that these modalities have not been fully implemented. Lack of consultations with both NATO and non-EU European NATO members prior to the launching of EULEX in Kosovo (January-February 2008), delays in the transmissions of operation plans of some operations such as EULEX, and lack of consultations with both NATO and non-EU European NATO members before the initiation of EUPOL in Afghanistan (June 2007) are among examples of the failure of abiding by the mentioned modalities.

Since the research problem will be dealt through analyzing Turkish case, naturally Turkey’s role in the European security architecture and Turkey’s arguments will be given due attention. The role of Turkey in European security is commonly associated with its NATO membership. Neither Turkey’s place in the CSDP, nor its role in the NATO-EU cooperation is clearly understood. Naturally, this approach has its ramifications in the relevant literature. This study follows a

³“ESDP: ‘Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies’.” The Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex II (October 24-25, 2002).

comprehensive approach by analyzing Turkey's security perceptions and where the European security institutions stand in this realm, its place in NATO and relations with the Western European Union (WEU).

Objective, Research Questions and Significance

This research seeks to answer the main question of 'How does the restrictive approach of the EU effect the implementation of the principles of involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities?' Throughout the way the EU has tend to limit the decision making process of CSDP to only its full members, while excluding all others despite their previous acquisitions in the European security architecture. The Nice Implementation Document constitutes the main criteria in analyzing the level of implementation of the principles on involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP.

The research studies Turkey's case in detail in order to answer the main question. The reason why compliance with the modalities of involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities is studied through analyzing Turkey's case could be summarized as follows: Turkey is a strong supporter and a leading contributor of the CSDP operations. Turkey has taken part in all of the Berlin Plus operations and all CSDP activities to which it has been invited. Turkey is the biggest non-EU contributor to the CSDP activities. Most of these activities occur in the vicinity of Turkey. However, the evolution of CSDP process has adversely affected Turkey's position in the European security architecture and led its exclusion from the decision making process. In this vein, the arguments of Turkey regarding the involvement in CSDP activities raise attention and the reasons behind these arguments are worth elaborating. The study concentrates on the period between early 1990s and up to today.

The objective of this study is to reveal that a meaningful level of involvement in CSDP activities is essential for a non-EU European NATO member such as Turkey, particularly given its substantial contributions to CSDP activities, as well as the fact that many CSDP activities have been undertaken in geographic proximity to Turkey. The research also argues that the EU's restrictive approach to involvement of non-EU NATO members in CSDP activities disturbs the balance on which NATO-EU relations are established. The main question is closely linked with NATO-EU cooperation because EU's stance over the involvement of non-EU NATO members bears direct results over this cooperation. To this end, particular attention is given to this cooperation. The EU's desire to use NATO assets and capabilities for its operations within the framework of the CSDP has affected the relations from the beginning. CSDP has become a common concern of both NATO and the EU. During the process of institutionalizing NATO-EU cooperation, Turkish policies came to the forefront. This study also attempts to refute the misleading claim that Turkey is blocking the NATO-EU cooperation as put forward by some circles.

Constructivism is chosen as the main explanatory theory. Theoretically, the objective of the study is to assess the validity of constructivist insights on this particular topic. We attempt to analyze whether Realism and Old Institutionalism could also be useful complementary tools to explain the questions that Constructivism can not answer duly. We will follow a 'sequencing' approach between Constructivism, Realism and Institutionalism.

This study is based on the research questions as follows:

RQ1: How does the restrictive approach of the EU effect the implementation of the principles of involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities?

RQ2: How does the level of involvement in CSDP activities effect Turkey's policies in contributing to CSDP?

RQ3: Does EU's approach to involvement of non-EU NATO members bear any effect in NATO-EU relations?

Turkey's position in the European security architecture has attracted scholars' attention. There are studies in the literature elaborating on the question of Turkey's position and its possible contributions to European security architecture. They try to answer the question of 'Would Turkey be an asset or a liability for the EU in terms of security after its full participation in the European Union?' Most of these studies conclude that Turkey will be an asset for the EU after its participation in the Union. However, this research discusses whether Turkey could already be an asset in terms of CSDP, if the principles of involving non-EU NATO members in CSDP activities were applied fully. The concentration of the academic works is mostly on the 'potential contributions of Turkey in CSDP' and 'ideal solutions' to this end. This research asserts that there is ample room for further development of already existing mechanisms, but even the implementation of existing structures could be a valuable contribution. There are academic works concentrating on EU's approach to the involvement issue, but most of these are outdated and they do not fully appreciate the relevance of NATO and the Western European Union. This study is a modest attempt in adding to the existing literature in this sense.

This analysis is significant for several reasons. Firstly, existing shortcomings on the involvement of non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities and the ways of developing NATO-EU cooperation should be dealt with urgently. The security realities of our day require maximizing collective efforts to this end. Concrete proposals in this field are required. Secondly, Turkey has come to the center stage due to current global challenges and Turkish policies have been the focus of

attention. This country's security and foreign policy preferences are worth dwelling on, as the security challenges around Turkey are of global nature. In this vein, updated scholarly works are needed as well. The role of Turkey in European security is usually connected with the country's NATO membership. However, academic works about Turkey's place in the EU's CSDP and its role in the NATO-EU cooperation are rather limited.

Literature Overview

This research concentrates on case study Turkey's position in CSDP and NATO-EU cooperation. These two concepts are both dynamic and require analysis of current events, decisions and official texts together with a careful look at history and official documents. The EU and NATO together have developed an 'acquis' in this specific field. Without having sufficient knowledge about this 'acquis' it is not possible to understand this complex picture clearly. The official EU and NATO documents are the primary resources of this research.

Literature about Turkey's position in the CSDP and NATO-EU cooperation is not rich enough and most of the comprehensive studies were concluded in late 1990s and early 2000s. Consequently, they are outdated. They mainly focus on EU-Turkey relations and the historical evolution of the process. However, this study follows a comprehensive approach by analyzing Turkey's security perceptions, its place in NATO and relations with the WEU. The originality of this work also comes from its actuality. It covers the most updated debates and situations while taking into account of the 'principles of involvement issue'.

While analyzing Turkey's position, we have noticed that the academic works of Turkish officials contribute significantly to the debate. Mainly the works of Turkish diplomats who have served in security related departments and relevant diplomatic

missions of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs use a clear definition of the problem by touching on the important aspects of the issue. Those who have worked on the topic and have attended the meetings of NATO and the EU can have remarkable contributions to the literature in this sense. Ambassador Turan Morali's article '*Turkey's Security Perspectives and Perceptions*'⁴, Ambassador Ugur Ziyal's article "*Re-conceptualization of Soft Security and Turkey's Civilian Contributions to International Security*"⁵, Ambassador Omur Orhun's article "*European Security and Defence Identity-European Security and Defence Policy: A Turkish Perspective*"⁶, career diplomat Esra Dogan's work '*Turkey in the New European Security Architecture*'⁷, former career diplomat Can Buharali's work, '*Is Turkey Still an Asset for European Security?*'⁸ and career diplomat Ihsan Kiziltan's article '*Improving The NATO-EU Partnership :A Turkish Perspective*'⁹ are few examples of the contributions of Turkish diplomats to the literature. The main views expressed in these academic works and their contributions to the debate are covered in the relevant sections of this research. However here we would like to especially mention the work of Turkish

⁴ Turan Morali, "Turkey's Security Perspectives and Perceptions," **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, Vol.1, No:4, Winter 2002, p.1-12.

⁵ Ugur Ziyal, "Re-conceptualization of Soft Security and Turkey's Civilian Contributions to International Security", **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, 2004, 3(2), p. 31-40.

⁶ Omur Orhun, "European Security and Defence Identity-European Security and Defence Policy: A Turkish Perspective," **Perceptions** V (September-November 2000).

⁷ Esra Dogan, "Turkey in the New European Security Architecture," **Perceptions**, Volume VII, March-May 2003.

⁸ Can Buharali, "Is Turkey Still an Asset for European Security?" C. Arvanitopoulos, ed., **Turkey's Accession to the European Union**, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.

⁹ Ihsan Kiziltan, "Improving The NATO-EU Partnership: A Turkish Perspective," **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, Vol 7, No:3, 2008, pp 33-46.

Diplomat Ihsan Kiziltan titled '*Improving The NATO-EU Partnership: A Turkish Perspective*'. Kiziltan's work dated 2008 is one of the most updated and detailed analysis of Turkey's role in CSDP and NATO-EU cooperation. Kiziltan argues that the details of NATO-EU relations are dismissed by some as "theology" and the issue is too quickly reduced to the misleading shorthand description that Turkey is simply "blocking" cooperation between the two organizations. He defends the mismatch between the compositions of these two organizations and the question of how to involve non-EU NATO Members in ESDP has affected relations from the start.

Turkish scholar Ramazan Gozen's work "*Turkish Delicate Position Between NATO and the ESDP*"¹⁰ is also a significant contribution to the literature that examines Turkey's 'delicate position' between NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy. Gozen argues that ESDP created such institutional and operational mechanisms that non-EU European NATO members were 'marginalised' and Turkey is the most negatively affected country in this sense. Gozen tries to find a solution to bring an end Turkey's delicate position between NATO and the ESDP and he comes up with possible options. As also argued by Gozen, Turkey is not the only country whose relations with the EU have been influenced by the emergence of ESDP.

Meltem Muftuler Bac's work '*Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies*'¹¹ is also worth noting in this respect. She estimates the potential benefits of Turkey's inclusion into the EU's security policies and she argues that the costs entailed by its exclusion essentially shape the EU's

¹⁰ Ramazan Gozen, **Turkish Delicate Position Between NATO and the ESDP**, Center for Strategic Research Papers, March 2003, Ankara.

¹¹ Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies," **Security Dialogue**, Vol.31, No:4, December 2000.

policies towards Turkey. According to Muftuler-Bac, Turkey's membership in NATO, its military capabilities, and its geostrategic position make Turkey an indispensable actor in the European security system in the post cold war era. While sharing Muftuler Bac's arguments in this regard, we think that Turkish contributions to CSDP could definitely be counted as another factor.

In our analysis Turkey's acquisitions as a WEU associate member have been given special attention, since most of Turkey's arguments within CSDP framework make frequent references to its status in WEU. Despite the importance of the subject, we found the literature in this field rather limited. The scholars date back to Turkey's acquisitions from WEU in relation to Turkish position vis-à-vis CSDP and it is mainly considered that Turkey had a satisfactory position in WEU structure. However this position was not satisfactory for Turkey due to the absence of legal arrangements. Antonio Missiroli also pointed out this fact in his article '*EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP*'.¹² Missiroli argued that those arrangements were not Treaty-based and were mostly limited to the operational components of WEU activities. Turkish scholar Munevver Cebeci's work '*A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision Making for EU led Petersberg Operations, with Special Reference to Turkey*'¹³ is also of importance. This study is one of the most comprehensive and detailed studies in this field. Cebeci

¹² Antonio Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP," **Security Dialogue**, SAGE Publications, March 2002, Vol. 33(1): p.12.

¹³ Münevver Cebeci, "A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision Making for EU led Petersberg Operations, with Special Reference to Turkey," **Occasional Papers 10**, Western European Union, Brussels, November 1999.

analyses WEU's Associate Membership status while addressing, in particular, the issue of participation of WEU Associate Members in the EU decision-making process for Petersberg operations.

In the literature there also exist one-sided interpretations of Turkey's place in the European security architecture and we deem it necessary to cover a few of them here. We could start with Daniel Keohane's well structured and informing article '*ESDP and NATO*'. While tackling the 'Berlin Plus' debate Keohane mentions that '*Turkey wished to have the right to block autonomous EU operations in an area of strategic importance to Turkey*'¹⁴ In fact, labeling Turkey as a country that is wishing to have the right to block these arrangements in general is a common misunderstanding. Valasek and Korski also provided in their article '*Closer NATO-EU Ties: Ideas for the Strategic Concept*' practical suggestions to develop the NATO-EU relations further. They argue that the development of these relations "*may only be relevant when a lasting thaw in Greek-Turkish-Cypriot relations occurs*" and they emphasized the affect of the so-called "*Turkish-Greek*" impasse between the two blocs¹⁵. Thomas Bauer, in his article '*NATO is dead – Long live NATO!*' regarding the fate of *NATO* discusses that "*Turkey is blocking any NATO-EU cooperation under the Berlin plus arrangements, and its dissatisfaction with the accession-process to the European Union also causes damage to NATO. Providing Turkey with an option for closer cooperation with the EU below the level of full membership could help end Ankara's*

¹⁴ Daniel Keohane, *ESDP and NATO, European Security and Defence Policy, The First 10 years (1999-2009)*, Ed. G. Grevi, D. Helly, D. Keohane, Institute for Security Studies, 2009, pp.127-138, p.129.

¹⁵ Tomas Valasek & Daniel Korski, "Closer NATO-EU Ties: Ideas for the Strategic Concept," http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/nato/Closer_NATO-EU_Ties_Valasek_Korski.pdf, accessed on 10 April 2010.

blockade against NATO-EU cooperation, and create a more credible and strategic partner for both NATO and the EU in the Black Sea region."¹⁶

During our research official documents of NATO and EU such as summit conclusions and decisions were given special attention, together with secondary resources. This study heavily relies on these official texts as a natural outcome of the chosen topic. These documents provide the most necessary and important information. Applying constructivist approach also paved the way for frequent references to these documents. Here European security strategy "*A Secure Europe in A Better World-The European Security Strategy*" occupies an important role.¹⁷ This document was revised in 2008. It underlines the key threats facing the EU. According to the strategy the key threats were identified as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. The Security Strategy of EU was a very useful and concrete tool that enabled a healthy comparison between Turkey's and EU's security approaches.

In addition to the literature particular to Turkey and CSDP, we also deem it necessary to mention few well known sources that study the European Union. The book by Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark A. Pollack, '*Policy Making in the European Union*' is a remarkable contribution to the existing literature in the sense that it enables a detailed explanation of the diversity of EU policymaking across a range of policy areas

¹⁶ Thomas Bauer, NATO is dead – Long live NATO!, C.A.Perspectives Center for Applied Policy Research · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich · No. 2, March 2009, p.3.

¹⁷ A Secure Europe in A Better World-The European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

and identifies predominant patterns.¹⁸ Neill Nugent's book '*The Government and Politics of the European Union*' is one of the main sources in analyzing the European Union through dwelling on the historical evolution, the EU's institutions and political actors, policies and policy processes in detail.¹⁹ Robert Hunter's book '*The European Security and Defence Policy NATO's Companion or Competitor*' is also a valuable source in underlying the development of ESDI in NATO and ESDP in the EU.²⁰

Since Constructivism is chosen as the main explanatory theory Nicholas Onuf's and Alexander Wendt's works were given special attention. Wendt contributed to the debate following Onuf in the 1990's through his book '*Social Theory of International Politics*'²¹ in 1999 and his article "*Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*"²².

Theoretical Background

In our research we apply Constructivism as the main explanatory theory. The theoretical approach is to assess the validity of the assumptions of Constructivism in CSDP activities and NATO-EU relations. The goal is to find out to what extent Constructivist insights can explain the specific

¹⁸ Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark A. Pollack, **Policy Making in the European Union**, Fifth Edition, The new European Union Series, Oxford University Press, 2005.

¹⁹ Neill Nugent, **The Government and Politics of the European Union**, Sixth Edition, Duke University Press, Durham 2006.

²⁰ Robert E. Hunter, **The European Security and Defence Policy NATO's Companion or Competitor**, RAND Publication, 2002.

²¹ Alexander Wendt, **Social Theory of International Politics**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

²² Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," **International Organization**, Volume 46, Issue 2, Spring 1992, 391-425.

question of involvement of non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities. Realism and Old Institutionalism are also been benefited. Constructivism does not totally reject realist paradigms, whereas it could be regarded more as a complementary approach. We will analyze whether Realism and Institutionalism could be useful complementary tools to explain the questions that Constructivism can not answer. We will follow a ‘sequencing’ approach in which one theory may help explain a particular step in a sequence of actions while another theory might best explain subsequent developments.²³As also suggested by Schimmelfennig sequencing approach is most salient in EU policy issues that involve constitutive and legitimate rules of the community.²⁴ Following Alexander Wendt’s approach, we will put ‘state’ as the main unit of our analysis and will focus on the ‘identity’ concept which is Constructivists’ principal explanatory concept. While the primary analysis unit is ‘state’, the regional level analysis by studying EU’s and NATO’s security policies is also conducted.

In our work, we will concentrate on the principles of ‘conventional constructivism.’ In fact constructivism has two forms as ‘critical and conventional’; though their main principles are common. We will concentrate on Nicholas Onuf’s and Alexander Wendt’s works that represent the conventional form of constructivism which accepts both a material and ideational reality. Constructivism is a theoretical approach based on the notion that international relations are ‘socially constructed’. It

²³ Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark A. Pollack, **Chapter II Theorizing EU Policy Making, in Policy Making in the European Union, op. cit.**, p. 22-25.

²⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig, Strategic Action In a Community Environment: The Decision to Enlarge the European Union to the East, **Comparative Political Studies**, Vol. 36, No:1/2, February/March 2003, p. 157, online version can be found at <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/36/1-2/156> .

emerged as an approach to break the stalemate that the mainstream debate ended in. Its critiques in mainstream scholarship focus on what it takes for granted or ignores. Constructivism studies the sources and the content of state interests and preferences and it emphasizes the ideational and social side of international politics, which is ignored by mainstream scholarship.²⁵

Constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being. It accepts that not all statements have the same epistemic value and consequently that there is some foundation for knowledge. Instead, constructivism takes community interests and individual interests as ontologically complementary; that is, community interests require the fulfillment of individuals' interests and vice versa. Adler explains that social facts, because they depend on the attachment of collective meaning to physical reality and thus on human consciousness and language, are real objective facts only by human agreement. Although individuals carry knowledge, ideas, and meanings they also know, think, and feel only in the context of and with reference to collective or intersubjective understandings, including rules and language. Constructivists consider the mutual constitution of agents and structures to be part of constructivism's ontology.²⁶ They share an epistemology in which interpretation is an intrinsic part of the social sciences and emphasizes contingent generalizations. Contingent generalizations do not freeze understanding or bring

²⁵ Hasan Ulusoy, "Revisiting Security Communities After the Cold War: The Constructivist Perspective," *Perceptions*, Volume VIII, Ankara, September-November 2003, p. 7.

²⁶ Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations, The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations*, Routledge, London, New York, 2005, p.10-12.

it to closure; rather, they open up our understanding of the social world.²⁷

Constructivism's principal explanatory concept is '*identity*'. In explaining our research questions we will also benefit from identity concept. We will explain the security rationale of Turkey by emphasizing its identity. Constructivists have brought about significant studies regarding the role of identity in international relations. According to Constructivists actors acquire identities by participating in collective meanings. They argue that a state may have multiple identities and each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and which constitute the structure of the social world. Constructivists believe that identities are the basis of interests. Actors define their interests in the process of defining situations. In Wendt's words, an institution is a relatively stable set or 'structure' of identities and interests. Such structures are often codified in formal rules and norms, but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors' socialization with and participation in collective knowledge. Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works. Identities and such collective cognitions do not exist apart from each other. They are mutually constitutive.²⁸ According to Constructivists the debate over the future of collective security in Western Europe would suggest that this long term cooperation may have transformed a positive interdependence of outcomes into a collective 'European identity' in terms of which states increasingly define their self interests. Constructivists believe that the process of cooperating tends to redefine those reasons

²⁷ **Ibid.** p.11.

²⁸ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *op.cit.*, p.397-399.

by reconstituting identities and interests in terms of new intersubjective understandings and commitments.²⁹

The main contributions of the constructivist approaches to the European integration studies are the premises that account for the change of the actors' identities, interests and behaviors. Despite that there is no single approach able to explain all aspects of the European integration, the impact of the process can well be theorized within constructivist perspectives. It opens a new floor for discussing not only the impact of ESDP on national foreign and security policies and the mutual relationship between the ESDP and national policies, but also the social integration emanating from communication and social learning. Constructivism has introduced a new dimension to the European security debate through the 'speech act'³⁰

Methodology

The methodology issue has entered into the agenda of international security issues since the 1990s. Buzan and Hansen (Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *International Security Studies: The Emergence and Evolution of an Academic Sub-field*, San Diego: ISA, Unpublished Conference Communique, March 2006-quoted from AıkmeŒe) explain that methodology debates occur in two levels: 'How should security be studied?' and 'How to reach knowledge about security?' Within this concept, initially studying security through objective, subjective and discursive methods, and secondly positivist and post-positivist epistemology debates have occupied the agendas of security theories. The roots of objective and subjective security approaches go back to Arnold Wolfers (Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", *Political Science*

²⁹ **Ibid.**, p. 417-418.

³⁰ Nilüfer Karacasulu - Elif Uzgören, *Explaining Social Constructivist Contributions to Security Studies*, **Perceptions**, Volume XII, Summer-Autumn 2007, p.38-42.

Quarterly, Volume 67, No. 4, December 1952- quoted from Açıkmeye). This approach deals with the issue of 'whether there is a threat against acquired assets\values'. Whereas the Copenhagen School, along with constructivists, concentrate on discourses.³¹

Methodology could be described as a system of methods applied within the framework of a theoretical analysis. Ontological and epistemological stances of a particular theory lead us to apply a certain type of methodology. Our main theoretical framework, Constructivism, suggests that ontology determines epistemology and methodology. Constructivists apply interpretive methodology. In our research we will conduct an interpretive analysis based on qualitative methods, such as interviewing and discourse analysis.

Our main question is "How does the restrictive approach of the EU effect the implementation of the principles of involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities?" We will apply 'case study' as the main research strategy. As Robert Yin points out 'how' and 'why' questions are likely to favor the use of case studies, experiments, or histories. There are several definitions of case study. As quoted from Yin's 'Case Study Research, Design and Methods' a common definition of case study reads as '*The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result.*'³² The case study method is preferred in examining contemporary events. It

³¹ Sinem Akgül Açıkmeye, **Actor, Threat and Policy in Copenhagen School and Realist Security Studies: An Assessment of European Security**, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Ankara University Institute of Social Sciences, Ankara, 2008, p.64-65.

³² Robert K. Yin, **Case Study Research Design and Methods**, Third Edition, Applied Social Research Methods Series, Volume 5, Sage Publications, California, 2003, p.12.

comprises an all-encompassing method covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis. This method is not only a design feature, but a comprehensive research strategy. Case studies can be based on mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence and can include both single and multiple-case studies.³³

We applied the ‘single case study’ method and selected Turkey as the case in explaining the research questions. As revealed previously there are several reasons why Turkey is chosen as the case. By choosing Turkey as the case we attempted to refute the main critics of case study method on the generalization of the conclusions reached. It is true that it is not easy to make scientific generalizations from one single case. However, carefully selected Turkish case is eligible to lead us healthy conclusions.

The main components of case study research design³⁴ and their application to our dissertation are the following:

-Study’s questions and propositions: We have 3 research questions.

-Its unit of analysis: As applied by Wendt, we have also chosen ‘state’ as the principal unit of our analysis. However, regional level of analysis is also made as the outcome of the chosen topic. We will mainly concentrate on the decision-making institutions’ discourses, either spoken or written.

-The criteria for interpreting the findings: In our research we attempt to interpret our findings in the light of the main principles of the involvement of non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities.

³³ **Ibid.**, p. 5-15.

³⁴ **Ibid.**, p.21-27.

Evidence for case studies may come from several sources. These are documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts.³⁵ The data in for our research was collected from the following sources:

Documentation: Official EU and NATO documents, press releases and information notes of relevant institutions, and letters.

Archival records: Statements and speeches of relevant officials, newspaper articles and comments, and personnel records of the author.

Interviews: We conducted interviews with diplomats from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU member countries, and Canada. We also interviewed NATO's Assistant Secretary General For Defence Policy and Planning.

Direct Observation: The author has been a career diplomat and served also in the international security field with a focus on NATO issues for several years. She had the chance to make direct observations. The outcomes of these observations have also been utilized.

Supporting documents: Academic works of Turkish and foreign officials and academicians, and literature on European security issues.

Interviewing has been a useful method for data collection for this study. We have applied 'intensive interviewing' and thus followed a qualitative method. We have chosen the interviewees among the people who have experiences in European Security issues. The number of the interviewees is limited since we have chosen open-ended questions in the form of guided conversations. As explained by Marsh and Stoker,

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

lengthy interviews are usually conducted with only a small sample of informants; they are open and flexible allowing the informants to elaborate on their values and attitudes. In depth interviews allow people to tell their own story so that it is possible to understand the logic of an interviewees' argument.³⁶

The official EU and NATO documents were the primary resources of this work as the constituents of the acquis of the CSDP. Analyses of these official texts are crucial since they put forward the opinions of state organs. The arguments are based on these documents and they are supported by revealing the acts and decisions of Turkish, EU and NATO officials. The up-to-dateness of the **research** has been ensured by following up on the responses of the relevant actors to the developments by using newspaper articles and comments, and speeches and explanations of the relevant actors. In analyzing our case study Turkey, we mainly concentrated on the deeds of Turkish Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish General Staff and Turkish Ministry of National Defence.

As Ulusoy notes, discourses are speech acts that are of particular importance in two aspects: First, they are the reflection of the identity in foreign policy. Second, speech acts help understand the contents of the identity. This is because such discourses written or spoken by state officials and organs directly contribute to the shaping of the identity. Therefore, there exists a continuous circle of interaction through speech acts in the formation and implementation of the state's identity in the foreign and security policies.³⁷ We deem the discourse analysis a very useful method in explaining our research

³⁶ David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, **Theory and Methods in Political Science**, First Edition, Macmillan Press Ltd, United Kingdom, 1995, p. 137-138.

³⁷ Hasan Ulusoy, **A Constructivist Analysis of Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era**, p. 17.

questions. In cooperation with the case study approach, discourse analysis also been benefited for data collection.

Structure

Following the objectives of the research, the research is arranged in four chapters in the following order:

The *first chapter* presents the theoretical background of the research in detail. The main insights of Constructivism are explained. Theoretically the study aims at assessing the relevance of Constructivist insights in handling research questions and attempts to analyze to what extent Realism and Old Institutionalism could be complementary in explaining the events.

The *second chapter* analyses the main principles of the involvement of Non-EU European NATO Members in CSDP activities. The section starts with the evolution process of the CSDP and NATO-EU Cooperation. The limit of this section is to cover detailed information on the development of CSDP and NATO-EU cooperation. Discussing the reasons behind these initiatives is also another limit. However, the major steps taken during the process that led to improvement of CSDP and NATO-EU cooperation are explained briefly in order to be able to fully understand case study Turkey's position and its arguments during the process. It will also tackle the issues related with the EU decision making on CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty. This chapter puts forward the modalities of the involvement of Non-EU European NATO Members in CSDP activities. It looks at the problem from a holistic approach through dealing the 'involvement issue' from the perspective of non-EU European NATO Members as a whole. In this chapter indicative examples concerning the difficulties of non-EU NATO Members participation to the CSDP are also discussed.

The *third chapter* attempts to analyze Turkey's security discourse in the face of a new security environment, by making special reference to its geographical location and its enduring ties with the West. In order to make a convincing analysis of Turkey's policies in the European security structure, the security rationale of Turkey should be analyzed in detail. This section asserts that Turkey's strategic importance has increased after the end of the Cold War. It discusses Turkey's attitude in the face of current security challenges, such as NATO operation to Libya. The main purpose of this section is to reveal the major factors shaping Turkey's security policies after the Cold War. It also argues whether new features are appearing in the country's security understanding. This section also covers Turkey's position in NATO and its contributions to the Alliance. Here Turkey's views on NATO's new Strategic Concept with a special focus on NATO-EU relations are also touched upon.

The *fourth chapter* tackles Turkey's position in CSDP activities and NATO-EU cooperation. It explains the core of the problem. This chapter questions whether Turkey was satisfied with her associate membership status in the WEU. It is argued that the EU's desire to obtain an autonomous military capability and the transfer of the functions of WEU into the EU affected Turkey's place in the European Security architecture. This chapter includes a comparison between the security policies of Turkey and the EU, with a view to revealing the similarity of security policies of both sides. Chapter Four asserts that principles of involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities have not been duly implemented. There are also several arguments linked to each other that are drawn from the Turkish case. This chapter also discusses whether the issue of involvement of non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities attitude has ramifications over NATO-EU Cooperation. It questions whether the working cultures of the EU and NATO are different and how this situation affects this

cooperation in general. It is argued that both institutions understand NATO-EU cooperation in different ways. The reflections of Cyprus issue in this strategic cooperation are also discussed. The new NATO Strategic Concept's relevance on the NATO-EU relations is included, as well.

The final part of the research covers the conclusions of this study and its findings. There are several proposals included for the way ahead. The aim of this research is not to find theoretically ideal solutions out of non-existing mechanisms in the framework of the involvement of non-EU NATO members in the CSDP. However it aims at revealing the actual shortcomings in the involvement of non-EU NATO members, including Turkey, in CSDP activities and the ways to improve NATO-EU Cooperation. This study attempts to find out what could be done to reach a better state of affairs through utilizing already existing mechanisms. The conclusions offer ideas that could easily be achieved without creating additional obligations for the interested parties.

