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# INTERNATIONAL PANEL TÜRKİYE-INDIA HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY RELATIONS

Edited by:  
**Omair ANAS**  
**Yalçın KAYALI**

**CIWAD India-Centre for India West Asia Dialogue**

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## FOREWORD

Türkiye-India relations, also called Indo-Turkish relations, refer to the bilateral relations between India and Türkiye. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Türkiye in 1948, political and bilateral relations have generally been characterised by warmth and cordiality. Indeed, there are historical connections between Türkiye and India. The first exchange of diplomatic missions between the Ottoman Sultans and the Muslim rulers of the subcontinent dates back to the years 1481-82. The Sufi philosophy of Mevlana Jelaluddin Rumi found resonance in the Indian sub-continent with its own traditions of Sufism and the Bhakti movement. The Hindustani and Turkish languages also have many words in common. More recent historical contacts between India and Türkiye were exemplified by the medical mission led by renowned Indian freedom fighter, Dr. M.A. Ansari, to Türkiye in 1912 during the Balkan Wars and the Khilafat movement (1919-1924). In the 1920s, India also extended support to Türkiye's War of Independence and the formation of the Turkish republic. Mahatma Gandhi himself took a stand against the injustices inflicted on Türkiye at the end of World War I.

Therefore, bilateral trade relations started a new phase and both sides emphasized the importance of developing bilateral cooperation programmes with the aim of enhancing their commercial relations on a mutually beneficial and sustainable basis. However, as the world's second-most populous country, India's progress in gaining importance in the global economy and international politics since the 1990s has led to Türkiye's quest to develop a new strategy for South Asia. At this stage, the need for consultation, dialogue, cooperation and solidarity between Türkiye and India and experts on every issue has become more evident. APAM, with the contribution of CIWAD INDIA, decided to organize a panel where we could discuss and exchange scholarly ideas put forth by Turkish and Indian experts and academics. This is how the panel titled *Türkiye-India Historical and Contemporary Relations* came to be, and it was held virtually on 29 March 2022. This book contains the full texts of the panelists' presentations.

We are indebted to all the valuable speakers who participated in the panel and shared their knowledge and academic opinions with us. We would like to

thank Dr. Omair ANAS, CIWAD INDIA-Centre for India West Asia Dialogue; Dr. Yalçın KAYALI, vice director of APAM-Ankara University Asia Pacific Research Centre; Mrs. Aysun HARPER; and the Ankara University Publishing House. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to our rector, Prof. Dr. Necdet ÜNÜVAR, who supports us in all our scholarly endeavours.

Prof. Dr. A. Merthan DÜNDAR  
Director of APAM

# THE CONTOURS OF TÜRKİYE-INDIA ECONOMIC RELATIONS

*Hülya GEDİK\**

This article analyzes general patterns between Turkish and Indian relations with respect to economic, trade and historical dimensions. In that regard, as being one of the major developing economic powerhouses, India's evolving economic profile is assessed through the structural dynamics of trade and investment. Given Türkiye's emphasis on Asia Anew Initiative as one of the foreign policy priority areas and historical background of both countries' trade engagement with each other, India's potential as a rapidly growing economy motivates Türkiye to diversify the agenda of its foreign trade towards Asia. Concerning the outlook of trade and investment relations of Türkiye and India, this article argues that in order to tap into the mutual benefits of respective economies, constructive and targeted policies should be pursued.

## **Indian Economy General Outlook**

India lying within the boundaries of Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal is the second most populous country in the world, which according to the latest estimates corresponds to the 18% of world population with 1.3 billion people where 31% belongs to urban population (World Bank). Its strategic geographical position, with large coastline of more than 7.500 kilometers, locates the country at the center of most significant maritime trade routes that meet Africa, Middle East and East Asia (Jaishankar, 2016).

One may argue that over the seven decades or so after India has established its independence in 1947, the country has achieved self-sufficiency in terms of food and grains. India is now a net exporter of food. Life expectancy has more than doubled, literacy rates have quadrupled,

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health conditions have improved, and a middle class has emerged. India is now home to globally recognized companies in pharmaceuticals, automobiles, steel, and information and space technologies (PWC, 2022). The country is known for its fastest-growing high-technology centers with major information technology and software companies settled in India. (Britannica Encyclopedia India)

In terms of natural resources, India has the largest copper reserves in the world, 7<sup>th</sup> largest reserve of manganese ore, 3<sup>rd</sup> largest reserves in the world of iron ore, 4<sup>th</sup> largest reserve of coal and 4<sup>th</sup> largest reserve of zinc in the world. On the other hand, India is the largest producer of milk, largest producer of fruits and vegetables and has 25% of the world's cotton production. (Nature, 2020)

India is developing into an open-market economy. Economic liberalization, including reduced controls on foreign trade and investment, began in the early 1990s and has served to accelerate the country's growth rate (PWC, 2022). It should also be added that India has the world's 6<sup>th</sup> largest consumer market.

### **Economic Indicators of India**

India is one of the major growing economies in the world where its GDP has expanded by 2.57 times from 2004-2005 to 2018-2019. Over the past three decades, India has been one of the 18 outperforming emerging economies where since 1992 real GDP growth averaged 6.8 percent per annum and since 2005, more than 270 million people have escaped extreme poverty (McKinsey, 2020). The country is expected to be the third largest consumer market by 2030 behind the US and China (PWC, 2022).

However, in the aftermath of global financial crisis of 2008, India's main demand engines of domestic private investment and global demand have stalled. Exports declined as a share of India's GDP from 25 to 19 percent from fiscal year 2013 to 2019. Gross domestic savings and household savings slowed. Core sectors, including manufacturing and construction showed signs of stress (Subramanian & Felman, 2019).

When looked at manufacturing sector in general, it is seen that in the fiscal year 2000 the sector has contributed 15.3 per cent to its GDP, whereas in 2020 manufacturing generated 17.4 per cent of India's GDP. On the other

hand, from fiscal year 2006 to 2012, India's manufacturing sector GDP grew by an average of 9.5 per cent per year. Then, over the next six years growth declined to 7.4 per cent. And for the last 13 years, India's manufacturing sector share of employment increased by just one percentage point (McKinsey, 2020).

In the fiscal year Q3 2021-22 India's economy grew by 8.4 per cent. The elements contributing the growth mostly derive from global economic recovery and related strong exports and also domestic private investment. Accordingly, we may claim that there exist four engines of real GDP; private consumption, government consumption, total fixed investments, and exports, goods and services. It should also be mentioned that manufacturing and construction sectors have seen sustained rebound thanks to the reduced mobility restrictions and pick-up demand (Majumdar, 2022). On the other hand, the pandemic has increased the pace of digitalization with businesses ramping up their online presence to survive. This trend is likely to continue even after the pandemic is over and will aid in improving the efficiency and productivity of labor and capital (Majumdar, 2022).

According to the results of a prominent research center (McKinsey, 2020) India needs to create at least 90 million nonfarm jobs to absorb the 60 million new workers who will enter the workforce based on current demographics over the decade to 2030. Accordingly, India's GDP will need to grow by 8.0 percent to 8.5- percent annually over the same decade. In line with this forecast, Global economic growth in 2022 is expected to moderate from 5.9 percent in 2021 to 4.4 percent due to the factors such as new Omicron variant, inflation arising from rising energy and food prices and continuing supply disruptions. It should be noted that whereas continued supply chain disruptions hamper global manufacturing, the volatilities in energy prices and wage pressures imply that uncertainty remains live for some period (Fund, 2022).

It is estimated that the prices will rise rapidly over the next two years and also the demand for goods is faster than services considering social distancing practices may continue for some more time. Therefore, inflation will be driven by rising good prices as it is difficult to quickly ramp up the supply of goods. In addition to this, high commodity prices will put pressure on production costs, which will feed into inflation (Majumdar, 2022).

## **India's Trade Agreements**

India has inked trade agreements with more than 50 countries manifesting India's engagement in regional and bilateral pacts with an aim of expanding its export markets and boost value-added domestic manufacturing (India-Country Commercial Guide, 2022).

It is to be noted that the United States during the tenure of Trump government, after the review process of India's compliance with the General System of Preferences (GSP) decided that India failed to meet the necessary criteria for the GSP on the grounds that India implemented trade barriers negatively affecting the US's economic interests. And in March 2019 revoked India's GDP status (Press Release, 2019).

Given India's opt out from the mega Regional Comprehensive Economic Pact (RCEP) trade agreement (Karabel, 2020) and preference for bilateral trade agreements such as with the UK, Australia, Russia and Oman may be corresponded to India's target for boosting export-oriented domestic manufacturing (Associates, 2022).

There is no Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Türkiye and India. However, Türkiye-India trade agreement discussions are on the negotiating table since 2000s between two sides. With a view to offset the disadvantages of being outside of the mega RCEP Pact and to deepen economic and trade relations, a FTA is mutually beneficiary. On the other hand, India benefits from Türkiye's GPS applied by the European Union (India, 2022).

## **Foreign Direct Investment in India**

Starting from 1990s, it might be argued that investment climate in India has improved significantly in line with economic liberalization process. Accordingly, the EU continues to be one of the largest sources of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for India with FDI inflows from the EU to India valued at US \$ 88.32 billion from Apr 2000-March 2021. The FDI from EFTA and other European Countries in the same period is valued at US\$ 35.89 billion (Foreign Trade, 2022).

Since the economic liberalization attempts have begun in 1990s, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been an important component of Indian economy as FDI contributes to development of strategic sectors, innovation, competition and employment benefits (Trade, 2020). It is to be noted that

aftermath of the Independence India imposed some measures concerning the industrial policy of the country. However, the measures failed to push the countries' industrial development and instead caused slow growth between 1950 and 1980 (Kniivilä, 2007).

The period after 1960s witnessed a market deepening of import-substitution regime and strengthening of domestic regulatory structures. The decade of the 1980s witnessed some experimentation with domestic deregulation that yielded dividends in productivity gains and acceleration in growth to seven per cent per annum. New Industrial Policy was announced in 1991 and the period from 1991 to 1997 saw rapid and wide-ranging reforms in industrial and trade policies, and tax and other policies that influence the macroeconomic management (Kniivilä, 2007).

In 2001, India regained momentum towards improving the environment for private investment opening the economy to foreign competition and infrastructure development. India began to remove quantitative restrictions on consumer goods and agricultural products in 2001. (Saha & Bhowmick, 2020) A significant proportion of the FDI in India is in the manufacturing, communication and financial services sectors. Six sectors account for more than 50 percent of all FDI in India between April 2000 to June 2019 (Saha & Bhowmick, 2020).

According to the latest FDI report by UNCTAD (Nations, 2021), global foreign direct investment in 2020 fell by 35 percent and reached 1 trillion dollars from 1.5 trillion dollars in 2019. This is the lowest since 2005 and almost 20 percent lower than 2009 through after the global financial crisis. FDI plummeted in developed and transition economies, falling by 58 per cent in both. In developing economies, it decreased by 8 percent (\$663 billion) mainly because of resilient flows in Asia (up 4 per cent), investment facilitation efforts and continuing investment liberalization. The uptick in Asia was mostly driven by an increase in FDI flows to Hong Kong, China. It might be argued that the impact of the pandemic on global investment trends was immediate and concentrated in the first half of 2020.

FDI inflows to developing Asia grew by 4 per cent to \$535 billion in 2020, increasing Asia's share of global inflows to 54 per cent. In India FDI increased by 27 per cent (64+ billion) FDI prospects in the region are more positive than those for other developing regions, owing to resilient intraregional value chains and stronger economic growth prospects (Nations,

2021). In India, FDI rose, pushed up by acquisitions in the information and communication technology (ICT) industry, making it the fifth largest recipient in the World. In terms of FDI outflows, India declined from 13 billion dollars to 12 billion dollars (Nations, 2021).

Global FDI flows showed a strong rebound in 2021, up 77% to an estimated \$1.65 trillion, from \$929 billion in 2020, surpassing their pre-Covid 19 level. FDI flows in developing economies rose by 30% to nearly \$870 billion, with growth acceleration in East and South-East Asia (+20%) (Nations, Investment Trends Monitor, 2022) Of the total increase in global FDI flows in 2021 (\$718 billion), more than \$500 billion, or almost three quarters was recorded in developed economies (Nations, Investment Trends Monitor, 2022).

It should be mentioned that India issues its highest FDI inflow of USD 81.97 billion in the financial year 2020-21 in that computer software and hardware sector attracted the largest share with 19 per cent, trading 7 per cent and telecommunications and construction with 7 per cent. The top five countries from the period April 2014 to August 2021 include; Singapore, USA, Mauritius, Holland, Japan (Government of India Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2021)

### **Türkiye-India Trade Relations**

The data concerning bilateral trade between Türkiye and India reveals that the bilateral trade has increased over the past decades. In that, whereas in 2000 the trade volume merely reached USD 429 million, in 2018 the volume reached its apex and stood at USD 8.65 billion. On the other hand, there exists a trade deficit to the detriment of Türkiye. In 2020-21 despite the pandemic the trade volume between two countries was USD 5.42 billion. (Turkey-India Economic and Trade Relations) Türkiye is the 23<sup>th</sup> export destination for India.

According to the MFA data, main export items to India include; gold, marble, oil seeds and raw materials and main import items from India comprise; minerals, pearl, petroleum, textile yarn and related products and vehicle spare parts. (Turkey-India Economic and Trade Relations) With its developing economy, demographic trends, technological advances, Türkiye accords a strategic significance to India.

Regarding mutual economic agreements, in 1973 a Bilateral Trade Agreement between Türkiye and India has been signed (Andrabi, 2014, s. 2). In 1978 Economic and Technical Cooperation established Türkiye-India Joint Economic and Cooperation Committee (JEC). (Turkey-India Economic and Trade Relations) In 1983 Türkiye and India inked an agreement for the setting up of a Joint Economic Commission (JEC) (Alam, 2007).

In addition to these, Türkiye-India Joint Business Council (JBC) was founded in 1996 between Foreign Economic Relations Board of Türkiye (DEİK) and Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) (Andrabi, 2014, s. 2). The Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation in 1996 and the Agreement on the Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters in 2015 were signed (Alam, 2007).

On 6 August 2015, State Bank of India and Türkiye's Akbank entered into a cooperation agreement to support bilateral trade and investments. (Hindistan Ülke Profili, 2021) In 2015 Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) signed an MoU with the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye (TOBB) with an aim of promoting bilateral trade and economic cooperation. CII also agreed a MoU with DEİK in March 2018. (India Turkey Relations) TOBB and FICCI inked an cooperation agreement to set up India-Türkiye Working Committee and Investment Forums. An India Business Forum (IBF) was established in Istanbul that convenes four times a year (India Turkey Relations).

### **Historical Background of Türkiye-India Trade Relations**

Although the historical relationship between Türkiye and India dates back to 15<sup>th</sup> century, Türkiye and India established diplomatic relationship in 1948. It might be argued that an ongoing theme between Türkiye and India in the context of enhancing trade relationship has been boosting the commercial relations on a mutually beneficial and sustainable basis (Andrabi, 2014, s. 2).