FIRST CHAPTER THEORETICAL APPROACHES

1.1. Constructivist Approach as Explanatory Framework

A scientific explanation will be one that effects unifications and reduces the stock of beliefs we need to have in order to effect explanations. According to Alex Rosenberg, unification is the aim of scientific explanation because human understanding of the world increases as the number of independent explained we need decreases. Unification is all scientific understanding can aim at.¹ Theories unify and they do so almost always by going beyond, beneath and behind the phenomena empirical regularities report and they are the most powerful explainers. They operate by bringing diverse phenomena under a small number of fundamental assumptions.² Theoretically, this study attempts to assess the validity of constructivist insights in analyzing CSDP activities and NATO-EU relations. Constructivism is considered as a useful theoretical tool to understand the material world by concentrating on the importance of identities, interests, norms and cultures of the states.

The contours of International Relations Theory in recent years have been broadened. The mainstream theories of International Relations have been seriously challenged by critical approaches. Constructivism emerged as an analytical framework in this regard, but it challenged mainstream

¹ Alex Rosenberg, **Philosophy of Science A Contemporary Introduction**, Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy, New York, London, 2000, p. 54-55.

² **Ibid.**, p. 71.

International Relations theory largely on ontological grounds. To constructivism, it is the ontology that basically determines epistemology and methodology. As Ulusoy points out, it is also argued that constructivism is a product of the third debate in the sense that it is related to the confluence of diverse anti-positivistic philosophical and sociological trends. The International Relations (IR) Theory witnessed a renaissance in 'social' theorising in recent years. In the American core of the discipline, neo-realists long denied that relations between states had any social content, and neo-liberals understood social interaction among states as little more than strategically induced institutional cooperation. This rationalist condominium was challenged, however, by the advent of constructivism in the 1990s. Constructivists see international relations as deeply social, as a realm of action in which the identities and interests of states and other actors are discursively structured by inter-subjective rules, norms and institutions.³

If we simply define security as not being subject to threat, risk and danger, then we should also dwell on defining the meanings and validity of mentioned factors at a given time due to their dynamic nature. Post Cold War global processes have been changing the nature of threat and forcing some adaptation of basic strategic principles and the patterns of allegiance associated with them. Traditional security policy has been concerned primarily with deliberate threats. Security meant the need to confront a militarized, strongly motivated, nuclear and superior power during the bipolar system. The old, bipolar Cold war order provided a stability of sorts.⁴ During the cold war, the stakes were high, the threat was imminent, but there was also

³ Ulusoy, *op.cit.*, p.33-34.

⁴ Kostas Ifantis, "International Security: A Paradigm Shift?", *International Security Today, Understanding Change and Debating Strategy*, **Center For Strategic Research Papers**, No:1/2006, Ankara, August 2006, p.13-32.

stability.⁵ While this understanding has been dominant for half a century, since the end of the Cold War it has been disaggregated and rendered less specific by the major actors. Conceptualizing security meant the mixing of rather vague and ill-defined elements. Throughout the 1990s the security debate remained rather tentative, unfocused and vague.⁶

In the same way, the theoretical work about the European security issues has also been insufficient. The classical mainstream theories were not able to answer all aspects of the CSDP. They were helpful to understand this new concept to some extent. It is true that the literature on CSDP is rich; however there is a theoretical inadequacy in this field. This theoretical vacuum has been noticed, but research has barely progressed beyond this basic observation. Research on the CSDP has been theoretically weak and empirically superficial. It has been neither systematic nor cumulative.⁷ As Bono argues the majority of the literature on CSDP has not been driven by a desire to clarify theoretical frameworks. However, the complexity of the CSDP requires it to be analysed on different levels. It is necessary to take into account of dynamics that range from the existence of bilateral/special relationships, the interaction between EU and NATO to the specific decision-making mechanism in these international organizations that allow member states to coordinate their foreign, defence and security policies. Furthermore, conceptualizing how domestic,

⁵ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Contemporary Security Challenges: Is Classical Deterrence an Adequate Response?", *International Security Today, Understanding Change and Debating Strategy, Center For Strategic Research Papers*, No:1/2006, Ankara, August 2006, p. 224.

⁶ Ifantis, *op.cit.*, p.17.

⁷ Tuomas Forsberg, *Explaining the Emergence of the ESDP: Setting the Research Agenda*, Paper Prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research, Standing Group for International Relations Conference, Turin, September 12-15, 2007, p. 1-2, <http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Forsberg-torino-forsberg-esdp.pdf>, accessed on 5 January 2010.

transgovernmental and transnational actors influence the formulation of the EU and NATO policies should be sought, and the impact of external developments should also be taken into account.⁸ There is a lack of consensus among researchers as to the best ‘theory’, and the tendency is to seek to bring together different theoretical approaches.⁹

Nicholas Onuf introduced constructivism in 1989.¹⁰ Onuf¹¹ was followed by Alexander Wendt in the 1990’s through his book “*Social Theory of International Politics*”¹² in 1999 and article “*Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*”¹³. In the development of constructivism, the ‘English School’ and the ‘Copenhagen School’ have also made substantial contributions. The English school, which interprets IR as being social and historical, and which stresses the existence of an international society driven by norms and identity, played a role in promoting constructivist ideas. Similarly, the ‘Copenhagen School’, which is formed by a proponent of the English School, Barry Buzan, with Ole

⁸ Giovanna Bono, European Security and Defence Policy: Theoretical Approaches, the Nice Summit and Hot Issues, ESDP and Democracy, February 2002, p.5-6, <http://www.bits-berlin.de/CESD-PA/esdp02.pdf>, accessed on 2 January 2010.

⁹ **Ibid.** p. 6.

¹⁰ Nicholas. Onuf, **World of Our Making : Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International relations**, University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

¹¹ Nicholas Onuf further developed his ideas through "A Constructivist Manifesto" in Burch & Denmark, eds., **Constituting Political Economy**, Lynne Rienner, 1997, "Constructivism: A User's Manual" in Kubalkova, et al. eds., **International Relations in a Constructed World**, M.E. Sharpe, 1998, "Worlds of Our Own Making: The Strange Career of Constructivism" in Puchala, ed., **Visions of International Relations**, University of South Carolina Press, 2002.

¹²Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999

¹³ Alexander Wendt, “*Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*”, *op. cit.*

Weaver, is also considered to have played a role in the evolution of constructivism. Both emphasize the importance of identity-building and shared norms.¹⁴

In his article '*Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*' Wendt aimed at building a bridge between the realist-liberal and rationalist-reflectivist debates by developing a constructivist argument on behalf of the liberal claim that international institutions can transform state identities and interests. He argued that constructivism might contribute to the strong liberal interest in identity and interest formation. His strategy was to argue against the neorealist claim that self help is given by anarchic structure exogenously to process. He claimed that there is no 'logic' of anarchy apart from the practices that create one structure of identities and interests rather than another. Structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. He put forward that '*anarchy is what states make of it*'.¹⁵

Ontology may be described as the image of social reality upon which a theory is based. Constructivism's ontological position asserts that social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors. It implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction, but that they are in a constant state of revision.¹⁶ Alexander Wendt is of the view that the dominant ontology today in mainstream theories of international politics is materialist. International Relations social scientists usually

¹⁴ Ulusoy, *Ibid*, p. 8.

¹⁵ Alexander Wendt, "**Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics**", *op.cit.*, p. 394-395.

¹⁶ Jonathan Grix, Introducing Students to the Generic Terminology of Social Research, **Politics: 2002 Vol, 22(3)**, **Political Studies Association, Blackwell Publishers**, UK, p.177, <http://www.politicsjournal.org/Articles/grix.pdf>, accessed on 26 March 2011.

turn first to material forces, defined as power and interest, and bring in ideas only to mop up residual unexplained variance. This approach is clearest in Neorealism, but Neoliberalism seems to be based on it as well. Wendt defends an idealist or social ontology. According to him such ontology should not deny or obscure the fact that culture supervenes on nature. He rejects the “ideas all the way down” thesis that might be associated with a thicker, more radical constructivism. But neither should idealism be reduced to the proposition that ideas matter only to the extent that power and interest do not. Wendt begins theorizing about international politics with the distribution of ideas, and especially culture, in the system, and then bring in material forces, rather than the other way around. He advocates the ontology of international life which is “social” in the sense that it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one another, and “constructionist” in the sense that these ideas help define who and what states are.¹⁷ Constructivism’s added value for the study of International Relations comes mainly from its emphasis on the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge and on the epistemological and methodological implications of this reality. Adler describes Constructivists as ‘ontological realists’; they believe not only in the existence of the material world, but also that ‘this material world offers resistance when we act upon it. Constructivism is an attempt to build a bridge between the widely separated positivist/materialist and idealist/interpretive philosophies of social science.¹⁸ Adler mentions constructivism’s claim as the ontological middle ground. He explains that Constructivism seizes the middle ground because it is interested in understanding how the material, subjective, and intersubjective

¹⁷ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing) 2003, p.371-372.

¹⁸ Adler, *op.cit.*, p.90.

worlds interact in the social construction of reality, rather than focusing exclusively on how structures constitute agents' identities and interests. According to him constructivism belongs in the center of the matrix, the dense dot where all the lines intersect.¹⁹

According to Wendt, the epistemic authority of any scientific study, whether using interpretive or positivist methods, depends on publicly available evidence and the possibility that its conclusions might in some broad sense be falsified. If there is no such evidence or if a study is non-falsifiable, then it might still be interesting as a form of art, self-expression, or revelation. It is not an effort to know the world through "science."²⁰ Constructivists share an epistemology in which interpretation is an intrinsic part of the social sciences and emphasizes contingent generalizations. Contingent generalizations open up our understanding of the social world.²¹ Interpretivism as an epistemological position stresses that a strategy is required that respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action.²² Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.²³ On the other hand, constructivists like post-modernists and poststructuralists, follow an interpretive approach embrace the mediative position. They accept the notion that there is a real world out there and believe that it is not entirely determined by physical reality and is socially emergent. More importantly, they believe that the

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 97.

²⁰ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p.373.

²¹ Adler, *op. cit.*, p.11.

²² Grix, *Ibid.*, p.178.

²³ Adler, *op.cit.*, p. 90.

identities, interests, and behavior of political agents are socially constructed by collective meanings, interpretations, and assumptions about the world.²⁴

Constructivism has two core assumptions. First, the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material. Second, these structures shape actors' identities and interests, not just their behaviors. Constructivism takes the world to be emergent and constituted both by knowledge and material factors. Constructivism is in this sense a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; the key structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than material. State identities and interests are constructed by these social structures; they are not given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.²⁵

According to constructivists, the international system “is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place”. Human agents construct social reality and reproduce it in their daily practices. As Onuf points out ‘people and societies construct, or constitute each other’.²⁶ Thus, constructivism sees the international system as ‘socially constructed’ and not given. They argue that agents do not exist independently from their social environment. Social world involves thoughts, beliefs, ideas, concepts, languages, discourses, signs and signals. Social environment defines who we are, our identities as social beings. Constructivists focus both on differences among people and how those relations are formed by means of collective social

²⁴ **Ibid**, p.91-92.

²⁵ Hasan Ulusoy, A Constructivist Analysis of Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, unpublished PHD Thesis, **op.cit.**,p. 34-35.

²⁶ Onuf, World of Our Making : Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, p.38.

institutions and emphasize the importance of normative or ideational structures as well as material structures in defining the meaning and identity of an individual. Norms and shared beliefs constitute actor's identities and interests. They concentrate on the social identities and interests of actors. Social identities and interests are not fixed but relative and relational. Interests are based on the social identities of actors.²⁷ Constructivists argue that in order to understand the relations and events on the international arena, domestic events must also be investigated. What goes inside the state will often have consequences in relations with other states. The same line of reasoning will be applicable to all political actors. The internal affects the external. Therefore the internal must be considered when regarding the external, and vice versa. A constructivist description of political action is thereby characterized by actors trying to find out what the relevant rules or norms concerning a certain situation are and following these.²⁸ With regard to international organizations, Constructivists argue that institutions are important frameworks in which states interact and create common rules, norms and values.

As summarized by Karacasulu and Uzgoren, constructivists argue that there is social interaction, and thus favor social ontology instead of individualistic ontology of rationalism. They do not see international relations within the context of international power structure. Instead, they are concerned with the impact of 'norms', 'identities' and 'strategic cultures' in international security. Norms shape interests and interests shape actions. Norms do not determine actions. Changing norms may change state interests and create new interests.

²⁷ Nilüfer Karacasulu-Elif Uzgören, Explaining Social Constructivist Contributions to Security Studies, *op.cit.*, p.27-48.

²⁸ Adam Svensson, **Turkey as the European Other A Constructivist Account of Turkey's Accession Process to the EU**, Paper prepared at Lund University, Department of Political Science, Autumn 2007, p.7.

Furthermore, constructivists consider states as role players trying to do what is appropriate or proper to do in a given situation. States are guided by norms, which involve standards of appropriate behavior. States conform to norms because they understand it appropriate and good within the 'logic of appropriateness'. Constructivists argue that the actors' interests are redefined with intensive interaction and shaped with the 'logic of appropriateness'. Within the tradition of 'logic of appropriateness', actions are seen as rule-based in which actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations.²⁹ Within the logic of appropriateness, actors are assumed to determine 'what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligations of that role in that situation are'. In making these assessments the actors do not start from their individual needs and interests, but reason normatively about what to want and what to do remaining.³⁰

Constructivism, according to Onuf, 'applies to all fields of social inquiry' and has the potential to bring together matters which at first seem unrelated. It starts from the belief that human beings are social. It is based on the notion that society and people make each other in an ongoing, two-way process. Deeds, which may consist in speech acts or physical actions, make the world and they are able to construct reality. According to Onuf, meaning in human social relations depends on the existence of rules based on such deeds. This increases the importance of discourses as speech acts in state policies in the field of foreign and security policies.³¹ They put 'state' as the main unit analysis and they brought about significant studies regarding the role of identity in international relations.

²⁹ Karacasulu-Uzgören, **op. cit.**, p.36-38.

³⁰ Schimmelfenning, **op. cit.** p. 164.

³¹ Ulusoy, **op.cit.** p. 72.

1.2. Complementary Approaches

1.2.1. Realism

Traditionally, the analysis of national security has concentrated on the hard security dimension and it was primarily defined in military terms. Its focus was thus on the state's military ability to deter and defend against aggression and threats of violence. This perspective of the concept of security that is guided by exclusively military considerations has been criticized as limited in focus and 'too narrowly founded'. The end of the Cold War has allowed for a burgeoning of the security agenda. As a result, issues such as economic and social conditions, environmental damage, ethnic and religious based communal conflict, terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking have increasingly gained currency alongside the more familiar matters of military attack and defence capabilities. It is thus clear that the end of the Cold War has brought about a significant modification in national security agendas, especially in western states.³² The so called 'rogue states' as well as non-state actors which have developed state-like hierarchical command structures started to become influential actors in the political and military arena. The appearance of these entities in the center-stage of international politics has broadly disturbed the long running stability and predictability in the international system.³³

Naturally, security concept also has a central place in the International Relations theory. Due to the complex nature of the term of 'security', it is not easy to come up with a clear definition that could be agreed by all. The classical Realist approaches that have dominated the debate until today are of significant importance in this regard. Realist approaches focus

³² Sevgi Drorian, Security, State and Society in Troubled Times, **European Security**, Vol. 14, No:2, June 2005, p.255-275.

³³ Mustafa Kibaroglu, **op.cit.**, p.216.

on nation state, power and balance of power. For Realists, military power remains the most effective means of ensuring national security and state survival. For this reason, the military distribution of power continues to be essential. State sovereignty is everything to the Realists because the international system is state-centric and states are considered the key actors in international relations. For Realists, alliances are a means to ensure survival.³⁴ The appearance of new developments in the international stage and the diversifying of threats and risks paved the way for new approaches such as behavioralism, structuralism and neo-realism. These new approaches are based on the main principles of Realism and are aimed at further development of Realism.

Today the main premises of the Realist approach still continue to exist. The classical Realist theory was shaped through the major works of scholars between 5th century B.C and the period after World War II. In this sense the opinions of Thucydides in 5th century B.C., Niccolo Machiavelli in 17th century and Carl von Clausewitz in 19th century are important in shaping the classical realist theory.³⁵ The forerunners of Realism consider that states are ambitious and their only target is to gain more power. Machiavelli puts it as politics 'it must need to be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that

³⁴ Grame P. Herd, International Relations Theory and Security Concepts, Geneva Center for Security Policy, <http://www.gcsp.ch/e/training/ITC/2009-10/Terml/week3.htm>, accessed on 11 December 2009.

³⁵ The examples of the main works of classical realism could be summarized as: Hans J. Morgenthau, **Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace**, Fifth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, E.H. Carr, **The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations** (Londra: Macmillan, 1939), Nicholas John Spykman, **America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power**, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company (1942), Reinhold Niebuhr, **Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics**, New York , Scribner's, 1932.

they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers'. Some Realists such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau see Machiavelli's claim as largely descriptive. However, all of them emphasized the egoistic passions and self interest in international politics. They argue that since these passions are ineradicable 'conflict is inevitable'. Realists are unanimous in holding that human nature contains egoistic passions and that statesmanship is dominated by the need to control this side of human nature. Realists stress the political necessities that flow from international anarchy.³⁶ Realism dominated the international relations theory throughout the cold war.

Realism evolved considerably throughout the Cold War. As time passed, in which the world witnessed new phenomena and developments, the field of international relations theory, also observed new approaches to better account for these developments in world affairs, such as decision-making analysis, systemic discussions, behavioralism, structuralism and Neo-realism.³⁷ They did not change the main core of realist premises but only improved it. Neo-realism is identified with Kenneth Waltz. Waltz put forward the main principles of Neo-realism in his work of '*Theory of International Politics*' in 1979.³⁸ According to Neo-realists, states seek to maximize power and security. According to Neo-realists international organizations reflect the distribution of power among states. International organizations are arenas for pursuing power relationships and they have no enforcement power, which is

³⁶ Jack Donnelly, "**Realism and International Relations**", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p.9-11.

³⁷ Hasan Ulusoy, **A Constructivist Analysis of Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era**, Unpublished PhD Thesis, **op. cit.**, p. 28-29.

³⁸ Kenneth Waltz, **Theory of International Politics**, McGraw Hill. New York: 1979.

why they do not have any impact on state behavior. Neo-realism introduced new actors in addition to the nation-state without challenging the dominance of Realism. It gave emphasis to economic issues as well as the issues of high-politics such as security and military concerns. Structuralists, however, introduced the concept of structure as a level of analysis.³⁹ In Alexander Wendt words, classical Realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau attributed egoism and power politics primarily to human nature, whereas neo-realists emphasize anarchy. According to Wendt, the difference stems in part from different interpretations of anarchy's causal powers.⁴⁰

In our research we will concentrate on the classical Realism. We share the views of Sten Rynning underlying that classical Realists see the CSDP as a case of power politics, but one steeped in traditions of European diplomacy and statesmanship. Politics is about power, but power has meaning and cannot be appreciated outside of it. Classical Realism sees the CSDP as a result of the changes wrought on Europe's nation-states by Europe's history, political choices and global processes. According to Rynning, the CSDP reflects the erosion of political power within Europe and is, as such, a measure created to cope with inner weakness, not external power. Classical Realism offers an understanding that statesmen, academics and other relevant actors can rely on in their assessments of current realities.⁴¹

³⁹ Ulusoy, *op.cit.* p.29.

⁴⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *op.cit.*, p. 395.

⁴¹ Sten Rynning, Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy, *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 49, Issue 1, January 2011, p.23-42, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02127.x/full>, accessed on 20 March 2011.

In fact, Constructivism does not totally reject realist paradigms. It could be regarded more as a complementary approach. Alexander Wendt explains that he shares that international politics are anarchic, and that states have offensive capabilities, can not be one hundred percent certain about others' intentions, wish to survive, and are rational. Wendt also notes that they also share with Realists a commitment to "states" as units of analysis and to the importance of systemic or 'third image' theorizing.⁴²

In the logic of constructivism threats are not natural and inevitable. States may change their threat perceptions by evolutions in their environment and modified practices. Furthermore, anarchy, sovereignty, interests and identities are socially constructed and can change in time whereas the mainstream IR theories assume that these terms are static. In fact, constructivism can better explain the changing nature of sovereignty over time than realism. According to constructivism, national interests are inter-subjective understanding about what it takes to advance power, wealth and influence. Anarchy is not externally given as assumed by neo-realism. States are not considered as prisoners in anarchical structure, they create it.⁴³

There is overlapping between modernist constructivism and neoclassical realism, as discussed by Christoph O. Meyer and Eva Strickmann. Neoclassical realists agree that the domestic ideational context has an impact on the foreign policy behaviour of states and they seek to include ideational intervening variables such as perceptions of policy elites. Neoclassical realists attempt to understand how systemic pressures and domestic processes interact. They do not pay attention to

⁴² Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, **International Security**, Vol. 20, No.1, Summer 1995, p. 72.

⁴³ Karacasulu - Uzgören, **op.cit.**,p.27-48.

domestic factors and policy elites. Meyer and Strickmann also explain that Constructivists fail to remedy the problems of realism as they prioritize structures of shared knowledge to an extent that little room is left for understanding material changes and their ideational effects. According to them, Constructivists suffer from epistemological problems relating to formulating forward-looking theoretical propositions.⁴⁴

Constructivists look to socially constructed roles and institutional rules and ask what sort of behaviour is appropriate in a given situation. Constructivism offers a fundamentally different view of human agency than rational-choice approaches, including Realism. Mark Pollack argues that constructivists and rationalists fail to agree on a common standard for judging what constitutes support for one approach or another. Rationalism and constructivism are not hopelessly incommensurate, but can engage each other through ‘four distinct modes of theoretical conversation’ as explained by Pollack:

-“competitive testing, in which competing theories are pitted against each other in explaining a single event or class of events;

-a ‘domain of application’ approach, in which each theory is considered to explain some sub-set of empirical reality, so that, for example, utility-maximizing and strategic bargaining obtain in certain circumstances, while socialization and collective preference formation obtain in others;

⁴⁴ Christoph O. Meyer and Eva Strickmann, Solidifying Constructivism: How Material and Ideational Factors Interact in European Defence, **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 49, Issue 1, January 2011, p.61-81, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02129.x/full>, accessed on 20 March 2011.

- a ‘sequencing’ approach in which one theory may help explain a particular step in a sequence of actions while another theory might best explain subsequent developments;

-‘incorporation’ or ‘subsumption’ in which one theory claims to subsume the other so that, for example, rational choice becomes a sub-set of human behavior ultimately explicable in terms of the social construction of modern rationality.”⁴⁵

1.2.2. Institutionalism

The institutional approach is one of the central pillars of the discipline of politics. It focuses on the rules, procedures and formal organizations of government. Its methods are institutional descriptive, formal-legal, and historical-comparative. R.A.W Rhodes explain that it seeks to explain the relationship between structure and democracy and the ways in which rules, procedures and formal organization succeed or fail in constraining political behaviour.⁴⁶ Institutionalism is characterized by its emphasis upon the institutional context in which political events occur and for the outcomes and effects they generate. It emphasizes the extent to which political conduct is shaped by the institutional landscape in which it occurs, the importance of the historical legacies bequeathed from the past to the present and the range of diversity of actors’ strategic orientation to the institutional contexts in which they find themselves. Each contributes to its distinctive view of the state.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark A. Pollack, **Chapter II Theorizing EU Policy Making**, Policy Making in the European Union, op. cit., p. 22-25.

⁴⁶ David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, **op.cit.**, p. 54-55.

⁴⁷ Vivien Schmidt, “Institutionalism” p.98, in Colin Hay, Michael Lister and David Marsh, eds., **The State Theories and Issues**, Hampshire and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

The “old institutionalism” characterized political science until at least the early 1950s, and to some extent never really died out among many students of politics.⁴⁸ According to Peters, the old institutionalism did make some definite contributions to comprehension of governance. One contribution came from the attention given to the details of structures which is, to some degree, returning to academic fashion—particularly in historical institutionalism. The fundamental point of that descriptive research was that seemingly insignificant details could have a pervasive impact on the actual behavior of the institution and individuals within it. This perspective could be contrasted with some of the vague characterizations of government as the “black box” in systems analyses of politics so much in fashion in comparative politics during the height of the behavioral revolution.⁴⁹

The old institutionalism analyzed the formal institutions of government and defined the state in political, administrative, and legal terms. It used a descriptive methodology to explain the relations among levels and branches of government, with concepts of the state drawn from traditional political philosophy and understood in terms of sovereignty, justice, power, citizenship, and legal status in international law. Where the old institutionalism was comparative, it mainly juxtaposed different state configurations to demonstrate similarities or differences in how governments worked. By the 1950s and 1960s, systemic approaches to political science had largely superseded the old institutionalism, whether structural-functionalist or other ‘holistic’ approaches.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ B. Guy Peters, “Political Institutions, Old and New” p.205, in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., **A New Handbook of Political Science**, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁵⁰ Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p.99-100.

The school of institutionalism arose to explain and interpret the accelerated and very dynamic process of European institutionalisation with its totally new institutional and supranational characteristics. The institutional logic of European integration has gradually led to the political situation where common institutions have their own political and economic interests and a powerful normative role.⁵¹ Institutional assumptions about European integration underline that ‘institutions make a difference’. International institutions, once established, take on a political life of their own, and the rule-making authority delegated to them by states collectively binds governments by locking in patterns of collective behaviour. As international integration gathers momentum, supranational agents become the entrepreneurs of further integration. Their effectiveness follows from their command and control of information, their technical expertise and their ability to efficiently orchestrate and mediate collective international problem-solving.⁵² Puchala explains that while institutionalists readily accept that European integration is structurally and procedurally complex, they nonetheless insist that the key to explaining how it is happening, and why it is happening, lies in understanding the influence of European institutions and the people who direct them.⁵³

⁵¹ Jani K Kaarlejärvi, *New Institutionalism and the Study of European Institutionalisation*, Paper Prepared for the Second ECPR Conference, p. 3, 18 – 21 September 2003 Marburg, Germany, <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/marburg/papers/12/6/kaarlejarvi.pdf>, accessed on 26 June 2011.

⁵² Donald J. Puchala, “Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration: A Review Article”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 318, June 1999, <http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/puchala.pdf>, accessed on 27 June 2011.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p 318.

The new institutionalism was characterized by an explicit concern with theory development and by the use of quantitative analysis. Although the new institutionalism focuses on structures and organizations rather than on individual behavior, the concern with theory and analytic methods is shared with behavioral approaches to politics. The older version of institutionalism was content to describe institutions.⁵⁴ What political scientists mean by new institutionalism depends upon their preferred methodological approach and its particular epistemological and ontological presuppositions. There are four main new institutionalisms: rational choice, historical, sociological institutionalism and discursive institutionalism.⁵⁵ The discursive institutionalism is also known as constructivist institutionalism. Constructivist institutionalists emphasize that reality is socially constructed. According to them institutional analysis is dependent on the social context around it. In these endogenous and contingent circumstances, the rationalist calculations of individual interests are not considered effective because constructivists regard interests as very endogenous in social interaction.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ B. Guy Peters, **op.cit.**, p. 206.

⁵⁵ Schmidt., **op.cit.** p. 98-99.

⁵⁶ Kaarlejärvi, **op.cit.** p.4 .

SECOND CHAPTER

EXPLAINING THE PRINCIPLES OF INVOLVEMENT OF NON-EU EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS IN CSDP ACTIVITIES

2.1. Development of CSDP and NATO-EU Relations

2.1.1. From ESDI to CSDP

The signing of the **Maastricht Treaty** in 1992 put forward the European Union's commitment to define and implement a common foreign and security policy, which might in time lead to common defence. This is raised in the Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty as:

“The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.”¹

The efforts in the early years of the 1990s concentrated on the key role of the WEU in transatlantic relations and the WEU's reactivation as a connector between NATO and the EU was regarded as the best option. In those days, the preference of the NATO member states was to develop ESDI within the Alliance. In the NATO's Strategic Concept of 1991, the significance of the WEU was emphasized and was made clear that *'NATO would remain the essential forum for consultation among the Allies'* (Article 21 of NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept). Article 2 of the 1991 Strategic Concept emphasized that *'The development of a European security identity and*

¹ The Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, <http://www.ena.lu/>, accessed on 1 June 2010.

*defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.*²

The Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the **North Atlantic Council held in Berlin on 3 June 1996**, further developed the ESDI and marked the completion of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Concept (Article 6 of the Communiqué)³

On the EU's side, through the **Treaty of Amsterdam**, the WEU was regarded as an integral part of the EU as stated in the Article J.7\1 of the mentioned Treaty:

*'The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements'*⁴

² NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm, accessed on 13 June 2010.

³ Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Berlin on 3 June 1996, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25067.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 13 June 2010.

⁴ Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, <http://www.ena.lu/>, accessed on 5 June 2010.

The Treaty of Amsterdam also created the position of the High Representative for the CFSP, and opened the way for non-EU European NATO members' participation in EU led operations.

The St. Malo initiative of British and French leaders in 1998 was a crucial step on the European security integration. Article 2 of the St. Malo Declaration emphasized that *“the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”*⁵ In the St. Malo Declaration ESDP activities were restricted according to NATO's response. Article 3 of the St. Malo Declaration read *“In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).”*⁶

The Vienna European Council of December 1998 welcomed the provisions of the St. Malo Declaration. Article 76 of the mentioned Council read *“The European Council welcomes the new impetus given to the debate on a common European policy on security and defence. The European*

⁵ Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998, <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html>, accessed on 6 June 2010.

⁶ *Ibid.*

*Council considers that in order for the European Union to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities. It welcomes the Franco-British declaration made on 4 December 1998 in St Malo. The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European States, including the obligations of some Member States within NATO.”*⁷ Through this statement the Vienna European Council marked a significant step in terms of the development of the ESDP.

The provisions of the St. Malo declaration mark a significant turning point in terms of the ESDP. The issue of involvement of non-EU European Allies in the ESDP and the EU’s ambition to move the ESDP further through autonomous action capability were the triggers for **NATO’s Washington Summit of April 1999**. The Washington Summit Communique of NATO underlined the *“building the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness”* (Article 4)⁸

Article 9 of the NATO’s Washington Summit Communiqué is very important in terms of the involvement of non-EU Allies in EU led operations. Turkey’s main arguments on its position on the ESDP are based on the Washington Summit conclusions. Therefore we deem it necessary to include Article 9 of the Communique in full here:

“9. We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and the reflections launched since then in

⁷ Vienna European Council Presidency Conclusions, 11-12 December 1998, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/0300-R1.EN8.htm, accessed on 1 June 2010.

⁸ NATO’s Washington Summit Communique, 24 April 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>, accessed on 13 June 2010.

the WEU and - following the St. Malo Declaration - in the EU, including the Vienna European Council Conclusions. This is a process which has implications for all Allies. We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the 21st century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard:

a. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;

b. As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU;

c. We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;

d. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. We also note Canada's interest in participating in such operations under appropriate modalities.

e. We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed.”⁹

As seen in the Article 9. Para. d ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis

⁹ **Ibid.**

response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU, was clearly emphasized by the Allies.

The Cologne European Council of June 1999 is considered a milestone in terms of the institutionalization of the ESDP. It was emphasized in Cologne that as *“regards EU decision making in the field of security and defence policy, necessary arrangements must be made in order to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations so that the EU can decide and conduct such operations effectively.”* The institutional arrangements were summarized as follows:

- *“regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs Council, as appropriate including Defence Ministers;*
- *a permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee) consisting of representatives with pol/mil expertise;*
- *an EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee;*

- *a EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre;*
- *other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies”¹⁰*

The Cologne European Council stated two types of operations: EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities or EU-led operations without recourse to NATO

¹⁰ Cologne European Council Presidency Conclusions, 3-4 June 1999, ANNEX III - Declaration of the European Council and Presidency report on strengthening the European common policy on security and defence, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.htm#an3, accessed on 4 June 2010.

assets and capabilities. For EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the EU could use national or multinational European means pre-identified by Member States. It was clarified that for EU-led operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, including European command arrangements, the main focus should be on the following aspects:

- *“Implementation of the arrangements based on the Berlin decisions of 1996 and the Washington NATO summit decisions of April 1999.*
- *The further arrangements set out by NATO at its summit meeting in Washington should address in particular:*
 - *Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;*
 - *The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations.”¹¹*

Regarding the modalities of participation and cooperation the Cologne European Council emphasized the establishment of the balance between NATO and the EU. The Council made it clear that ‘the different status of Member States with regard to collective defense guarantees will not be affected.’ To this end, the Council stated the following:

- *“the possibility of all EU Member States, including non-allied members, to participate fully and on an equal footing in EU operations;*
- *satisfactory arrangements for European NATO members who are not EU Member States to ensure their fullest possible involvement in EU-led operations, **building on***

¹¹ **Ibid.**

existing consultation arrangements within WEU; (emphasis added)

- *arrangements to ensure that all participants in an EU-led operation will have equal rights in respect of the conduct of that operation, without prejudice to the principle of the EU's decision-making autonomy, notably the right of the Council to discuss and decide matters of principle and policy;*
- *the need to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between NATO and the EU;*
- *the consideration of ways to ensure the possibility for WEU Associate Partners to be involved.*"¹²

The EU's Helsinki Summit held in 1999 put forward the operational framework of the ESDP and marked the era of starting the development of the capabilities for the ESDP operations. It was decided in Helsinki to create military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons to launch and conduct EU led operations in response to international crises. The conclusions of the summit stated that:

'...cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;

*..appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management'*¹³

¹² **Ibid.**

¹³ Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm, accessed on 4 June 2010.

The Helsinki European Council set the institutional framework of the ESDP by stating that *“new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework.”* To this end it was decided that a standing Political and Security Committee, The Military Committee and Military Staff should be established.

The Helsinki European Council has also failed to give any decision making rights to non-EU European Allies in the ESDP. The Council underlined that *“appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management”*¹⁴ Furthermore the Helsinki Council underlined that *“All the States that have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying significant military forces will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating Member States in the day-to-day conduct of such an operation.”*¹⁵

The Santa Maria de Feira European Council of 19-20 June 2000 created the Headline Goal Task Force with a view to developing capable instruments for the ESDP. Later, the Helsinki Headline Catalogue was introduced. The Feira Council concluded with the below mentioned arrangements concerning the modalities for the participation of non-EU European NATO members and candidate countries, to be established for the permanent phase:

- *“regular meetings in EU+15 format, at the appropriate level;*

¹⁴ **Ibid.**

¹⁵ **Ibid.**

- *at least two meetings with the participation of the non-EU European NATO members in EU+6 format;*
- *additional meetings will be organised if the need arises upon decision by the Council or the PSC.*¹⁶

The Nice European Council of 7-9 December 2000 tackled the involvement of non-EU European NATO Members set out the permanent bodies of the ESDP and made it clear that the crisis-management functions of the WEU was taken over by the EU.¹⁷ Finally the Laeken European Council declared the ESDP operational by saying:

*“Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of the appropriate EU structures, the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop. Decisions to make use of this ability will be taken in the light of the circumstances of each particular situation, a determining factor being the assets and capabilities available.”*¹⁸

With the entry into force of the *Lisbon Treaty* on 1 December 2009 the name of European Security and Defence Policy changed into Common Security and Defence Policy and this policy still forms an integral part of the Common Foreign

¹⁶Santa Maria Da Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions, 19-20 June 2000, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei2_en.htm#an1, accessed on 2 June 2010.

¹⁷ Nice European Council Presidency Conclusions, 7-9 December 2000, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm, accessed 16 June 2010.

¹⁸ Laeken European Council Presidency Conclusions, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Declaration%20on%20operationality%20-%20Laeken%20European%20Council.pdf>, accessed on 16 June 2010.

and Security Policy. As in the preceding Treaties, the CSDP remains a fundamentally intergovernmental issue. The Council of the EU principally acts unanimously. With the Treaty of Lisbon the tasks which could be carried out under the framework of the CSDP are as follows: humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks, and tasks in post-conflict stabilization. The Council defines the objectives of the tasks and the general conditions for their implementation. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council may henceforth delegate the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary civil and military assets to carry out the task. Member States responsible for carrying out tasks must regularly inform the Council of their progress.¹⁹

The Lisbon Treaty created a ‘High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’. The goal is to achieve greater coherence across the first and second pillars within the EU. The HR will act in accordance with a Council mandate, and be responsible for harmonizing and coordinating the EU’s external action between the Commission and Council (ToL, Article 9E paragraph 4). The new HR will:

-“Conduct security and foreign policy on behalf of the Council (ToL, Article 9E, paragraph 2) and, in addition to the powers exercised by the current HR for CFSP, the new HR will preside over the External Relations Council (ToL, Article 9E, paragraph 3)4.

¹⁹ Common Security and Defence Policy, Europa, Summaries of EU Legislation, The Lisbon Treaty: A comprehensive Guide, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0026_en.htm, accessed on 5 February 2011.

-Participate in the elaboration of CFSP, having a new right to “*submit proposals on his own initiative or conjointly with the Commission*”, and may “*submit questions to the Council and convoke extraordinary meetings on emergency matters*”.

- Have a representative role in the “*conduct of political dialogue with third parties, and shall express the Union’s position in International Organisations and at intergovernmental conferences*” (ToL, Article 13a paragraph 2).

-Have responsibility for facilitating the harmonisation of Member states’ views.”²⁰

The Treaty of Lisbon also introduces for the first time a mutual defence clause, specifically binding EU Member States. If a Member State is the victim of an armed attack on its territory, it can rely on the aid and assistance of the other Member States, which are obliged to help.²¹ The European Defence Agency (EDA), created in July 2004, is also now inserted within the legal framework of the CSDP (ToL, Article 28 D), thereby seemingly reinforcing the leading role that the Member States want to assign it in pushing forward the development of EU operational capabilities and the EU as a military actor on the international scene.²²

These new arrangements brought about by Lisbon have also affected the status of the WEU. The latest declaration of 31 March 2010 adopted by the WEU Council, foresees the closure of the organization, including its Parliamentary Assembly until June 2011. A new parliamentary scrutiny mechanism for CSDP will be set up. These developments will have implications for

²⁰ The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP, European Security Review, Number 37, March 2008, http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_150_esr37tol-mar08.pdf, accessed on 5 February 2011.

²¹ Common Security and Defence Policy, Europa, **op.cit.**

²² The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP, **op.cit.**

some non-EU European NATO members like Turkey as well. The nations within the WEU involved not only full members, but also associate members such as the non-EU NATO Allies like Turkey. Turkey was fully involved in the WEU Assembly work and had a fair say in the deliberations, albeit without the right of vote. The key question now is how those nations will be involved in the process from now. It is of utmost importance that the Parliamentarians of WEU associate members and partners be a part of the planned parliamentary formation.

CSDP is intergovernmental and organized in the second pillar within a largely supranational European Union.²³ Although the essential intergovernmental nature of decision-making in relation to CFSP and CSDP looks set to prevail with the Lisbon Treaty, there are new provisions to ‘facilitate’ that process in a Union of 27 Member States. By granting the Union a legal personality (ToL, Article 46A) for the first time, the Lisbon Treaty enables it to sign treaties or international agreements towards which it has actively participated in the elaboration and negotiation. Nonetheless, CFSP is still to be governed by specific decision-making procedures. Among the various new provisions contained in the Lisbon Treaty, many do not challenge the essential inter-governmental nature of foreign and security policy decision making.²⁴

Recently different scholars have proposed a constructivist explanatory framework concentrating on domestic ideational

²³ Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee, *Breaking Pillars: Towards a Civil-Military Security Approach For the European Union*, Clingendael Institute, January 2010, Netherlands, p.14, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20100211_breaking_pillars.pdf, accessed on 17 April 2011.

²⁴ Sophie Dagand, *The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP*, *European Security Review*, Number 37, March 2008, http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_150_esr37tol-mar08.pdf, accessed on 17 April 2011.

drivers of CSDP and on the socialization and identity-shaping effects of European integration on national agents. We share the views of Meyer and Strickmann that constructivist approaches contributed to the debate by exploring the interaction between ideas, discourses, preferences, and interests across different levels of governance. Constructivism has been successful in drawing attention to the differences between EU Member States in terms of their foreign policy traditions, and strategic and bureaucratic cultures, while emphasizing that these divergences do not necessarily hinder defence co-operation. Constructivism has focused on the impact of strategic culture on CSDP, analyzing both the national and EU levels. It is suitable in explaining the complex day-to-day evolution of EU's security and defence co-operation. However it needs to theorize more extensively the link between material and ideational factors.²⁵

Given the current situation and the stage reached by the Lisbon Treaty on CSDP, we could say that the EU has managed to develop a common security policy within its limits. However, there is certainly ample room for further development. Appointment of a 'High Representative' responsible for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with the Lisbon Treaty could well be explained with Constructivist accounts. The creation of this new position reveals the fact that the difficulties that Javier Solana went through in the absence of concrete mechanisms in CFSP field have been taken into account. The experiences of Solana's term have thus turned into norms and institutions. This has been possible through interaction. The existence of clashing interests of the member states still continues to be the main challenge. From a constructivist point of view, despite the shortcomings we could state that common norms, rules and institutions have gradually emerged on the way to CSDP. The

²⁵ C. Meyer and E. Strickmann, *op.cit.*

new mechanisms created by the Lisbon Treaty regarding CSDP constitute the evidences in this vein.

The EU's quest for developing its own security arrangements has consequently led to the building of the institutional arrangements. In this chapter we followed a descriptive method based on the assumptions of Old Institutionalism. Development of CSDP and NATO-EU relations are descriptively explained. The assumptions of Institutionalism on the rule-making authority of international institutions to create rules that binds governments in collective behaviour have been useful for the research purposes.

On the basis of Institutionalism given the current state of CSDP, we could note that the EU has developed a common security policy, even though there is room for further development. According to Institutionalism supranational agents led to further integration. The evolution of CSDP process is an example of managing further integration. However, the existence of clashing interests of the member states at times is an important shortcoming. Through a constructive approach we could note that common norms, rules and institutions have gradually emerged on the way to develop a more coherent CSDP.

2.1.2. The Context of NATO-EU Cooperation

Since the early days of the NATO-EU strategic partnership, non-EU NATO members' fullest involvement in ESDP activities has been a crucial component of this relationship. As Missiroli points out, since the Cologne Summit all the issues related to ESDI and the 'Berlin-Plus' arrangements have become bilateral issues between NATO and the EU. The EU and NATO were confronted with the problem of creating a direct bilateral link in the absence of a clear set of arrangements and common procedures to apply. The concerns raised by the US administration as formulated in the famous 3Ds (no

duplication, no discrimination, no decoupling) and insufficient capabilities have further complicated the picture.²⁶

The ‘agreed framework’ for NATO-EU cooperation was established in the year 2003 with an exchange of letters and consist of Berlin (+) agreements, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Decision of 13 December 2002 and the Nice Implementation Document. The main aspects of this framework will be touched upon to give a better understanding of the research problem.

The development of arrangements between NATO and the WEU laid the groundwork for the subsequent development of the NATO-EU strategic partnership after the WEU’s crisis-management role was transferred to the European Union in 1999. NATO’s Berlin Summit of 1996 opened the way for the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements through making its assets available for WEU led crisis management operations. In January 2001, an exchange of letters between the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency formalized the start of direct relations between NATO and the EU. Since then, considerable progress has been made in developing the NATO-EU strategic partnership, though its full potential is yet to be realized. The year 2001 marked the beginning of institutionalized relations between NATO and the EU with the establishment of joint meetings, including at the level of foreign ministers and ambassadors. The NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency exchanged letters on the scope of cooperation and modalities for consultation.²⁷

In fact, the mismatch between the compositions of these two organizations and the question of how to involve non-EU

²⁶ Missiroli, **op.cit.**

²⁷NATO Web page, NATO-EU: a strategic partnership
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm?selectedLocale=en,
accessed on 6 July 2010.

NATO members in ESDP has affected relations from the start. Since it is a multifaceted international matter, there is more than one national or institutional agenda at stake.²⁸ The ‘participation issue’ has been on the agenda since the outset of the arrangements regarding the involvement of non-EU Allies. Then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs HE. Ismail Cem’s remarks expressed in 2001 are worth noting at this stage. Cem stated in Luxembourg on 26 June 2001 “... *NATO-EU co-operation is slowly but surely gathering pace and will continue to do so. However, the important issue of participation, which is one of the defining dimensions of the whole process, is yet to be resolved, even though there has recently been some progress. A solution is within our grasp if all the involved parties continue to display the foresight and flexibility.*”²⁹ Currently the ‘participation issue’ is also among one of the main items in the interaction between NATO and the EU.

The Alliance gave its blessing to ESDP through the Washington Summit of 1999. Paragraph 10.d of the Washington Summit Communique reads: “We attach utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in the EU-led crisis response operations, *building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU.*” Subsequently, at the Nice European Council held in December 2000, the EU set out the arrangements regarding the involvement in ESDP of non-EU European members (at the time Norway, Iceland, and Turkey) and candidates for accession to the EU, as well as the standing arrangements for consultations and cooperation between the EU and NATO. However, the practical details of these arrangements for the involvement of non- EU European allies in ESDP had to be

²⁸ Ihsan Kızıltan, *op. cit.*, p.34.

²⁹ Statement By H.E. Mr. Ismail Cem June 26, 2001–Luxembourg, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_statement-by-h_e_-mr_ismail-cem_br_june-26_-2001-_-luxembourg__p_.en.mfa, accessed on 19 July 2010.

elaborated. This process required intensive negotiations between the main national actors, namely the UK, U.S., Greece and Turkey as well as the EU and NATO staffs. Referred to initially as the “Ankara”, then the “Brussels” document, eventually the “Nice implementation document” was approved at the Brussels European Council on 24-25 December 2002.³⁰

The Ankara Agreement was a result of long negotiations since the Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, and Nice European Councils failed to find a comprehensive solution to the participation of non-EU allies to ESDP. The “participation question” put forward by Turkey was criticized widely before and after the finalization of the Nice arrangements. The main criticism was that Turkey was blocking the development of an effective NATO-EU relationship. Kori Schake gives a relevant answer to this criticism and states that the Turkish frustration was not the major problem: The major problems were among the NATO members and the EU members, as they were not able to agree on the modalities for assured access to NATO planning capabilities, the need for duplication between NATO and the EU, the role of Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR), and the widening gap between the US and EU military capabilities. Furthermore, she asserts that Turkey’s potential veto forced NATO and the EU to address the issue of duplication, and therefore it was beneficial in the long-run.(quoted from Dogan)³¹ The Document basically laid down the arrangements of EU-NATO cooperation in military crisis management and the existing status of non-EU European NATO members in the ESDP.³² Öner Akgül summarizes the main features of the Ankara Agreement as follows:

³⁰ Kızıltan, **op. cit.** p. 35.

³¹ Doğan, **op.cit.**, p.9-10.

³² Öner Akgül, **Turkey’s Role In The European Security And Defence Policy**, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul 2008, p. 113.

“1. in the event of a crisis, the ESDP would not be used against a NATO member,

2. the ESDP would respect in every case the obligations of the EU Member States towards their NATO allies,

3. the EU would hold more frequent consultations with the non-EU European Allies,

4. the EU would create opportunities for the non-EU European Allies to provide ‘input’ into the ESDP and to be associated with decisions and actions of the ESDP. Non-EU European Allies would send permanent interlocutors to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). They would also be able to appoint representatives to the European Union Military Committee (EUMC).

5. If a crisis occurred in the geographic proximity of the non-EU European Allies and affected their national security interests, the Council would consult them and take into consideration their position.

6. In the operational stage of the ESDP, non-EU European Allies would be entitled to be involved as observers in the operations which would be planned and coordinated by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) (in case they chose not to commit forces). In an EU only operation in which they were invited to commit forces, the Committee of Contributors would act as the main forum for the management of operation under the political control of the PSC and they would have equal rights with the EU members in the Committee of Contributors.”³³

³³Akgül, *op.cit.*, p. 113-114.

As Gözen also states, the Ankara Agreement was an important formula for finding a solution to the problem. According to this agreement, Turkey was provided with additional assurances and rights in return for removing its potential veto on NATO-EU co-operation, such as the EU's guaranteed access to pre-identified NATO assets. The Ankara Agreement was a compromise emphasizing that the EU will pay due attention to Turkey's serious concerns and supreme national interests primarily in areas of geographic proximity to Turkey.³⁴ The Ankara package was formed from six sub-titles in line with the Nice conclusions. The statement that the ESDP will not be used against any ally, constituted the so-called "security pledge" that Turkish authorities have been seeking. A similar arrangement existed also in the WEU. The section on the modalities for the participation non-EU European Allies in EU-led operations envisages that non-EU European Allies will be invited by a council decision to participate in an EU autonomous operation. Moreover, if an envisaged autonomous EU operation is to be conducted in the geographic proximity of a non-EU European ally, or may affect its interests, the council will consult with that ally, and on the basis of this consultation, will consider its participation in the operation.³⁵ That formula was a compromise; however it needed to be slightly changed in order to be accepted by all.

The Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defense Policy, Annex II, known as the "Nice Implementation Document" was particularly important as an attempt to enhance the EU-NATO cooperation. It stated:

'...under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will ESDP be used against an Ally, on the understanding, reciprocally, that

³⁴ Gözen, **op.cit.**, p. 66.

³⁵ Doğan, **op.cit.** p.11.

*NATO military crisis management will not undertake any action against the EU or its Member States.*³⁶

The Nice Implementation Document made a distinction between an 'EU-led operation using NATO assets and capabilities' and 'EU-led operation not requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities' (para.11 and 12.)³⁷ This document opened the way for NATO and the EU to reach an agreement based on the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision of 13 December 2002 and the NATO-EU Joint Declaration of 16 December 2002 on the establishment of the NATO-EU strategic partnership.³⁸

The Copenhagen European Council of 12-13 December 2002 had also further developed the parameters of NATO-EU cooperation. As Kirişçi states, in Copenhagen 15 member governments decided to admit 10 new members from Eastern and Central Europe including Greek Cypriots and Malta. Simultaneously, the summit was also deeply preoccupied with the question of whether a date should be given for Turkey to begin accession talks for eventual membership. However, the French president Jacques Chirac and German chancellor Gerhard Schröder proposed that accession negotiations with Turkey could start after July 2005. The final Presidency Conclusions offered December 2004 as a date when the decision to open negotiations would be taken "without delay", and is an improvement on the original EU position that had identified July 2005 as a possible starting date for negotiations.

³⁶ The Brussels European Council, 24-25 October 2002, Presidency Conclusions on European Security and Defense Policy, Annex II, para. 2.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 11 and 12.

³⁸ European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iv_-european-security-and-defence-identity_policy-_esdi_p_.en.mfa, accessed on 10 July 2010.

³⁹ Even though the conclusions of the Summit were not fully satisfying to Turkey at the time, emphasizing a date for the launch of the negotiations and the decision of strengthening the accession strategy for Turkey was rather a positive development in EU's stance vis-à-vis Turkey. Furthermore, on the other side the conclusions of the Summit regarding the NATO-EU relations have constituted another significant and constructive stage. The Copenhagen Council paved the way for further development of the NATO-EU cooperation and stated the following:

“As things stand at present, the "Berlin plus" arrangements and the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU Member States which are also either NATO members or parties to the "Partnership for Peace", and which have consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO.

The fact that, as things stand at present, Cyprus and Malta will not take part in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets once they have become members of the EU will not, within the limits of the EU Security Regulations, affect the right of their representatives to participate and vote in EU institutions and bodies, including COPS, with regard to decisions which do not concern the implementation of such operations.

Likewise, their right to receive EU classified information, within the limits of the EU Security Regulations, shall not be

³⁹ Kemal Kirişçi, 12-13 December 2002 - Copenhagen Summit of the European Council and Turkey, 19 December 2002, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/12-13-december-2002-copenhagen-summit-european-council-turkey/article-118245>, accessed on 10 July 2010

*affected, provided the EU classified information does not contain or refer to any classified NATO information.*⁴⁰

We could state that the long-awaited solution came during the Copenhagen summit meeting of 12-13 December 2002, as a result of parallel work both in NATO and the EU. While negotiations were carried out in the North Atlantic Council on a draft Council decision on NATO-EU cooperation and ‘Berlin plus’, Javier Solana formally transmitted to NATO the text of the Nice Implementation Document, as agreed by the Heads of State and Government of the EU member states on 13 December 2002. The NATO Secretary- General, Lord Robertson, replied to Solana’s letter by transmitting the final text of the NAC decision of the same day. Finally, a joint NATO-EU declaration was issued on 16 December 2002, in which the members of both organizations welcomed the establishment of an NATO-EU strategic partnership, identified the principles of this partnership and put on paper once again the equilibrium between the participation of non-EU European Allies and NATO’s support to the ESDP.⁴¹ The ‘EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP’ laid down the main principles of this interaction by stating:

“The European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing the relevant Nice arrangements, as set out in the letter from the EU High Representative on 13 December 2002;

⁴⁰ Copenhagen European Council 12-13 December 2002 Presidency Conclusions, Annex II, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/02/15&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, accessed on 10 July 2010.

⁴¹ Doğan, *op.cit.*, p.12.

NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevant Washington Summit decisions, and is giving the European Union, inter alia and in particular, assured access to NATO's planning capabilities, as set out in the NAC decisions on 13 December 2002;

-Both organisations have recognised the need for arrangements to ensure the coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to the two organisations, with a spirit of openness”⁴²

Those arrangements were significant for the joint action of NATO and the EU. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated on 13 December 2002 that ‘*NATO and the European Union have taken a major step forward in putting into effect the strategic partnership between the two organizations. This is a vital milestone in the history of NATO EU relations. These decisions will provide a permanent framework for joint action in support of peace and stability. They will open a new chapter in what has already been a very fruitful cooperation...Allies are determined to speedily conclude the detailed arrangements for implementing each of the elements of Berlin Plus. These arrangements should be in place by 1 March 2003.*⁴³ In his remarks of 6 December 2002, the EU's High Representative Solana underlined that it is a clear milestone in joint efforts in order to face the challenges of the new century. Solana also made it clear that they worked hard to be able to meet the deadline on making the ESDP operational by 2003. He noted that “*In December 1999, the EU said in Helsinki that in 2003 it was going to be fully ready to act in crisis management operations with military capabilities. Three years after*

⁴² EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm>, accessed on 10 July 2010.

⁴³ Statement By the NATO Secretary General, 13 December 2002, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_19599.htm, accessed on 10 July 2010.

*Helsinki, we are going to be ready. We have worked extremely hard to reach this moment and we have succeeded.*⁴⁴ Through the intensive work carried out in NATO and the EU, the implementation of the full package became possible by 17 March 2003. The transfer of the NATO mission in Macedonia to the EU on 30 March 2003 provided the first operational test for the implementation of the package.⁴⁵

By guaranteeing a secure physical environment and enabling the exchange of classified documents and information, the EU and NATO concluded an agreement on the security of information. When a crisis gives rise to an EU-led operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities, the EU and NATO will draw on the so-called "Berlin Plus arrangements". These arrangements cover three main elements that are directly connected to operations and which can be combined: EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities.⁴⁶ The Berlin Plus Agreement opened the long-awaited possibility for the EU to engage in limited crisis management in its 'near abroad'. The EU peacekeeping operations undertaken in Macedonia and Bosnia in 2003 and 2004 under this agreement give ample evidence of its importance. The document is classified. The NAC decision on the matter is based on a classified exchange of letters

⁴⁴ Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy following the agreement on the establishment of EU-NATO permanent arrangements, Brussels, 16 December 2002, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/73803%20-%20Solana%20-%20Permanent%20arrangements%20+%20NATO%20declaration.pdf>, accessed on 10 July 2010.

⁴⁵ Doğan, *op.cit.* p. 12.

⁴⁶ EU-NATO: The Framework For Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf>, accessed on 10 February 2010.

between the EU's High Representative for the Common and Security Policy Javier Solana and NATO's Secretary General George Robertson.⁴⁷

Akgül summarized that the Berlin Plus Agreement consists of:

- *a NATO-EU Security Agreement (covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules);*

- *assured EU access to NATO's planning capabilities for actual use in the military planning of EU-led crisis management operations;*

- *presumed availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management operations;*

- *procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;*

- *terms of reference for NATO's Deputy SACEUR - who in principle will be the operation commander of an EU-led operation under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements (and who is always a European) - and European command options for NATO;*

- *NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities;*

- *incorporation within NATO's long-established defence planning system, of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations, thereby ensuring*

⁴⁷ Martin Reichard, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective*, Ashgate Publishing, UK, 2006, p.273-274.

*the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations.*⁴⁸ (Quoted from Akgül)

In summary, the agreed framework for the ‘Strategic Partnership’ between NATO and the EU established in 2003 with an exchange of letters and consist of Berlin (+) agreements, the North Atlantic Council Decision of 13 December 2002 and the Nice Implementation Document. The North Atlantic Council decision of 13 December 2002 is particularly important since it clearly states that NATO-EU relations go beyond Berlin the Plus arrangements and cover NATO-EU strategic cooperation as well. In fact remarkable progress has been done so far, however much more can be achieved. There is plenty of room for the improvement of this useful relation. The starting point to this end should be the compliance of the *acquis* established up to now without further delay.

The NATO Istanbul Summit held on 28-29 June 2004 provided another opportunity to stress the importance of the NATO-EU strategic partnership. Art. 26 of the NATO’s Istanbul Summit Communique noted the progress made in developing the NATO-EU strategic partnership on the basis of and since the conclusion of the Berlin Plus arrangements. It also underlined that *‘NATO-EU relations now cover a wide range of issues of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities, and civil emergency planning. We are determined to work together to further develop the NATO-EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organisations, in a spirit of transparency, and respecting the autonomy of our two*

⁴⁸ Akgül, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

organisations.⁴⁹ The Istanbul Summit also provided another opportunity to carry the NATO-EU cooperation at the operational level to a further stage. Operation Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was terminated, and the EU launched operation EUFOR-ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the “Berlin plus” arrangements.

The efforts to manage a coherent state of affairs between NATO and the EU have intensified after the institutionalization of ESDP. Theoretically, these efforts have been in conformity with institutional insights. Turkey has been successful in reflecting its national security preferences to the delicate balance established between NATO and EU, through Ankara Agreement, the Nice Implementation Document and finally the ‘EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP’. These documents were the result of the diplomatic success of the parties involved. However, these arrangements were not concluded overnight. They were the outcome of discussions and diplomatic bargains. From a constructivist point of view, Turkey was following a logic of appropriateness through social interaction and finally these efforts resulted in norms that bind the relevant parties. Through the mentioned texts the EU is supposed to ensure the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within CSDP.