The economic liberalization reforms of India coincided with Türkiye's economic opening up attempts of Turgut Özal period in 1980s which led to a revitalization of commerce relations manifested in increased trade and official visits. Turgut Özal's economic agenda comprised promotion of exports and devaluation of Turkish Lira so in order to run the envisaged system new markets were deemed necessary (Oran, 2013, s. 31). In that

sense, Türkiye has expanded its relations with Asian and South Asian countries. Consequently, the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal's official visit of India on 9-14 April 1986 heralded a new phase in relations between two countries particularly in the realm of economics and trade. The visit accelerated efforts to enhance the substance of relationship ranging from economics to communication. Within the context of the visit, on one hand a business delegation accompanied Özal (Mehta, 2019), on the other hand a joint economic consultation mechanism establishment decision on foreign ministry level was taken (Malkoç, 2017). Turgut Özal's visit had been reciprocated by Indian Prime Minister Rajiy Gandhi in 1988.

In April 2000 the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's visit to India and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Türkiye in September 2003 are particularly noteworthy in the sense that with a wide range of subjects on the agenda the visits created a positive momentum between two sides (Çolakoğlu, 2014). In 2008 visit to India President Erdoğan endorsed the Türkiye-India Free Trade Agreement. Türkiye has shown interest in institutions such as the BRICS, SCO and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank where also India takes part in (Ketan, 2019).

In 2015 President Erdoğan met with Prime Minister and Narendra Modi on the margins of the G20 Summit in Antalya and then followed by another meeting between two leaders at the G20 summit in Hangzhou, China in 2016. These meetings led to the charting of a roadmap between two countries, towards strengthening economic, political and cultural cooperation (Ketan, 2019). In 2017 President Erdoğan with a business delegation of over 100 representatives visited India.

### **Investment Relations between Türkiye and India**

With regards to FDI flows from India, it might be said that even though the portion of Türkiye is relatively low there exists a trend towards accelerating. As per October 2021, 338 Indian companies operate in Türkiye (Hindistan Ülke Profili, 2021). According to the data from Indian embassy in Ankara (India Turkey Relations), several Indian companies are registered in Türkiye. Indian companies such as TAFE, Mahindra, Sonalika, Tata, Jindal, Indo-Rama, Birla Cellulose, Polyplex Merrill Lynch, Punj Lloyd, Thermax, Wipro, Jain Irrigation, etc. have invested in Türkiye to the tune of USD 125 million while Turkish investments in India stands at USD 223 million

according to the data compiled by Indian Embassy. Turkish companies Koc Holding, Arcelik A.S, Dogus Holding Dogus Construction, Celebi Holding, Orhan Holding, operate in India.

Major investment sectors for Indian investors comprise; polyester film, irrigation systems, cosmetic, tractors, telecommunication, airport management, petro-chemistry and refinery, iron and steel, thermal power, plant management. (Hindistan Ülke Profili, 2021) On the other hand, Turkish investors focus on airport ground services, airport cargo terminal operation, automotive supply industry, contracting engineering, textile fabric, construction materials, pharmaceutical-medical, telecommunications products, glass and glass products (Hindistan Ülke Profili, 2021).

### **Conclusion**

Given the latest trends in Indian economy and the global economic outlook and also the nature of Indo-Turkish economic relations, it might be said that India's economic rise and its potential for future development motivates Türkiye to diversify the agenda of its bilateral relations with India. On the other hand, in order to escape middle income trap India offered significant benefits to Türkiye in Türkiye's attempts to diversify trade network (Çolakoğlu, 2014).

In August 2019 Türkiye declared Asia Anew Initiative with a specific foreign policy focus of boosting and diversifying the relations with Asian continent countries. At its core, the recalibrating of this new initiative comprised economic, security, and socio-cultural dimensions largely driven by the shifting gravity of economics from West to East and relevant geopolitical developments.

In this regard, India constitutes an engagement of booming economies and strategic importance where India has been designated as target country for the period 2020-2021 as one of the most important players in the global economic landscape.

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## **TÜRKİYE AND INDIA MILITARY COOPERATION: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES**

*Haluk KARADAĞ\**

Relations between Türkiye and India date back centuries. The Mughal Empire was the last Turkish state to rule in the lands of India, which witnessed power struggles involving various Turkish tribes in certain periods of history. The geography of India came under the domination of the British from the 18th century, who held the administration of these lands until the end of the World War II. In 1947, it was divided into two Pakistan and India. In relations with Türkiye, the material and moral support provided by Indian Muslims in the Turkish War of Independence led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk against the imperialist states after the First World War still preserves its place in the memory of the Turkish people. Afterward, there was not much development in the relations between the two countries, and as mentioned above, the British colonial empire also played a role. During the Cold War, there was no significant military cooperation between the two countries who were on the same side, as part of the containment doctrine applied by the United States against the Soviet Union. The closeness that has developed between Pakistan and Türkiye, which has problematic relations with India and has come to the brink of war, especially in the Kashmir issue, also plays a role in this.

The reflection of the political cooperation between Türkiye and Pakistan on military relations has caused India to keep a distance from Türkiye. After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the USA, a rapprochement process emerged between Türkiye and India, who sent military units to Afghanistan to support NATO operations within the scope of the fight against terrorism initiated in the global system. In this, the "The Istanbul Summit for Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia" meetings, which commenced through the

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initiative of Ankara, had an important place. The Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process - HoA-IP, which includes 16 countries and 12 regional and international organizations, together with India, was among the developments that paved the way for cooperation between both countries. This initiation aimed to create a platform that puts forward the economic and political cooperation opportunities that focus on regional security in Afghanistan and solve regional problems through neoliberal policies. After the first meetings held on November 2, 2011, this cooperation gained continuity within the framework of the Implementation Plan Concept for the Counter-Terrorism CBM, which was held in Ankara on September 4, 2012.<sup>1</sup>

However, despite the development of these projects, Türkiye's perspective on the problems in the region was mostly affected by the perspective of Pakistan and thus, Ankara continued its course of action as more Islamabad-centered. Therefore, the political attitude in question has led to the perception of Türkiye's relations with the countries of the region through Pakistan. For this reason, military cooperation with India, which has the second largest population in the world did (could) not advance, following a rather limited course. The Indian government has made statements stating that it is against Türkiye's operation in northern Syria in 2019.<sup>2</sup> While President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's mention of the Kashmir issue in the text of his speech at the United Nations General Assembly on September 21, 2022, was welcomed by Pakistan, it led to negative statements on the Indian side.<sup>3</sup> Türkiye's stance in favor of Pakistan caused India to take the side of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Despite the negative political atmosphere between Türkiye and India, there are some positive developments within the scope of military cooperation. One of these is mutual military personnel visits at the

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<sup>1</sup> India Ministry of External Affairs, India-Turkey Relations, Retrieved from: [https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Turkey\\_Brief\\_Unclas\\_29\\_Jan\\_2013.pdf](https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Turkey_Brief_Unclas_29_Jan_2013.pdf) (11 November 2022).

<sup>2</sup> The Times of India, India slams Turkey for its 'unilateral military offensive' in northeast Syria, Retrieved from: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-slams-turkey-for-its-unilateral-military-offensive-in-northeast-syria/articleshow/71520852.cms> (11 November 2022).

<sup>3</sup> Prashant Ja, Turkish President Erdogan raises Kashmir at UN meet again. There is a difference, Hindustan Times, Retrieved from: <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/turkish-prez-erdogan-raises-kashmir-at-un-meet-again-there-is-a-difference-101663781800581.html> (11 November 2022).

general/admiral level, while another is the execution of military training and drills, and the last one is signing agreements regarding the purchase of military weapon systems and other defense systems.

### **Mutual Military Personnel Visits**

The direct relations between Türkiye and the Indian Armed Forces have remained distant for many years due to friendly relations with Pakistan. In the aforementioned process, reciprocal relations were maintained between military personnel assigned only within the scope of United Nations peacekeeping operations, apart from military attachés, but these processes did not go beyond individual efforts. However, in recent years, mutual military personnel visits have started to be carried out as a result of the dialogues between governments. In particular, the officers studying at the Indian Defense College in May 2012 visited Türkiye and contributed to the cooperation process. In November 2012, Admiral Murat Emin Murat Bilgel, the Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces (Navy Commander), visited India. During this visit, Admiral Bilgel held various consultations with senior military personnel of the Indian Navy in New Delhi, Agra, and Mumbai. In October 2021, some personnel from the Indian Navy participated in the Situational Awareness at Sea training held at the Maritime Security Center of Excellence in Türkiye.<sup>4</sup>

### **Bilateral Military Exercises and Operations**

Apart from the issues mentioned above, various cooperation activities have started to be carried out recently between the warships of the navies of both countries. One of them was the drill known as Passage Exercise (PASSEX) during a routine visit to Mumbai city by Turkish Navy warships on 10-11 July 2011. The warships participating in the said exercise carried out activities such as target recognition, communication with visual signals, and the manoeuvres by officers of the watch.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> India Ministry of External Affairs, India-Turkey Relations, Retrieved from: [https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Turkey\\_Brief\\_Unclas\\_29\\_Jan\\_2013.pdf](https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Turkey_Brief_Unclas_29_Jan_2013.pdf) (11 November 2022).

<sup>5</sup> Press Information Bureau Government of India Ministry of Defence, India Turkey Naval Exercise, Retrieved from: <https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=75703> (11 Kasım 2022).

A military delegation from the Turkish Navy made a coordinated visit to New Delhi and Mumbai on 19-22 September 2012. In addition, a group of representatives from the Turkish Naval Forces participated in the Regatta Admiral's Cup held at the Indian Naval Academy in Kerala between 27 November and 1 December 2012.<sup>6</sup>

Apart from the above-mentioned activities, Indian Armed Forces personnel worked in cooperation with Turkish military personnel in various military missions abroad. Although the Turkish Armed Forces mainly serve in military missions within the scope of NATO, it participates in United Nations peacekeeping operations with some units. Indian Armed Forces are also known to be heavily involved in UN peacekeeping operations. As a result, the military personnel of the two countries serving in the same missions fulfill many tasks together. As an example, in the operation known as the United Nations Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) based in Naqoura in Lebanon, some Turkish and Indian headquarters officers work collaboratively and contribute to the establishment of international peace and security in cooperation.

### **Agreements for the Sale of Military Weapon Systems and Other Defense Systems**

The most striking example in this regard is the participation of Turkish companies in an important tender within the scope of the five large fleet support shipbuilding opened by the Indian Ministry of Defense and being the winner as a result of the tender. A consortium of Sedef, Sefine, and Anadolu Shipyards, known as TAIS, participated in the tender for the construction of five ships, each of which has a size of 45,000 tons, and was the party that submitted the most appropriate bid in the tender worth 2.3 billion USD. In the tender opened in 2019, the world's leading Russian, German, and South Korean companies were among the competitors of TAIS, but TAIS won the tender as the party that submitted the most appropriate bid. The said tender has made history as the largest and most comprehensive tender the Turkish defense industry has ever received abroad. However, the statements made by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan regarding the Kashmir region during the 74th General Assembly meetings of the United Nations on September 24,

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<sup>6</sup> India Ministry of External Affairs, India-Turkey Relations, Retrieved from: [https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Turkey\\_Brief\\_Unclas\\_29\\_Jan\\_2013.pdf](https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Turkey_Brief_Unclas_29_Jan_2013.pdf) (11 November 2022).

2019, drew a reaction in the Indian media, and calls for a boycott were made to cancel the tender.<sup>7</sup>

Apart from the aforementioned field of activity, Savronik, which was established in 1986 to support the Turkish defense industry, participated in various tenders in India, won them, and continued its activities in India. This company carries out various activities in India with the partnership established under the name of "Savronik Systems India". The partnership formed with STFA, a Turkish company gained appreciation with several projects, including the Atal Tunnel project, the Pir-Panjal Railway tunnel (Banihal-India), known as the longest railway tunnel, the Chenani-Nashri tunnel, which is the longest highway tunnel, and finally the long highway tunnel (J&K-India), also known as the T-9 Railway tunnel (Assam-India), which contributes to the interconnection of existing strategic roads in India.<sup>8</sup>

## Conclusion

Turkish and Indian societies, which are not very different from each other historically and culturally, have many common features at the level of states. The cooperation activities between the two countries, whose mutual trade volume is approximately 8 billion USD, can increase.<sup>9</sup> Considering that India is the second most populous country in the world after the People's Republic of China, this cooperation also has a large economic capacity. For this reason, increasing the bilateral trade volume with India by following neoliberal policies is in favor of both countries. In the military field, the aforementioned

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<sup>7</sup> Kerim Ülker, Hindistan Türk şirketlerin kazandığı 2.3 milyar dolarlık ihaleyi imzaladı. Dünya Gazetesi, 24 November 2020.

Martin Manaranche, Indian MoD Signed A Contract With Turkey's TAIS Shipyards For 5 Fleet Support Vessels, Naval News, Retrieved from: <https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/05/indian-mod-signed-a-contract-with-turkeys-tais-shipyards-for-5-fleet-support-vessels/> (13 November 2022)

<sup>8</sup> Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, A Turkish connection to Atal Tunnel, The Economic Times, Retrieved from: [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/turkish-connection-to-atal-tunnel/articleshow/78477966.cms?utm\\_source=contentofinterest&utm\\_medium=text&utm\\_campaign=cppst](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/turkish-connection-to-atal-tunnel/articleshow/78477966.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst) (13 November 2022).

Erkan Yılmaz, Hindistan'daki Atal Tüneli'nde Türk Mühendislerin İmzası Var, Retrieved from: <https://www.tasimadunyasi.com/karayolu/hindistandaki-atal-tunelinde-turk-muhen-dislerin-imzasi-var-h8024.html> (13 November 2022).

<sup>9</sup> Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hindistan'ın Ekonomisi, Retrieved from: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/hindistan-ekonomisi.tr.mfa> (15 November 2022).

cooperation opportunities present a multidimensional structure that includes unlimited opportunities. Although there are many opportunities for cooperation between the two countries, especially in the context of naval forces, the abundance of the said opportunities in the field of combating global terrorism draws attention.

However, Türkiye has been shaping its relations with India through Pakistan for years. This situation is the most important factor preventing the further development of Türkiye-India relations. Considering Türkiye's cultural, historical, and economic power, it is within Türkiye's existing capacity to develop friendly relations with both Pakistan and India by using her soft power. With the recent "Asian Re-fopening" initiated by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the necessity of re-evaluating the relations between Türkiye and India for maintaining an effective foreign policy in Asia and developing a strategic cooperation plan emerged. In this respect, the current efforts to establish constructive and sustainable relations with both Pakistan and India can be paced. In addition, the Republic of Türkiye can play an important role in establishing "positive peace" between both countries, as she is one of the few countries that has the potential to act as a mediator between Pakistan and India from a historical, cultural, and military perspective.