2.2. The Principles of the Involvement Issue

2.2.1. The Way to Determine the Principles of Involving Non-EU European NATO Members in CSDP

Since 2003, EU governments have conducted a wide range of ESDP operations in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Aside from geography, they have also varied in task, from traditional military peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina to

⁴⁹ NATO Istanbul Summit Communique, 28-29 June, 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>, accessed on 14 July 2010.

helping reform the Georgian judicial system and to training the Afghan and Iraqi police forces.⁵⁰ Civilian CSDP missions have become a key instrument of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Since the first civilian deployment in 2003, civilian CSDP missions have also varied in scope (police, monitoring, justice, security sector reform), nature (non-executive and executive), geographic location and size.⁵¹ Among 24 CSDP activities including the completed ones, 8 of them were in military nature.⁵²

In many ways the development of CSDP has been defined by its relationship with NATO. The EU-NATO relationship matters because of the strategic importance of the transatlantic relationship. This has made the EU's relationship with NATO a much more strategic and political challenge than the EU's interaction with other international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).⁵³

At the European Summit of Nice in December 2000, the EU elaborated on its proposals concerning 'participation' of non-EU NATO members and EU accession candidates: in the pre-operational phase to a crisis '*dialogue and consultation will be*

⁵⁰ Eds. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009), **op.cit.**, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf, accessed on 3 April 2011, p. 14.

⁵¹ Civilian CSDP Missions: lessons and best practices (Report 2009), European Union Common Security and Defence Policy, May 2010, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Fact%20Sheet%20%20Civilian%20CSDP%20missions%20-%202009%20report%20on%20lessons%20and%20best%20practices.pdf>, accessed on 3 April 2011.

⁵² Current overview of the CSDP activities is available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN>

⁵³ Daniel Keohane, ESDP and NATO, in European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009), **op.cit.**, p.127.

intensified at all levels ... to ensure that the countries potentially contributing to such an operation are informed of the EU's intentions'. In the operational phase of autonomous EU-led operations, the views of potential non-EU NATO participants would be heard once the Council *had* chosen the strategic military options. After approval of the operation concept, they would formally be invited to participate. In the case of non-NATO countries which were EU accession candidates, such an invitation was optional for the Council. The distinction between the two kinds of operations was also drawn at the level of operations planning in the case of operations requiring NATO assets, and in autonomous operations.⁵⁴

At the Brussels Summit on 24–25 October 2002, the EU concluded that the future Berlin Plus agreement should contain a clause on 'implementing the relevant Nice provisions', and contain a reference to the Charter of the United Nations. The 'participation issue' was dealt with at this Summit again at great length. The relevant procedures included: respect by certain EU member States of their NATO obligations, participation of the non-EU European Allies in peace-time ESDP consultations, relations with the EUMS and national HQs involved in EU-led operations, involvement in EU-led exercises, modalities for participation in EU-led operations, and involvement in preparation, planning and management of an EU-led operation.⁵⁵ The 'Annex II' of the Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions of 24-25 October 2002 set the modalities for the involving non-EU European NATO members in ESDP activities.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Martin Reichard, *op. cit.*, p.281-282.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.286.

⁵⁶ "ESDP: 'Implementation of the Nice Provisions on the Involvement of the Non-EU European Allies'." The Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Annex II (October 24-25, 2002).

2.2.2. The Nice Implementation Document: Setting the Main Principles of Non-EU NATO Members Involvement

The ‘Annex II’ of the Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, called also as the Nice Implementation document underlines that under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will ESDP be used against an Ally, on the understanding, reciprocally, that NATO military crisis management will not undertake any action against the EU or its Member States (Para 2). At the time the EU had 15 members, and the number of non-EU European NATO Members was 6.

According to the Nice Implementation Document in terms of participation of the non-EU European Allies in ‘**peace-time ESDP consultations**’ the EU will have ‘*permanent and continuing consultations with the non-EU European Allies, covering the full range of security, defence and crisis management issues. Additional 15 + 6 meetings will be arranged as required. In particular, consultations will, as appropriate, involve additional meetings in the format of EU + 6 in advance of PSC and EUMC meetings where decisions may be taken on matters affecting the security interests of the Non-EU European Allies. The objective of these consultations will be for the EU and the non-EU European Allies to exchange views, and to discuss any concerns and interests raised by these Allies, so as to enable the EU to take them into consideration. As with CFSP, these consultations will enable the non-EU European Allies to contribute to European Security and Defence Policy and to associate themselves with EU decisions, actions and declarations on ESDP. (para.3)*⁵⁷ According to the document, ‘15 + 6’ meetings, will be facilitated through the appointment of permanent interlocutors with the Political and Security Committee. To provide for dialogue with the EU

⁵⁷The Brussels European Council, **Ibid.**, Para.3.

Military Committee⁵⁸ and to help prepare the 15+6 meetings at Military Committee representative level, the non-EU European Allies may also designate interlocutors with the Military Committee and those designated interlocutors with the various EU bodies will be able, on a day-to-day basis, to pursue bilateral contacts, which will underpin the regular 15+6 consultations (para.5)⁵⁹ In terms of national headquarters involvement, if operational planning is conducted in NATO, the non-EU European Allies will be fully involved. If operational planning is conducted in one of the European strategic-level Headquarters, the non-EU European Allies as contributors will be invited to send officers to that Headquarters (para. 6).⁶⁰

Paragraphs 10-18 of the Nice Implementation Document explain in detail the modalities for participation in EU-led operations of non-EU European Allies. A clear distinction is made between ‘in the case of an EU-led operation using NATO assets and capabilities’ and ‘in the case of any EU-led operation not requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities’. We deem it necessary to cite paragraphs 10,11 and 12 in full for a better understanding of our research problem:

“10. In considering the options for response to a crisis, including a possible EU-led operation, the EU would take account of the interests and concerns of non-EU European Allies and consultations between them would be sufficiently intensive to ensure this was the case.

11. In the case of an EU-led operation using NATO assets and capabilities, non-EU European Allies will, if they wish, participate in the operation, and will be involved in its planning

⁵⁸ The Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS) are the permanent political and military bodies in charge of autonomous and operational ESDP.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Para.5.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Para. 6.

and preparation in accordance with the procedures laid down within NATO.

12. In the case of any EU-led operation not requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, non-EU European Allies will be invited, upon a decision of the Council, to participate. In taking decisions on participation, the Council will take account of the security concerns of the non-EU European Allies. In a specific case when any of the non-EU European Allies raises its concerns that an envisaged autonomous EU operation will be conducted in the geographic proximity of a non-EU European Ally or may affect its national security interests, the Council will consult with that Ally and, taking into consideration the outcome of those consultations, decide on the participation of that Ally, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of the Treaty on European Union quoted above and the statement in paragraph 2 above.”⁶¹

The following paragraphs of the document explain involvement in preparation, planning and management of an EU-led operation. The ‘15 + 6’ consultations are set to constitute a forum for the non-EU European Allies for engagement from the earliest stages of a crisis in dialogue with the EU. Contacts at all levels with non-EU European Allies considered to take place as the pre-crisis stage unfolds through 15 + 6 consultations and other arrangements. The idea is to enable the views of the non-EU European Allies, particularly their security concerns and their views on the nature of an EU response to the crisis, to be taken into account by the Council before decisions on a military option (para 14).

Consultations envisaged to be carried forward together in the 15 + 6 forum, including at PSC and EUMC levels. It is aimed at discussing the development of the Concept of Operations

⁶¹ **Ibid.**, Para.10-11-12.

(CONOPS) and related issues such as command and force structures so that the non-EU European NATO Members would have the opportunity to make known their views about the CONOPS, and about their potential participation, before the Council took decisions to proceed to detailed planning of an operation and decisions formally to invite non-EU Member States to take part. Once decisions were taken on non-EU Member States' participation, non-EU European Allies, as contributors, would be invited to take part in operational planning. Once the decision is taken by the Council to undertake a military operation, and a force generation conference, the Committee of Contributors would be established in order to discuss the finalization of the initial operational plans and military preparations for the operation. The Committee of Contributors is considered the main forum where contributing nations collectively address questions relating to the employment of their forces in an operation. The views expressed by the Committee of Contributors will be taken into account by the PSC (para.13-18)⁶²

Since the institutionalization of the CSDP activities, there has been an effort to accommodate non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities. These efforts have stemmed from the fact that those countries' acquisitions from past arrangements should be reflected in the new mechanism. Consequently, intense negotiations had taken place especially at the early stages of CSDP. Theoretically, those efforts culminated in the year 2002 with the Nice Implementation Document. The way to the Nice Implementation Document could well be explained with Constructivist insights. The interests of different countries have turned into norms through 'social construction'. During that period negotiations were taking place with a view to accommodate all relevant actors'

⁶² **Ibid.**, Para 13-18.

interests. The states, while considering their national interests have also taken into consideration the interests of the EU and its ambition to build a coherent security and defence policy in this regard. The logic followed its course and the road to a more institutionalized CSDP has been opened. Though there is still work that needs to be done on the way to a stronger CSDP.

2.3. Difficulties Regarding Non-EU European NATO Members' Involvement in the CSDP Activities

NATO and the EU are sometimes involved in the same theaters of operation such as Afghanistan.

21 NATO Allies are also EU members, and there is a significant degree of overlap in leading policy statements and concepts within both organizations. However, the degree of openness, transparency and particularly the desire of the two organizations to work together are different.

The partners of NATO are able to discuss and participate in shaping key documents on the future strategies in the operational field. Turkey's and other non-EU European NATO members' experience in its relationship with the EU on the other hand, is in contrast to the openness and transparency accorded by NATO to its partners. These countries like to take part in negotiations of key documents in the EU with a seat at the PSC when it comes to the activities they participate in. This happens not to be the case.

With a view to understanding the issue more clearly, we deemed it useful to conduct interviews with relevant persons. We cover the relevant parts of our interviews below.

NATO Assistant Secretary General For Defence Policy and Planning H.E. Ambassador Hüseyin Diriöz responded to our question of 'How do you evaluate the current practices of European Union regarding the involvement of Non-EU European NATO members in Common Security and Defence

Policy activities?’ with the following: “*The new Strategic Concept of NATO adopted at the Lisbon Summit of November 2010 states that “for the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in these efforts (active and effective contribution to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area) is essential.” NATO’s Secretary General, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has frequently said that there is room for further improving the current practices of the European Union regarding the involvement of non-EU NATO members (and not just the European ones) in Common Security and Defence Policy activities. In this context, he refers to the example set by NATO in involving its partners in its activities, including in decision-shaping.*” The Assistant Secretary General is of the view that ‘*Certainly from the perspective of at least one Ally, the modalities of the “Nice Implementation Document” have not been fully implemented’* in terms of involving non-EU Allies. In response to our question of ‘Do you think that the Nice Implementation document could be extended to cover not only non-EU European Allies, but also North American Allies?’ Ambassador Dirioz responded that he is not aware of any suggestion of this kind being considered by nations or either organisation.⁶³

With reference to the same questions, a Turkish Diplomat from the NATO Department of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that “*The level of the involvement of the non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities is not enough. EU does not encouraging such countries to participate in the decision shaping process of the CSDP missions and operations. As timely and meaningful consultations are imperative, EU should create proper mechanisms to develop a well functioning cooperation with non-EU European Allies. NATO’s*

⁶³ Interview with NATO Assistant Secretary General For Defence Policy and Planning H.E. Ambassador Huseyin Dirioz, 17 February 2011.

relationship with Partners constitutes as a good example and thus it could have been taken as a model by the EU.” The interviewee also stressed that *“I don’t think that the modalities of Nice Implementation Document have been fully implemented. Indeed, EU questions the relevance of the document.”*⁶⁴

Non-EU NATO member Canada’s position is also worth noting here. This country emphasizes the importance of regular consultations for improving mission planning and coordination, the inclusion of third parties in the mission development process, the importance of joint training exercises and the necessity for systematic opportunities for feedback and sharing of lessons learned. Canadians also note that while mission planning is part of the ‘Framework Agreement for the Participation of Canada in the EU Crisis Management Operations’ in practice the EU has rarely included Canada at the planning stage.⁶⁵ In our interview with a Canadian Diplomat, the interviewee responded that the modalities of the Nice Implementation Document have not been fully implemented. The interviewee referred to non-EU Allies’s not being able to duly take part in the CSDP activities decision making process as ‘problematic’.⁶⁶

A Polish Diplomat answered our question of ‘How do you evaluate the current practices of the European Union regarding the involvement of Non-EU European NATO members in Common Security and Defense Policy activities?’ with following: *Both, the EU and NATO are working together to ensure the secure and stable environment not only on their own territories but also beyond. On the base of separate agreements, the EU involves all five non-EU European NATO members,*

⁶⁴ Interview with a Turkish Diplomat, from the NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security Affairs Department of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 June 2011.

⁶⁵ Interview with a Canadian Diplomat, 15 February 2011.

⁶⁶ **Ibid.**

especially Turkey, in this activity. One could always argue that strengthened involvement of other partners could be launched. But difficulties which the EU countries alone are having with cooperation within this framework should be taken into consideration. No matter how strong and consistent the ESDP may look like, there is still no unity and real solidarity in this regard (and the decision of French authorities which decided to sell Mistral warship to Russia—what met negative reaction of many of the EU Member States – is only one example of that attitude).” Our interviewee is of the view that ‘some restraints may be observed for the fully implementation of Nice Implementation Document for the involvement of Ankara—which is caused considerably by tough issue of the Northern Cyprus. Both EU and NATO seem to be at the dead end with this matter, and the need to take adequate steps lays within the area of responsibility of Turkish and Cypriot authorities.’ In response to the question of ‘Do you think that the Nice Implementation Document could be extended to cover not only non-EU European Allies, but also North American Allies?’ the respondent stated that ‘It’s more a question of whether extending The Nice Implementation Document would bring any added value—there is a danger that too many activities could be unnecessarily doubled. Moreover, as for now, it is probably much more important for the EU and NATO to work out effective modus operandi between themselves.’⁶⁷

The above opinions underline the fact that the modalities of involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities are not being duly implemented in accordance with the relevant written obligations. Consequently it creates undesired situations for non-EU European NATO members.

⁶⁷ Interview with a Polish Diplomat, 1 February 2011.

2.4. Indicative Examples on the Existing Difficulties of Non-EU European NATO Members' Involvement

Some indicative examples concerning the difficulties of non-EU NATO Members participation to the CSDP are as follows:

- Lack of *consultations* on the crisis in Georgia despite Turkey's request on the basis of the Nice Implementation Document (September 2008).

- Lack of *response* to Turkey's request to contribute to the ESDP Mission in Georgia (September 2008).

- Lack of involvement of non-EU NATO members as a privileged group in the 'EU Concept for Force Generation'' despite the Nice Implementation Document provisions to the contrary (June 2008).

- Lack of involvement of any non-EU actor at the planning phase of any ESDP operation/mission, as foreseen in the EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level (June 2008).

- Lack of consultations with both NATO and non-EU European NATO members such as Turkey prior to the launching of EULEX in Kosovo (January-February 2008).

- Delay in the transmission of the EULEX Operation Plan (February-April 2008).

- Lack of consultations with both NATO and non-EU European NATO members such as Turkey before the initiation of EUPOL in Afghanistan (June 2007).

- Lack of response to Turkey's request to contribute to the ESDP mission in Iraq, EUJUSTLEX (2005).

-Lack of response to Turkey's request to contribute to the ESDP mission in Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) (June 2004).⁶⁸

Current practical experiences reveal that there are difficulties existing in involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities to the fullest extent despite the letter and spirit of written obligations on the part of the EU. Theoretically with a Constructivist understanding, this should not be the case. After establishing the agreed norms and procedures with the consent of all actors, the principles should be duly implemented. The above mentioned indicative examples about involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities reveal that the established legal procedures are still need to be understood by the constituent states. Here Realist insights can also be visited. We could analyse this situation from the lens of national interest maximization. Since the EU acts on the basis of consensus, some countries national interests might lead to different interpretations of the written obligations.

⁶⁸ Figuring out the mentioned indicative examples concerning the difficulties of non-EU NATO Members participation to the ESDP has been possible with the assistance of the Turkish diplomats who served at the Turkish Delegation to the European Union.

THIRD CHAPTER

FACTORS SHAPING TURKEY'S SECURITY POLICIES

This chapter aims at analyzing the main parameters of Turkey's security understanding. Special reference is made to its geographical location, as one of the main determiner of the country's security policy. It also focuses on Turkey's position in the European security architecture after the cold war.

3.1. General Parameters of Turkish Security Perceptions

Established in 1923, following a costly war of independence against the occupying powers, the security policy of the Republic of Turkey has been shaped by two main elements: geography and longstanding ties with the countries in her region. These two determinants make Turkey a key security player in Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. Turkey has faced the challenge of being located at the confluence of such conflict areas by basing its foreign policy on the motto: "Peace at home, Peace in the world" as laid down by Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic.¹

The Turkish General Staff summarizes the defense policy of Turkey as preserving and protecting the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and vital interests of the country. Accordingly in its National Defense Policy, Turkey

¹ Turkey's Security Perspective, Historical and Conceptual Background, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_-turkey_s-security-perspective_-historical-and-conceptual-background_-turkey_s-contributions.en.mfa . accessed on 24 December 2009.

considers the following targets, to be an element of power and stabilization in its region, to form a “peace and security zone” in its surroundings, to contribute to peace and security in its region and to spread it to a broader range, to be a nation that produces strategies and security that can influence all strategies regarding its region and beyond, to make use of every opportunity to be engaged in initiatives to develop cooperation aimed at having close and positive relations. Turkish officials focus on terrorism, the threat of long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction, religious extremism and regional conflicts when analyzing the country’s basic security concerns.² In response to the uncertainty and instability of the new era, the Turkish armed forces plan to re-organize themselves to add new capabilities by paying utmost attention to the establishment of multifunctional units capable of conducting different tasks. Priority is given to small but flexible units that have sufficient capability, equipped with hi-tech weapons and systems, comprising sufficient command-control assets, precise and advanced ammunition, early warning tools and also be able to conduct operations in any weather condition³.

Establishing and maintaining friendly relations with other countries, promoting regional and international cooperation through bilateral as well as multilateral schemes, resolving conflicts through peaceful means and enhancing regional and international peace, stability and prosperity are the guiding principles of Turkish security and foreign policy. Developing good neighborly relations; respect for sovereignty,

²Turkish General Staff, http://www.tsk.tr/eng/genel_konular/savunmapolitikasi.htm. accessed on 24 December 2009.

³ Turkish General Staff , http://www.tsk.tr/eng/genel_konular/gorevi.htm, accessed on 24 December 2009.

independence, and territorial integrity are its salient features.⁴ Turkish security discourse makes frequent references to cooperation and partnership and importance of sustainable peace and stability. Ankara shows strong preference for multilateral approaches in handling the crises of all sorts.

Turkey's geographic location, historical background, proximity to volatile regions, effects of domestic factors, its long lasting ties with the West, and relations with its neighbours necessitate a comprehensive approach in terms of the country's security policy. Turkish decision makers concentrate on all factors while establishing security strategies and foreign policy priorities. Placing self preservation and protection of territorial integrity at the very core of its security strategy, Turkey pursues a very active diplomacy.

Ambassador Turan Morali, then Director General of International Security Affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, analyses Turkey's security perspectives in terms of concentric circles. He places the Turkish domestic scene at the nucleus, followed by its immediate security environment comprised of its neighbours. The third circle is the broader geography consisting of regions and countries that Turkey has historical, cultural or ethnic affinities. The fourth circle is Euro-Atlantic and wider frameworks of security including NATO and the EU. Finally, the UN completes the picture.⁵ Morali's building-blocks approach to security issues, starting at the immediate environment and moving on to a wider geostrategic context through effective multilateralism well explains Turkey's security approach. A founding member of the UN, a member of NATO and all leading European and Euro-Atlantic

⁴Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_-turkey_s-security-perspective_-historical-and-conceptual-background_-turkey_s-contributions.en.mfa, accessed on 24 December 2009.

⁵ Turan Morali ., Turkey's Security Perspectives and Perceptions, op. cit., p.1-12.

institutions, and a negotiating country for membership in the European Union, Turkey actively pursues a policy geared at enhancing cooperation in its region and beyond.⁶

Ambassador Uğur Ziyal, the former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, underlines that as a country with significant military capabilities and a growing civilian sector that is active in humanitarian efforts, Turkey is a net contributor to international peace and security. Turkey makes considerable efforts through bilateral contributions. Turkey has always been committed to upholding the universal principles enshrined in the UN Charter. Turkey's commitment to international stabilization efforts dates back to the Korean War, where the services of Turkish troops are commemorated to this day. Currently, Turkey takes part in several UN peacekeeping operations.⁷

Turkey became an integral part of the Western alliance, a member of NATO, and a frontline state against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey chose to be a part of Western Alliance and since the accession to NATO in 1952, the North Atlantic Alliance has become the main pillar of Turkish security policy. Turkey's membership in NATO constituted a reconfirmation of Turkey's Western orientation. Turkey, with the second largest armed forces in the Alliance, has played a crucial role in the defence of the West in even the most delicate moments.⁸

⁶http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_-turkey_s-security-perspective_-historical-and-conceptual-background_-turkey_s-contributions.en.mfa . accessed on 26 December 2009.

⁷ Uğur Ziyal, "Re-conceptualization of Soft Security and Turkey's Civilian Contributions to International Security", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 2004, 3(2), p. 31-40.

⁸ Süleyman Demirel., *Turkey and NATO At the Threshold of A New Century*, **Perceptions**, March-May 1999, Vol IV. No.: 1,

Turkey remained a staunch member of NATO even at the height of Cold War in a volatile region bordering the Eastern Bloc. It made a substantial contribution to the security and defence of the Alliance in general and of Western Europe in particular by guarding the Alliance's southern flank. Having the longest border with the former Soviet Union, Turkey was responsible for defending one-third of the Alliance's land frontiers against the Warsaw Pact. For a country with limited resources, this came at the expense of great sacrifices.⁹

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey's security responsibilities have considerably increased. Accordingly, Turkey has broadened its contributions, both in hard and soft terms, in a vast geography ranging from the Balkans to Afghanistan. In this sense, Turkey's contributions to NATO's operations have been remarkable. It has participated in all operations led by NATO in the Balkans since 1995. It contributed to IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo and Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony in Macedonia. Since NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation on 10 August 2003, Turkey assumed the command of the operation twice and has continuously contributed troops since the beginning of ISAF. Historical ties with Afghanistan and the importance attached to NATO's eventual success are the primary drivers of Turkish contributions. H.E. then Minister Hikmet Çetin served as NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan (Jan 2004-Aug 2006) and through its Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Wardak province on 12

<http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume4/March-May1999/demirel.PDF>, accessed on 17 December 2009.

⁹ Web Page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_-turkey_s-security-perspective_-historical-and-conceptual-background_-turkey_s-contributions.en.mfa, accessed on 25 January 2010.

November 2006 Turkey further extended the scope of its contributions to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.¹⁰ Following Wardak PRT Turkey launched Jowzjan PRT in 2010.

The conflicts of the 1990's in the Balkans, as well as both Gulf crises had direct implications for Turkey. Turkey's proactive and cooperative approach required dealing with security issues, as well as terrorism, presenting new obligations and duties for every responsible member of the international community. Turkey has been a net contributor to efforts in this vein within the UN, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.¹¹

As mentioned, the demise of the Cold War has brought a new state of affairs in terms of security. Issues such as economic and social conditions, environmental damage, ethnic and religious based communal conflict, terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking have increasingly gained importance alongside the more familiar matters of military attack and defence capabilities. As Drorian argues, it is clear that the end of the Cold War has brought about a significant modification in national security agendas, especially in western states.¹² In this new uncertain security environment, the nature of the "threat" has also been subject to dramatic changes, including, inter alia, international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human and weapons trafficking, illegal immigration, illicit drug trafficking, money laundering and cyber terror. Turkey also has responded to this new security environment by adopting its security discourse to be able to meet the new challenges. Keeping the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and vital interests of the country

¹⁰ Web Page of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations, <http://www.un.int/turkey/page198.html>, accessed on January 2010.

¹¹ Ziyal, *op.cit.* p.40.

¹² Sevgi Drorian., *Security, State and Society in Troubled Times*, European Security, Vol. 14, No:2, June 2005, p.255-275.

as main pillars of the defense policy, the new threats such as terrorism, the threat of long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction, religious extremism and regional conflicts have been focused. New actors such as the media and non-state actors have been more vocal regarding the security and foreign policy making process. Media and public opinion have occupied bigger roles in current Turkish security discourse. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is at the moment in the process of reconstructing the public diplomacy mechanism and a more effective communication strategy. While geography and ties with the countries in its region have still been the main determiners of Turkey's security policy, Turkey's security agenda has broadened due to globalised security challenges. The process of accession to the European Union was also another factor influencing Turkey's security thinking.

Turkey's geographical location, historical experiences and relations with its neighbours are the main factors in shaping its security policies. Theoretically from a Realist perspective, these are the main driving forces behind the countries security policies and they place the national interests in the center. However a traditional Realist approach could not give a complete analysis of the current Turkish security discourse. There are other relevant factors in shaping these policies and they continue to emerge. This state of affairs could be better explained by constructivist accounts. While the traditional determiners are still very relevant, Turkey's security policies have broadened due to the challenges of the globalised security agenda. Non-state actors such as the media and public opinion have been more vocal in the security and foreign policy making process. The process of accession to the European Union was also another factor influencing Turkey's security thinking. The significance of Constructive analysis in order to reach an understanding of the security discourse of Turkey should be taken into account, since a Constructivist approach is useful to

analyze not only the effects of international politics but also of domestic factors on foreign policy.

3.2. Turkey's Geographical Location as One of the Determiner of Its Security Perceptions

The Turkish Ministry of Defense summarizes the geographical location of Turkey as follows:

— “The Middle East and the Caspian Basin, which have the most important oil reserves in the world,

— The Mediterranean Basin, which is at the intersection of important sea lines of communication,

— The Black Sea Basin and the Turkish Straits, which have always maintained their importance in history,

— The Balkans, which have undergone structural changes as the result of the break up of the USSR and Yugoslavia, and

— The center of the geography composed of Caucasia, which has abundant natural resources, as well as ethnic conflicts, and Central Asia.”¹³

Turkey controls the only seaway joining the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. Referred to as Bosphorus and the Dardanelles in international terminology, the Turkish straits geographically separate the Asian and European continents but bind them together politically and increase Turkey's geopolitical and geo-strategic importance. The Turkish straits are the main entry and exit of not only the littorals of the Black sea but the whole Black Sea basin. The Turkish Straits connect the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. The

¹³ Web Page of the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey, <http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GNPP/html/pdf/p1c2.pdf>, accessed on 26 December 2009.

Turkish Straits are exclusively national and used in international transport in line with the Montreux Convention.¹⁴

In the Middle East and the Caucasus, regions that are in the immediate vicinity of Turkey, deep-rooted conflicts may at any moment lead to wide-ranging military confrontations, despite all the efforts made to attain lasting peace and stability. Similarly, the situation in the Balkans remains fragile. Therefore, according to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the proactive and positive approach of Turkish foreign policy is both a choice and a necessity brought about by regional challenges.¹⁵

Turkey is also geographically located in close proximity to 72 % of the world's proven gas and 73 % of oil reserves, in particular those in the Middle East and the Caspian basin. It thus forms a natural energy bridge between the source countries and consumer markets and stands as a key country in ensuring energy security through diversification of supply sources and routes, considerations that have gained increased significance in Europe today. From the energy security perspective, the Turkish Straits are of particular importance as around 3.7% of the world's daily oil consumption is shipped through the Turkish Straits.¹⁶ Large energy consumers such as the EU seek to secure supplies through diversifying their energy suppliers. If Turkey became a major energy transit corridor into the EU, the

14

<http://www.trtenglish.com/trtinternational/en/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=41c5b326-22f1-463f-a357-9d5e8f3a5434>, accessed on 26 December 2009.

¹⁵ Web Page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>, accessed on 10 December 2009.

¹⁶ Web page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/Turkey's%20Energy%20Strategy%20\(Ocak%202009\).pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/Turkey's%20Energy%20Strategy%20(Ocak%202009).pdf), accessed on 26 December 2009

Union would be able to increase the diversification of its energy suppliers and transit countries to a certain extent. To this end, Turkey could become a partner of the EU in terms of energy. Moreover, with the implementation of its energy projects (oil and natural gas pipelines, LNG terminals, refineries, underground gas storage facilities), Turkey will have the potential to make significant contributions to the regional as well as global energy supply security.

Water also represents one of the most important items on Turkey's agenda. Despite its geographical location on the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, Turkey is not a water rich country. The Tigris and Euphrates provide an important source of water supply to Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Water, an essential need for human beings is growing more scarce, therefore water policy should be handled with cooperation. Turkey views water as a catalyst for cooperation rather than a source of conflict. Its policy is based on the premise that transboundary waters should be used in an equitable, reasonable and optimum manner.

Touching upon the major aspects of Turkey's geographic location, we could draw the conclusion that the security thinking of the country has been intensively influenced by the geography. All the issues handled above require very detailed examination and the literature in this sense is very rich. However, the main aim of this chapter is to give an outlook to the security preferences of Turkey that stem from its location. The starting point for scholars analyzing Turkey's security discourse is the country's geographical location. Without drawing a clear picture of the geographical realities, the picture can not be completed. The fact that Turkey is the only state which is at the same time a member of NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Cooperation and Development, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the G-20, and the Islamic Conference Organization, is a striking evidence of the influence

of geography on its security and foreign policy preferences, while making it a unique international actor.

The strategic importance of Turkey has been revisited with the start of a new era in the world politics. This research argues that the importance of the country has been even more visible after the Cold War, due to the realities of the new system. Traditionally, Turkey has been considered an important country because of its geographic location between Europe, the Middle East and Asia, which gives it easy access to strategically important regions and major energy resources. The conventional importance attributed to Turkey's strategic value became more visible following the events of September 11. As a result, Turkey and its foreign policy increasingly became a center of interest. As Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardaş point out, the dominant view is that post September 11 events have contributed to Turkey's strategic importance.¹⁷

At this point we would like to dwell on the Iraq issue that constitutes an example underlining Turkey's strategic importance in the world politics. Turkey's priority with regard to its neighbour is Iraq's preservation of its territorial integrity and national unity. According to Turkey, political reconciliation is the key for Iraq to emerge as a secure and stable country and therefore it gives full support to the efforts of the Iraqi Government to stabilize Iraq through political dialogue. Turkey enjoys a privileged network of communication with all the political groups and community leaders in Iraq without any exception. Turkey supports the political process on the way to democracy in Iraq, and the parliamentary elections held on 7 March 2010, was considered to be decisive on the success of

¹⁷Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardaş, Post September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited, Prepared for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, Brussels, 12 May 2003, <http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm>, accessed on 25 December 2009.

democratization and stabilization efforts in Iraq.¹⁸ Turkish officials stress the importance of reconstruction efforts and economic development, enabling all Iraqi people to benefit from Iraq's natural resources in a fair manner and determination of a special status for Kirkuk Province that will reflect the consensus of all parties. Another very important item is the PKK terror organizations' presence in Iraq. Elimination of the PKK presence from Iraq and from the agenda of Turkish-Iraqi bilateral relations is one of Turkey's major security objectives. With a proactive approach Turkey initiated neighboring countries process regarding Iraq and this platform has developed into a unique international forum.

The Iraq issue had ramifications on Turkey-US relations as well. Before the Iraq war broke out, Turkey, on the one hand, tried to contribute to the solution of the crisis in both bilateral and multilateral platform, and on the other hand, entered into negotiations with the US on the political, economical and military issues, to eliminate the potential negative impacts of a possible war. In accordance with Article 92 of the Turkish Constitution, the motion that would have allowed the opening of a northern front through Turkey was rejected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on 1 March 2003. Rejection of the motions created a bitter atmosphere in bilateral relations. However, the TGNA adopted a decision to open Turkish airspace for US forces. Following the rejection of the motion, regular contacts and reciprocal high-level visits helped consolidate Turkish-US friendship. The two sides reiterated the mutual commitment to extend the cooperation further. As a result, then Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice and then Minister of Foreign Affairs HE. Abdullah Gül agreed upon the

¹⁸ Press Release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Parliamentary elections in Iraq, 5 March 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-50_-5-march-2010_-press-release-regarding-the-parliamentary-elections-to-be-held-in-iraq.en.mfa, accessed on 11 March 2010.

“Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Strategic Partnership” in July 2006, that specifies the areas of cooperation on issues of common interest that allow structured consultations on those issues.¹⁹ Despite occasional difficulties in bilateral relations, the US and Turkey share a deep rooted partnership.

Another important issue is Iran’s nuclear file. Turkey and Iran have deep-rooted relations based on centuries of interaction. Political bilateral relations rest on the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, good neighbourliness, common interests, and respect for mutual sensitivities. The controversy between Iran and the international community regarding Iran’s nuclear programme has still been going on. Turkey holds the view that Iran has the right to develop peaceful nuclear technology on an equal footing with other countries, and this is valid for all countries. Turkey is against nuclear weapons and attaches importance to non-existence of nuclear weapons in its region. Turkish officials strongly emphasize that the only way to solve this problem is to recourse diplomacy. On this matter, diplomacy still has ample room to maneuver and Turkey is actively trying to prepare the ground for diplomatic means. There is a consensus in Ankara that Iran’s nuclear programme issue could only be solved through diplomatic and peaceful means.

Another major area that reflects Turkey’s contributions to peace and stability is the Southern Caucasus. The main aspects of Turkish policy vis-a-vis the Southern Caucasus is the existence of independent, sovereign, stable states that adopt contemporary values and realize their democratic transformation, and thus providing political and economic support to them. Turkey wishes to establish comprehensive

¹⁹ Turkish-US Political Relations, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-u_s_-political-relations.en.mfa, accessed on 5 January 2010.

cooperation with South Caucasian countries and supports their integration with international and regional organizations such as NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe and Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of South Caucasian countries and established diplomatic ties with the exception of Armenia. However Turkey is determined to continue the process of dialogue by engaging Armenia and is willing to normalize its relations with this country to promote regional cooperation and contribute to the security of the region.²⁰ Therefore, with the new administration in Armenia it was considered to be an opportunity to open a new phase in the relationship. President Gül paid an official visit to Armenia in September 2008, upon the invitation of President Sargsyan, and accompanied by Foreign Minister Davutoglu. In the aftermath of this visit Foreign Ministers have met several times with a view to discussing the means that will bring peace and security to the region. The two countries signed the “Protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations” and the “Protocol on the development of bilateral relations” on 10 October 2009. Turkey holds the view that normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey will contribute to the regional peace. Therefore, a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will facilitate the approval by the Turkish Parliamentarians of the said protocols. The Constitutional Court of Armenia has declared its decision of constitutional conformity on the Protocols with a short statement on 12 January 2010. The decision containing preconditions and restrictive provisions which impair the letter and spirit of the Protocols are considered to have the potential to undermine the very reason for negotiating these Protocols as well as their fundamental

²⁰ Turkey’s political relations with Armenia, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-armenia.en.mfa, accessed on 6 June 2010.

objective by Turkish authorities.²¹ As the normalization efforts continue, the adoption of resolutions by some parliaments regarding historical events carry the potential to damage the ongoing efforts towards establishing peace and stability in the South Caucasus. The passage of the H.RES. 252 decision in the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding the 1915 events on 4 March 2010 and the adoption of a resolution by the Parliament of Sweden on 11 March 2010 pertaining to the claim that certain peoples were subjected to genocide during the final period of the Ottoman Empire constitute two examples of such decisions. Turkish officials strongly condemned these acts and recalled the Turkish Ambassador in Washington and Stockholm to Turkey for consultations.

As explained through specific cases, it could be noted that Turkish security discourse makes frequent references to cooperation and partnership. This approach is visible such as in the way Turkey handles Iran's nuclear file or the Iraqi issue. Turkish decision makers place the self preservation and protection of territorial integrity in center of the security policies. However, all relevant factors like domestic actors are also taken into account with a Constructivist approach. Here we can say that Constructivist approach complement the Realist concerns.

3.3. Westernization of Turkish Security Discourse

As the Turkish nation state was founded in 1923, it was surrounded by a new international environment which was no longer identical to the one that which had existed prior to World War I. Most of the new actors were politically unstable and

²¹ Press Release by Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Recently Published Grounds of the Decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court on the Protocols Between Turkey and Armenia, 18 January 2010 , <http://www.mfa.gov.tr> , accessed on 25 January 2010

economically weak. The new Turkish Republic was in need of a new, realistically sound foreign policy that could respond to the challenges of the new international system without endangering the existence of the state. One of the fundamental features of the new Republic's foreign policy has been its western orientation. This was expressed first in cultural and, after World War II, in political and military terms. This orientation has been continuous.²² Westernization had its roots in the Ottoman Empire period.

The history of Westernization in the Turkish State dates back to the 'Tanzimat' (regulation) period which began in 1839. The mentioned period was characterized by various attempts to modernize the Ottoman Empire with a view to securing the territorial integrity of the Empire. The Ottoman Empire adopted westernized policies mainly in the technology, education and military fields. The Tanzimat period's main aim was to "save the state" and bring the Empire back to its victorious days. The Ottomans were aware of the fact that that one of the most important reasons for European political strength was the organizational basis of the European nation-states. This led them to organize the government through a rational division of tasks and the creation of effective enforcement mechanisms.²³

Turkey's emergence as an independent state became possible as a result of the ideological zeal and elevation of the leaders who emerged from the ranks of the Ottoman bureaucrats. The efforts of this group brought about a complete westernization of the state and society. During the nineteenth century, the ruling elite played a key role in promoting

²² Mustafa Aydın, **Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis**, Center For Strategic Research Papers, Ankara, December 2004.

²³ Kıvanç Ulusoy., "The Changing Challenge of Europeanization to Politics And Governance in Turkey," **International Political Science Review**, 2009, p. 363, also available at <http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/30/4/363>

westernization and identification with the West as the best policy for the 'state'. For the integrity of the empire or for the preservation of the imperial political and social system, the central bureaucracy decided that westernization and western alliance was the only way out.²⁴

The Turkish Republic consolidated the modernization of political structures and the secularization process of the 19th century. Founding a new state modeled on the European examples of nation-state was intended to realize a complete westernization of the social, cultural, and political spheres in Turkey.²⁵ The founder of the Turkish Republic Atatürk's theory and practice of foreign policy have been the most important factors in shaping Turkish foreign policy. Atatürk did not want to see the Turkish nation as a foreign or hostile community set apart from the nations of the world and did not want the nation to belong to any group holding such views. Atatürk wanted Turkey to be a part of the civilized world. He was aware that a successful foreign policy was necessary in order to achieve his far-reaching reforms inside Turkey. Between 1920 and 1955, Turkey entered a number of pacts and alliances, as well as signing friendship declarations with all its neighbours and bilateral security treaties with the United States.²⁶ However, as far as Turkey's security was concerned, Turkey's adherence to NATO in 1952 has constituted a milestone.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's principles are the products of the Turkish Revolution and "denotes the basic character" of the ideological principles of the Turkish Republic. The Kemalist ideology (defined in terms of six principles, namely nationalism, republicanism, populism, secularism, statism, and

²⁴ Halil İnalçık, Turkey Between Europe and the Middle East, **Perceptions**, Journal of International Affairs, March-May 1998, Volume III, No: 1, p.7-8.

²⁵ Ulusoy, **op.cit.**, p.371.

²⁶ Aydın, **op. cit.**

revolutionism) was unveiled in 1931. These principles were incorporated into the Turkish constitution in 1937.²⁷ These principles are the products of modern educational setting of the late nineteenth century and had some knowledge of European languages. They have been heavily influenced by western ideas. The transformation of the state from an empire into a modern, secular nation-state and the creation of a new political elite carried important implications for both Turkey's foreign and domestic politics. In terms of foreign policy, the construction of a new identity through these reforms provided the new political elite with the framework within which Turkish foreign policy was thenceforth to be formulated.²⁸

After the end of the World War II, Turkey attempted to take part in the picture, mainly because of the 'western element' in its foreign policy. Be it organizations such as NATO or the Council of Europe, or the European Economic Community in the early 1960s, Turkey has consistently attempted to locate itself in the western sphere of political activity.²⁹

Since the Republican times, Turkey has sought security through alliances and made effort to embrace the West. NATO membership in 1952 solidified Ankara's western orientation by establishing a long lasting institutional and functional link with the West. Turkey regards the North Atlantic Alliance as the linchpin of Euro-Atlantic security and stability. As for security policy, Turkey has defined the concepts of strategic cooperation and strategic partnership that could affect its new geopolitical

²⁷ Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, **Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach**, Edited by Charles G. MacDonald Florida International University, Routledge, New York and London, 2003, p. 46.

²⁸ **Ibid**, p.51-52.

²⁹ Adam Bronstone, *European Security into the Twenty-First Century, Beyond traditional theories of international relations*, **Euro-Turkish Relations: The Saga**, Chapter 7, England, Ashgate Publishing, 2000, p. 188.

axis in the post-cold war period.³⁰ Turkey joined Council of Europe in 1949. It has been a member for Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe since 1975. It has also taken place in the European security architecture through its associate membership status in the Western European Union in 1992.

Turkey has continued to be a strategic member of the Atlantic Alliance since the end of the Cold War, through its strategic geographical location and its contributions to the Alliance's political and military transformation. It has contributed to the Euro-Atlantic security. During the time of the discussions regarding military intervention in Iraq, Turkey's key role in the security area was once again been very visible. In February 2003, Turkey requested NATO assistance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance undertook a number of precautionary defensive measures to ensure Turkey's security in the event of a potential threat to its territory or population as a consequence of the crisis. The decisions to assist Turkey were the culmination of formal and informal consultations on a possible NATO role in Iraq, which began in 2002. This decision reflected the Alliance's commitment to the security of its member states and policy of making its assets and experience available wherever and whenever they are needed, in accordance with NATO's founding treaty.³¹

Turkey's EU membership bid dates back to late 1950s. The Association Agreement was concluded between Turkey and the European Economic Community in 1963.³² Through a Customs Union arrangement established in 1995 between EU and

³⁰ Şebnem Udum , Turkey and the Emerging European Security Framework, **Turkish Studies**, Vol.3, No:2, Autumn 2002, p. 69-103.

³¹NATO and the 2003 campaign against Iraq, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51977.htm, accessed on 1 February 2010.

³² Udum, **op.cit** , p.75.

Turkey, the relations reached an advanced stage economically. From 1994 onward the EU policy makers concentrated on Eastern enlargement. The EU's new agenda, meaning enlargement, has also opened a new era in Turkey-EU relations. The 1999 Helsinki Summit officially declared Turkey a candidate country for accession to the EU. Turkey's candidacy status can be regarded as a crucial turning point with regard to the transformation of Turkish politics. Since December 1999, Turkey's security and foreign policy environment has been diversified.³³ The European Union's quest for playing a major role in security and defence affairs, have been very closely followed by Turkey. It has supported the development of the European Security and Defence Policy of the EU from its outset. Turkey's efforts to render ESDP more inclusive have contributed to the effective development of the project from its very beginning. These efforts were based on the vested rights and status that Turkey has enjoyed in the WEU.³⁴

Turkey shares the same values as the Euro-Atlantic community. A significant number of Turks live in Europe and the Turkish economy is essentially tied to Europe. One can easily assert that peace and security in Europe is of significant importance to Turkey.³⁵ As a key component of its foreign policy, Turkey reaffirms its primary role in European security and defence affairs. From the beginning of the Cold War, it has played a vital part in the West's defence structure

³³ Tuğcan Durmuşlar., Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy: 1999-2007 Period, draft work, <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/graduateconference/barcelona/papers/477.pdf>

³⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iv_-european-security-and-defence-identity_policy-_esdi_p_.en.mfa, accessed on 25 January 2010.

³⁵ Sadi Ergüvenç., " Turkey's Security Perceptions," *Perceptions*, Vol.3, No.2, June-August 1998

thanks to its geographic position providing common borders with the Balkans, Syria, Iraq and the former Soviet Union.³⁶

According to Meltem Müftüler-Bac, there are three assets that make Turkey an indispensable actor in the European security system in the post cold war era: its membership in NATO, its military capabilities, and its geostrategic position. First, by exercising its veto in the North Atlantic Council, Turkey has an institutional lever which can affect the EU's defense aspirations. Second, Turkish military capabilities are essential for operations in the European Security area. And finally, Turkey's geostrategic position allows it to be a major player in its surroundings.³⁷ We also suggest adding Turkish contributions to CSDP as another important asset for the European security architecture. Cognizant of the fact that there is still ample room for enhancing the cooperation between Turkey and the EU on security matters, Turkey makes every effort to be able to partake actively and support the EU on this very important initiative. Not being a full member to the European Union has brought along some complications for Turkey's full participation in the security and defense policies of European Union. Despite the existence of some unfavorable conditions, Turkey did its best to contribute to the ESDP activities. Turkey is the biggest non-EU contributor to the ESDP missions and operations, the third biggest contributor to Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a significant contributor to civilian and military capability development efforts.³⁸

³⁶ Onur Öymen, "Turkey's European Foreign Policy," **Perceptions**, Vol.2, March-May 1997, <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume2/MarchMay1997/TURKEYS EUROPEANFOREIGNPOLICY.pdf>, accessed on 20 November 2009.

³⁷ Meltem Müftüler Bac, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies," **Security Dialogue**, Vol.31, No:4, December 2000, p. 490.

³⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Bridging an Unnecessary Divide: NATO and the EU," **Issues**, EUISS, October 2009, Vol.30,

Turkey's geographical location, historical experiences, and relations with its neighbours constitute the structural determiners of its security policies. However, the national identity is above all these determiners. The national identity of Turkey is formed by secularism and westernism. Theoretically from a Constructivist point of view these main determiners have led Turkey to pursue multilateral and multifaceted security policy preferences. For example, westernism has its roots in the Turkish national identity which dates back to Ottoman era. The Ottomans, with Realist considerations, adopted westernized policies mainly in the technology, education and military fields. The modern Turkish Republic adopted this approach and carried it further. Explaining with the constructivist accounts, Turkey's being a staunch NATO ally and pursuing an active policy to take part in the European security architecture in general could be interpreted with the influence of westernized foreign and security policy choices that date back to Ottomans.

Since December 1999, Turkey's security and foreign policy environment has been diversified. Turkey has now been a negotiating country with the EU since 2005. From the constructivist perspective, we could state that the determination of Turkey on the way to EU membership is a result of its European identity through a historical process dating back to the Ottoman time. There are other additional factors that could be explained with constructivist accounts. The fact that Turkey shares the same values as the Euro-Atlantic community is the main one. One can easily assert that peace and security in Europe is of significant importance to Turkey. The new risks and threats also give both sides a reason for common concern. The public opinion in Turkey has also been in favor of EU membership since the outset. It is also a commonly agreed goal

http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ISSues30_web.pdf, accessed on 25 December 2009.

of political parties in Turkey. As seen, a constructivist perspective is successful in explaining Turkey's EU bid, from a Turkish perspective. The consequence of this attitude has also reflected to the shaping of Turkish security policies vis-à-vis CSDP. The EU's quest for playing a major role in security and defence affairs has been very closely followed by Turkey. Turkey has supported the development of the European Security and Defence Policy of the EU from its outset and has made every effort to contribute actively to the CSDP.

3.4 Turkey's Position in NATO

Turkey is a staunch NATO Ally and considers the Alliance as the linchpin of transatlantic ties and Euro-Atlantic Security, of which Turkey is an integral part.³⁹ Turkey significantly contributed to the Alliance's defense posture during the Cold War and is now contributing in many ways to NATO's political and military transformation.⁴⁰

Turkey entered into the North Atlantic Alliance on 18 February 1952 and paid attention to NATO since its inception for various reasons. Despite the close cooperation with the United States through the Truman Doctrine of 1947⁴¹ and

³⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iii_-turkey_s-views-on-current-nato-issues.en.mfa, accessed on 25 January 2010.

⁴⁰ Stefanie Babst, **NATO and Turkey Looking Ahead**, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Volume 7, No.2, 2008, p.29.

⁴¹ The Truman Doctrine arose from a speech delivered by President Truman before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947. The cause for the speech was a recent announcement by the British Government that, as of March 31, it would no longer provide military and economic assistance to the Greek Government in its civil war against the Greek Communist Party. Truman asked Congress to support the Greek Government against the Communists. He also asked Congress to provide assistance for Turkey, too. (Source: U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/82210.htm>)

Marshall Aid⁴², it wanted to take part in Western European security architecture supported by North American countries. Second, Turkish ruling elite considered NATO membership as a requirement stemming from the country's western oriented foreign policy that had been followed since the proclamation of the republic in 1923. Moreover, Turkish public opinion was also of the view that Turkey should take part in NATO. A link was established by some circles between the success of the continuation of the transition period of multiparty political system that started in 1946 and Turkey's NATO membership along with the democratic European countries.⁴³

3.4.1. Turkey's Contributions to NATO

NATO has successfully transformed itself to be able to meet the needs of current security challenges. The Partnership for Peace Program, Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO-Russia Council, NATO-Ukraine Commission and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative all constitute concrete examples of NATO's transformation. Through its ongoing transformation efforts, the Alliance will strengthen its ability to confront existing and emerging 21st century security threats.⁴⁴ As a country covering

⁴² The Marshall Plan (from its enactment, officially the European Recovery Program, *ERP*) was the primary program, 1948-52, of the United States for rebuilding and creating a stronger economic foundation for the countries of Western Europe, and repelling the threat of internal communism after World War II. The initiative was named for Secretary of State George Marshall and was largely the creation of State Department officials, especially William L. Clayton and George F. Kennan. George Marshall spoke of the administration's desire to help European recovery in his address at Harvard University in June 1947. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan)

⁴³ Ed. Baskın Oran, **Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt I:1919-1980 (Turkish Foreign Policy, Facts, Documents, Interpretations from the War of Independence to day, Vol I: 1919-1980)**, İletişim Yayıncılık A.S., İstanbul, 2001, p.544-545.

⁴⁴ NATO's Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, 4 April 2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm, accessed on 20 December 2010.

the southern flank of the Alliance during the cold war years, Turkey has actively contributed to the military and political transformation of the Alliance. Turkish General Staff summarizes the main elements of the Turkish Defence Policy as determination and will for National Defence, NATO solidarity, and the Turkish Armed Forces.⁴⁵ NATO alliance is at the very core of Turkish Defence Policy.

Turkey undertook the leadership of the first two iterations of the land component of the NATO Response Force NRF (LCC) and hosted the first NRF exercise in Izmir on 20 November 2003.⁴⁶ The NATO Response Force (NRF) occupies a central role in the Alliance's transformation efforts and is a highly ready and technologically advanced force made up of land, air, sea, and special forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly wherever needed.⁴⁷ Turkey also established a High Readiness Force Headquarters (NRDC-T) in Istanbul. NRDC-T is among the six Graduated Readiness Force (GRF) HQs within NATO. Turkey also hosts the Air Component Command Headquarters in Izmir as well as the Center of Excellence on Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara.⁴⁸ With a view to become NATO's transformation expert for Defence Against Terrorism, the mentioned center also constitute concrete contribution to the fight against terrorism.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Turkish General Staff Web Page, http://www.tsk.tr/eng/genel_konular/tarihce.htm, accessed on 24 December 2009.

⁴⁶ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iii_-turkey_s-views-on-current-nato-issues.en.mfa, accessed on 25 January 2010.

⁴⁷ NATO Web Page, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm, accessed on 25 January 2010.

⁴⁸ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *op.cit.*

⁴⁹ Center of Excellence on Defence Against Terrorism Web Page, <http://www.tmmm.tsk.mil.tr/>, accessed on 20 December 2009.

In support of NATO's Partnership activities, the Turkish Partnership for Peace (PfP) Training Centre (BIOEM), established in Ankara on 29 June 1998, conducts courses and seminars with the goal of providing strategic and tactical training and education to the military and civilian personnel of Partner countries in accordance with NATO/PfP overall concepts. Turkey has also supported NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue initiated in 1994 with the objectives of contributing to regional security and stability. As an indication of its active contribution, Turkey fulfilled the task of Contact Point Embassy in Morocco for the period of 2007-2008. In addition, the PfP Training Center in Ankara is open to all MD Countries for courses carried out in the spirit of the MD.⁵⁰

Turkey's contributions to NATO's operations have also been remarkable. Turkey has played a very active role in international peacekeeping operations in the framework of NATO. Turkey has participated in all operations led by NATO in the Balkans since 1995. It contributed to IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo and Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, and Allied Harmony in Macedonia. Most recently, on 27 March 2011, NATO Allies decided to take on the whole military operation in Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. The purpose of Operation Unified Protector is to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack. It is decided that NATO will implement all military aspects of the UN Resolution⁵¹ Turkey also contributed to this operation. Turkey wants the NATO operation to be conducted efficiently, in line with the directives

⁵⁰ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **op.cit.**

⁵¹ NATO and Libya - Operation Unified Protector, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm?, accessed on 9 April 2011.

drawn out by the UN Security Council resolutions and accepted by consensus by the NATO Council.⁵²

Since NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation on 10 August 2003, Turkey assumed the command of the operation twice and has continuously contributed troops since the beginning of ISAF. Through its Provincial Reconstruction Team in Wardak province, on 12 November 2006 Turkey has further extended the scope of its contributions to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan.⁵³ In light of the successful efforts of the Wardak Provincial Reconstruction Team since November 2006, Turkey also inaugurated the Jawzjan Provincial Reconstruction Team in July 2010. Jawzjan Provincial Reconstruction Team will extend Turkey's contributions in support of development, good governance and capacity building to broader masses. The principal objective of the Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Teams is to support the Afghan authorities' efforts in development and capacity building at the local level.⁵⁴ Turkey has also been active in supporting NATO's humanitarian assistance activities. It participated with a C-130 aircraft for the NATO support to USA in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The same year when Pakistan was hit by a devastating earthquake, Turkey also joined NATO's humanitarian assistance operation. As part of NATO's logistic support to the Africa Union Operation in Darfur, Turkey assigned a C-130

⁵² Speech Delivered by H.E. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Libya (Ankara, 7 April 2011), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delievered-by-h_e_-prime-minister-recep-tayyip-erdogan-on-libya-_ankara_-7-april-2011_.en.mfa, accessed on 9 April 2011.

⁵³ Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations, <http://www.un.int/turkey/page198.html>, accessed on 25 December 2009.

⁵⁴ 18 July 2010, Press Release of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Kabul Conference, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-162_-18-july-2010_-press-release-regarding-the-kabul-conference.en.mfa, accessed on 19 July 2010.

aircraft.⁵⁵ Turkey also takes part in the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, NTM-I. A number of Iraqi military personnel attended courses in Turkey and Turkish officers have been serving at NTM-I Headquarters in Baghdad.

When we compare the defence expenditures, we see that Turkey's expenditure is higher than the defence expenditures of many European Allies. Turkey has the second largest army among the NATO Allies.

Table 1 : Defence expenditures of NATO countries
Current prices and exchange rates (million US dollars)

Country	1985	1990	1995	2000	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Belgium	2428	4644	4449	3191	4262	4229	4308	5164	5469
Bulgaria	"	"	"	"	621	667	893	1198	1316
Canada	7566	11547	9077	8292	11492	13204	15044	17926	19477
Czech Republic	"	"	"	1148	1984	2211	2408	2527	3173
Denmark	1259	2650	3118	2393	3579	3468	3897	4175	4418
Estonia	20780	42589	47768	33815	53007	52909	55673	61784	66180
France	19922	42319	41160	28150	38007	38054	38092	42552	46241
Germany	2331	3863	5056	5522	5960	6752	7313	8208	9989
Greece	"	"	"	804	1533	1596	1410	1776	1850
Hungary	9305	23376	19375	22411	34116	33527	33409	28648	30471
Italy	"	"	"	"	176	204	314	443	545
Latvia	"	"	"	"	310	305	353	453	548
Lithuania	38	97	142	128	235	244	247	286	228
Luxembourg	3884	7421	8012	5972	9376	9567	10218	11480	12093
Netherlands	1797	3395	3508	2922	4887	4885	5012	5875	5870
Norway	654	1875	2670	2204	2848	3143	3154	3309	3673
Poland	"	"	"	"	1530	1976	2251	2608	3017
Portugal	"	"	"	"	711	823	911	1139	1458
Romania	3969	9053	8651	7001	12661	13054	14434	16724	18974
Slovak Republic	2365	5315	6606	9994	9390	10301	11560	11810	13324
Slovenia	23485	39590	33836	35608	49061	55894	59076	68903	60499
Spain	258165	306170	278856	301697	464676	503353	527660	556961	574940
Turkey									
United Kingdom									
United States									

*Statistics retrieved from NATO Web Page⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Turkish General Staff,

<http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararasi/barisdestekkatki.htm>, accessed on December 2009.

⁵⁶ Statistics retrieved from NATO Web Page,

http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_02/2009_03_D34F22C9AE854B7FAA0BB409A21C90D3_p09-009.pdf, accessed on 9 April 2011

Turkish Ambassador Hüseyin Diriöz was appointed to the post of NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning on 16 July 2010. The need for the fair and balanced allocation of high level posts in NATO among Allies was one of the topics that Turkey had emphasized during the appointment process of Secretary General Rasmussen. As a result of this appointment, a Turkish citizen will assume the post of Assistant Secretary General, after a lapse of more than 30 years.⁵⁷

NATO, as an intergovernmental organization, allows equal representation to its member states and the decisions are taken on the basis of consensus. When decisions have to be made, action is agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord. There is no voting or decision by majority. Each nation retains complete sovereignty over its own decisions.⁵⁸ As the decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity, Turkey could reflect her position very clearly in the Alliance, just as the other members. During the Cold War, NATO remained as the most powerful security organization. However after the Cold War, new security platforms such as the ESDP within the European Union have emerged. NATO still preserves its importance, but there are other actors as well. Turkey's place in the European Security would be clearer if NATO had remained the only security organization. However the issue of not belonging to the European Union as a full member has brought along some complications for Turkey's participation in the security policies in Europe.

⁵⁷ Press Release of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Appointment of The Ambassador Hüseyin Diriöz to the NATO Assistant Secretary, 16 July 2010, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-160_-16-july-2010_-press-release-regarding-the-appointment-of-the-ambassador-huseyin-dirioz-to-the-nato-assistant-secretary.en.mfa , accessed on 19 July 2010.

⁵⁸ NATO Handbook, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070101.htm>, accessed on 5 January 2011.

Table 2: NATO Countries' Armed Forces-Annual Strength Military (Thousands)

Country	1985	1990	1995	2000	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Belgium	107	106	47	42	40	40	39	39	38
Bulgaria	//	//	//	//	42	43	41	37	29
Czech Republic	//	//	//	52	24	25	25	25	24
Denmark	29	31	27	24	20	21	20	21	18
Estonia	//	//	//	//	4	5	4	4	5
France	560	548	502	394	357	357	356	354	347
Germany	495	545	352	319	252	246	248	245	252
Greece	201	201	213	205	132	135	139	134	134
Hungary	//	//	//	50	26	24	23	20	19
Italy	504	493	435	381	315	314	309	195	195
Latvia	//	//	//	//	6	6	5	5	5
Lithuania	//	//	//	//	11	11	10	9	10
Luxembourg	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	0.9
Netherlands	103	104	67	52	49	50	49	48	44
Norway	36	51	38	32	22	18	18	19	20
Poland	//	//	//	191	150	150	150	150	150
Portugal	102	87	78	68	39	40	40	38	38
Romania	//	//	//	//	91	73	75	74	62
Slovak Republic	//	//	//	//	18	15	15	14	14
Slovenia	//	//	//	//	6	6	7	6	7
Spain	314	263	210	144	124	120	127	132	129
Turkey	814	769	805	793	502	501	501	497	496
United Kingdom	334	308	233	218	208	201	196	192	173
NATO-Europe	3600	3508	3009	2966	2439	2400	2400	2262	2210
Canada	83	87	70	59	62	63	54	55	55
United States	2244	2181	1620	1483	1414	1377	1388	1340	1326
<i>North America</i>	<i>2327</i>	<i>2268</i>	<i>1690</i>	<i>1542</i>	<i>1476</i>	<i>1439</i>	<i>1442</i>	<i>1395</i>	<i>1381</i>
NATO-Total	5927	5776	4698	4508	3915	3839	3842	3657	3591

*Statistics retrieved from NATO Web Page⁵⁹

As Table 2 demonstrates, Turkey is among the first in European Allies, and the second among all Allies in terms of the annual strength of Armed forces.

Realist, Institutional and Constructivists accounts could all explain Turkey's becoming a NATO member within their capacity. Realists assert that strengthening the security of the state in the face of Soviet threat was the main reason for Turkey to join NATO. However, with a constructivist approach NATO membership can be regarded as a quest for participation in the collective identity of NATO. From a Constructivist point of

⁵⁹Statistics Retrieved from NATO Web Page, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_02/2009_03_D34F22C9_AE854B7FAA0BB409A21C90D3_p09-009.pdf, accessed on 9 April 2011.

view since Republican times, Turkey has sought security through alliances and devoted persistent efforts to embrace the West. NATO membership in 1952 solidified Ankara's western orientation. Since the institutionalization of European Affairs after the end of the World War II, Turkey attempted to take part in the picture, mainly because of the 'western element' in its national identity. This is in line with the 'identity' analysis of Constructivists. The old institutionalism analyzed the formal institutions of government. The Institutionalists' descriptive analysis of the evolution of Turkey's security policies is also useful to explain Turkey's becoming a NATO member.

During the Cold War years, Turkey was considered a geopolitical asset having the function of containing the USSR in NATO's southern region. However, with the fall of the Warsaw Pact, the picture has changed. The strategic importance of Turkey has been revisited with the start of a new era in the world politics. Turkey has found itself at the center of international security issues after the cold war. The conflicts of the 1990s in the Balkans, as well as both Gulf crises, and the dynamics of post September 11 had direct implications for Turkey. The revisiting of Turkey's strategic importance could well be explained with constructivist terms. We could explain that perception of states can change due to various factors, and it is very relative in terms of the change in the international system. Another important point here to note is the continuation of NATO's being the backbone of Turkey's security policies after the Cold War could be explained by Realist accounts.

3.4.2. Turkey's Position During the Preparation of NATO's New Strategic Concept

NATO's evolution throughout the 1990s laid the groundwork for its transformation. While, the commitment to collective defence remains the linchpin of the NATO of the twenty-first century, NATO has adjusted its forces to be more

flexible and more mobile.⁶⁰ NATO's transformation process is reflected in the Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999.

A new Strategic Concept was needed, because the last one was written more than a decade ago. This was before 12 new states joined the Alliance and before NATO became involved in operations outside Europe. A new concept was necessary to reflect the totality of the security landscape of our day and it presents an unparalleled opportunity to refine the Alliance's self-conception.⁶¹ At the NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl on 3-4 April 2009, Heads of State and Government tasked the Secretary General to develop a new NATO Strategic Concept and it was expected to be completed by the time of NATO's next Summit in Lisbon at the end of 2010. The new Strategic Concept, was envisaged to take into account how NATO has adapted and transformed in the last decade to be able to better tackle these challenges. The new Strategic Concept aimed at giving specific guidance to 28 NATO members on how they need to further transform the Alliance and their own national defence structures and capabilities.⁶²

Turkey took an active part in the efforts of drafting NATO's new Strategic Concept. Retired Turkish Ambassador Ümit Pamir participated in the 'Experts Group' tasked to prepare the new Strategic Concept. Prior to the approval of NATO's new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit of 2010, Turkey emphasized that collective defense should continue to be reaffirmed as the core purpose of the Alliance, it is not necessary to redefine Article 5 responsibilities and the new

⁶⁰ Javier Solana, NATO in the Twenty First Century, *Perceptions*. March-May 1999, Vol IV. No:1 <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume4/March-May1999/solana.PDF>, accessed on 5 March 2010.

⁶¹ Ivo H. Daalder (US Ambassador to NATO) **Defining US and NATO Priorities**, Chatham House, 14 September 2009.

⁶² NATO official Web Page, <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/what-is-strategic-concept.html>, accessed on 3 March 2010.

Concept should provide the necessary flexibility. Indivisibility of the Alliance's security, continuation of Transatlantic link, and solidarity should be preserved in the new Concept and a delicate balance should be established between defense and crisis management operations. The principle of 'consensus' is an indispensable element of preserving the Alliance's solidarity for Turkey. Any concession on this principle is deemed unacceptable. Turkey considers it directly linked to the credibility of the Alliance. Turkey emphasized that non-Article 5 responsibilities should not be allowed to overshadow this core responsibility of the Alliance. Turkey stressed that a more politically involved NATO is needed, not a military Alliance dealing only with the military and technical details of ongoing operations. New global actors such as, China, India, Pakistan and Japan should be included in the network of partnerships. Therefore continuation of the Alliance's open door policy is deemed vital. Turkey underlined that terrorism is another important issue that should occupy an important place in the new Strategic Concept.

According to Turkey, partnerships and the NATO-Russia Council should be considered among the main elements of the new concept, and continuation of the open door policy should be emphasized. Nuclear issues are another significant aspect. Turkey paid attention to close consultations on nuclear issues among the Allies. Consultations on nuclear issues are an important element of the Alliance solidarity and cohesion. According to Turkey, NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept continues to contain key elements on nuclear issues, which remain as relevant and critical today as they were in 1999. Turkey stressed that NATO should remain the main forum for transatlantic dialogue and US-EU dialogue cannot be an alternative of the ongoing dialogue in NATO.

Turkey reiterated that NATO's Strategic Concept should provide guidance on the strategic partnership between NATO

and the EU, as well. This guidance should focus primarily on how to make this partnership work better. It should not be formulated simply as a unilateral declaration of NATO's readiness to support development of European defence capacity. The agreed framework of NATO-EU strategic cooperation as established in March 2003 should continue to provide the modalities of this cooperation. These modalities are comprehensive and cover all aspects of NATO-EU interaction. Turkey hopes to see reflected the delicate balance established at NATO's 1999 Washington Summit, which rendered NATO's support for CSDP activities conditional to the fullest possible involvement of non-EU Allies in CSDP and underlines that the desire of both NATO and the EU to work together should be mutual. Non-EU Allies' fullest involvement in CSDP activities is a key element of this relationship. Turkey also emphasized that the fulfillment of previous commitments by the EU need to be addressed urgently. An efficient cooperation between NATO and the EU will not be realized when commitments toward non-EU Allies who make significant contributions to CSDP activities are not fulfilled.

FOURTH CHAPTER

ANALYZING TURKEY'S EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE CSDP

4.1. The Core of the Problem

The main issue stems from the marginalization of Turkey's position in the European security architecture during the process that the EU has been developing its own capacity since 1990s. According to Turkey, a successful security policy for any region can only be established with the inclusion of all the relevant actors. The issue is directly related to the transfer of the functions of the Western European Union to the European Union. The situation became more complicated when the EU expressed its desire to use NATO assets and capabilities for its operations within the framework of the ESDP. Turkey participated in the construction of the EU's security and defence identity within the framework of the WEU. However, this is not to be the case with the current arrangements. As Ramazan Gözen points out, just like its application for accession to the EU, Turkey applied for full membership in the WEU in 1991. Turkey was offered an 'associate membership'. The EU decided that full membership in the WEU would be contingent upon full membership in the EU.¹

The problem arises from the fact that the EU has not responded to Turkish demands in terms of decision shaping, decision making and the implementation phases and also of the operational phases of CSDP. Turkey has actively taken part in international organizations such as NATO, OSCE, and WEU. It does not want to be excluded in any international organization

¹ Ramazan Gözen, *op.cit.*, p.25.

whose activities may have implications for Turkish security, defence and foreign policy. Ramazan Gözen analyzes Turkey's connection with the European security architecture in three channels and dimensions. Firstly, as a full member of NATO, Turkey is at 'the centre' of the European security architecture. Secondly, as an Associate Member of the WEU, Turkey is at 'the midway' of this architecture. Thirdly, Turkey has been put at 'the margin of' the European Security and Defence Policy. Turkey's position within the European security architecture moved from 'the midway' to 'the margin, due to the termination of Turkey's participation in the WEU decision making mechanism and of its exclusion from the CSDP's decision making process. The ESDP decision making mechanism created a structure that put EU members at the centre and the others at the margin, the latter serving only as "contributors" to the ESDP.²

In the institutional aspect, through the inclusion of the WEU in the EU, Turkey's position has deteriorated. Despite the fact that WEU provisions were not also satisfying Turkey one hundred percent, this new formation was also far from meeting Turkey's demands. During the development phases of ESDP, Turkish officials stressed that Turkey, as a European country aware of her responsibilities, has always supported the notion that Europeans should assume more roles and responsibilities in matters pertaining to the security of the continent. Turks were underlying that transparency, inclusiveness, and the indivisibility of European security are basic principles which should be the basis of all work in this field.

Work has been carried out within NATO for the development of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) in parallel to the work in the EU for the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP). NATO Members at the

² **Ibid.**

Summit meeting held in Washington on 23-24 April 1999, through the documents accepted therein have established the basis which takes into account Turkish expectations for full and equal participation of European Allies who are not, like Turkey, members of the EU, in the new structures to be established within the context of the CESDP. Following that period intensive presentations have been made by Turkey both to NATO and bilaterally to EU members for the acceptance of arrangements that would on this basis ensure Turkey's full and equal participation in the new structures. Turkish efforts have been intensified on the preservation and further development on a contractual basis of its *acquis* acquired at the WEU.³

Turkey is in close proximity to existing and potential crisis areas. Therefore, arrangements to be formulated for the security of Europe were of the utmost importance to it, given the fact that Turkey's vital interests would be at stake. The following aspects of EU activities are of particular significance to Turkey as outlined by Ambassador Omur Orhun: *'Day to day consultations and other non-operational activities related to European security and defence issues; consultations on and the shaping of policy related to crisis situations, including the stage before a decision in principle on planning for or initiating an operation, full participation in all aspects of force planning, operational planning and exercises; not only military but also non-military crisis management operations.'*⁴ Turkey has

³ Press Release of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding Common European Security And Defence Policy (CESDP) Addressed At The EU's Helsinki Summit No:239 -;December 13, 1999, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-release-regarding-common-european-security-and-defence-policy-_cesdp_-addressed-at-the-eu_s-helsinki-summit_br_no_239--_december-13_-1999.en.mfa, accessed on 1 June 2010.

⁴ Ömür Orhun, "European Security and Defence Identity-European Security and Defence Policy: A Turkish Perspective." *Perceptions* V (September-

emphasized that any future arrangements should allow direct input into the decision process for all relevant aspects of European security. Such arrangements should be based on the common recognition that European security and defence must be further developed in close co-operation with NATO and transatlantic partners.⁵

The Helsinki European Council of 1999, stated that *“appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management”*⁶. The points reflected at the Helsinki Summit indicate that the prevailing understanding in the EU was still far from being satisfactory regarding the participation of European Allies like Turkey, who are not members of the EU, in the new structures within the CESDP. In fact, by this statement Turkey was categorized in the same place with other countries that are not NATO members. Turkey showed its reaction by stating that *“work concerning the development of the ESDI will be continued not only in the EU, but also within NATO during the forthcoming period. During this period we will continue our demarches regarding the fulfillment of our expectations on participation. We will persist in defending our legitimate views.”*⁷ Turkey wished that the EU would show the necessary foresight for establishing a satisfactory arrangement for the participation of all European Allies, so that there will be no difficulties in defining the modalities for the foreseen NATO-EU relations,

November 2000), <http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume5/September-November2000/VolumeVN3OmurOrhun.pdf>, accessed on 1 April 2010.

⁵ **Ibid.**

⁶ Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, **op.cit.**,

⁷ Press Release of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding Common European Security And Defence Policy (CESDP) Addressed At The EU's Helsinki Summit No:239, **op. cit.**

and eventually, it will take the place it deserves in the new structure.

At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey could have been marginalized and excluded from the emerging European project or there could be a working relationship to incorporate Turkey within in the European Union. The Helsinki Summit decided on the latter. According to Turkish authorities, the declaration of Turkey as a candidate country on an equal footing with other candidate countries was a positive development. Even before the Helsinki Summit when Turkey's candidate status was not yet 'confirmed politically', Turkey was giving its full support to ESDP. Turkish Defence Minister Sabahattin Çakmakoglu declared Turkey's readiness to contribute to the ESDI/P with five thousand troops, 36 F-16 planes, two transportation aircraft and a number of warships, and even more upon mutual agreement.⁸ Meltem Müftüler-Bac argues that the important reason behind granting Turkey the candidacy status at Helsinki was mainly the EU's evolving security role.⁹ It is true that security considerations of the EU have played a significant role, but there were other factors such as the change of the German government from Christian-Democrat to a Social Democrat-Green coalition that made a positive impact in this regard.

Turkish officials underlined that the Washington Summit foresees that the involvement of the non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis management operations would be ensured, building on the existing arrangements within the WEU. Turkey's approach regarding the evolving CESDP had been shaped within this framework. Turkey emphasized that the EU's requests from NATO will be assessed by Turkey within the

⁸ Quoted from Mahmut Bali Aykan, Turkey and European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A Turkish View, **Journal of Contemporary European Studies**, Vol.13, No.3, December 2005, p. 337.

⁹ Meltem Müftüler Bac, 'Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies', **op. cit.**, p. 489.

framework of the above-mentioned principles, its national interests, and of European security. Turkey made it clear that it can not be expected to be content with EU's relevant decisions and alter her own views.¹⁰ Therefore the 2000 Feira Council's conclusions were unacceptable to Turkey, mainly in terms of the participation issue, since in the case of an EU operation undertaken with NATO assets, non-EU European NATO members would participate automatically, *'if they so wish'*, whereas in the EU-only operations, they would simply 'be invited' to be involved if the Council regards it as appropriate.

Missiroli summarized the picture drawn at Feira that "exchanges with the non-EU European NATO members where the subject matter requires it, *such as* on questions concerning the nature and functioning of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities' and 'a single, inclusive structure in which *all* the 15 countries concerned (the non-EU European NATO members *and* the candidates for accession to the EU) can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU". In the emerging ESDP jargon, this meant that all non-EU members would be involved in decision-*shaping*, which entailed information, consultation and pre-planning and in implementation. However, decision making and political control would pertain exclusively to the EU-15.¹¹

Feira failed to tackle Turkey's legitimate concerns and expectations or address the core of the following issues:

¹⁰ Press Release of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Decisions Taken At The EU Feira Summit (Unofficial Translation) No:103 - June 20, 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-decisions-taken-at-the-eu-feira-summit_br_-_unofficial-translation_br_no_103--_june-20_-2000.en.mfa, accessed on 19 July 2010.

¹¹ Missiroli, *op. cit.*, p.15.

- “A non-Article 5, Petersberg-type operation may eventually transform into an Article 5 contingency, so having direct implications on the security and defence of all Allies;

- Any possible EU operation will make use of the same sets of forces and capabilities assigned for the full range of Alliance missions;

- And, an EU operation, regardless of the capabilities used, might affect the legitimate security interests of Allies like Turkey.”¹²

In Missiroli’s words, the Helsinki and Feira decisions had indeed curtailed the ‘assured access’ of European NATO allies to EU-only operations as compared to the arrangements in place within the WEU. Their eventual ‘invitation’ to join was de facto subject to a unanimous decision, whereas their eventual participation in a WEU-only operation was assured unless ‘a majority’ of full members decided otherwise. Missiroli also emphasized that the two procedures are quite different.¹³

While the EU created “an autonomous decision making structure for the ESDP,” the non-EU countries were put at the margin. Those countries are entitled only to become involved as “consultant” countries, and whether or not their views, interests, and participation are taken into consideration depends on the decision of the EU decision making institutions. Turkey’s main concerns stemmed from the fact that the position granted to non-EU NATO members was not satisfactory in the current phase when it was compared with those awarded by the WEU. As Gozen rightly put forward, the non-EU European NATO (at the time these countries were Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Turkey, Norway and Iceland) members that

¹² Orhun. **op. cit.**

¹³ Missiroli, **op.cit.**, p.16.

had been part of the WEU were to be influenced negatively by these developments.¹⁴

Doğan states that Turkey was traumatised long before the Nice arrangements by the fact that Europeans were preferring to make their own arrangements for military crisis management, therefore reinforcing the view that they intended to leave Turkey “out in the cold”. She summarizes the main reasons for these concerns as: European security and defence were to be dealt with an organisation that Turkey was not a full member of. On the other hand, NATO was faced with the risk of the so-called 3 Ds (discrimination, duplication and decoupling); and the WEU, in which it developed an equal status over time and enjoyed rights close to an EU member, was to be left dormant. Turkey’s location in the midst of a region of instability, namely the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, necessitated that it be perceived by other countries in the region to be firmly anchored in the European security architecture. Doğan states that this perception of Turkey has been put at risk by the fact of it being sidelined in the new EU project. Therefore, according to Doğan the so-called “participation question” was above all an issue of national security.¹⁵

4.2. Turkey and the Western European Union

Analyzing the relations between the Western European Union and Turkey is of particular importance to be able to understand Turkey’s position in the European security architecture. The basics of Turkey’s main arguments in its involvement in the CSDP and NATO-EU cooperation stem from her rights deriving from her associate membership to WEU. This part is included in this study, to understand Turkey’s concerns clearly and correctly vis-à-vis the new European security system.

¹⁴ Gözen, **op.cit.**

¹⁵ Doğan, **op.cit.**, p.9

4.2.1. The Role Assumed by the WEU in the European Security Architecture

The ‘Dunkirk Treaty’¹⁶ of 4 March 1947, signed between France and England had constituted the first initiative on the way to European integration. It was stated that a solution was sought for the division of Germany through the Dunkirk Treaty. In that period, tensions between the Eastern and Western Blocks became more visible and eventually the Brussels Agreement was signed in 17 March 1948.¹⁷ The Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

The Treaty represented an attempt to translate into practical arrangements some of the ideals of the European movement. Its main feature was the commitment to mutual defence, if any of the signatories be the victim of an armed attack in Europe. In September 1948, military co-operation was initiated in the framework of the Brussels Treaty Organisation. A plan for common defence was adopted, involving the integration of air defences and a joint command organisation. The Paris Agreements, signed on 20 October 1954, which amended the Brussels Treaty, created the WEU as a new international organisation and provided the participation of Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.¹⁸ The WEU remained under NATO’s

¹⁶ In Dunkirk, on 4 March 1947, France and the United Kingdom signed a mutual assistance pact. This friendship and cooperation treaty was openly targeted at Germany in order to forestall any new aggression on its part. The French Government sought to guard against what it still considered a potential threat from across the Rhine. (**Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between The United Kingdom and France, Dunkirk, 4 March 1947, <http://www.ena.lu>**)

¹⁷ Burak Özdemir, **Avrupa’nın Güvenlik ve Savunma Yapısı ve Türkiye** (Europe’s Security and Defense Structure and Turkey), İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, İKV 171, İstanbul, October 2002, p. 2.

¹⁸ History of the Western European Union, <http://www.weu.int>, accessed on 20 February 2010

shadow until the 1980s and it started to assume an important role in Western European security architecture only after the Maastricht Treaty of 1991.¹⁹ Despite the fact that the WEU's mutual defense commitment in Art V is more binding than NATO's, this organization had remained dormant during most parts of the Cold War (see the footnote for a comparison between NATO's and WEU's Article 5).²⁰ The dormancy of the WEU mainly stemmed from disagreements among the European countries regarding the role of the WEU. In that era the WEU had marginalized and delivered its functions to NATO. However the year of 1984 constituted a milestone in the WEU history.²¹

The early 1980s witnessed a revival of the debate on European security. The failure of the Genscher-Colombo

¹⁹ Avrupa'nın Güvenlik ve Savunma Yapısı ve Türkiye, op.cit, p. 2.

²⁰ Art. 5 of the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 states that **'If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.'**

Whereas Art. 5 of North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 reads as **'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.**

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.'

²¹ Micheal Rupp, Avrupa Birliği'nin Ortak Dışışleri ve Güvenlik Politikası ve Türkiye'nin Uyumunu, (European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and Turkey's adaptation), İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, May 2002, p.52.

initiative in November 1981, aimed at extending the EPC's sphere of competence to security and defence questions, prompted the countries in favour to look for another framework of consultation. A preliminary joint meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers within the WEU framework was held in Rome on 26 and 27 October 1984. It was marked by the adoption of the founding text of the WEU's reactivation: the "Rome Declaration". Work on the definition of a European security identity and the gradual harmonisation of its members' defence policies were among the stated objectives. Ministers recognised the "*continuing necessity to strengthen western security, and that better utilization of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance*". Pursuant to the decisions taken in Rome, the WEU Council was henceforth to hold two meetings a year at Ministerial level.²²

The Maastricht Summit held in December 1991 constituted the main development in this regard. At the Summit the member states decided the development of European security and defence identity, the WEU became as the defence component of the European Union on a new basis for the sake of stability and security in Europe. In this context states which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European member states of NATO are invited to become associate members of the WEU in a way which will give them the possibility to participate fully in the activities of the WEU.²³

²² History of WEU, <http://www.weu.int>, accessed on 20 February 2010.

²³ Maastricht European Council Presidency Conclusions, 9-10 December 1999, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/maastricht/default_en.htm, accessed on 15 February 2010.

The WEU council of ministers gathered in Bonn on 19 June 1992 and signed the ‘Petersberg Declaration’ the WEU assumed roles such as peace force, peace keeping, crisis prevention and humanitarian assistance while having the idea of strengthening NATO’s European dimension. To this effect Art. II.4 of the Petersberg Declaration reads as:

“Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

-humanitarian and rescue tasks;

-peacekeeping tasks;

-tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”²⁴

The year 1994 also marked another important step. NATO decided to establish a European Security and Defence Identity and the way for the WEU’s recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. The NATO countries agreed in the Brussels Summit of 1994:

“4. We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. The emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable

²⁴ Petersberg Declaration, Bonn 19 June 1992, Western European Union Council of Ministers, <http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/5e-f.html>, accessed on 16 February 2010.

European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests.

5. To support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union. The Alliance's organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this. We welcome the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the WEU that has been achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. In future contingencies, NATO and the WEU will consult, including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on how to address such contingencies.”²⁵

At the Brussels Summit, it was decided to develop the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces to provide “separable but not separate military capabilities” that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. That meant the WEU could recourse to NATO assets. In practice the WEU was allowed to use NATO’s troops, communication assets, and command control. On the other hand NATO was able to maintain the development of ESDI within the Alliance. Actually, the main parameters of ESDI were clarified in the Berlin NATO Ministerial Meeting in 1996. There was a need for this definition. As Javier Solana, the then NATO Secretary General, points out the attempts to define and develop the ESDI have been conducted in different platforms the division of labour implied in 1991 between NATO, the WEU and the EU was never very clear. There are major overlaps in interest.²⁶ The Berlin Ministerial Meeting was

²⁵NATO Brussels Summit Declaration, 11 January 2004, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24470.htm, accessed on 2 February 2010.

²⁶ Javier Solana, NATO and the Development of the European Security and Defense Identity, Speech delivered at the IEEI conference in Lisbon, 25 November 1996,

an important achievement in this way. The 5th Paragraph of the Berlin Meeting Communiqué reads as:

‘An essential part of this adaptation is to build a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, which will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; to act themselves as required; and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership; ...’²⁷

In the year 1997 in Amsterdam, EU Heads of State and Government agreed on revisions for the future Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union and EU-WEU relations. In particular, the Petersberg missions were included in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Amsterdam Treaty stipulated that the WEU is an integral part of the development of the European Union, providing the latter with access to operational capability, notably in the context of the Petersberg missions. The WEU should support the EU in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy and the EU should, accordingly, foster closer institutional relations with the WEU "with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the EU, should the European Council so decide". The WEU, in its "Declaration on the Role of Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance", adopted by WEU Ministers on 22 July 1997, set out the WEU's understanding of its role and relations with the EU as well as with NATO. It defined the WEU as an integral part of the development of the European Union, providing it with access to operational capability, notably in the context of the

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_25130.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 4 February 2010.

²⁷ Final Communiqué of the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 3 June 1996, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25067.htm, accessed on 14 February 2010.

Petersberg missions. The WEU was regarded as the essential element of the development of the ESDI within the Alliance.²⁸

The European Council held in Cologne on 3-4 June 1999 agreed that the EU should procure the capabilities necessary to conduct military crisis-management operations across the full range of the Petersberg missions. The Heads of State and Government revealed their determination to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union. They decided that the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfill its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks and necessary decisions in this respect will be taken by the end of the year 2000. It was underlined that in that event, the WEU as would have completed its purpose.²⁹

The decisions on the transfer of the functions of the WEU to the EU were completed at the WEU Council meeting in Marseille on 13 November 2000. The WEU was kept as an organisation, however it was deprived of all its operational capacity. Its mission consists of maintaining links with the Parliamentary Assembly, supporting the work of the Western European Armaments Group and safeguarding the mutual defense commitment of the Brussels Treaty.³⁰

The most striking fact that came out of the above mentioned developments with regard to the WEU was that this organization never actually felt ready to launch a

²⁸ NATO Hand Book, 2001 Version, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1504.htm>, accessed on 1 February 2010.

²⁹ Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 3-4 June 1999, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm, accessed on 2 February 2010.

³⁰ Developing a Common European Security and Defense Policy, The CESD policy Archive, <http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/NEWCESDMAIN.html>, accessed on 2 February 2010.

comprehensive military operation. Its involvement in the crisis areas was mainly based on providing education and advice in the form of police missions. For example the operations conducted by the WEU in the Balkans between 1992 and 2001 concentrated on areas such as security surveillance, patrolling, demining assistance and training. However, the modified Brussels Treaty of the WEU was paving the way for assuming responsibilities without restriction to certain geographies. Those years between the revival of the WEU and its practical termination came across with the establishment of ESDP. The EU's quest for being a security player has gained momentum. Moreover, NATO had also remained the main security organization with its vast military capabilities.

4.2.2. Turkey's Rights Stemming From its Associate Membership Status in the WEU

Turkey participated in the construction of the EU's security and defence identity within the framework of the WEU. Turkey hold 'associate membership' status within the WEU.

Within the WEU, a system of variable geometry with three different levels of membership and affiliation, as well as observer status, was created:

- 'Members (also members of both NATO and of the EU);
- Associate Members (NATO but not EU members);
- Associate Partners (neither NATO nor EU members)
- Observers (EU but not NATO members.)³¹

As Münevver Cebeci described, "Associate Membership" is one of the four different types of member statuses in the WEU that the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the

³¹ NATO Hand Book, 2001 version, op.cit.

Republic of Turkey obtained. This status was issued in the Declaration on the WEU attached to the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 (Declaration No. 30). The Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 and the Declaration on Associate Membership signed in Rome on 20 November 1992 established the guidelines of their status. Associate Membership became effective in 1995 and evolved through a number of ministerial declarations and by Permanent Council decisions. Associate Members are not signatories to the Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT). Their status only consists of non-Article V activities meaning that they are neither under Article V guarantee nor held responsible for Article V missions. However, they have the right to participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council, its working groups and the subsidiary bodies under certain conditions. These conditions are:

‘a) their participation should not prejudice the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the MBT; and,

b) at the request of a majority of the Member States, or half of the Member States including the Presidency, participation may be restricted to full members.’³²

Associate Members also have the right to speak and submit proposals but they do not have the right to block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the Member States. They are further associated with the Planning Cell through special arrangements, and they can nominate officers to the cell. They take part on the same basis as full members in WEU military operations to which they commit forces. By virtue of being NATO members, the Associate Members are given the right to have a say in WEU operations in which they are interested.

³² Münevver Cebeci, A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision Making for EU led Petersberg Operations, with Special Reference to Turkey, **Occasional Papers 10**, Western European Union, Brussels, November 1999, p. 6.

They are directly involved in the planning and preparation of WEU operations in which NATO assets and capabilities are used within the framework of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). They are also connected to the WEU telecommunications system (WEUCOM), involved in the activities of the Satellite Centre, and they are regularly informed about WEU's space activities. With regard to the activities of the former EUROGROUP, the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), the Associate Members have full rights and responsibilities. This refers to full cooperation in the field of armaments, and is again a natural consequence of the organizational link between WEU and NATO and the move towards the establishment of a European Security and Defence Identity.³³

After 1995, Turkey had actively tried to participate in all sorts of WEU activity, bearing in mind her rights as a NATO member. Turkey assumed all the rights granted to associate members as explained above. For Turkey the most important outcome of this procedure was to be able to participate in the operations that she provided forces, on an equal footing with the full members. The Erfurt Declaration of WEU Council of Ministers on 18 November 1997 constituted a milestone on this matter. The 29th Article of the Erfurt Declaration stated that:

“29. Ministers welcomed the improved arrangements allowing Associate Members and Observer States to participate fully in accordance with their status in all Petersberg operations under taken by WEU and tasked the Permanent Council to pursue its examination of possibilities for maximum participation in its activities by Associate Members and

³³ Cebeci, **op.cit.**

*observer States in accordance with their status in particular in the fields of armaments, space and military studies.*³⁴

The Erfurt Declaration constituted an important guarantee for Turkey in terms of preserving the rights it gained in the WEU. In practice the Erfurt Declaration took into consideration of non-EU NATO members.

Turkey's status in the WEU system granted her the right to become closely involved in the European security architecture. Turkey had the right to participate in the meetings of the WEU Council and its working groups and subsidiary bodies under certain conditions. Turkey also had the right to speak and submit proposals, but not the right to block a decision that was the subject of consensus among the full member states. However, Turkey could adhere to such decisions later if she wanted. Turkey was also associated with the WEU Planning Cell and could nominate officers to the Cell. Moreover, Turkey could take part on the same basis as full members in WEU operations to which it committed forces. As a result of its NATO membership, it had a say in WEU operations, and it was directly involved in the planning and preparation of WEU operations in which NATO assets and capabilities were to be used within the framework of the CJTF.³⁵

NATO's Washington Summit document of 1999 was a significant document that details Turkey's position as well as the relationships between NATO and the WEU on ESDI. NATO's Washington Communiqué established a balance between ready access by the EU to the Alliance's assets and capabilities on the one hand and the participation of non-EU European allies in the ESDP on the other. Through this

³⁴ WEU Council of Ministers, Erfurt Declaration, 18 November 1997, <http://www.weu.int/documents/971118en.pdf> , accessed on 13 February 2010.

³⁵ Gözen., *op.cit.*, p.26-27.

equilibrium, the Alliance engaged itself in assisting the EU in attaining an autonomous European military capability. These arrangements were later referred to as 'Berlin plus'.³⁶

4.2.3. Was Turkey Satisfied With its Associate Membership Status in the WEU?

Even though this question has been very relevant when analyzing Turkey's position on ESDP, in fact it was not given special attention by the scholars working in this field. We attempt to cover the main studies in this particular aspect of the question. Esra Dogan concludes that the WEU experience of Turkey was three-fold. First, the arrangements in the WEU have provided Turkey, as an associate member, with *de facto* full membership. Secondly, they have been based on the primacy of the Alliance and finally, compared to the primacy of the Alliance, the EU membership has had a limited effect on the status of members in the WEU. According to Dogan, it was clear that the relationship the WEU would establish with the Alliance would accentuate the role of the latter and anchor the former closely to NATO.³⁷ We share these conclusions; however the shortcomings of the mentioned arrangements should also be evaluated.

In fact, the Associate Membership status was not a completely desirable position for Turkey. This status was not taking place in the Modified Brussels Treaty, and it was developed through the years and different council decisions. The rights gained under associate membership status were not clearly defined legally, they were rather vague. Therefore for Turkey it was essential to make the legal arrangements to guarantee her rights. Missiroli, among other scholars also argued, that those arrangements were not Treaty-based and never went as far as to give the Associate Members shared

³⁶ Doğan, *op.cit.*, p.3.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.6.

political control. They were mostly limited to the *operational* components of WEU activities –although they included ‘military planning’ at large – and were based on the assumption that the WEU would act as an interface between the EU and NATO for non-Article V mBT/Article 17.2 TEU missions, in other words the ‘Petersberg tasks’.³⁸

The status of Associate Membership provides participation in WEU activities. As also pointed out by Hüseyin Bağcı, in principle, associate members can be denied participation when half the members object. Within the context of the activities they take part in, associate members can express opinions, but they cannot block decisions. Their proposals need to find a sponsor among full members in order to be taken into account.³⁹ Bağcı explains that for Turkey, the problematic dimension of this evolutionary process is the nature of the relationship between the EU’s CFSP and the WEU. At Maastricht, it was agreed that the Union could make a request of the WEU to undertake operations in implementation of the CFSP decisions. As Turkey is excluded from the policy and decision-making phase within the CFSP mechanisms, its place within the ESDI would be restricted to the receiving end of instructions. The disadvantage for Turkey is that as the WEU becomes increasingly subservient to the CFSP, the role of Associate Members is becoming restricted to the Implementation phase in the WEU. Turkey’s exclusion from the decision-making mechanism in ESDI posed problems for Turkey, because a significant aspect of Turkey’s desire to be part of the EU is also about security.⁴⁰

³⁸ Missiroli, *op.cit.*, p.12.

³⁹ Hüseyin Bağcı, **Turkey and the European Security and Defence Identity, A Turkish View**, http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/09_ega_01_tes.pdf, accessed on 14 February 2010.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Turkey was not fully satisfied with the Associate Membership status that did not provide a legal status for her. During the development of ESDI she sought to be a full member of WEU, and raised her arguments in every possible forum. However, the door for full membership in the WEU was closed in 1994, when EU membership became a prerequisite for WEU membership. Turkish officials strongly emphasized that the *acquis* which was accumulated within the WEU should be preserved and further developed on a contractual basis so as to ensure the full participation of non-EU European Allies in the new structures to be established within the EU.⁴¹

As Buharalı argues, associate membership in the WEU was less than what Turkey had expected. This decision was particularly disconcerting since Greece was admitted as a full member to the WEU. For the first time after the Second World War, Turkey and Greece were treated separately in the security arena. Despite this unfavorable situation, Turkey's contributions to the WEU were significant. For example, Turkey's contribution to the WEU police mission in Albania was more substantial than that of many full members, including Greece.⁴²

The decisions on the transfer of the functions of the WEU to the EU made things worse. When the British and French agreed on a new way forward in 1998 in St. Malo, the structures established by the WEU were set aside and the EU developed new structures. Turkey's status became vaguer in the EU's foreign and security policy. This new policy completely closed

⁴¹ Press Release on ESDI Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 February 2000, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/enter-the-header_note-to-the-press-on-esdi-br_unofficialtranslation_br_february-14_-2000.en.mfa, accessed on 14 February 2000.

⁴² Can Buharalı, 'Is Turkey Still an Asset for European Security?', C. Arvanitopoulos, ed., *Turkey's Accession to the European Union*, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg 2009, p. 89-90.

the doors for non-EU European Allies and the seat created for Turkey in WEU became meaningless.⁴³ A compromise was reached later on, but Turkey is still behind the position that she deserves in the ESDP. The reaction of Turkey to these developments were made loud by Turkey's Defence Minister Sabahattin Çakmakoglu as 'Turkey could block the use of NATO equipment and forces by the ESDP if it is not allowed to take part in the new force'⁴⁴. Then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit also criticized ESDP by saying that 'Turkey has received unfair treatment from the EU over the ESDP so far'.⁴⁵

This section paid particular attention to Turkey's position in the WEU, since Turkey's main arguments within CSDP context stem from its acquisitions from the WEU. In terms of explaining Turkey's involvement in the WEU the Realist and Constructivist accounts could be applied together. In fact the WEU had never been the most crucial security alliance and never felt ready to launch a comprehensive military operation. Its involvement in the crisis areas was mainly based on providing education and advice in the form of police missions. Similar to the explanation above, Turkey attempted to take an active part in the WEU as a result of the 'western element' in its national identity that could be explained through a constructivist approach. The WEU remained under NATO's shadow until 1980s and it started to assume an important role in Western European security architecture only after the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. The dormancy of the WEU mainly stemmed from disagreements among the European countries regarding the role of the WEU. In that era the WEU had marginalized and delivered its functions to NATO. The disagreements of European countries can be explained with Realist terms, since each nation was trying to maximize its own

⁴³ **Ibid.**, p.90.

⁴⁴ Turkish Daily News, 23 November 2000.

⁴⁵ Turkish Daily News, 25 November 2000.

benefits. After becoming an associate member of the WEU, Turkey actively tried to participate in all sort of WEU activity, bearing in mind its rights as a NATO member. This attitude was in line with both realist and constructivist explanations. There is 'logic of appropriateness' in following the same approach with regard to NATO. Furthermore, the realities of the post cold war necessitated Turkey to take an active part in the security organizations of Europe.

The Associate Membership status was not a completely desirable position for Turkey, since it did not provide a legal status. Turkey sought to be a full member of the WEU, and raised its arguments to this end. This attitude was in line with the constructivist accounts, since norms are the results of social constructions.

4.3. Comparing Turkey's and the European Union's Security Policies

The European security strategy "*A Secure Europe in A Better World-The European Security Strategy*" provided the main basis for the comparison of Turkey and the EU's security policies.⁴⁶ This document underlines the key threats facing the EU and strategic objectives of it. It was revised in 2008. This revised version is titled "*Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy-Providing Security in a changing world*". According to the European Security Strategy of 2003 the key threats were identified as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. In the revised version of the Strategy dated 2008, cyber security, energy security and climate change have also been added to the equation. The Security Strategy of EU was a very useful and concrete tool that enabled a healthy

⁴⁶ A Secure Europe in A Better World-The European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

comparison between the security approaches of Turkey and the EU.

Turkish officials focus on terrorism, the threat of long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction, religious extremism and regional conflicts when analyzing the country's basic security concerns. In fact, threats identified by the EU are compatible with Turkey's threat perceptions. The EU's strategy document's key element was 'effective multilateralism'. The 2003 strategy puts this fact forward as "*... no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own*"⁴⁷.

Promoting regional and international cooperation through bilateral as well as multilateral schemes is among the guiding principles of Turkish security and foreign policy. As emphasized Turkish security discourse makes frequent references to cooperation, and partnership and the importance of sustainable peace and stability. Ankara shows strong preference for multilateral approaches in dealing with current security challenges. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, multilateral approaches have been shaping the Turkish Foreign and Security policies. In fact, these multilateral approaches of Turkey are very visible and the specific cases that were touched upon are clear evidences to this understanding. The parallelism between Turkey and the EU's security approaches also facilitates active involvement of Turkey in the EU's security policies.

The 2003 document lists three strategic objectives in the face of the above mentioned threats. First the European Union must be active in addressing the new threats. Second, it underlines building security in our neighborhood. The document explicitly makes reference to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean Area. Third, it places a strong emphasis

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

on multilateralism. Turkey shares the strategic objectives. It is striking to notice that the geographic priorities listed in the strategy document are all in Turkey's neighborhood: The Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean area.⁴⁸ Turkey's positive attitude towards ESDP since its inception and its efforts to actively involve itself in the operations are clear signs that the EU and Turkey share the same security policy considerations. Turkey shares with the actors involved in ESDP the same threat perceptions and priorities.

During the preparations for the European Union Security strategy document in 2003 Turkey was officially consulted. Through these interactions Turkey was able to ensure that her security concerns were taken into account. However, there was a lack of consultations in the finalization of the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy in 2008, despite the fact that Turkey actively contributed to the drafting of the first document in 2003. Constructivism views 'socially constructed' knowledge as a factor of power, which especially affects state interests and identities. The preparation of the security strategy document in 2003 through interaction with Turkey could be explained by constructivism. It also suits well to the 'logic of appropriateness' approach. However, here constructivism fails to explain the lack of consultations with Turkey in 2008. In accordance with the appropriate logic, consultations with Turkey should take place. We believe that Realist theory explains the case in 2008 in a better way. Since Realists believe that International cooperation is unlikely because of 'relative gains' concerns and discard the international cooperation. this notion is visible in the case at hand.

⁴⁸ Can Buharalı, Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards EU Membership: A Security Perspective, **Turkish Policy Quarterly**, 2004-No:3, 2004, p.12-13.

4.4. Analyzing the Involvement of Non-EU NATO Members in CSDP Through Turkish Experience

4.4.1. Different Interpretations of the NATO's Washington Summit Communiqué

NATO's 1999 Washington Summit Communiqué is of significant importance in terms of the involvement of non-EU NATO Members in EU led operations. In essence, NATO's support for ESDP activities was linked to the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in ESDP activities through underlying the modalities of the Western European Union. However, over the years the practices of the EU have been far from corresponding to this fact. Article 9 of the Washington Summit Communiqué underlined the importance of '*mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU (Art. 9.b)*' and also '*ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, (Art. 9.d)*'.⁴⁹ Turkey paid utmost importance to these principles and has sought compliance with the obligations as stated in the Communiqué.

From the Turkish perspective, the Washington consensus provided an important basis to its claims concerning the CSDP. As Turkey had an associate membership in the WEU, Turkey could participate in the strategic planning, operations, and command of EU-led Petersberg type operations in its surrounding areas. Turkey had the right: 1) to take part in a WEU-led operation with NATO support, including its preparation and planning with full and equal rights; 2) to participate in an autonomous WEU operation with equal rights if it declared its readiness to take part by making available a significant troop contribution; and 3) to participate, as a member of both NATO and the WEU, in the organs the EU

⁴⁹ NATO's Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm>, accessed on 13 June 2010.

would set up, since NATO-EU mechanisms would be built on existing NATO-WEU mechanisms. The Washington Summit consensus recognized the WEU acquis as the basis of future work for the European security architecture. It accepted that the development of the ESDI would be constructed on the existing mechanisms of NATO-WEU cooperation.⁵⁰ Turkey has kept underlying that it was foreseen at the Washington Summit that the involvement of the non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis management operations would be ensured, building on the existing arrangements within the WEU.

However, the different approach of the EU in the interpretation of the Washington Summit Communiqué constituted a disagreement. The EU focused more on Article 10 of the Washington Summit Communiqué that read ‘...we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance’.⁵¹ Art. 10 stressed ‘assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities’. Turkey has been looking at the picture by combining all the relevant official documents of both institutions. Turkey’s arguments are based on Article 9 of the Washington Summit Communiqué and the NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999. The 1999 Strategic Concept underlines that European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed within NATO and the decisions on making the Alliances’ assets and capabilities available on a ‘case by case basis’ unanimously by stating ‘...on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU

⁵⁰ Gözen, *op.cit.*, p.40.

⁵¹ NATO’s Washington Summit Communiqué, *op.cit.*

or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose (Article 30)⁵²”

Even though the Cologne European Council of 3-4 June 1999 confirmed the fact that the arrangements should be based on NATO's Washington Summit by stating “*Implementation of the arrangements based on the Berlin decisions of 1996 and the Washington NATO summit decisions of April 1999*”, the arrangements of the EU that came afterwards were not in conformity with this understanding. The Helsinki and Feira decisions had also negatively affected the access of European NATO Allies to the EU-only operations as compared to the arrangements in place within the WEU. The arrangements provided by the EU's Nice Summit of 2000 were also short of satisfying the non-EU European Allies.

Turkey raised concern over bypassing the existing legal arrangements by the EU during the work of establishing the acquis for CSDP and particularly for the participation of non-EU European Allies. In this vein, Turkey's efforts have concentrated on shaping a fair balance in the package agreement on the modalities of the cooperation between NATO and the EU. One should also bear in mind that these arrangements were not only benefiting Turkey, but the other non-EU European Allies as well.

4.4.2. Influences on the Operational Side

As emphasized, Turkey has taken part in all of the Berlin Plus operations and all CSDP activities to which it has been invited. In fact, in many operations such as Proxima in Macedonia or EUPM in Bosnia Herzegovina, Turkey has

⁵² The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 24 April 1999, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed on 7 July 2010.

contributed more than most EU members.⁵³ Turkey is still the largest non-EU contributor to CSDP missions and operations. Despite Turkey's extensive contributions to the operations, either with Berlin Plus or autonomous EU operations, the modalities of these arrangements have not been completely implemented. As Kiziltan puts forward from the Turkish perspective, the application of the Nice Implementation Document has unfortunately not lived up to expectations as a major breakthrough in relations with the EU. The EU has either applied it in a perfunctory manner or essentially ignored it. Kiziltan rightly states that for example, not even symbolic consultations were held with Turkey when "EUJUST LEX" was launched in Iraq or "EUJUST Themis" in Georgia, as would have been possible under the provision of this document regarding EU operations conducted in geographic proximity of non-EU allies or that may affect their national security interests.⁵⁴ While Art. 12 of the Nice Implementation Document reads "*In a specific case when any of the non-EU European Allies raises its concerns that an envisaged autonomous EU operation will be conducted in the geographic proximity of a non-EU European Ally or may affect its national security interests, the Council will consult with that Ally and, taking into consideration the outcome of those consultations, decide on the participation of that Ally...*", the practices of the EU in fact have been far from complying with the agreed arrangements.

During the initial stages of the crisis in Georgia, Turkey requested to have immediate consultations with the EU. However it did not receive a favorable reply at the time. EUJUST THEMIS, which was designed to support the

⁵³ European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/iv_-european-security-and-defence-identity_policy_esdi_p_en.mfa, accessed on 14 July 2010.

⁵⁴ Kiziltan. *op.cit.*, p.36.

Georgian authorities, was an operation taking place in one of the neighbouring countries of Turkey. Likewise, Turkey's offer to support the autonomous civilian monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM) in 2008 was also not accepted. The civilian crisis management operation EUJUST LEX launched in Iraq in 2005 is also taking place in the immediate vicinity of Turkey. However, there was a lack of response to Turkey's request to contribute to this mission as well. Turkey's request to be involved in the CSDP decision making phase was fully in line with Article 12 of the Nice Implementation Document as stated above. These are clear examples of narrow interpretations by the EU vis-à-vis a non-EU NATO member showing a strong determination to support CSDP activities. The EU's arguments on not consulting Turkey were rather difficult to understand. These arguments were that the mentioned activities are civilian operations and in accordance with the consultation arrangements only military operations can be consulted. In fact, the arrangements that established the acquis of the NATO-EU cooperation did not differentiate between civilian or military operations; they apply to all sorts of operations.

It is not only Turkey who is putting these arguments forward, but also NATO's top official Rasmussen who was quoted by Danish press on 7 July 2010 that he finds it unfair that the Turks are not included in the decisions on the EU's peace operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina since they participate there, too. NATO's Secretary General told that "*Turkey is the second largest contributor to the EU's operation in Bosnia, but Turkey is not included in the decision making process. That is unfair. The EU should clearly signal that Turkey belongs to the western circle*"⁵⁵ In the same news, EUFOR's spokesman Major Bruce Foster is also quoted as "*Turkey is an important*

⁵⁵ Thomas Lauritzen, 'Fogh defends Turkey: The EU is not being fair', *Politiken*, 7 July 2010.

partner that is fully involved in a number of areas in the operation,⁵⁶.

During the year 2007, the issues concerning NATO-EU cooperation in Kosovo and Afghanistan have been frequently discussed. At the time, some commentators in the international press claimed that these problems emanate from the blockages laid down by Turkey. An example was the article published in the International Herald Tribune on 23 August 2007 that read '*...neither EU police officers nor the Afghan police will be automatically given intelligence or backup support from NATO if they come under attack from the Taliban or other fighters. The reason is a squabble in Brussels between the EU and Turkey, a NATO member.*'⁵⁷ Turkey had no intention to block NATO-EU cooperation within the context of those EU civilian ESDP missions planned in Kosovo or in Afghanistan. In fact, Turkey has stressed that the said EU civilian missions could play an important complementary role in terms of contributing to the success of the NATO missions conducted in those regions. Turkish officials stated that Turkey, instead of impeding cooperation between the two organizations, advocates the rapid conclusion of the necessary arrangements which would enable a more effective relationship between NATO and the EU. In those days Turkey frequently reminded its Allies and the EU Member States of its expectation of the adherence to decisions taken and arrangements laid down at the highest level for such cooperation.⁵⁸ In fact, Turkey has never wished to

⁵⁶ **Ibid.**

⁵⁷ Judy Dempsey, Letter from Germany: Bickering between NATO and EU hampers training of Afghan police, **International Herald Tribune**, 23 August 2007.

⁵⁸ QA:42 -;3 December 2007,; Statement of the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, in a response to a Question (Unofficial Translation), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_qa_42--_3-december-2007-statement-of-the-spokesman-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-of-

hinder NATO-EU cooperation in Kosovo and Afghanistan, but has continued to stress the need for abiding by agreed decisions and commitments as necessary.

4.4.3. Turkey's Exclusion From European Defence Industry Cooperation Projects

A striking aspect of the matter is related to Turkey's exclusion from European defence industry cooperation projects. The main EU institution in this respect, European Defence Agency (EDA), was established on the basis of the *acquis* of the Western European Armaments Group/Organisation (WEAG/WEAO). Turkey and Norway, as associate members of the WEU, were full members of the WEAG/WEAO. Norway and Turkey approved the transfer of responsibilities and institutional *acquis* of the WEAG/WEAO on the condition that they would be included in the European defence industry projects to be handled by the EDA. The EU, through its Joint Action establishing the EDA, acknowledged this commitment. The draft text on Turkey has been blocked since 2005, while Norway was able to finalize these arrangements.

EDA was established under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July, 2004, with a view toward supporting the Member States and the EU Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities. Article 8 of the preface of the "Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004" on the establishment of the European Defence Agency reads as "The Agency should develop close working relations with *existing arrangements*, groupings and organisations such as Letter of Intent (LoI), Organisation de coopération conjointe en matière d'armement (OCCAR) and *Western European Armaments Group (WEAG)/Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO)*, with a view to assimilation or incorporation of

turkey_in-a-response-to-a-question_unofficial-translation_
p.en.mfa, accessed on 19 July 2010.

relevant principles and practices as appropriate”⁵⁹ (Emphasis added).

Turkey is aware that it can not participate with full membership rights in EDA before the realization of the country’s full membership in the EU. However upon the legal commitment of the EU as underlined in the Council Joint Action Plan establishing EDA, Turkey gave its consent to the closure of WEAG\WEAO with a view toward establishing working relations on the basis of existing arrangements. At the time when the ‘Administrative Arrangement Document’ was about to enter into force together with the document prepared for Norway on 14 April 2005, the Greek Cypriot Administration prevented the approval of Turkey’s document by emphasizing that this decision is a result of *‘political considerations’*. However, Norway was able to finalize these arrangements.

Since 2005, Turkey’s efforts on the way to finalizing its arrangements with EDA have been futile, as a result of blockage by one EU member. Norwegian former Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg gave a conference at Vilnius University on 22 February 2011, and the author had the chance to ask about the different treatment of Norway and Turkey in terms of EDA membership despite their similar acquisitions. Stoltenberg responded that *‘if we miss the opportunity of including Turkey in all these processes we will make a historical mistake. Turkey is one of the most important actors in Europe.’*⁶⁰ Those words were revealed that the EU’s

⁵⁹ Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004” on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_245/l_24520040717en00170028.pdf, accessed on 17 June 2010.

⁶⁰ The question asked to Norwegian former Foreign Minister H.E. Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg by the author during the conference held at Vilnius

unfair treatment of Turkey will lead to mistakes. Our interviewee the Turkish Diplomat answered the same question as the following “*This is one of the most concrete examples of the EU’s selective approach. EU should further develop its own mechanisms to act as a genuine union, complying with its own decisions and promises. It is all about reliability and credibility of the EU.*”⁶¹

The Joint Action Plan on EDA is not only referring to the WEAG acquis in the preface, but also to the Article 6 of the Chapter VI on ‘relations with third countries, organizations and entities’. This Article reads as “*The non-EU WEAG members shall be provided with the fullest possible transparency regarding the Agency’s specific projects and programmes with a view to their participation therein as appropriate. A consultative committee shall be set up for this purpose, to provide a forum for exchanging views and information on matters of common interest falling within the scope of the Agency’s mission*”.⁶² The partial treatment of Turkey in terms of EDA has been raised by Turkish officials in every possible platform. As such, former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan’s stated at the European Parliament Committee of Foreign Affairs in Brussels on 28 May 2008: ‘*We are being blocked away from European Defence Agency, security arrangements with EU and this is happening by one member’s opposition, by one member’s veto in a way, although this implementation protocol says that non-EU European countries should be involved more in the security issues, defence issues of the European Union; Turkey is kept away*’⁶³.

University under the theme of ‘Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy’ on 22 February 2011, Vilnius.

⁶¹ Interview with a Turkish Diplomat, **op.cit.**

⁶² **Ibid.**

⁶³ Speech Delivered By H.E. Ali Babacan, Foreign Minister of Turkey at the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, 28 May 2008, Brussell,

NATO Secretary General Rasmussen also rejects treating Turkey unfairly on this matter. He was quoted by 'Politiken' newspaper as *'I actually think it is unfair. Norway, which is not a member of the EU either, has an agreement with the European Defence Agency. Why can't Turkey have that? I do not see any explanation and did not either when I was Prime Minister'*⁶⁴ On this matter comments by Nick Witney, former chief executive of EDA, are also remarkable and thought provoking: *"We initiated parallel negotiations with Turkey and Norway because almost all EU countries wanted this. But then Cyprus entered the EU and blocked everything. We were all very frustrated. It has been like that ever since. The Cypriots run around and close all doors and windows to the Turks. It is scandalous and selfish, and it is bad for the EU. But things are not going to change before someone deals with Cyprus."*⁶⁵ Witney's remarks bluntly describe the current stalemate. However, high level officials' remarks and complaints do not change anything, as long as these discourses are not put into practice. The Greek Cypriot Administration did not become a full member to the EU automatically; it was a result of the consensus reached by all the EU members. The consequences of accepting the Greek Cypriots as an EU member before the Cyprus problem was resolved had to be considered with due care and caution; unfortunately at the time this was not the case. Now not only Turkey, but the entire EU itself is faced with these negative consequences. In essence, the overall picture explained above in terms of establishing the necessary link between EDA and Turkey clearly show that there is not any genuine institutional impediment on the way. The current

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-delivered-by-h_e_-ali-babacan_-foreign-minister-of-turkey-at-the-european-parliament-committee-on-foreign-affairs_-28-may.en.mfa, accessed on 10 July 2010.

⁶⁴ Politiken, 7 July 2010, **op.cit.**

⁶⁵ **Ibid.**

impasse is simply the result of Greek Cypriots' objection and is purely political.

4.4.4. Why Can Turkey Not Conclude a Security Agreement With the EU?

Another example of the approach of the EU in terms of the involvement of non-EU Allies in CSDP is the prevention of the conclusion of a permanent 'security agreement' between Turkey and the EU. Such agreements provide the necessary guarantees for the protection of EU classified information released to third parties relating to any area of the Union's activity. The EU has concluded specific agreements more limited in scope with a number of third countries. These agreements may be concluded for an indefinite period (such as framework participation agreements with third States taking part in EU-led ESDP crisis management operations) or on a temporary or *ad hoc* basis.⁶⁶ Turkey concluded *ad hoc* agreements or arrangements of limited duration with the EU that will allow the exchange of EU classified information in specific operational contexts in which Turkey has been contributing. However, the permanent security agreement on the exchange of classified information has not been realized.

Turkey is a non-EU Ally that has been negotiating for accession to the EU since 2005. To this end, the problem related to the exchange of classified information with the EU due to a lack of Security Agreement between Turkey and the EU does not follow the logic. The draft agreement is ready, but blocked within the EU due to political reasons. As Kiziltan states, the blockage on the agreement regarding classified information is hampering not only Turkish-CSDP ties, but also relations

⁶⁶ Information Note of the General Secretariat of the Council on 'Exchange of EU classified information (EUCI) with third countries and Organizations', Brussels, 8 September 2006, <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/sep/eu-classified-docs-third-countries.pdf>, accessed on 17 July 2010.

between Turkey and the EU in general, including in scientific and technological cooperation. Despite previous EU decisions, such as the EU's Joint Action of 2004 on establishing EDA, to conclude these agreements with Turkey, the EU approval process has been blocked. Failure to meet its own obligations does not bring any credibility to the EU.⁶⁷ This blockage is also not in conformity with the Nice Implementation document and it points out once again that agreed framework of the Berlin Plus is 'narrowly and selectively' interpreted by the EU.

The reason why Turkey cannot conclude a security agreement with the EU is also result of the blockage by the Greek Cypriots. This negative treatment has been raised not only by Turkey, but by other European officials as well. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen was quoted by Euobserver in May 2010 as *'Speaking frankly, maybe a bit bluntly, the EU must move to accommodate some concerns raised by NATO allies that are not EU members. The EU should include non-EU contributors to the military decision-making process, it should conclude a security agreement with Turkey and an arrangement between Turkey and the European Defence Agency'*.⁶⁸ NATO's Chief shared his opinion also at a transatlantic security conference in Brussels in March 2010 as *"Turkey is the second-largest contributor to the EU operation in Bosnia... but the EU does not provide non-EU contributors with the opportunity to contribute" to policy and decision-making,*⁶⁹ It is argued that the lack of a security agreement between Turkey and the EU has been effecting the NATO-EU cooperation negatively, mainly on the ground, in terms of the operations.

⁶⁷ Kızıltan, *op.cit.*, p. 44-45.

⁶⁸Valentina Pop, NATO chief tells EU to reach security pact with Turkey, <http://euobserver.com/13/30134>, accessed on 17 July 2010.

⁶⁹ NATO chief urges EU to bring Turkey into defence arm, <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/nato-defence-turkey.3wk/>, accessed on 17 July 2010.

Starting with the assumption that institutions are settled or routinized practices established and regulated by norms, and that these norms are contingent on the interplay between different actors, institutions therefore are susceptible to the effect of change in the behaviour of different actors.⁷⁰ The Greek Cypriot Administration's policy on blocking Turkey's conclusion of administrative arrangements with the European Defence Agency and signing a security agreement with the EU are striking cases in terms of explaining how an individual actor's policy preferences can constitute a norm of an international organization. Here, the Greek Cypriot attitude becomes an EU norm, since it determines the course of cooperation between Turkey and EU in terms of security.

4.5. NATO-EU Cooperation

4.5.1. NATO-EU Relations Within the NATO's New Strategic Concept

At the Summit meeting in Lisbon on 19 November 2010, NATO leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept that will serve as the Alliance's roadmap for the next ten years and that reconfirms the commitment to defend one another against attack as the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security. The document lays out NATO's vision for an evolving Alliance that will remain able to defend its members against modern threats and commits NATO to become more agile, more capable and more effective. The new Strategic Concept urges Allies to invest in key capabilities in order to meet emerging threats and agree to develop within NATO the capabilities necessary to defend against ballistic missile attacks and cyber attacks. It offers partner countries more opportunities for dialogue and cooperation and commits NATO to reinforce cooperation with Russia. The document highlights the need for NATO to remain

⁷⁰ Svensson, *op.cit.*, p.8.

ready to play an active role in crisis management operations whenever it is called to act. Finally, it points to the need for the Alliance to remain cost-effective and makes continuous internal reform a key aspect of the way the Alliance will do business in the future.⁷¹

The NATO-EU partnership was given due attention in the new strategic concept and Non-EU NATO members' fullest involvement in strategic partnership between NATO and the EU is deemed essential. The relevant part of the new strategic concepts reads as follows:

*“28. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. **Non-EU Allies** make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, **their fullest involvement** in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:*

(emphasis added)

1. fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency,

⁷¹ NATO adopts New Strategic Concept, 19 November 2010, NATO official Web Page, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68172.htm, accessed on 9 January 2011.

complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;

2. enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;

3. broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;

4. cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.”⁷²

The above wording on the non-EU NATO members involvement in the strategic partnership between these two organizations has been the strongest wording among the NATO's other strategic concepts. The 1999 Strategic Concept included the following wording: “...*This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution ..* (para. 30)⁷³ The 1991 Strategic Concept written before the institutionalization of the ESDP read as “...*The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce*

⁷² Active Engagement, Modern Defence-Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19 November 2010, NATO's official web page, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm, accessed on 9 January 2011.

⁷³ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., 24 April 1999, NATO's official web page, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, accessed on 9 January 2011.

*transatlantic solidarity. ...NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty. (Para 19)*⁷⁴

During the preparation phase of the NATO's new Strategic Concept every member naturally was given the chance to raise its own concerns. Finally, it became possible to agree on a text that was acceptable to all. After the adoption of the new Strategic Concept, discussions at the academic and political levels have carried on in NATO countries. For example, at a round table discussion titled "NATO after Lisbon: results and perspectives" carried in Vilnius on 1 December 2010, Lithuanian Minister of National Defence Mrs. Rasa Juknevičienė made the following remarks "*the Lisbon Summit of NATO has been an important event that important decisions are taken, Lithuania is satisfied with the outcome, it is not easy to come up with a common denominator for 28 countries, however it is achieved within the context of NATO, the emphasize on the "collective defence" is important for Lithuania*". During the same event, the Political Director of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Eitvydas Bajarunas said that "*Lithuania is satisfied with the outcome of NATO's new Strategic Concept. The concept managed to create a balance between all Allies, and preservance of "conventional threats" along with the new threats in the text is important*". Along with covering the comments of high level officials of a NATO member country, we also would like to mention an unofficial view from the same country. Lithuanian policy

⁷⁴ The Alliance's New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 7 November 1991, NATO's official web page, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm, accessed on 9 January 2011.

analyst at the daily “Lietuvos Rytas” Mr. Marius Laurinavicius is quoted from the same event as saying “*The negative outcome of the Lisbon Summit is that NATO’s nature has remained same, today there is no common threat or enemy, and also the Alliance has no common vision. The new strategic concept could be considered as a ‘christmas tree’ that anyone can add any sort of decoration. It is not a concrete study and every Ally could interpret this new concept in accordance with its own threat perception.*”⁷⁵

4.5.2. The Cases Related With the NATO-EU Cooperation

4.5.2.1. NATO-EU Cooperation and the Cyprus Question

As summarized the mismatch between the compositions of NATO and EU member states caused complications in involving non-EU allies in CSDP. Turkey has been accused from the outset of the process until today of blocking the NATO-EU cooperation. From the Turkish perspective, the claim that it is blocking NATO-EU cooperation is a lop-sided accusation.⁷⁶ There were attempts to find a comprehensive solution to the participation of non-EU NATO members to CSDP through the Ankara Agreement, and Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice European Councils. However they could not bring about an agreeable formula.

In the ‘Ankara Agreement’ of 2001, Turkey was provided with additional assurances and rights in return for removing its potential veto on NATO-EU co-operation and it was also understood that the EU would pay due attention to Turkey’s serious concerns in areas of geographic proximity to

⁷⁵ Round Table Discussion, ‘**NATO after Lisbon: Results and Perspectives**’ 1 December 2010, Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University, Vilnius, The event was followed by the author herself.

⁷⁶ İhsan Kızıltan, **op.cit.**, p.34.

Turkey. The Ankara Agreement was an important stage in the interaction between NATO and the EU and it stresses that Turkey's concerns were taken into account in the equation. It is also evidence of Turkey's being one of the main determiners of shaping the cooperation between the EU and NATO. These arrangements were not only benefiting Turkey, but also the other non-EU European NATO members as well. The fact that the EU and NATO gave their support to the agreement also proved this point. However, Greece's rejection of the agreement mainly stemming from the fact that it is not in favor of the participation of non-EU countries in the ESDP decision making process and the non-automatic access of EU to the strategic assets of NATO.

The Ankara Agreement, the Brussels Document, and the conclusions of Copenhagen Summit of 2002 established the basics of NATO-EU cooperation, while the 'EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP'⁷⁷ laid down the main principles of this interaction. As Aykan points out, the wording of the 'NATO-EU Declaration on the ESDP' reflected Turkish diplomatic success. This declaration referred to '*respect for treaty rights and obligations*' as well as '*... peaceful resolution of disputes*' which could be applied to the Turkish policy concerning Cyprus. Turkey has always been careful to ensure that a NATO-EU strategic partnership on crisis management did not compromise the London-Zurich agreements of 1959-1960.⁷⁸

The decision of the EU to accept the Greek Cypriot Administration application to become a member and later on accepting it as a full member are in contradiction with the balance that was created on the island between the two communities through relevant treaties. On 3 July 1990 the

⁷⁷ EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm>, accessed on 10 July 2010.

⁷⁸ Aykan., *op.cit.*, p. 350.

Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus lodged an application to become a full member and on March 6, 1995 the EU Council of Ministers accepted the Greek Cypriot application and decided to start negotiations. From its inception Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side have objected to this process on the ground that the Greek Cypriot Administration had no legitimate authority to make such an application on behalf of the whole of Cyprus and that in accordance with the 1959 London and Zurich Agreements and the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, Cyprus could not apply to join or having applied, to join the EU whilst Turkey is not a member. These facts were brought the attention of the EU member states at all possible platforms and officially through a Circular Note of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent to the Embassies of the EU on 30 June 1997.⁷⁹ At the time the President of the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in their Statement to the Press issued on 4 July 1997, stated that *'The 1960 Treaties stipulate that Cyprus cannot join any international political or economic union of which both Turkey and Greece are not members according to the dictates of international law and regional peace and stability, Cyprus can only become a full member of the EU after a settlement which will comprise these principles and once Turkey has become a member as well. Each step the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus takes on the road to EU membership, on the basis of its unilateral application in contravention of international law, will accelerate the*

⁷⁹ Circular Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Sent To The Embassies Of The EU Member States Concerning The Greek Cypriot Application To The EU, 30 June 1997, available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/circular-note-sent-to-the-embassies-of-the-eu-member-states-concerning-the-greek-cypriot-application-to-the-eu_-30-june-1997.en.mfa, accessed on 11 July 2010

*integration process between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.*⁸⁰

During that time, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Prof. Dr. Çiller had to also remind her British counter part, who was representing a country that was also party to the 1960 agreements, in her letter dated 17 June 1997 by saying that ‘*As you well know, our two Governments, along with Greece, were parties to the 1959 negotiations resulting in a series of important agreements in 1960, including the Treaty of Guarantee, which imposes certain mutual obligations on the three guarantor states. It is also on the basis of the relevant agreements that the U.K. retains its base areas in Cyprus.*’⁸¹ As explained briefly, the acceptance by the EU, the Greek Cypriot side as a member was against the nature of the treaties and therefore unacceptable. When it comes to the effect of these developments to the ESDP process, it should be once again clarified that Turkish policies were definitely not an “obstacle” for the development of ESDP and NATO-EU cooperation, since its policy has followed logical national security considerations as part of the reasons belonging to Greek Cypriot Administration’s participation in Berlin Plus.

The "Berlin plus" arrangements and its implementation apply only to those EU Member States which are also either

⁸⁰ Quoted from the Letter By The Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of The Republic Of Turkey, Addressed To The Ministers Of Foreign Affairs of EU Member Countries Concerning The Greek Cypriot Application To The EU, 15 July 1997, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/letter-by-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-turkey_-addressed-to-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-eu-member.en.mfa, accessed on 11 July 2010.

⁸¹ Letter By The Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of The Republic Of Turkey To The Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of United Kingdom Concerning The Greek Cypriot Application To The EU, 17 June 1997, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/letter-by-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-turkey-to-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-united-kingdom-concern.en.mfa>, accessed on 11 July 2010.

NATO members or parties to the "Partnership for Peace (PfP)" and which have consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO. Greek Cypriot Administration is not a PfP member and does not have a security agreement with NATO on the exchange of classified documents. Therefore it cannot participate in official NATO-EU meetings. Greek Cypriots' participation in these arrangements is out of the question for Turkey, and Turkish officials strongly raise their objections to the concessions asked from them in terms of diluting the existing framework.

It is a fact that the difficulties in the current state of affairs in NATO-EU cooperation are also related to the Cyprus problem. The decision of the EU accepting the Greek Cypriot Administration as a member in 2004 put the Cyprus question in the middle of the delicate balance established between NATO and the EU, and brought about other significant complications as well. However, the Cyprus issue is definitely not the only obstacle on the way to moving NATO-EU relations further. Therefore blaming Turkey for blocking the NATO-EU cooperation is baseless.

A historical opportunity was missed when Greek Cypriots voted against the UN Plan of 2004. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey pointed out in its statement of 1 May 2004 that "*the referenda were held in Cyprus on 24 April 2004 and overwhelming majority of Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the UN Secretary-General's settlement plan which would have allowed for a united Cyprus to join the EU on 1 May 2004. However, the Greek Cypriots rejected it with a 75 percent majority, and efforts to allow a unified Cyprus to join the EU thus failed.*"⁸² Even though the EU appreciated the fact that the

⁸² Press Release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Regarding the EU Enlargement, 1 May 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_73---press-

Turkish Cypriot side voted 'yes' to the Annan Plan, this did not change the negative consequences of accepting the Greek Cypriots into the EU. Through this decision, the EU has officially incorporated the impasse into its structures and has somehow become a party to the Cyprus question. The European Commission pointed out in its press release of 24 April 2004: *"The European Commission deeply regrets that the Greek Cypriot community did not approve the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. A unique opportunity to bring about a solution to the long-lasting Cyprus issue has been missed. The European Commission would like to warmly congratulate Turkish Cypriots for their "Yes" vote. This signals a clear desire of the community to resolve the island's problem."*⁸³ This 'deep regret' of the EU has not been reflected into practice since 2004. A comprehensive solution to the problem under UN umbrella will definitely bear positive ramifications on the NATO-EU relations.

In our interview with a diplomat from Czech Republic the following opinions were expressed: *'Involvement of non-EU members of NATO into the ESDP and relations between EU and NATO in general are longstanding problems that are not easy to solve. All the attempts to find a solution have so far failed. Everybody knows, where the problems lie, but only a few are able to say it openly. It is the issue of Cyprus and disputes between Greece and Turkey about its solution. It is absolutely clear that without solving the case of Cyprus there will be no move in EU-NATO relations and involvement of non-EU members of NATO into the ESDP. We can speak about current EU legislation or treaties, but in the end always the*

release-regarding-the-eu-enlargement_-1-may-2004.en.mfa, accessed on 13 July 2010.

⁸³ What the World said After the Referanda, The European Commission's press release of 24 April 2004, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/what-the-world-said-after-the-referanda.en.mfa>, accessed on 13 July 2010.

*interests of member states prevail and without a general consent of all we can not move further, and it is not only about the security and defence cooperation, but also about enlargement of the EU, as you know very well.*⁸⁴ These statements reflect the fact that the Cyprus issue is considered a problem on the way to further development of NATO-EU relations and the non-EU NATO members' involvement in CSDP.

4.5.2.2. Reflections of the Different Working Cultures of the EU and NATO

It is clear that there is a need for making NATO-EU cooperation better since they both share the same values and make efforts to contribute to international peace, security and stability. They are mostly involved in the same operational theaters and they also have 21 members in common. They face the same nature of risks, threats and challenges. The capabilities they require are also compatible. Strengthening NATO-EU cooperation is necessary in handling the current challenges together and more strongly.

Existing discrepancies in the degree of openness and transparency accorded by the two organizations constitute the core of the issue. The practices of NATO and the EU reveal that NATO is more open to work with non-NATO contributors. Current problems in the NATO-EU cooperation mainly stem from the restrictive working culture of the EU, which should be addressed with a comprehensive approach. The starting point could be to discuss the main working philosophies of these two organizations. NATO's transparent and open policies vis-à-vis its counterparts is obvious and ramifications of this constructive approach are visible both in practice and in documentation, such as the NATO's Comprehensive Approach Document.

⁸⁴ Interview with a diplomat from Czech Republic, 5 March 2011.

More specifically, NATO has taken a more eager stance on working with the EU. This seems to be reflected in the number and significance of references made to the EU and to NATO-EU cooperation in NATO declarations and documents. Also EU officials are regularly invited to attend more NATO events than vice versa.⁸⁵

NATO seems to be more willing to transform its structures and practices in order to bring force-contributing partners closer to the Alliance. The requests by EU partners of NATO for deeper consultations with NATO reveal the wish for closer involvement in CSDP on the part of Allies that are not in the EU.⁸⁶ NATO's '*Political-Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-Led Operations Document*' is also a clear proof of the Alliance's open and transparent approach. A focused effort to reform NATO's partnerships policy was launched in 2010 Lisbon Summit, with a view to making dialogue and cooperation more inclusive, flexible, meaningful, and strategically oriented. Following up on the Lisbon decisions, a new partnership policy was endorsed by NATO foreign ministers at their meeting in Berlin in April 2011.⁸⁷ In line with NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration, the new document established a structural role for NATO's operational partners for their participation in shaping strategy and decisions from the planning through the execution phase of current and future NATO-led operations to which they contribute. This document superseded the version endorsed by EAPC Heads of State and Government at the

⁸⁵ Kızıltan, *op.cit.* p. 37.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Partnerships : a cooperative approach to security, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51103.htm, accessed on 24 June 2011.

Washington Summit in 1999.⁸⁸ Since 1999 the implementation of the mentioned document is reviewed through annual reports in order to be able to enhance the involvement of partners and to work on the possible shortcomings through taking into account the partners' opinions. As seen, NATO is revising its own modalities regularly with a transparent and open approach. However, revisions of the existing mechanisms are not taking place at the EU's side.

Another striking difference is in terms of bringing together the political wills of member states of each organization. On the NATO's side reaching consensus is generally smooth and well functioning. However this is not the case at the EU's end. There is a discrepancy between the EU's stated ambition and its actual policies. Javier Solana's decade as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy demonstrates that personalities matter, as do institutions. But neither will make up for a lack of political will on the part of member states. For example the disagreements between the EU's member states over Iraq made it impossible to form a united EU policy. The EU decision makers stepped back from the big questions and instead focused on the areas where the EU could make a difference. This has led to missions that are often limited in scope and time in the western Balkans, in Africa, but also in Aceh (Indonesia) and Georgia. The Lisbon Treaty could serve as an opportunity to be exploited in the mentioned matters. Treaty-based authority, including a right of initiative and a foothold in the European Commission, plus much more staff and financial resources will definitely make a difference. The Lisbon Treaty could be a useful tool in terms of closing the gap

⁸⁸ Article 2 of 'Political Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-Led Operations', 15 April 2011, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_04/20110415_110415-PMF.pdf, accessed on 22 June 2011.

between ambition and achievement.⁸⁹ Solana touched upon the importance of the political will of member states and made remarks such as ‘...*Our Member States each have a different history and geography. We must improve our ability to channel the richness of this diversity in support of our political engagement in other parts of the world. ... EU foreign policy cannot function if it is only about Member States particular concerns. We need solidarity. Also in political terms. We should back a Member State if it has a particular problem or need. But this is a two-way street. Individual solidarity with the common endeavour is key for projecting force, for making ESDP works.*⁹⁰ The issue of achieving solidarity has been high on the EU’s agenda, whereas at NATO the solidarity clause constitutes the backbone of the Alliance’s decisions and actions. The working rationales of the two organizations are different at this junction, as well. Lack of political will of the member states is reflected in the EU’s common policies, as well as in NATO-EU relations. Once the EU starts to take bigger steps in achieving solidarity in political terms, its positive ramifications over NATO-EU cooperation will be visible as well.

With regard to questioning the different working cultures of both organizations NATO’s Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Huseyin Dirioz told the following: ‘*EU and NATO are different organisations with autonomous decision-making mechanisms and not identical memberships. NATO is more focused on security and defence matters whereas the EU has*

⁸⁹“What the EU Can Learn from Solana's Legacy.” **European Voice** (December 1, 2009), <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/what-the-eu-can-learn-from-solana-s-legacy/66524.aspx>, accessed 20 February 2011.

⁹⁰ Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy "ESDP@10: What lessons for the future?", Brussels, 28 July 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/109453.pdf, accessed on 19 July 2010.

evolved from being an economic organisation into a political union with a broad agenda in the security field, be it in and around Europe or other parts of the world. Since 21 countries are members of both organisations, it is only logical for them to cooperate, collaborate, create synergies, and avoid duplications. So, even though they are different organisations with sometimes different priorities, in the field of security and defence, the cultures are similar enough for there to be significant engagement and dialogue at various levels (e.g. in the field, in operational headquarters, and between the two staffs in Brussels).⁹¹ A Polish diplomat responded this question followingly: 'Day-to-day work of the EU institutions may be seen as more public-oriented, where one can receive full information on all (or almost all) activities, whereas actions of NATO institutions are not well known among inhabitants of the Member States.'⁹² Those views also express that there is a difference in the working cultures of both organizations.

4.5.2.3. Reading the Concept of NATO-EU Cooperation Differently

The actual scope of NATO-EU relations are interpreted differently by the two sides. The decisions taken in December 2002 on the EU side did not match those made in the Alliance. These discrepancies between the decisions made by the two organizations constitute the core of the dispute. NATO-EU strategic cooperation, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the agreed framework, covers all aspects of ties between NATO and the EU.⁹³

In fact, the 2003 agreement between NATO and the EU was established on the basis of 1999 Strategic Concept and

⁹¹ Interview with NATO's Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Dirioz, **op. cit**

⁹² Interview with a Polish Diplomat, **op. cit.**

⁹³ Kızıltan, **op.cit.** p.41.

Washington Summit Communiqué. Therefore, it covers not only the Berlin Plus operations, but also the entire strategic cooperation. The EU has a narrower definition of the scope of NATO-EU cooperation. The EU insists that this can be restricted only in cases where the “Berlin plus” arrangements are employed. In other words, the EU believes that all EU members, including the Greek Cypriots must participate in all other avenues of interaction between NATO and the EU. As a result of the EU’s obstinacy on this point, formal meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the EU’s Political and Security Committee (i.e. without the participation of the Greek Cypriots now, and before Maltese representatives) are essentially limited to a single item that is “Berlin Plus” operations. The EU insists that at the moment other topics can be dealt with at NAC-PSC meetings only in the presence of the Greek Cypriots. Proposals put forward at various times by Turkey and other Allies to informally discuss issues such as terrorism, Darfur, and Hurricane Katrina have thus not been accepted.⁹⁴

NATO’s Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Dirioz thinks that NATO-EU strategic cooperation could be further developed and he expresses the following: *‘The Lisbon Summit Declaration of November 2010 states that NATO countries “are determined to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations.” At the political level NATO’s Secretary General was encouraged by NATO leaders to “continue to work with the EU High Representative and to report to the Council on the ongoing efforts...” Concerning operations, (Afghanistan, Kosovo, counter-piracy most notably), the Strategic Concept calls for enhancement of practical cooperation between the two organisations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated*

⁹⁴ **Ibid.**

*planning to mutual support in the field. I believe there has been improvement in this area over recent years, but we need to seek further enhancement. As far as cooperating more fully in capability development, a lot of work is already being undertaken. Within the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), there is a significant amount of transparency with EU staffs which helps both organisations avoid unnecessary duplication and enhance coherence and complementarity. As far as capability development is concerned, the NATO-EU Capability Group is a useful tool for exchanging information and ideas. Substantial work has been undertaken under the auspices of the Capability Group to explore possibilities for creating greater synergies through cooperative efforts, including most recently in the areas of Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) and Medical Support. In these times of pressures on defence budgets, seeking multinational and other innovative approaches to capability development is high on the agenda of both organisations, and here too, staff contacts are in place to help explore further areas of cooperation*⁹⁵ Those views explain that the NATO-EU cooperation could be developed further. Eliminating the differences between the understanding of this cooperation by the two sides will definitely pave the way for a stronger cooperation.

Current problems in the NATO-EU cooperation mainly stem from the restrictive working culture of the EU. NATO's '*Political-Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-Led Operations Document*' is a clear proof of the Alliance's open and transparent approach. The implementation of this document is annually reviewed to be able to enhance the involvement of partners and to work on the possible

⁹⁵ Interview with NATO Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Diriöz, **op. cit.**

shortcomings by taking into account of the partners' opinions. This practice can best be explained by constructivist accounts. It is a significant example of the case that norms are shaped through social interaction. The approach of NATO vis-à-vis ESDP can be explained better with constructivist theory.

However, the EU's decision to accept Greek Cypriot Administration as a member before reaching a comprehensive solution on the island cannot be explained by constructivist accounts. The EU's decision is in contradiction with the balance created by relevant treaties between the two communities on the island. Furthermore, the appropriate logic requires that the Greek Cypriot Administration will be accepted as a member of the Union after finding a viable solution to the problem.

CONCLUSIONS

1. This dissertation attempted to answer the main question of *'How does the restrictive approach of the EU effect the implementation of the principles of involving non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities?'* Analysing the discourses of Turkey reveals that Turkey is not satisfied with the EU's compliance with the principles for involving non-EU European NATO members. Practices show that the non-EU European NATO members' experience in their relations with the EU is not in conformity with the experience of NATO's partners in terms of openness and transparency accorded by NATO.

Attempts to answer the main research question have centered on the details of the discourses, relevant official documents and how they are put into effect by the EU, and by analyzing specific cases. The main points could be summarized as follows:

- Turkish political discourse indicates that the Nice Implementation Document has not been fully put into effect by the EU.
- Turkey interprets that the EU used the Nice Implementation Document in a restrictive manner.
- The analysis of official documents proves that there is not any genuine institutional impediment in the way to concluding Administrative Arrangements between Turkey and European Defence Agency or signing a bilateral security agreement between Turkey and the EU. According to the Turkish interpretation the current impasse is simply the result of bilateral political issues. Analyzing the practices also prove that

concluding those arrangements has been blocked by Greek Cypriot's objection.

- The principles of the involvement of non-EU European Allies have not been completely complied with also in terms of operations. Studying particular EU missions and operations prove this fact.

- The interviews conducted also reveal the fact that the level of the implementation of the involvement of Non-EU European NATO members in CSDP is not satisfactory. All our interviewees acknowledged that the level of implementation should be increased.

2. In order to answer the second research question of 'How does the level of involvement in CSDP activities effect Turkey's policies in contributing to CSDP?' we analyzed the country's security rational. Turkey's unique geographical location, historical experiences and relations with its neighbours are the main factors in dominating its security policies. While these determiners are still very relevant, Turkey's security policies have broadened due to the challenges of globalised security agenda. Non-state actors such as media and public opinion have been more vocal in the security and foreign policy making process. The process of accession to the European Union was also another factor influencing Turkey's security thinking. NATO membership still constitutes the backbone of Turkey's security policy. Turkey is actively taking part in the Alliance's political and military transformation and providing substantial contributions to the operations. The European Union's quest for playing a major role in security and defence affairs has also been very closely followed by Turkey. Although analysis of discourse indicates a number of unfavorable conditions regarding Turkey's participation, CSDP has been actively supported by Turkey from the beginning. Analysis of Turkish security and political discourse show that Turkey is

willing to contribute to the CSDP activities. The determination in this regard has been continuous. Existing shortcomings in participation to CSDP activities do not diminish Turkey's encouragement to contribute.

The relations between the WEU and Turkey are of particular importance to understanding Turkey's position in the European security architecture because the basics of Turkey's main arguments in its involvement in the CSDP and NATO-EU cooperation derive from its associate membership to WEU. Turkey's status in the WEU system granted it the right to become closely involved in the European security architecture. However, analyses of relevant official documents prove that the decision on the transfer of the functions of the WEU to the EU has affected Turkey's position in this architecture.

While the European dimension of Turkish security policy remains essential, Turkey has been following a multi dimensional approach. Analyzing the discourses of high level Turkish officials reveal that Turkey's active involvement in the European initiatives does not prevent her from establishing close cooperation with the US, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus or Russia. Turkey regards all these dimensions as complementing each other.

The Turkish case is an example of how states' foreign policy preferences are affected by their national identity. Identity based analyses are useful in analyzing foreign policy preferences. In this case Constructivism serves as a beneficial theory. Identity analysis helps to understand the actions and preferences of states. Constructivists' concentration on identity provides an opportunity to understand how the foreign policy of a state is established. Our case study analysis show that there is a direct link existing between the identity of a state and its foreign policy preferences. The Westernization process in Turkey dates back to the 19th century and it has become an

integral part of the country's national identity. The discourses explain that main feature of Turkish Foreign Policy has been its western orientation and this orientation has been continuous. Turkey's integration process with the EU is a concrete example of this orientation. Turkey's positions in NATO, the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community in the early 1960s, and the Western European Union are also clear examples of the western identity effect in foreign policy choices.

3. The third research question was 'Does the EU's approach to involvement of non-EU NATO members bear any effect in NATO-EU relations?' Analyzing implementations of both organizations show that the EU's restrictive approach on involving non-EU NATO members in CSDP activities has affected NATO-EU relations negatively. Non-EU NATO members' fullest involvement in CSDP activities is the cornerstone of NATO-EU Cooperation. Since 2001 considerable progress has been made in developing the NATO-EU strategic partnership. However its potential has still not been fulfilled. Current problems in the NATO-EU cooperation mainly stem from the restrictive working approach of the EU. All of our interviewees acknowledged the fact that NATO and the EU have different working cultures and there is a need to further develop NATO-EU strategic cooperation. It is also accepted by all parties involved that the Cyprus question has ramifications over NATO-EU Cooperation. However, there are other unfavorable conditions on the way to building a more coherent cooperation.

4. The following proposals could be exploited to achieve a better state of affairs on the involvement of non-EU European NATO members in CSDP activities:

- The EU decision makers should be encouraged to reconsider the implementation of the 'acquis' created in the CSDP in the light of the 'pacta sunt servanda' principle.

- Enabling the necessary level of involvement of a non-EU European Ally like Turkey in CSDP activities, many of which have been undertaken in its geographic proximity, is necessary.

- The provisions of the Nice Implementation Document should be implemented fully. A review of the Nice Implementation Document through taking into consideration of the non-EU NATO members' opinions could be a starting point. Preparation of regular reports by the EU could be helpful.

- It is recommended that organizing regularly common NATO-EU exercises that concentrate more on the points related to the Nice Implementation Document could be a way to exchange views. The 'lessons learned' from these exercises could serve as a valuable contribution.

- The Nice Implementation document could be extended to cover not only non-EU European NATO members but also North American Allies as well.

- All non-EU NATO members should be allowed to conclude security agreements with the EU. This would smooth the flow of information.

- Utilizing each other's educational facilities (such as NATO School in Oberammergau) by EU and NATO officials.

5. Theories of international relations complement and serve as a main basis for each other. Every single theory has value in explaining certain aspects of international politics. We see value in the constructivist approach in explaining our research questions; however we also find the Realist and Institutionalist approaches useful in the European security debate during our research. The combination of these theories has been useful in explaining CSDP activities and the roles of the relevant actors.

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APPENDICES

MAIN QUESTIONS ASKED AT THE INTERVIEWS

1. How do you evaluate the current practices of European Union regarding the involvement of Non-EU European NATO members in Common Security and Defence Policy activities?
2. Do you think that the modalities of “Nice Implementation Document” (Annex II of the Brussels European Council, 24-25 October 2002, Presidency Conclusions) have been fully implemented in terms of involving non-EU NATO members?
3. Do you think that the Nice Implementation document could be extended to cover not only non-EU European NATO members, but also North American Allies?
4. Do you believe that there is a need to further develop NATO-EU strategic cooperation? If so, what could be done to achieve a better state of affairs?
5. Do you think that the EU and NATO have different working cultures?

LIST OF THE PERSONS INTERVIEWED

- NATO Assistant Secretary General For Defence Policy and Planning, H.E. Ambassador Hüseyin Diriöz
- A Turkish Diplomat, NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security Affairs Department of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- A Canadian Diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada
- A Polish Diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland
- A Czech Diplomat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic