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## INDIAN-TÜRKİYE RELATIONS IN OTTOMAN AND TURKISH ARCHIVES

*Omair ANAS\**

Turkey-India historical relations have received special attention from Indian and Turkish scholars for a long time. There are several books which have been written to inquire the historical references. Most of these references have been in Ottoman Turkish or Osmanlica, as the old language is called. The archival stock of India-Turkey relations starts from the fifteenth century to the end of the First World War. There are nearly 7000 papers in which these issues and many other issues have been discussed. Only friction of these archives has so far been accessed and studied. Historically speaking, the earliest of these archives can be traced back to the 960 Hijri or 16<sup>th</sup> century. These archives provide essential information about India's historical importance and how Indian affairs figured prominently in Turkey's Asian and Middle Eastern perspectives. However, much of the research has been done only by the Khilafat Movement and Indian Medical Mission to Turkey. Other historical and more important aspects have not even been touched upon.

These archives can be broadly divided into following sections:

1. Ottoman-Mughal Diplomatic Exchanges
2. Ottoman admiral Sidi Reis' accidental trip to Gujarat
3. Ottoman-Emperor Akbar dispute
4. Ottoman notes about Portuguese advancement towards India
5. Ottoman letters on Sufi travellers
6. Ottoman letters on Indian Hajj Pilgrims
7. Ottoman letters on Indian traders
8. Ottoman archives on the Indian Ocean

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9. Ottoman archives on Khilafat Movement
10. Ottoman archives on Indian help for Hijaz Railway Project
11. Ottoman archives on Telegraph connectivity towards India
12. Ottoman archives on Turkish railway projects towards India
13. Ottoman reports on Russian-British affairs
14. Ottoman reports on British policies towards India
15. Ottoman reports on Indian affairs
16. Ottoman-Nizam exchanges
17. Ottoman Tipu Sultan Exchanges
18. Ottoman notes on Turkish Prisoners of War in India
19. Ottoman notes on Indian war prisoners in Turkey
20. Ottoman notes on Indian Muslims
21. Ottoman exchanges from Bombay, Madras Consulates
22. Ottoman-Indian trades via Malta
23. Ottoman-Rampur exchanges
24. Ottoman-Bhopal exchanges
25. Ottoman papers on 1857 mutiny
26. Ottoman notes on Nadir Shah
27. Ottoman-Afghanistan-India notes
28. Ottoman-Raja Mehmudabad exchanges
29. Ottoman-Indian Medical Mission papers
30. Ottoman-Red Crescent Help
31. Ottoman notes on Indian help for Mecca and Madina
32. Ottoman notes on Indian freedom fighters fleeing from British sight
33. Ottoman exchanges with Malik Shah of Bahmanabad
34. Ottoman exchanges with the Indian diaspora in Britain, Sweden, and Germany
35. Ottoman papers on Japan, China, Turkistan, and Tibet
36. Ottoman papers on Burma, Indonesia, and Malaysia and their links with India
37. Ottoman papers on Kashmir
38. Ottoman papers on Indian culture, art, religions, and traditions
39. Ottoman papers on Indian freedom fighters
40. Ottoman reports on Indian publications
41. Miscellaneous

## Sufism as a Bridge

While visiting Turkey's spiritual sites, one would be surprised to encounter with an omnipresence of a book *Mektubati Rabbani*, the collections of letter of famous Indian Sufi of sixteenth century, Ahmad Sarhindi (1564-1624). How come an Indian Sufi became popular in Turkey, perhaps second after Mevlana? The records of huge traffic of Sufi travellers between India and Turkey, between fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, explain why and how Istanbul and other Ottoman cities became the centres of Indian Sufis. Among the earlier Islamic scholarly texts brought to Istanbul, according to Christopher D. Bahl, are the works of al-Muḥammad al-Damamini (d.827/1424), Shihab al-Din al-Dawlatabadi (d. 848/1445). However, the Sufi networks had started spreading from the time of Delhi Sultanate. Even though Baghdad was the seat of world's most powerful capital, and the Mangol invasion had not started, Indian cities were attracting spiritual seekers from all over the world. Unlike Christian countries, where Islam was seen as a principle rival, Hindu and Buddhist philosophers were joining the Islamic scholarship and spiritual centres in large numbers in the rapidly changing Transoxiana. The powerful Prime Ministers of the Abbasid Empire, the Baramika, were said to be Buddhists or Hindus before they went to Baghdad. Sanskrit literature was brought and translated. The Panchtantra was the first book translated to Persian and then to Arabic by Ibn-Muqaffa (720–757 AD). According to historian Muzaffar Alam, several Hindus and Buddhists were brought to Baghdad to teach several subjects. As the translation of Hindu texts spread, Sufis were more curious to learn it. Al Biruni (A.D. 973-C. 1050) translated Patanjali's Yogasūtra, Varahamihira's Brihatsamhita and other texts. The Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh in seventeenth century, translated the Upanishads as *Sirr-i Akbar* and wrote his famous book *Majma' al-Bahrarain*. Hindu scriptures became a new point of scholarly debates among Muslim Sufis. In their encounter with Hindu philosophy, Indian Sufi traditions mastered new discourses and soon became popular and sought-after in the Islamic mystical centres of the Arab world and Anatolia. Aleppo, Baghdad, Istanbul, Edirne, even Bulgaria's Sofia, and Kosovo's Prizern were the new centres of Indian Sufism. Indian pilgrims had to transit via Ottoman lands to reach Mecca and Madina as the Ottoman Caliphate became the custodian of the two holy mosques. In their route to Mecca and Medina, they were welcomed to spend time in various Sufi centres, known as tekke in Turkish or Takiya as called in Urdu.

The earliest reference of Indian Tekke in the Ottoman archives is traced back to 989 Hijri (1581), Indian Sufis had arrived in Sofya and Pazarcik and were also financially supported by the Ottoman Sultan. There are almost 150-200 Ottoman era archives that mention the presence of Indian Sufis in various cities of the Ottoman Sultanate. The most famous Indian Sufi circles or tekke were the Bursa and Horhor tekke of Uskudar, now in Istanbul. These two tekkes remained active at least for two hundred years and have been repaired recently. Mughal and other Indian diplomatic missions were in acknowledgement of Horhor tekke. Imam Muhammed Serdar, a member of Tipu Sultan's diplomatic delegation to the Ottoman Sultanate, had stayed at Horhor tekke and was buried here after he died. Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi, the great Indian freedom fighter, also used to stay this Horhor tekke to consult with Turkish politicians and specially Abdurrahamn Peshawari, then known as an Indian freedom fighter in Turkey. Peshawari had convinced Maulana Sindhi about the reforms undertaken by Mustafa Kemal after the Caliphate.

Now the question is how the letters of Imam Rabbani became popular in Turkey. Along with several Sufi travellers who were frequently travelling to Ottoman Sufi circles, was Shaikh Khalid Al Baghdadi who had visited India at the recommendation of an Indian Sufi traveller Mirza Rahimullah Azimabadi. Azimabadi informed Baghdadi about Imam Rabbani and his disciple Abdullah Dihlevi. Shaikh Khalid took no time in visiting India in 1809 and there, he spent more than a year and sat with Shaikh Abdullah Dihlevi to learn the teachings of Ahmad Sarhindi or Imam Rabbani. There he also spent time with Shah Abdul Aziz, the son and spiritual heir of Shah Waliullah Dihlevi, the famous Islamic revivalist. Abdullah Dihlevi has frequently been mentioned in the Ottoman archives as a prominent disciple of Imam Rabbani. Abdullah Dihlevi not only introduced Khalid Baghdadi the works of Imam Rabbani but also sent his disciples to Anatolia to establish some tekkes. With the teachings and disciples of Imam Rabbani, the influence Naqsbandi Sufi tradition reached every corner of the Ottoman land. Khalid Baghdadi returned Baghdad in 1811 where he started spreading the teachings of Imam Rabbani

In the first reference to Imam Rabbani, an archive of 1829 mentions the travel of one of the grandsons of Imam Rabbani, Halil Efendi, to Ordu where he stayed for sometime. The Ottoman authorities, ranging from the finance,


Shaikh al Islam, and Shura, were all very warm and welcoming to the Sufi travellers coming from India. They not only approved their arrival and stay papers but also allocated daily expenses. In many cases, they provided financial support to get the tekke built and repaired. One of the family members of Imam Rabbani, Shaikh Masumi sent a request for his travel to Mecca, Medina and Alexandria, he requested a *Tawajjahnama* from the Prime Ministry. Shaikh Masumi later died in this travel in 1862. As per the documents, several other members of the Imam Rabbani's family also died in this journey. As a result, the survived ones were taken care of and provided necessary accommodation and hospitality. The extended family members and disciples of Imam Rabbani continued to receive special attention and hospitality of Ottomans and were lodged in Mecca, Istanbul and other places of their visit.

The Ottoman authorities commissioned the translation of Imam Rabbani's letters from Persian to Arabic and from Persian to Turkish. According to archives, one of the translators of *Mektubati Rabbani*, Abdurrahman Efendi, was a disciple of Shaikh Khalid al Baghdadi and was staying at his tekke in Baghdad. After he died in 1853, the translation honorarium continued. However, there is no evidence that another translation by Müstakimzâde Süleyman Sadeddin, completed in 1780, was part of this translation project.


Indian Sufi connections remains stronger even now as all Sufi orders have strong presence in Turkey's Sufi traditions. Researchers and academicians have started paying attention in tracing the memories of Indian Sufis presence in Turkey. A recent book by Ali Emre Islek, *Osmanlı Coğrafyasındaki Hintli Mutasavvıflar ve Tekkeleri* (Indian Sufis and Tekkes in Ottoman Lands) has covered most of archival references available archives. Rishad Choudhri's *The Hajj and the Hindi: The ascent of the Indian Sufi lodge in the Ottoman Empire*, and previous works of M. Baha Tanman, Zafer Hasan Aybek, Thierry Zarcone, Prof. Azmi Ozcan, and Cemil Kutlutürk have provided enough evidences on a strong presence of Indian Sufis across the Anatolian landscape. Most of these tekkes may have lost much public attention but they remain part of spiritual memories whenever Sufis travel to Turkey. As Turkey is trying to reach out via its *Asia Anew Initiative*, the revival and reintroduction of Indian Sufi memorials in Turkey would greatly help the initiative and reconnect India-Turkey relations beyond political exchanges.

## Indian Sufi Tekkes in the Ottoman Time


Sufis	Tekke as Known	City	Year/Circa
Seyyid Ali Efendi	Şeyhül Ali Baba tekke	Prizren, Kosovo	
Hasan Hindi	Şeyh Hasan Hindi Zaviyesi	Syria	1535
Bayezid Hindi	Şeyh Hasan Hindi Zaviyesi	Syria	1664
Cafer Baba	Adana Hindiler Tekkesi	Adana	1670
İbrahim Efendi	Adana Hindiler Tekkesi	Adana	1729
Abdülkerim Hindi	Abdülkerim (Mehmed Refi'i) Tekkesi	1600?	
Shaikh Ali	Edirne Hindiler Tekkesi	Edirne	1601
Shaikh Seyyid Abdusselam bin Shihabeddin Ensari	Edirne Hindiler Tekkesi	Edirne	1601
Muzaffer Efendi	Haleb Hindiler Tekkesi	Aleppo	
Mehmed Hindi	Haleb Hindiler Tekkesi	Aleppo	1677
Hasan Hindi	Şam Hindiler Tekkesi		1535
Abdulkayyum Hindi	Danyal Aleyhisselam Türbesi	Tersus, Mersin,	1696
Süleyman Hindi	Danyal Aleyhisselam Türbesi	Tersus, Mersin,	1725
Ahmed Hindi	Urfa Hindiler Tekkesi	Urfa, Turkey	1891
Şeyh Can Hindi	Anteb Hindiler Tekkesi	Antab, Turkey	1703
Derviş Cuma Hindi	Anteb Hindiler Tekkesi	Antab, Turkey	1724
Şeyh İsmail	Antakya Hindiler Tekkesi	Antakya, Turkey	1760
Abdulhak Turabi	Abdulhak Turabi Hindiler Tekkesi	Baghdad	??
Turabi-i Hindi	Harmancık Turabi Baba Hindiler Tekkesi	Bursa, Turkey	1797
Seyyid Feyzullah Hind	Üsküdar Hindiler Tekkesi	Uskudar, Istanbul	1737 -
Hacı Mehmed Hindi	Kütahya Hindiler Tekkesi	Kutahya, Turkey	1812
Şeyh Ahmed Lahori	Süleymaniye Hindiler (Ahmed Lahori) Tekkesi	Baghdad, Iraq	1817- 1856
Mehmed Sabit Efendi	Van Hindiler Tekkesi	Van, Turkey	-1874
Baba Şemseddin bin Pir Gayb el-Kalenderi	Bursa Hindiler Tekkesi	Bursa, Turkey	Before 1594
Hâce İshak Buhar	Horhor Hindiler Tekkesi	Istanbul	1457
Fethullah Efendi	Horhor Hindiler Tekkesi	Istanbul	1624
Şeyh Ebu'l Hâdi İzzi	Kudüs Hindiler Tekkesi	Jerusalem, Palestine	1621
Seyyid Feyzullah İbn-i Arabşah Hindi, Seyyid Hüseyin Fazıl Hindi	Konya Hindi tekkesi	Konya, Turkey	




A letter sent by Indian Sufi Abdulkерim Hindi to the Sultan in 1211 Hijri for financial help for his tekke




A letter by one of the family members of Imam Rabbani, and Sufi known as Masum to the Prime Ministry to seek *tawajjahname* for his travel to Mecca and Medina via Alexandria in 1276 Hijri



A letter sent by a Sufi Al Haji Ahmad Hindi to the Sultan to seek his help for Indian tekke in Adana



A letter on Indian Sufi Tekke in Istanbul, The Hindu Sufis' stay in Gaza, Palestine, dates circa 1229 Hijri (1860) circa 1170 Hijri (1750)



Receipt of gifts from India to the Ottoman Sultan circa 1600



خارجی دفتر - ۸ صید

۴۶۵۹-۵۱۹

دردند اقدم حقیر  
 رعایایه عزیمت آید یعنی ما لقمه! پرتاب آید فاقصه بر نامه خدمتیت پدیه  
 و پیله و بقدرت اعاده آلتا ایتار حبه در رسیده طلب اولقمه ایشو و بقدرت اعاده  
 بالاقصه خارجه سیر تبارک حضرتت ایجاب آید و اولم بولسه بایده اردنانه  
 حقیر هم اولم اولم


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
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Letter about Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh's planned visit to Istanbul in 1915



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A report on Tipu Sultan's reaching to power



A report on Hyderabad Nizam's preparation to stop Russian forces from coming close to Indian borders

## **Indian Support to the Ottoman Empire**

In 1877, an Anglo Indian wrote to the British foreign office that if Turkey were allowed to decline, the British Empire would endanger its hold on India because a victorious Russian army would claim the lion's share in the dismembered Turkey. The colonial British observers see Turkey mainly as a player in the British-Russian rivalry in Asia and wanted Turkey to establish good relations with India's local rulers, to keep them from Russians or French. However, gradually, Turkey's Ottoman rulers understood the rise of India's independence movement and sympathized with pro-independence sentiments. Amid a British-Russian rivalry, the Ottomans were to balance could gain the ground by reaching out to India's local rulers. The Ottomans managed to build close relations with the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Nawabs of Bhopal, Rampur, Mahmudabad, and Malabar. During the Ottoman-Russian war in 1877-78, Turkey received support and sympathy from many Indians and local rulers. Ottoman Foreign minister Keccizade Mehmed Fuad Pasha preferred to lose some Ottoman provinces than losing the alliance with England. Indian rulers, mainly the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Nawab of Bhopal were among the first to have sent financial and medical aid to the Ottoman Empire after the 1876 Ottoman-Russian war. In her letter on 29 Muharram 1294 (12 February 1878) to the Ottoman Sultan, the Malika of Bhopal, Shahjahan Begum, called the Russian forces "defeated and humiliated" while praying for the orphans and injured of the war. She sent 150,000 British Pound while her husband Nawab Siddiq Hasan Khan, sent 25,000, along with 25,700 from her family members. The Ottomans received support from Indian rulers, the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Nawab of Bhopal, in developing the residential and transportation infrastructure in the Hijaz. For this purpose, the Nizam of Hyderabad had provided a huge amount to the Ottomans to build Hijaz Railway. With the development of the Holy Mosques of Mecca and Madina and the support of Indian Muslims for that, scholarly exchanges between India and Turkey increased. Even though the Ottomans were losing political power, the modernisation of the empire was seen with great hope by the Asian politicians who were in search of a non-Western model of modernity. Japan and the Ottomans were projecting themselves as the two models and started calling for Pan-Asian alliances. The pan-Asian sentiments soon spread all over the Asian cities and politicians across Asia started joining hands for the rise of Asia. At this juncture, pan-Islamism and pan-Asianism came along. The Ottoman-inspired

modernisation drive started in several countries including in India where Indian rulers started establishing institutions of higher learning and translation projects. In 1877, an Ottoman delegation had also visited India and visited Aligarh where they met the founder of Aligarh Muslim University Sir Syed Ahmad. Sir Syed then had written that the Ottoman Sultan, in his modern outlook, is like a European ruler. The Prime Minister of Nizam of Hyderabad Nawab Vakar al Mulk Bahadur wrote a letter to the Ottoman Prime Minister on 23 August 1898 requesting him the photocopies of books of Mahmud Khan, Bayezid, and Nur-e-Osmani libraries. Among all educational initiatives that Indian Muslims had seen during that time, Hyderabad's Dairatul Maarif-il Osmaniya had inspired a generation of Muslim modernists. Similarly, the Muslim modernist Shibli Numani had traveled to Turkey and stayed here for a few months only to start his educational institutions in the future. Among all Islamic Madrasas established at that time, Shibli was considered the most modern and forward-looking Islamic reformer. He criticised both Aligarh Muslim University and Nadwatul Ulama and tried to establish his school of thought, though it gained only limited success. The impact of the Ottomans educational reforms on Shibli should be seen as one of the reasons for his rebellious critique of the traditional education of Muslims. It shouldn't surprise that Jamaluddin Afghani, the most famous yet controversial reformist of the time, was also initially hosted by the Ottomans before he left for Paris. Similarly, another Muslim modernist Syed Ameer Ali was also a regular visitor of Istanbul and was the first who had welcomed the formation of the Ottoman Parliament in 1909. Documents suggest that he was also advising the Ottomans for more reforms in the Anatolia region. One of the reasons that the Ottoman reforms had inspired India's Muslim modernists was the 1855 reform about non-Muslim citizens of the empire. These reforms allowed Turkey's Christian population equal citizenship rights, greater religious freedom, and inclusion in participation in state affairs. The rights of non-Muslims in Muslim political thoughts had taken a drastic change once the Tanzimat reforms empowered the non-Muslim populations. In one speech, the British foreign secretary had even claimed that now Turkey's Christian population have greater rights than Russian Christians.

Soon after the First World War, Indian freedom fighters wanted to establish an independent Indian government in exile in Kabul. For this purpose, Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh, Muhammad Barkatullah Bhopali, and

his friends started reaching out to Turkey and Germany. After traveling to Berlin, Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh arrived in Istanbul to meet the Ottoman Sultan in May 1915. He had carried an important message of German war officers to Istanbul and had met the Turkish war minister Enver Pasha. This made the British authorities very anxious and a team of British intelligence followed them from Istanbul to Baghdad, to Kabul. However, Raja managed to reach Kabul and declared the first Indian government in exile on 1st December 1915 of which he was the first Prime Minister. Soon, an all-India agitation against the British plans against the Ottomans would start and Mahatma Gandhi would lead the famous Khilafat Movement. The Khilafat movement, despite having an agenda of protecting religious shrines from going to the British colonial administration, the movement had brought conservatives and modernists together shaping new modernity for Indian political thought where religious leaders like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Muhammad Ali Jauhar, Husain Ahmad Madni would strongly support a united, modern, secular Indian republic. This is the reason that the Khilafat Movement remained relevant even after the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished and the movement extended its support to Mustafa Kemal in his reform to build a modern Turkish republic. At this juncture, Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi, a close aide of Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh and Subhash Chandra Bose was invited to Istanbul where he was apprised about the reforms introduced by Mustafa Kemal. Maulana Sindhi returned to India and conveyed the message of Mustafa Kemal. When the prominent Turkish revolutionary leader Halide Edib visited India in 1938, she met Gandhi and other prominent leaders and stayed at Jamia Millia Islami. Her speeches made them clear that it is time for Indian Muslims to seek a composite, reformed, and modern worldview beyond the delusions of the past.

### ***Sebilürreşâd's Support to Indian Independence Struggle***

The old files of late Ottoman newspapers are made public by the Turkish government and Turkish non-governmental organizations. These digitized newspapers add new knowledge on Ottoman society, culture, and politics. Among many late Ottoman newspapers, *Sebilürreşâd* is one of the most popular publications which had closely covered and followed Indian affairs. The fortnightly magazine was first started in 1908 as *Sirât-ı Müstakîm* by Ebül'ulâ Zeynelâbidin and H. Eşref Edip with Mehmet Akif as the Chief Editor. Forced several times to be stopped or changed its name, it

became *Sebilürreşâd* in 1912. Mehmet Akif, who actively participated in Turkey's national struggle, and would, later on, write the national anthem of Turkey, was the editor in chief of *Sebilürreşâd*. The editorial team of *Sebilürreşâd* had widely travelled to South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe to mobilize awareness and support for Turkey. When *Sebilürreşâd* was started, British-Ottoman relations had already started declining. Parts of Turkish territories were under allies' control after the First World War. The status of the two holy mosques of Mecca and Madina was th biggest source of disquiet for Muslims community worldwide, including the largest Muslim population of the world of the Indian subcontinent. They had already set up organisation like *Anjuman Khuddam-e-Kaba* (Assembly of Servants of Kaba) and the Indian Khilafat Movement, to demand the protection of Islam's holiest sites. When the correspondents of *Sebilürreşâd* started covering Indian affairs, they found a long list of political issues that concerned the future of India and Turkey.

Abdürreşid İbrahim (1909), SM Tevfik (1912-1913), Ahmed Halil, Ashraf Edip, Ömer Rıza Doğrul can be seen among the frequent contributors on Indian affairs in *Sebilürreşâd*. The pan-Asianist Abdürreşid İbrahim had traveled to India, en route to Japan in 1908 and had published his observations both in *Sırât-ı Müstakîm* and then *Sebilürreşâd*, when the name was changed. In one of his letters from India, he writes, "if I say India is the world's most sacred place, it will not be wrong. Prophet Adam is said to have landed near India in Srandip (Srilanka). Abdürreşid İbrahim's Arabic biographer Salim Muhammad underlines his suggestion that India's independence had to be fought together by both Muslims and Hindus. Abdürreşid İbrahim wrote a long article in 1922 to analyze India's independence struggle. In this article, the Ahmedabad session of the Indian National Congress in 1921 got his attention, for it was held under a Muslim president, Hakim Ajmal Ahmad Khan. He found this a strong message of unity of all Indians against British rule. In this article, he wrote, "India is a country of the greatest diversity of religion, languages, and faiths; however, their disunity will spoil their dreams of independence. The unity which Indians of all faiths had shown in the Indian Khilafat Movement was an example." After Abdürreşid İbrahim, SM Tevfik had extensively traveled to Indian cities from 1912-1913 and published 37 long parts of his travelogue titled "Hind Yolunda" or "on the way to India."

*Sebilürreşâd* is said to be a magazine of conservative late Ottoman politicians. This makes it a unique understanding of the complex relation between Islam, nationalism, and Muslim identity. Their generous admiration for Indian leaders and India's Islamic scholars, including Rabindranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Muhammad Ali Jauhar, Shaukat Ali, Shibli Nomani, and many others.

*Sebilürreşâd*, while covering Indian affairs, had no clue that India could ever be partitioned on religious grounds, some two decades later. For them, Maulana Azad was not only a politician but also a great Islamic thinker who had inspired a new awareness among global Muslims. The articles and speeches of Maulana Azad were immediately translated and published in *Sebilürreşâd* and other magazines. In this period, the magazine started covering Indian affairs more actively. The famous speech of Maulana Abul Kalam at a Calcutta court received much attention and was published in *Sebilürreşâd* and other magazines. His address was translated into Ottoman Turkish and was later published as a book. In addition, events from small Indian cities, like Rampur, Lucknow, Hamirpur, and other citizens, got the journal's attention.

From 1908 to 1925, around 500 articles, news items, or translations of India-related materials were published in *Sebilürreşâd*. Among the earliest articles are the reports of Abdurresid Ibrahim, who had visited Bombay, Hyderabad, and other cities in 1908. Abdurresid Ibrahim was the first Turkish journalist and activist who had introduced his Turkish readers to Indian political affairs. His writings helped the Ottoman politicians understand Indian politics more closely, and, as a result, the Ottoman/Turkish interest in Indian affairs increased rapidly. In these years, Indian Muslims helped with the Hijaz Railway project of the Ottoman government, and for the construction of ports in Turkey, Indian activities in Iran found special attention. There is a possibility that Abdurresid Ibrahim had also met Rabindranath Tagore and Subash Chandra Bose during his stay in Japan.

Since the start of the First World War in 1914, the magazine covered war affairs, especially Indian Muslims' positions towards the war. The issue of British politics towards the Ottoman Khilafat and the two Holy Mosques of Mecca and Madina received special attention. In this tumultuous time, Khilafat Movement had also started. In 1924, when Rabindranath Tagore

reached Japan, Abdurresid Ibrahim was already there, and he closely followed the lectures of Tagore and published the reports of Tagore's lectures in four long series.

One of the most widely covered subjects in these papers is India's independence struggle. Then the Khilafat movement found significant coverage in these papers. The subjects of India's history, culture, and society were also widely covered in many issues of *Sebilürreşâd*. Japanese politics, pan-Asianism, Hijaz railway, British policy towards Mecca and Medina, centers of Islamic scholarship in India like Deoband, Nadwatul Ulama, and works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Allama Shibli Numani found significant mention. The travel of Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh and the results of Tagore received their attention. It is interesting that news from small towns like Azamgarh, Rampur, Hamirpur, Lucknow, Kanpur also gets the magazine's attention. Even the prevalence of Unani medicine in India also received the attention of SM Tevfik, who published a long report about Unani medicine in India in issue number 257 in 1329.

Among political issues, the Indian Khilafat Movement, Indian National Congress, Gandhi, Azad, British conferences about India received much attention. According to a report published *Sebilürreşâd's* issue number 528 in 1339, the Indian Khilafat Movement offered to mediate between the Arabs and Turks to find a solution to their differences. In the issues of 551-552, detailed articles on Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Shaukat Ali, famously known as Ali Brothers, were published. The report also noted that Ali Brothers had a huge support of all Muslims and non-Muslims in their anti-British politics. For Ali Brothers, like Maulana Azad, the support for the Ottoman Khilafat in the time of the British occupation of Istanbul and other Islamic holy places, Mecca and Madina, was not different from their struggle against British colonial rule in India. In an article published in the issue of 286, in February 1913, "What do Indian Muslims expect from us," the visiting correspondent of *Sebilürreşâd* SM Tevfik, includes two interesting expectations, one, the Ottomans should closely observe and learn from the rise of Japan. Second, Turkey should establish close trade relations with India and all Asian countries, even if the trade volume is small. In the issue of 292, in 1913, Tevfik observed that the failure of the 1857 mutiny had made the Indian masses more sensitive and aware, especially Hindus. They found that modern education is necessary to compete with the West. For

these reasons, Hindus in Calcutta opened schools and colleges and sent their children to Europe for the advanced education of Science and Math. He writes that the nationalist sentiments are getting stronger among Hindus, to the extent that a Hindu working with any British office is publicly laughed at and humiliated. Those who work for British authorities now hide their identity or resign from their jobs. These nationalist sentiments are reflected in their political struggle in the Indian National Congress. This year, they chose a Muslim, Syed Muhammad Khan, as their president at the Karachi session of 1913. In the issue of 11 July 1911, the magazine introduced a Paris based magazine *Vande Matram* founded by freedom fighter Madam Bhikaji Kama. in a report on Indians' happiness over the return of Edirne back to the Ottoman rule, SM Tevfik introduced the *Vande Matram* magazine and translated the motto of the magazine which read, "Life is nothing without independence, There is no different between the dead people buried in their graves and the people without freedom." Tevfik found that any Indian in possession of this magazine, would have to lose everything. The issue of 25 July 1913 carefully covered the Kanpur riots. The writers said that the British authorities had misused the communal violence to weaken the Hindu-Muslim unity against British colonialism. SM Tevfik noticed that Hindu and Muslim businessmen in Madras (Chennai) had unitedly set up a chamber of commerce. After reporting from many cities, SM Tevfik announced that he would write a detailed introduction of Hinduism to Turkish readers. In most reports, *Sebîlürreşâd* always underlined the unity among various Indian religions for their common political future. *The coverage of India in the magazine shows Turkey's humanist worldview towards Indian affairs by appreciating India's diversity and its leaders' efforts to make India's country of pluralist ideas and values.*

### **Gandhi Among Turkish Intellectuals**

A British colonial-era civil servant, Bernard Houghton, while serving the empire in the Indian subcontinent, had gradually ended being critical of British policy towards India. Interestingly, the Khilafat movement was his main reference point in explaining why Britain's India policy is doomed to fail. He then had observed, "apart from these dissensions, the Khilafat agitation has illuminated the growing sense of unity between Hindus and Mohammedans. The future of the Khilafat is a purely religious question; it interests, moves and inflames only the followers of Islam. Yet the Hindus

have throughout sympathized deeply with their fellow citizens; they have supported them, helped them, indeed have acted almost as if it were a tenet of their own religion which was at stake." He had warned the British government that "it was no longer possible to govern India on the principle of divide and rule, to play off Mohammedan against Hindu."

As India commemorates the 152<sup>nd</sup> birth anniversary of Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma), Gandhi, Turkey, too, remembers Gandhi's unforgettable contribution to her struggle for independence. It is impossible to recall Turkey's anti-colonial struggle without mentioning Gandhi's support for the unity and integrity of the then-crumbling Ottoman Empire. Initially, Britain wanted to use Turkey to hold Tsarist expansionism in check by asking Turkey to help Indian security in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Against this backdrop, Indian politicians and activists had been actively engaged with Turkey. Once the Russian threat was over, as Britain started conspiring to dismember the Ottoman Empire, Indian politicians and Turkey found a common cause against British rule. The eruption of the Khilafat Movement was neither sudden nor just a religiously-inspired question. Gandhi, in his autobiography, explained why he chose to support the Khilafat movement, "friends and critics have criticized my attitude regarding the Khilafat question. In spite of the criticism, I feel that I have no reason to revise it or to regret my co-operation with the Muslims. I should adopt the same attitude, should a similar occasion arise." Not just that, he viewed the question of Khilafat more as political than a religious question and urged non-Muslims-Hindus to support the Khilafat movement. In his autobiography, Gandhi says, "if the Khilafat question had a just and legitimate basis, as I believe it had, and if the government had really committed a gross injustice, the Hindus were bound to stand by the Musalmans in their demand for the redress of the Khilafat wrong." While addressing some concerns on whether the Khilafat movement is only about religious politics, Gandhi writes, "as time progressed I found that the Muslim demand about the Khilafat was not only not against any ethical principle." The Turkish foreign ministry's book "War of Independence" published on the occasion of fifty years of Turkish republic in 1981, carefully mentions that Muslims and non-Muslims had stood together with Gandhi by supporting Turkey financially and putting pressure on British government.

On the other hand, while supporting the Khilafat movement, he asked his Muslim followers to abide by the principle of non-violence in all of their struggles. He had got a resolution passed by the Khilafat Movement on adhering to the principle of non-violence. He had long deliberation with Hakim Ajmal and cleared his skepticism on the practicability of non-violent non-cooperation; Gandhi writes, "Hakim Ajmal threw himself into it heart and soul, and his help proved invaluable to the movement."

In his detailed discussions with Islamic scholars and the leaders of the Khilafat movement, such as Maulana Abdul Bari, about the extent to which a Musalman could observe the rule of non-violence. Gandhi writes, "in the end, they all agreed that Islam did not forbid its followers from following non-violence as a policy, and further, that, while they were pledged to that policy, they were bound faithfully to carry it out." Among all anti-colonials struggles being fought anywhere in the world, the idea of non-violent struggle first appeared in and was employed by Indian leaders. Particularly, Muslims' agreeing to the principle of non-violence was altogether a new political experiment in the history of Islam and the history of the world. When the prominent writer and Turkish revolutionary Halide Edip visited India in 1935, she closely observed the impact of the Khilafat movement on the unity of Hindus and Muslims. Her observations matched with Gandhi's real intentions when she said, "no one outside India can realize the sacred emotion which swept over all India by the mere fact of complete unity between the Muslims and Hindus." The famous poet Muhammad Iqbal himself had chaired the speech of Halide Edip at Jamia Millia Islamia. As noted, historian Mushirul Hasan calls Jamia Millia Islamia a representative of Gandhian thoughts and philosophy. The university founders were all Gandhian and worked with him in the Khilafat movement. The late Ottoman thinkers keenly watched India's independence struggle and their support for Turkey's war of independence. Ottoman-era weekly magazine *Yeni Mecmua* published the translation of Romain Rolland's series "Milliyet Kahramanları: Mahatma Gandhi" *The National Heros: Mahatma Gandhi* in its issues from April 1923 to May 1923.

Even though some Muslims were projecting the Khilafat movement mainly as a religious matter, Gandhi explained the convergence of interest between India and Turkey's anti-colonial ambitions. Gandhi had convinced prominent Hindu leaders like Swami Shradhanand, Motilal Nehru, C.R.

Das, B.S. Moonje, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and his lieutenants Kelkar and Khaparde, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar and Girdhari Lai, K.K. Malaviya, P.D. Tandon, Sundar Lai, Mohanlal Nehru, Motilal and his son, Jawaharlal, support and participate in the Khilafat movement activities. It is not surprising that Gandhi had managed to use the Khilafat movement to strengthen the anti-colonial movement and united Hindus and Muslims for a common cause of India's independence. At the same time, when some events of the Khilafat movement turned violent, Gandhi reminded his Muslim followers to stick to the principle of non-violence if they wanted his support. Gandhi's interest in the Khilafat movement gradually changed, and he conspicuously abstained from the Karachi Khilafat Conference of July 1921. As Turkey's new ruler Mustafa Kemal Ataturk decided to abolish the Caliphate, the agitated Indian Muslims demanded Gandhi to send a delegation to Ankara; Gandhi was pragmatic enough to recommend Indian Muslims be more realistic. Gandhi's principled positions towards Turkish events, from supporting the Khilafat movement to the recognition of Mustafa Kemal-led new government, were acknowledged equally by the late Ottomans in the 1920s and the Kemalists of 1930s. Turkish intellectuals remembered Gandhi not just as an Indian hero but also as a person who had influenced a generation of idealists who believed in the principles of non-violence (Ahimsa) and passive insistence (Satyagraha).

Besides the translation of Romain Rollands' book Gandhi in 1923, Hasan Sukru's article "Gandhi: The Voice of India" (Gandhi: Hindistan'ın Sesi) was published in 1930. None outside India, perhaps, better than Halide Edip might have captured the essence of being Gandhi. In her stay in India in 1935, she met Gandhi several times and spoke to his followers, and supporters. She couldn't find enough words to define Gandhi, "the alternative great man, who also represents an aggrandized type of the ordinary man, is Buddha, Christ...and to those belongs Mahatma Gandhi. But they belong to such a remote past that one wonders whether they were ever on earth. No one in our age, or since the days of saints and prophets, has taken the fancy of the masses, because of his resemblance to the good, to the loving kindness of the ordinary man."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> R. K. Sinha'nın Kurtuluş Savaşı, Devrimler Mustafa Kemal ve Mahatma Gandhi (1919-1928).



# یکلی مخبرونه

## ملیت قهرمانلری

### ماهاتما غاندی [۱]

□□□□

عزت و اسارت طویراقتنه ،  
قانی دولتر وابدی نکرلر دایرته .  
زمانه میدان اوقویان قوملره ،  
تکرار دوغاز هنده .

مسیحک محکومیتی سنه دوربه سی مناسیبله .  
( ۱۸ مارت ۱۹۲۲ )

قوبو کستانه زنگنده ایکی ساکن کوز .  
کوجوک ، تحیف بر آدم . بووک یلکن قولاقلی  
ضعیف برجهره ، باشنده بیاض برتاقیه ، صبرنده  
بیاض ، قاقا قاشدز بر البسه ، آبلری بییلاق ،  
یا لکنز بریح و میوه ییر .

یکین کانون ناییده اثرانی (غاندینک ایجا کاهی)  
زبیرت ایدن تاغور اوغودهی بو آتی غاندی به  
تطبیق ایتمشدر . صودن باشقه بر شی ایچمز .  
دوشمه اوستنده یانار . آز اوپور . بلا اقطاع  
چالیشیر . سانکه وجودنیک هیچ قیبنی یوقدر .  
اونده ایلك کوزه جازیلان حال « بووک بر صبر  
و بووک بر محبت اقدمسیدر . » « بیروسون » اون  
۱۹۱۳ سنه سنه جنوی آفریفاده کوردی ای آده

[۱] هند ماهالیسی غاندوی « ماهاتما » کله سنک  
لغوی مناسیبله نویسیم ایتمشدر :  
ماهاتما : بووک ، آتما روس ، دیکر

اولان اهالی اونی تماماً خسته ایدر . « کتره  
اعضای اولادینی وپانی برالمش خلفدن نبرت  
ابتدیی ایچون « امر و برن کوجوک ، ساکت  
سسی » دیکر بزرگ کنیدی آرقده راحت وازواده  
میسور بولوز ...

اوج بوز میلیون کیشی آیفلاندران ، برتانیایا  
ایمپراطورلنی صادران و ایکی ییک سنه یقیغ  
بر زماندن بری سیاست بشرک انقوتنی حرکت  
اخلاقه سی وقوعه کترین آدم ایسته بویله برآمددر .

حقیق اسمی « موهانداس قارامشانده غاندی »  
دروایی نثرین اول ۱۸۶۹ تاریخده ، هندستانک  
شمال غریبسنده ، عمان ساحلنده ، نیم مستقل  
بر کوجوک حکومت داخلنده کان « پوربانداز » ده  
دومشدر . بدزی ، قارامشانده غاندی ، مملکتک  
باش وکیلی ایدی . محبلی ذکی و منوردی ،  
فقط بوکسک طیفه منسوب دکدر . عالمی سی  
هندو دینک « ژائین » مذهبنه سالکیدی . بومذهبک  
انک بووک عمده سی ایسه غاندینک بالآخره کال شده تله  
ترویج و مدافعه ابتدیی « آهیمسا » [۲] ایدی .  
ژائویستلر نظرنده ذکادن اول محبت ، فولی  
الله ایصال ایدن بولدر . عالمده منتظماً « رامایانا »  
اوقونیردی . غاندی ایلك تریبه سی ، کندیبه  
« ویشنو » نصلیزنی تکرار ایتدیرن بر « برامان »  
دن آلمشدر ، فقط « ساندقریت » لسانده هیچ  
بر زمان بد طولوا صنایعی اولمادیقنه بالآخره  
تأسف ایتمش و آوز لسانتک خزیه لرندن ایدن  
انکیز تریبه سنه قارش بوندن طولوا یك چونی  
کین ایسبله مشدر . بوکله برابره هندو کتب مقدسه سی

First part of the translation of Romain Rolland's series "The National Heros: Gandhi" in Yeni Mecmua, April 1923.

Gandi'nin muhtelif vesilelerle ortaya koyduğu ifadelerinden de anlaşılacağı gibi, Türklerin saf ve temiz bir ülke uğruna çarpıştıkları için de desteklenmeleri gerektiği inancı, Hindistan Müslümanlarının ve Gardi'nin Türk sorununa bu kadar yakından eğilmelerinin önemli nedenlerinden biriydi.

Bütün Hindistan Hilafet Konferansı 8-10 Temmuz 1921 günü şöyle bir karar almıştı :

«Şu anda herhangi bir Müslüman İngiliz ordusunda görevinin sürdürmesi, yeniden orduya girmesi her yönden dini kurallara ve yöntemlere aykırıdır. Bu dini emirlerin, ordudaki her Müslümana ulaştırılması, genel olarak bütün Müslümanların, özel olarak da din ulularının görevidir. Şayet İngiliz Hükümeti, Ankara Hükümetine karşı doğrudan ya da dolaylı, açık ya da gizli herhangi bir askeri tedbir almaya kalkarsa, o takdirde Hindistan Müslümanları, Kongre'nin de desteğiyle bütün kaunuları çiğnemeğe, Hindistan'ın tam bağımsızlığını istemeye ve yeni bir Hindistan Cumhuriyeti kurmaya zorunluk duyacaklardır.» (\*)

*Türkiye Dış politikasında 50 Yıl Kurtuluş Savaşımız (1919-1922) (Fifty Years of War of Independence in Turkey's Foreign Policy)*

### **Tagore in Ottoman Publications**

Rabindranath Tagore is one of the most revered humanists and internationalists from India, who had also received a Nobel award for his poetry in 1923. While Indian-Ottoman relations have received the attention of scholars and academicians, there are only a few references about Rabindranath Tagore's familiarity with late Ottoman intellectuals and journalists. The late Ottoman newspapers had frequently covered Indian affairs due to Indian Muslims' launching a Khilafat Movement in defence of Turkey's territorial integrity. Among these newspapers are Sebilurresad, Uloom, Sirate-Mustakim, Milli Mecmua, Anadolu Mecmuasi, Ictihad, Hayat, and others. However, there was no discussion much how the great Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore had also figured among late Ottoman intellectuals and their writings. Tagore had indeed influenced many Turkish modern intellectuals and the respectful relations between Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Tagore are well documented. Moreover, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit was so fascinated with his writings that he had translated Tagore's book Gitanjali in 1941.



This was the time when Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi started attracting global attention with his unique politics of nonviolent resistance. Gandhi and Tagore were the two top icons of the new Indian philosophy. In the declining days of the Ottoman Empire, **the Ottoman Turkish language** newspapers and journals of the 1920s were covering Tagore's international travel, his speeches and publications with great interest. Ottoman journals and early republican journals such as *Sebilü'r-Reşad*, *Anadolu Mecmuası*, *Idjtihad*, *Hayat* and *Milli Mecmua* were regularly following Tagore's works and had started translating some of his works into Ottoman Turkish.

"The Home and the World" (1928), was the first novel of Tagore translated by Bedri Tahir in Ottoman Turkish. In later years, almost all of his works were translated into the Turkish language. "The Gardener," "Fruit Gathering," "The Crescent Moon," "Gitanjali," "The Post-Office," "The Fugitive," "Stray Birds," "The Home and the World," "Chitra," "Lover's Gift," "The Religion of the Poet," "Gitanjali" and "The Cycle of Spring" have been translated and widely publicized for Turkish readers since then.

Tagore's works had a special appeal for the late neo-Ottoman pursuits of establishing a modern, liberal and multicultural nation where all citizens could enjoy equal rights. In his definition of a nation, Tagore was opposed to European nationalism, which was conceived around narrow ethnic, linguistic and even religious biases.

This had led to racial, linguistic and ethnic conflicts within nations. Many Ottoman Turks wanted to transform Turkey into a multilingual, multiethnic and united Ottoman Vatan and were inspired by the rise of Asians and especially the **Meiji Japan of the 1800s**.

In Tagore, many Ottomans and even early republicans saw an intellectual patron of their modern and progressive aspirations. In one of the small articles on Tagore, a journal, *Dergah* writes on Aug. 5, 1920, "The biggest guard of India's independence sings the song of freedom to Indian children in the peace march in the forests of the Gulf of Bengal; he, walking barefoot, sang the songs of freedom and songs of free birds."

# آنادولو مجھوسی

صافی : ۶

تاغوره انجہ بر شاعر ، حساس بر صنعتکاردر . او بزہ اوزاق و مجھول بر عرفک  
آنشور افیک اوصاف و خصوصاتی تعریف ایتمز ، بلکہ روحی شعری شعری شعری شعری  
وفسولہ قاورایان خالص و بیوک صنعتی تمثیل و ترم ایڈر ، اوعالی صنعت و شعری کہ ،  
کوزلکده انجلا ساز اولور ، و ملی سرحد نہدر بیلیمز ... اور قیق شعری و موسیقی کہ ،  
کراہیا بر ایچی کی بشری صنعتک لایقنا خزینہ سنہ بز اوئی مال ایڈر و بو خزینہ  
قلبمک درینکلر نہ صافلارز . بیوک شاعرلر ، کزچکن بیوک شاعرلر بتون بر ماتک  
بتون بر بشریتک روحنہ لسان و بربرلر . تاغوره بونادزہ لر زمرہ سنہ ہماخدر .  
تاغورہ نیک شعری ، ال کوزل عصری شعرلر دن ترقیق ایدن صفت ایتمز ، ہجانی ،  
وجد و جوشی و خارق العادہ کی انطاقہ قوللابدنی سادگی ، وضوح ، صفوت ،  
طبیعیات ، مونسک صمیمی لکدر . بو تازہ وجد ماثرہ انشائیہ صنعتہ استعمال  
ایڈر کہ او ، سلطنت ادیبہ نیک مؤبد تختی ملتک صدر قلبہ فورمشدر . تاغورہ وجدان  
ملیدن ، وجدان انسانی بدن آیلش ، متروک ، محراترہ ، کنیدی ، دار ، صوتوق ،  
عشقز و صمیمتسز خودکام محیطندہ عزائشین غیر ملی و غیر بشری شاعرلر دن دکل ،  
بلکہ ملتک جرم روحندہ یاتان و فیض الہامی ملیدن ، انسانی بدن ، دندن ، طیبیدن ،  
عصرلرک اعماقہ قاریشان ہند افسانہ لر دن الان ملی و انسانی بر شاعردر .

The article by Cemil Hasan in Anadolu Mecmuasi, Jan. 1, 1927

In the Jan. 1, 1927 issue of Milli Mecmuasi, Dr. Safia Sami said: "Tagore successfully mixes successfully sensitivity of the East and aesthetic perfection of the West. Howsoever his poetry appears of a local context, it doesn't give the feeling of foreignness." She finds Tagore's appeal as global as Tolstoy's and Dostoevsky's, thanks to his compelling narration of subjects of universal values of love, longing and nature. With his message of fraternity and peace, Safia says, Tagore became a Murshid (spiritual guide) among all nations, a role for which he established the Shanti Niketan, the fort of peace (Sulh Kilasi). In 1924, Hasan Cemil published an emotional introduction of Tagore in "Anadolu Mecmuasi" in which he wrote: "With his

delicate poetry and music, Tagore stands out unique among all his contemporaries. With his best elements of excitement, ecstasy, marvel, simplicity, clarity, and naturality, Tagore became eternal in the Kingdom of Literature (Saltanat-e-Edebiyatisin).”

Cemil writes, in his Oxford lecture, Tagore appeared as “a guide of India’s message to the world, a spiritual guide, like a prophet of a religion.” In 1920, Sebilü'r-Reşad, a journal edited by **Turkey’s national poet Mehmet Akif**, published a series of translated articles to introduce Tagore and his literary works in four parts. The series titled “Japonya’da Milliyet-II: Nobel Mükafatını Kazanmakla Bütün Cihanda Temayüz Eden Hindistanlı Şair-i Muazzam Tagore'nin Konferansı” (The lectures of world-famous Noble laureate Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore) is mainly a detailed report of Tagore’s visit to Japan in 1920 and his lectures and meetings in Japan. This was the time when many Ottoman officials were still looking to make an alliance with the Pan-Asianist Japanese. In this sense, Tagore’s ideas were providing an intellectual ground for unity and solidarity among Asians so that they could come out from the yoke of colonialism. Interestingly, at this time, some

Ottoman Turks were already based in Japan and were actively interacting with Indian freedom fighters, among them, was Abdürreşid Ibrahim who, some sources claim, had also met the legendary Indian freedom fighter Subhash Chandra Bose in his Japan sojourn. The Ottoman bureaucrat and literary figure Süleyman Nazif wrote an introduction of Tagore in the Inci journal in which he even called Tagore equal to **Omar Khayyam**.

In the early republic years, Tagore received the popular attention of the Turkish intellectuals who went on a drive to translate his works into the Turkish language. For example, Ibrahim Aladdin published an article “Hind Şair Tagor'un Mektebi” in Muallimler Birliği magazine in its 22<sup>nd</sup> volume in 1927.

Büyük Ozan published an article on Turkish translations of Tagore’s works in Turkish in Yarım Ay magazine in its 17<sup>th</sup> volume in 1936. Elif Ayn wrote the article “Indian Poet Tagore” (“Hint Şairi Tagor ve Mektebi”) for the magazine Yeni Kitap, in the fifth volume of 1927. Mim Said published an article in 1928 “Hint Şairi Tagore'dan” (“From the Indian Poet Tagore”) in Fikirler journal’s 12<sup>th</sup> volume.

This fascination of Turks, both late Ottoman and early republic era intellectuals, with Tagore remained unchanged for a very long time and influenced the future literary and intellectual traditions in Turkey. So much was Tagore's spiritual influence that Tagore's poetic collection "Gitanjali" was translated in Turkish many times, once by none other than Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit himself in 1941.

As the world commemorates Tagore's 80<sup>th</sup> death anniversary, Indian and Turkish intellectuals share the memory of Rabindranath Tagore, who had not only traveled to Turkey in 1922 to meet Atatürk but also as a symbol of Asian resurgence. The books gifted by Atatürk to Tagore and exhibited in his institute Shanti Niketan in Kolkata are a reminder that both countries need to cherish these memories to strengthen their friendship.

# THE UNFADING BOND BETWEEN INDIA AND TÜRKİYE: SUFISTIC/MYSTIC INTERACTION

*Cemil KUTLUTÜRK\**

## **Introduction**

The historical and cultural ties between the Ottoman lands and the Indian continent date back to ancient times. The relations between the two regions realized in commercial, military, political and religious dimensions. Especially since the human being has religious belief and mystical dimension, such relationships have emerged in the sufistic field. Another reason for the mutual interaction in the mystical field is that the mystical formations that appeared in Central Asia and the Indian continent were met by the Anatolian lands and the Anatolian people. Similarly, some mystical discourses that developed in Anatolia like Maulana Rumi's Masnavi were appreciated by the Indian people, whether Hindu or Muslim. Therefore, it should be stated that one of the most unfading bonds and energetic interactions between the Indian subcontinent and Ottoman land has occurred in the area of Sufism/Mysticism. In order to provide such a view, this paper firstly mention on the texts in which the influence of Sufism and Indian mysticism is felt, and then dealt with the sufi orders that impact on both sides.

## **1. The Mystical Works Reached from India to Türkiye**

The works produced out of the interaction between Indian mysticism and Islamic Sufism developed a number of growing bonds between two sides. The manuscripts or translations of such kinds of works were transferred to Anatolia thanks to travelling scholars, mystics, pilgrims, and voyagers. An important figure in this context was the eminent scholar Ebu Reyhan al-Biruni, who reached to the north parts of the Indian subcontinent in the early eleventh century to collect first-hand knowledge on the region. He, who roughly spent more than ten years in the

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region, learned Sanskrit, observed Indians daily life, and studied on the Indian astronomy, philosophy, society and culture. After his investigation, he completed a famous book in Arabic titled *Tahqīq mā li-l-Hind min Maqūlah Maqbūlah fī al-‘Aql aw Mardhūlah*, which literally means *Verifying All That the Indians Recount, the Reasonable and the Unreasonable*, in which he frequently refers to Patanjali’s *Yoga sutra* to clarify the religious views of Hindus.<sup>1</sup>

According to data obtained from the *Tahqīq*, it is understood that al-Biruni, prior to his masterpiece, translated Patanjali’s *Yoga sutra*, a text on Hindu mysticism, from Sanskrit into Arabic as *Kitab Batanjali li’l-Hindī fi’l-halâsi mine’l-emsâl* which is significant for Indic mysticism studies since it was the earliest translation of the Sanskrit text. The title of al-Biruni’s text means *The Book of the Indian Patanjali on Liberation from the Afflictions*, scholars briefly refer to it as the *Kitab Patanjali*. Even though the original Sanskrit commentary is not evaluable today al-Biruni commonly is accepted to be the earliest documented translator of the *Yoga sutra*. Al-Biruni’s text is an important testimony of the process of cultural translation and knowledge transmission, since he tries to render several Hindu words and concepts into Arabic, and in that process, what emerged was a rich encounter of two cultures. Al-Biruni’s translation preserved many of the core themes of *Yoga* philosophy of Hinduism, but analytical commentaries were discoursed according to Islamic concept of God, tawhid. For instance, al-Biruni rendered terms like the Sanskrit word *deva* (mostly translate as God (?) in western writings) with the Arabic terms for “angels” (*mala’ikah*) or “spiritual beings” (*ruhaniyyat*).<sup>2</sup> Since Al-Biruni lived among the brahmans and learned Sanskrit, he understood very well what meaning they gave to such kinds of Sanskrit religious concepts. He had a much better grasp of the real meaning of the religious terms used in the sacred texts. When these books of Hindus were read to him, he comprehended their contents.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, its translation is extremely important in terms of understanding the Hindus’ thoughts on religious subjects such as God, creation of the world, salvation, and the metaphysical realm in a proper way. Al Biruni’s version of *Yoga Sutras*

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<sup>1</sup> el-Bîrûnî, *Tahkîku mâ lil-Hind min Makûletin Makbûletin fi’l Akl ev Merzûle*, thk. Arif Ahmed Abd’il Meani, Dâru’l-arab, 2015, p. 18, 25.

<sup>2</sup> el-Bîrûnî, Ebu Reyhan, *Kitâbu Batanceli’l-Hindî*, Köprülü Kütüphanesi, 1589, no. 415; Carl Ernst, “The Global Significance of Arabic Language and Literature”, *Religion Compass* 7/6 (2013): 195.

<sup>3</sup> el-Bîrûnî, *Tahkîku mâ lil-Hind*, p. 18.

reached Persia and Arabian Peninsula by about 1050 AD. A rare available version of this Arabic manuscript was discovered in the early 1920s in an archive in the Koprulu Library of Istanbul under reference number 1589.<sup>4</sup> Although it is not known exactly where and how this text, which has its origins in Indian culture, came to Istanbul, the rare copy of it in Anatolian lands is very meaningful in terms of showing that the Sufi interaction and the mystical influence between the two ancient regions dates back to very early periods.

Another important source regarding with Indian mysticism is *Amratkunda* (Pool of Nectar), which is a Sanskrit manual on tantric yoga. It is thought that the composer of this book was a Brahmin who converted to Islam. After that the text was translated into Persian and Arabic. The *Amritakunda* was translated into Arabic in the 15th (?) century as *Mirat al-maani fi Idraki'l Alemi'il Insani*, probably one of the earliest Islamic literary works from Bengal. It was also translated as *Hawz al-hayat* (*The Pool of Life*) of which date is not certain but it was popularized among Indian Sufi circles after the biggining of the sixteenth century.<sup>5</sup> The text of the *Hawz al-hayat*, which closely follows the Arabic original, includes mystical subjects such as the knowledge of the microcosm and macrocosm called as *alam-i sagir* and *alam-i kebir*, the knowledge of the heart and its ranks, the knowledge of the basic features of discipline, the power of the breath, information on the traces of death and preventing it; and capacity of the spirit and controlling it.<sup>6</sup>

When we read the Arabic translation of the text, we observe that some Sanskrit concepts were given with their close counterparts in Sufi thought. The texts include scriptural Islamic themes, philosophical notions, and the terminology and concepts of Sufism. Ernst also states “The vocabulary of the text is mostly formed on the Arabic technical terminology of Hellenistic philosophy, with some Islamic overtones derived from the Qur’an and Sufism. The translator worked strenuously to render the yogic practices in a way that was understandable to a philosophically oriented reader of Arabic.”<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See el-Bîrûnî, *Kitâbu Batenceli'l-Hindî*, Köprülü Kütüphanesi, 1589, no. 412a-419a.

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.perso-indica.net/work/hawd\\_al-hayat](http://www.perso-indica.net/work/hawd_al-hayat)

<sup>6</sup> es-Semerkindî, Rükneddin, *Havdu'l-Hayat*, İstanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi-Hacı Mahmut Efendi, no. 2934; *Mir'atu'l Meani fi Idraki'l Alemi'il Insani*, İstanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi-Hacı Mahmut Efendi, no. 397.

<sup>7</sup> Carl Ernst, *Refractions of Islam in India: Situating Sufism and Yoga*, Sage/Yoda Press, 2016.

The original Sanskrit text *Amritakunda*, which is believed to be no longer extant, survives in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu translations in multiple adjustments. Many copies of the Arabic text are to be found in libraries in European and Arab countries, the majority being in Istanbul. Through its Arabic translation called as *Hawdul ma al-hayat*, it circulated widely among Sufis in India and other parts of the world. This text popularized in some *tariqas* (religious orders) in Anatolia as well. The famous seventeenth-century Turkish Sufi scholar Muhammad al-Misri, one of the most important figures among the Anatolian Khalwatis, mentioned that the *Amratkunda* was an important source for the study of mystical practices.<sup>8</sup>

Likewise, more than twenty manuscripts of the *Hawz al-hayat* and its Ottoman translations have been located in various Turkish libraries. Based on our research, most of them were erroneously attributed to Ibn Arabi. Even though the exact reason is not certain, according to our research, an important factor for the misunderstanding is the lack of title pages in most manuscripts. When we compared copies) of the text in Paris with those in Turkish libraries, we concluded that many copies in Turkiye did not include the initial foils in which the term *Amratkunda* is clearly written in Arabic letters. Furthermore, we determined that most copies found in libraries in Turkiye did not contain the original Sanskrit expressions. Because of these variances and modifications found in the Arabic translations in Turkey, they were erroneously attributed to Ibn Arabi. Despite all this, it is really remarkable that there are many copies of a text originally belonging to the India continent in different libraries of Anatolia. This situation made a work unique to Indian mysticism to be recognized in Anatolian lands, especially in Sufi circles.<sup>9</sup>

## **2. Sufi Order Reached from Indian Sub-continent to Ottoman Land**

In the context of the development of Indian-Turkish sufistic relations in the medieval and early modern period, the role of some Sufi orders flourished in the Indian subcontinent is also very crucial. Some of them have transferred their mystical thoughts and Sufi literature to Anatolian and Rumelian land through various channels and have taken deep root here thanks to the eminent

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<sup>8</sup> R. Eaton, *The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier 1204-1760*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 78-80.

<sup>9</sup> Cemil Kutluturk, "Hinduism in Turkey: A General Approach to Indian-Turkish Relations and Activities of Indian Religious Groups" in *Hinduism in Europe (I-II)*, ed. Prof. Dr. Knut A. Jacobsen, Brill Publishing, Leiden 2020, p. 1509.

Sufi leaders and their efficient legacies such as trained disciples, written celebrated sources and inaugurated lodges in different areas during the Ottoman period.

The historical documents reveal that one of the most influential transnational Sufi networks on both sides has emanated out of Mujaddidiyah movement, a sub-branch of the Naqshbandiyah that is why this order has a unique position for mutual sufistic relations.

The founder of Mujaddidiyah movement Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi, who lived at the end of the 16th century in India, is usually familiar to the Turkish people as Imam-ı Rabbani. He emphasized the importance of the Islamic shariah to prevent the spread of non-Islamic practices and beliefs spring from Hindu culture. Another factor that lead to focusing on basic teachings of Islam is to decline the impact of Akbar Shah's eclectic attempt, namely Din-i Ilahi, among the Muslim societies and Sufi circles of India. Furthermore, he tried to remove the influence of Vedanta, a prevailing religious thought of Hindus based on the unity of God, in particular oneness of personal spirit (atman) and ultimate soul (Brahman). Ahmad Sirhindi, who argued that such a monistic belief is incompatible with the basic tenet of Islam. Thereby, he broke away from earlier mystic traditions and propounded his theory of the unity of the phenomenal world known as *wahdati shuhud* through which he separated the phenomenal world from the God, the creator.<sup>10</sup>

After the death of Sirhindi, some great Sufi disciples have played a crucial role in the progressing of the Mujaddidiyah order in Ottoman area. One of them was Muhammad Murad al-Bukhari (d. 1720), known as the first Sufi who brought the Mujaddidiyah order to Anatolian land. In India, he met with the son of Imam Rabbani (namely Muhammad Masum), and became his faithful disciple. When Murad al-Bukhari completed his Sufi training, he passed to the Hejaz, then to Turkiye to convey his Sufi view of points. He has lived for a long time in some of the most important parts of the Ottoman land. When he was in Istanbul, he settled in a Sufi lodge in Eyup district, where he passed away in the first quarter of eighteenth century. Through al-Bukhari's own works such as *Jamiu Mufradati 'l-Qur'an and Silsiletudh Dhahab* and the religious activities performed by his disciples like Lalizade Abdulbaqi, Ebu

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<sup>10</sup> Mektubat, no. 65.

Said Hadimi and Ahmad Trabzoni, this Sufi order achieved a significant momentum in Bombay, Bursa, Istanbul, and Basniya lines.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to Muhammad Murad al-Bukhari's role the works of Yekdest Ahmad Bukhari (d. 1707), who is another significant personality in the cycle of transmitting Mujaddidiyah's thoughts from India to Anatolia, should be cited. Yekdest Ahmad Bukhari, who was ordained as a deputy by Shaikh Muhammad, achieved to transfer the mystical thoughts of Mujaddidiyah to different locations of Turkiye thanks to his remarkable well-known disciples like Mahmad Emin Tokadi and Muhammad Semarqandi. Among the Yekdest chain, Mustaqimzade Sulayman Sadeddin occupied a special place since he was the first person who accurately translated Ahmad *Sirhindi's Sufi* book *al-Maktubat* into Ottoman-Turkish in eighteen sixty.<sup>12</sup>

Apart from the Mujaddidiyah wave, another vital trace of the cultural, religious, and intellectual exchange between Turkiye and the India was the lodges that were opened by Indian Sufis in different districts of the Ottoman Empire. Among them, two lodges located in Istanbul, mostly known as *Hindiler Tekkesi*, are quite striking as they were established in order to accommodate travellers arriving from the Indian subcontinent when they reach to Turkiye. The first one is in the Aksaray region, which was one of the oldest educational and cultural centers of the Naqshbandiyah in Istanbul, which was also named as *Horhor* because of the street on which it located. The second Indian Sufi lodge in Istanbul was founded by Sayyid Faydullah Hindi in the first half of eighteenth century that was mostly popularized as *Uskudar Hindi Tekkesi*.<sup>13</sup>

Indian lodges had a strategic position since they functioned as a bridge between the Ottoman and India regarding Sufi life and religious culture, as well as being an important area for Ottoman-Indian political relations. Regarding its political and diplomatic aspect, a prominent example is Muhammad Imam Sardar. His gravestone in Horhor lodge informs that he was known to his contemporaries as a military envoy in the service of the ruler of

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<sup>11</sup> H. İ. Şimşek, *Osmanlı'da Müceddidilik XIII/XVIII. Yüzyıl*, Erkam Matbaası, 2014, p. 125, 186.

<sup>12</sup> M. Kara, "Hindistan'da Oluşan Tasavvuf Kültürünün Bursa'ya/Osmanlı Dünyasına Aksedişi (Müceddidiye Örneği).", p. 2; Algar, "Bâkî-Billâh", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4, p. 12.

<sup>13</sup> M. B. Tanman, "Hindiler Tekkesi", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 18, p. 68

the Meysur State in India whose name was Tipu Sultan.<sup>14</sup> Sufis and their lodges, hence, built a universal solidarity among the diverse ethnic-religious and linguistic populations in both sides and established a transnational network between the Ottomans and the Indians.

### 3. Rumi's Influence in Indian Subcontinent

In addition to the Sufi movements of Indian origin that reached Anatolia, some Anatolian Sufi leaders and their thoughts influenced the Indian society. Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi and his outstanding work *Masnavi*, which was composed in the Anatolian city of Konya in the thirteenth century, is one of the most significant samples in this context. The most important feature of Mesnevi is that it explains even very deep subjects in a comfortable and understandable way.

Mevlânâ uses a simple style, but he brings thought-provoking evidences and gives examples, especially showing his ability to discovering. He makes it obvious what he demands to tell, and for such a purpose does not hesitate to tell even ridiculous stories. Although Masnavi is didactic in terms of narration, it is a work that also has a lyrical aspect. In Masnavi, which is based on the Qur'an and hadiths as a source, stories from Kelile and Dimne as well as Mantıku't-Tayr are included, and Iranian mystic-poet Hakîm Senâî's Masnavi on Sufism known as *Hadıkatu'l- Hakîka* is also used.<sup>15</sup> It is understood that Mevlana benefited from the five stories of the *Kalila wa Dimna* (*The Fables of Bidpai*) in order to clarify his spiritual message and philosophical ideas. *Kalila wa Dimna* was originally a Sanskrit work called *Pancatantra* (The five treatises). This Sanskrit book was first translated into middle Persian and from there into Arabic by Ibn'ul-Muqaffa.<sup>16</sup>

Its linguistic feature, the concepts of love and spiritualism in Masnavi made it popular among the mystics and as a result most of his poetic compositions have been translated into many languages. The historical data disclose that it took a very short time for this work to reach the Indian world.

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<sup>14</sup> Qureshi, "Tipu Sultan's Embassy to Constantinople", in Irfan Habib (ed.), *Confronting Colonialism: Resistance and Modernization under Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan*, New Delhi: Tulika, 1999, p. 69.

<sup>15</sup> Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî gave the name *İlâhînâme* to this work that he appreciated very much and quoted some of its subjects in his Meşnevi. See Mursel Öztürk, "Hadıkatu'l-Hakika", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 15, p. 20.

<sup>16</sup> el-Bîrûnî, *Tahkik uma lil Hind*, p. 123.

It is understood that after Rumi's death, Masnavi was brought to India by one of his disciples, Ahmad Rumi since the Persian language already had begun to use in India by the works of Muslim scholars, Sufis etc.. Rumi and his Masnavi influenced on the religious thoughts of the scholars and sufis of the region. In the Indian Subcontinent Maulana and his poetry was particularly appreciated among the Naqshbandiyyah Order in the fifteenth century. As a result of this impact, hundreds of commentaries were written on Masnavi in Persian and in different vernacular languages of India, most of them are now kept in manuscript form in the different libraries of the sub-continent, which belong to different centuries.

Apart from its Persian language a number of commentaries and translation are available in Urdu, Hindi and regional languages of the sub-continent during the last two hundred years and many of them are very popular among the Muslim and Hindu mystics and well known by scholars who focus on bhakti, Vedanta and sufi traditions. Mevlana influenced the Indian continent not only with his work but also with his ideas and thoughts. Scientific studies have been carried out on his view of man, nature and the world. Literary works that exemplify the style and fiction of the Masnavi were produced. For instance, many poets have written in Urdu following the style and content of Rumi's Masnavi. Besides such kinds of writings or commentaries, various theses, academic books and articles on the life, philosophy and worldview of Mawlana Rumi is penned in various languages of the sub-continent.

The Masnavi was not only effective in Sufi assemblies, but also affected Muslim as well as Hindu administrators and scholars. Some Muslim politicians benefited from Rumi's works and worldview while formulating policies regarding the local people. therefore, it is clear that the Masnavi was accepted as a significant and useful source throughout medieval India. For instance, the emperor Akbar who interested in mystical and philosophical religious debates, appreciated the Masnavi. Another Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, whose religious adviser, Maula Jivan, composed an interpretation of the Masnavi, was also fond of Rumi's poetry as valuable. His elder brother, Dara Shikoh, who copied a Masnavi of Rumi via his own effort, was also interested in Rumi's thoughts and poets.

In India, the influence of Maulana Rumi was by no means restricted to the Sufi Orders. Rumi's love did not remain confined to only Muslim scholars

but references to his poetry can be found in the lines of Hindu mystics like Dadu Dayal, who was very close to prince Dara Shikoh, the emperor of Baburi dynasty and the writer of *macmul bahravn*. Rumi's Masnavi inspired many poems produced by not only Muslim but Hindu mytctics. For example, a popular Hindu writer known as Anandagana Khwosh composed a Masnavi in the style of Rumi's Mathnavi end of the eighteenth century.<sup>17</sup> Hereby it would not be wrong to state that the poets and saints of Bhakti tradition like their Sufi counterparts too have been attracted to the message of Masnavi.

As in the medieval India even in modern times Rumi and his philosophy continue to inspire many religious thoughts flourishing in the sub-continent. This multicultural impact of mesnevi has continued until today. As some scholars mentioned when the people of bharat read Rumi's poems, they feel that they are reading someone who is not foreigner due the fact that his message not for any specific nation or country but the whole world. Actually, thinkers like Rumi who took care of the utilizing inclusive discourses cannot remain confined to any one language or country. That is why his Masnavi is recognized and appreciated all over the world. Even though Rumi wrote in Persian, Indian journals and newspapers keep writing a lot about his thought.<sup>18</sup>

A recent work performed by Dr. Balram Shukla, a Sanskrit poet from Delhi University, reveals the survival influence of Masnavi among young generation of India. He has selected one hundred gazels of Rumi and translated it into Hindi devanagari under the title *Niṣabd Nūpur* which means the *Silent Anklet*. It is stated that thanks to this book, Rumi's study has been translated directly from Persian into Hindi for the first time. The translator made remarkable evaluations about why he made such a translation and his interest in Mevlana. For him Rumi's writing is close to Vedanta which is an ancient Hindu philosophy based on strong relation between God (Brahman) and the soul (atman). That is why Indian people feel Maulana Rumi is close to their mind. They don't feel Rumi belongs to another country.<sup>19</sup>

The scholars who thought that there is close connection between Masnavi and Vedanta philosophy, made some comparison among Rumi's poems and

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<sup>17</sup> <http://sologak1.blogspot.com/2012/09/hindustan-india-and-hindus-in-rumis.html>

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/mevlana-rumi-s-poetry-transcends-boundaries-say-indian-scholars/2378701>

<sup>19</sup> See Balram Shukla, "Rumi and the Confluence of Indian and Islamic Spiritualism" *Cultural Dialogue* 2 (2021): 24-39.

Upanishad verses, which is the sacred text of Hindus and accepted as the nectar of the Vedanta philosophy. As Shukla states, Maulana advocates oneness of existence which leads to the dissolution of hatred and anger, and hence makes love inevitable for all humanity. Besides this, he delineates divine love embodied in human shape. These features keep his poetry and thought valid for centuries. As a famous performer puts his poetry and discourse are manifested in the rootedness of the human experience in socio-cultural contexts while indicating the essential unity of human oneness.<sup>20</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Sufism, which grounds on self-consciousness, inner purification, love for all without distinction of caste and race, has made a remarkable sign on social, cultural and religious history of the India and Turkiye. Therefore, the texts regarding Sufism and Indian mysticism, the experience of Mujaddidiyah order and Rumi's embracing phrase have enabled the establishment of unfading bond between both regions, which not only allowed cultures to recognize each other more closely but filled an essential gap in the context of political, social and cultural relations between the Turks and the Indians.

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<sup>20</sup> <https://www.firstpost.com/art-and-culture/tracing-the-unabating-universal-influence-of-rumi-and-his-connection-to-indian-vedantic-thought-10223581.html>; Shukla, "Rumi ki kimiyaagaree: Panchatantr ki naitik kahaniyon ka adhyatmik sanskaran", *Pratiman* 5/9 (2017): 218-245.

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# INDIA AND TÜRKİYE TRADE RELATIONS

*Saleem AHMAD<sup>1</sup>*

## **Historical Connections**

India and Turkey enjoy friendly and deep rooted relations dating back to several centuries. There are rich historical and cultural connections between two countries in “the field of art, culture and architecture” (Ministry of External Affairs 2017). The Mughal Dynasty, which ruled over India, traced its “ancestry” to a Turkish people. The imprint of Turkish culture and traditions is traceable in “our music, language, architecture and history”. It is regarded as there are over 9,000 common words between Turkish and Hindi language. The Sufi mystic, Mevlana Rumi, was an “inspiration to poets and thinkers in medieval India”. In fact, the Sufi movement was also influenced by the Hindu mystic tradition (Ministry of External Affairs 2003).

The 20<sup>th</sup> century saw close relations between the two countries. In 1912, during the Balkan Wars, renowned Indian freedom fighter, Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari led a medical mission to Turkey. Moreover, Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk was “an inspiring figure for the Indian national movement” (Ghosh 2000). In 1919, Mahatma Gandhi and Indian National Congress protested against British rule for abolishing the Caliphate in Turkey. Thus, India and Turkey share many “commonalities based on cultures, values, histories, progressive ideas, citizen welfare, etc” (TnH Global 2019). On the part of Turkey, it also played a significant role in recognition of India right after it declared independence on 15<sup>th</sup> August 1947 (D&B Bureau 2021).

## **Relations after 1947**

India and Turkey established diplomatic relations in 1948 but both countries remained at a distance for the next four decades as “Turkey was a

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NATO member while India was in the pro-soviet camp during the Cold War period”. Also, while Istanbul was part of “the Baghdad Pact of 1955, New Delhi preferred to remain non-aligned”. But India-Turkey bilateral trade agreement was signed in 1973. The first breakthrough came in 1986 when former Prime Minister of Turkey Turgut Ozal visited New Delhi and the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reciprocated the visit two years later (Siddiqui 2020). At that time, President Ozal was accompanied by a business delegation, indicating Turkey’s interest in strengthening economic relations with India (Mehta 2019). Several bilateral agreements and “an institutional mechanisms, at the governmental level as well as B2B, provide the framework for strengthening economic and commercial ties” (Ministry of External Affairs 2016). Besides, Institutional arrangements in terms of Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation (JCETC) signed in 1983 and a Joint Business Council (JBC) between Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK) was set up in 1996 (Embassy of India 2021).

### **Trade Relations after 2000**

Subsequently, Atal Bihari Vajpayee went on three-day visit to Turkey, the first by an Indian Prime Minister in 15 years, stating in an interview on 15 Sept 2003, “There is considerable scope for two countries to work together in a variety of fields. This includes cooperation in economic and commercial areas, science and technology, culture and people to people ties. We should also increase cooperation between our businessmen in third countries. Our bilateral economic and commercial relations have been growing steadily” (Ministry of External Affairs 2003). Bilateral trade continued to be in India’s favour with “exports touching \$564 million in 2002 while imports from Turkey totalled only \$70 million”. The main items of India’s exports were “tea, iron ore, finished leather, drugs, pharmaceuticals, jute, enamel and varnishes” (The Times of India 2003).

Moreover, several Indian companies entered the Turkish market in the early of 21<sup>st</sup> century. Notable among them are Polyplex, which set up a Polyplex film manufacturing factory in Çorlu in 2005 with “a total capital investment of \$60 million”. Tractors and Farm Equipment Ltd. (TAFE) also set up “a tractor manufacturing plant” in Turkey in 2010. Jain Irrigation Systems invested in a manufacturing unit in Adana. Dabur India Limited acquired Hobi Kozmetik Group, a Turkish personal care products company.

In 2013, ONGC Videsh Ltd “acquired 2.72 per cent in the Guneshli Fields ACG and a 2.3 per cent interest” in the associated Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The drug firm, Sequent Scientific, with its subsidiary, Alivira Animal Health, invested in the Turkey based firm, Topkim. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories has entered into “collaboration with TR-Pharm to manufacture and commercialize a portfolio of bio-similar drugs” in Turkey. Essar Steel won a “contract for supplying its Rock star steel plates” for constructing the Istanbul New Airport (Kulshreshth 2017).

Moreover, the medical technology firm Triviron Healthcare has acquired a “stake in the Turkish firm Bome Sanayi Urunleri Zyduş Cadila signed a strategic collaboration agreement with Eczacıbaşı, a Turkish healthcare company, to market biotech products” in Turkey. IOT Infrastructure&Energy Services, “a joint venture between Indian Oil Corporation and Oil tanking GmbH, is collaborating with VITO Energy and Investment of Turkey for the erection of a joint tank farm at the Star Refinery” near Izmir. Similarly, Turkish companies are represented in India, including “Limak, Ozaltın, Orhan Holding, Enpay, Celebi, Sarar and Izopoli-Kingspan”. The hope is that more Turkish companies will take “advantage of the economic opportunities in India, especially in the infrastructure and construction sectors” (Ibid.,).

On December 6-7, 2013, Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Industry TUSKON organized the Indian Turkey-CIS Business Forum for “a delegation from the FICCI and the India-Turkey Business Association (ITBA)” in Istanbul. 29 Indian entrepreneurs and over 100 Turkish businessmen participated in the Forum’s meetings. The 10<sup>th</sup> session of the Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation (JCETC) was held in New Delhi in January 2014. The Indian Delegation was led by Shri Anand Sharma, the then Minister for Commerce and Industry of India and the Turkish Delegation by H.E. Mr. Nihat Zeybekci, Minister for Economy of the Republic of Turkey. Economic and commercial relations between “the two countries received further impetus with the participation of commercial delegations” in events in both the countries (Ministry of External Affairs 2014).

Further, India participated in the 83<sup>rd</sup> Izmir International Fair in Izmir during 28 August to 2 September 2014 as “Focus Country”. More than 50 Indian companies participated in the fair under “the banner of FICCI, showcasing a range of Indian products”. The year has also witnessed “a robust

exchange of business and trade delegations” which served as “a catalyst in enhancing the India-Turkey bilateral trade”. High-level business delegations from “Federation of India Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PHDCCI), Engineering Export Promotion Council (EEPC), Gem and Jewellery Export Promotion Council (GJEPC), Bombay Industries Association and India Tourism” visited Istanbul. Leading Istanbul Chambers of Business and Industry, Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) and MUSIAD visited India during the year (Ibid.,).

On 6 April 2015, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) signed a MoU with the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) “to promote bilateral trade cooperation”. A cooperating agreement between FICCI and TOBB was also signed for “establishing India-Turkey Working Committee and Investment Forums”. On 6 August 2015, State Bank of India and Turkey’s Akbank entered into “a cooperation agreement to support bilateral trade and investments” (Embassy of India 2021). Also, Indian companies have been participating regularly in “trade fairs and exhibitions in Turkey, and Turkish companies are doing likewise in India”. According to Turkish statistics, “the bilateral trade volume between India and Turkey was more than \$6 billion in 2015” (Kulshreshth 2017). While the trade between India and Turkey increased during the preceding decade, the total trade volume between India and Turkey had “steadily declined from 7 billion in 2014 to 6 billion in 2015 and 2016” (Anas 2017a).

### **Turkey-India Bilateral Trade (2007-2016)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Export (Million)</b>	<b>Import (Billion)</b>	<b>Volume</b>	<b>Balance</b>
2007	348.229	2,299.732	2,647.961	-1,951.50
2011	756.082	6,498.651	7,254.733	-5,742.57
2014	586.589	6,898.575	7,485.164	-6,311.98
2015	650,424	5,613,217	6,263,641	-4,962.79
2016 (September)	613.94	2287.29	2901.23	
Gold, metalliferous ores and metal scrap, crude fertilizers and crude minerals, non-ferrous metals, power-generating machinery and equipment		Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials, textile yarn and related products, plastics in primary forms), organic chemicals, road Vehicles		

**Source:** Foreign Ministry, Republic of Turkey and bilateral-trade-report/turkey

## **Modi and Erdogan**

Turkish President Erdogan met with PM Modi on “the margins of the G-20 summit in Antalya” in 2015, which was followed by another meeting between “the two leaders at the G-20 summit” in Hangzhou, China in 2016. These meetings led to “the charting of a roadmap” between the two countries “towards strengthening their economic cooperation” (Kulshreshth 2017). When Turkish President visited India in 2017, PM Modi highlighted “the significance of Turkish investments in India’s manufacturing sector” especially in India’s flagship programmes like “Make in India” would be mutually beneficial to both sides. President Erdogan also agreed that “India’s infrastructure requirements and their ambitious vision of developing smart cities match well with Turkish capacities in the construction industry”. As a result, both the leaders agreed that “mutual cooperation in the field of IT, pharmaceuticals, health and tourism is beneficial to growth of bilateral trade” between the two nations (Asian News International 2017). The focus of Erdogan’s 2017 visit was largely economic. A business delegation of over 100 representatives accompanied him. Ankara has also shown interest in India’s ‘smart cities’ initiative, given the expertise of “Turkish firms in construction and in the infrastructure sector” (Rajalakshmi 2018). Now, Turkey seeks to tap “the potential of economic cooperation with growing economies” such as India to maintain its export-oriented growth rate. Turkey-India bilateral trade has been on “an upward trajectory” (Mehta 2019).

## **Bilateral Trade (2017-2021)**

India’s economic engagement with Turkey saw new thrust in recent years. Bilateral India-Turkey trade increased significantly in the previous decade “to reach USD 7.84 billion in 2018-19 and USD 7.086 billion” in 2019-20. The trade between “the two countries was USD 5.42 billion” in 2020-21 despite the COVID-19 pandemic. The major Indian exports to Turkey “include petroleum products, auto components/parts, man-made yarn, fabrics, made ups, aircraft & spacecraft parts, plastic raw materials, organic chemicals, dyes, industrial machinery, etc”. Imports from Turkey include “industrial machinery, broken/unbroken poppy seeds; machinery and mechanical appliances, iron and steel articles, inorganic chemicals, pearls and precious/semi-precious stones and metals (including imitation jewellery), granite and marble, etc” (Embassy of India 2021).

Recently, the Turkey-India Business Council (DEIK) of Istanbul’s foreign economic Relations Board finalized an agreement with the Dubai-based Emirates NBD Bank. Under this arrangement, Turkey will have the “special co-operation” of five bank branches in four states in India along with greater ease in banking transactions. According to the Chairman of the Turkey-India Business Council, Tevfik Donmez, “India is among the 17 countries included in the Turkish Trade Ministry export plan and the target is to increase the current volume of trade, which is \$8.5 billion, to at least \$20 billion” (Siddiqui 2020). He stressed, “I wholeheartedly believe that such an agreement will greatly contribute to bilateral trade figures and pave the way for Turkish business people who want to do business in India”. He also noted that the DEIK Turkey-India Business Council wants to “sustain growth in trade volume by supporting local firms that plan to enter the Indian market and coordinating win-win agreements and projects” (Daily Sabah 2020).

### **Bilateral trade between India and Turkey (2017-18)**

Figures of export, import, trade volume (million \$)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Export</b>	<b>Import</b>	<b>Volume</b>	<b>Balance</b>
2017	758,5	6.216,6	6.975,1	-5.458,1
2018	1,121,5	7.535,7	8.657,2	-6.414,2

**Source:** [https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey\\_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-india.en.mfa](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-india.en.mfa)


Main Export Items to India were “Gold, marble, oil seeds, raw metals”. Main Import Items to India were “Petroleum, textile yarn and related products, vehicle spare parts” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020). Turkey trade data shows both countries grew “their bilateral trade reaching \$8.6 billion” in 2018. The Indian market provides great opportunities to Turkish investors (Export Genius 2020).

### **Turkey’s Main Exports to India**

The bilateral trade between “Turkey and India was US\$ 7.56 billion, in which imports recorded the highest value of US\$ 6.5 billion” in 2019. And exports from Turkey to India totalled US\$ 1.06 billion. Both countries have acknowledged “a positive growth” in their bilateral trade. According to the

Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), Turkey has focused on especially Indian businesses. According to Turkey export data, “the country shipped machinery commodities at 2-digit level HS Code the most to India”. Here is the list of major export commodities of Turkey to India with their values (Export Genius 2020).

### Turkey’s Main Exports to India



Source: <https://www.exportgenius.in/blog/turkey-india-trade-2019-year-2020-hopes-positive-growth-in-bilateral-trade--388.php>


Product at 2-Digit Level HS Code	Value US\$ Million
Machinery	212.3
Salt, Sulphur, Earths & Stone	136.9
Inorganic Chemicals	72.9
Oil Seeds & Oleaginous	63.7
Iron and Steel	60.3
Electronics	52.2
Pearls and Precious Stones	38.7
Plastics	36.0
Edible Fruits and Nuts	32.9
Vehicles	31.9

Source: <https://www.exportgenius.in/blog/turkey-india-trade-2019-year-2020-hopes-positive-growth-in-bilateral-trade--388.php>

## Turkey's Main Imports from India

Turkey's imports from India "valued US\$ 6.5 billion in 2019". The purchases of mineral fuels and oils from India recorded the highest value. According to Turkey import data, "the country imported mineral fuels, oils and petroleum products worth US\$ 1954.8 million in 2019". Check other products at 2 digit level HS Code which are imported by Turkey from India with India Turkey trade statistics. Trade relations between India and Turkey were "boosted with fresh hopes to make goods investments in 2020" (Export Genius 2020).

### Turkey's Main Imports from India



Source: <https://www.exportgenius.in/blog/turkey-india-trade-2019-year-2020-hopes-positive-growth-in-bilateral-trade--388.phps://www.exportg>

Product at 2-Digit Level HS Code	Value US\$ Million
Mineral Fuels and Oils	1954.8
Pearls and Precious Stones	1083.8
Organic Chemicals	410.2
Electronics	409.7
Machinery	383.7
Man-made Filaments	312.9
Vehicles	269.1
Plastics	231.6
Tanning or Dyeing Extracts	229.3
Man-made Staple Fibres	162.6

Source: <https://www.exportgenius.in/blog/turkey-india-trade-2019-year-2020-hopes-positive-growth-in-bilateral-trade--388.php>






partnerships with India which is expected to be the fifth-largest economy in the world in 2025 and the third largest in the world in 2030. As the field workers of Turkey’s foreign trade, we want to make the best use of business opportunities in India within the framework of the win-win principle”. Also, Deputy Trade Minister Ms. Gonca Yılmaz Batur said, “Increasing the variety of products is important for both countries to further develop our commercial relations”. The Turkish Ambassador also said, “Turkish exporters should concentrate on the products that the Indian market needs, instead of products that are being produced in India, and form partnerships with Indian companies” (APN NEWS 2021).

Moreover, a Turkish company is preparing to offer “a multi-rotor mini UAV to India”. This mini UAV has been developed by Ankara-based Zyron Dynamics. India’s DCM Shriram Industries has bought a 30 per cent stake in this company. Zyron Dynamics is preparing to launch this multi-rotor UAV platform in India. This UAV will be “the first such product of this company, which will be introduced in India”. According to the agreement signed at the 15th International Defense Industry Fair in August 2021, Indian company DCM Shriram Industries had “bought 30 per cent of the company’s shares for \$3.5 million” (Hindustan News Hub 2021).


### **Bilateral Trade between India and Turkey (2021)**

India Exports to Turkey was US\$7.26 Billion during 2021, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade. India Exports to Turkey-data, historical chart and statistics-was last updated on June of 2022 (Trading Economics 2022).



**Source:** Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat)

**Turkey Exports to India** increased to 115997 US\$ THO in March from 95604 US\$ THO in February of 2022 (Trading Economics 2022).



**Source:** Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat)

Turkey’s new Ambassador to India, Firat Sunel, has emphasised on “promoting more economic engagement”. Bilateral trade between India and Turkey grew to US\$ 9.3 billion in 2021. Noting the robust trade ties, “the trend in the first four months of this year indicates that we will easily exceed the 10 billion thresholds in 2022” (Sibal 2022).

### **Expanding New Markets**

India-Turkey Cooperation in fields related to science, technology, education, culture and development areas have massive potential and both countries “need each other to achieve their development goals” (Anas 2017). According to Firat Sunel, Turkish Ambassador to India, who believes both countries have to now “open new horizons” and “deepen” their cooperation. Ankara considers New Delhi as a friend of “significant importance”. The ambassador argued that both countries are members of the G-20 and hence share “fundamental common values such as democracy, rule of law and liberal economies”. He said that the pace slowed down due to the pandemic. However, Turkey is now opening up “sectors such as mining, steel industry, pharmaceuticals, hospitality, bridge and highway construction, and IT for greater private-sector investments”. Turkey closely follows the “Make in India strategy”, he added (Basu 2021).

Further, there are “huge opportunities in different areas for Turkish investors” in India. India, where many pharmaceutical raw materials are

produced, has serious potential for Turkey, which makes medical devices, test kits, and many other high value-added products. Besides, the Indian Investment Agency offered “up to 70 per cent of incentives and grants for Turkish investors in food industry products” (Trem Global 2021). Turkey considers India as a “friendly country taking firm steps forward to be a global power with its growing economy, huge market, military power, outstanding knowledge in space technology and informatics, rich human resources, and deep-rooted historical and cultural heritage”. Firat Sunel argued, “Our bilateral relations have a huge potential to develop and benefit both sides as relations at social and economic levels are already flourishing. We welcome the increasing trend in people to people contacts and business sector cooperation while looking forward to further developing our relations” (Mohan Jha 2021).

According to Omair Anas, Turkish side is looking to access India’s expanding market for automotive and auto parts, textile machinery, chemical industry (Petrochemicals, inorganic and organic chemicals, fertilizers, paints, pharmaceuticals, soaps and detergents, synthetic fibres, essential oils, cosmetics and personal care products) Plastic products, Jewellery (precious metals and stones), Glass and glassware products, Leather products, Electrical equipment and electronics, Construction materials. Turkey wants a “Free Trade Agreement”, now part of “the Comprehensive Economic Partnership currently under consideration by both sides”. Completion of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in near future will be one important tool to rationalise the trade relations between the two countries (Anas 2017a).

On the other hand, tourism is another factor that plays a “crucial” role in bilateral relations. Turkey is an important country for Indian tourists. The number of tourists, which has reached 300 thousand, continues to increase in recent years (Trem Global 2021). In addition to that Turkey has close relations with Indian tourism associations such as the Travel Agents Association of India (TAAI) and Outbound Tour Associations of India (OTOAI). The 5<sup>th</sup> Annual Convention of OTOAI will take place in Antalya in 2022. Turkey has become “a popular wedding destination for Indians”. In 2019, the well-known wedding destinations of Turkey were Istanbul, Antalya and Bodrum hosted “30 large Indian weddings”. The Turkish Ambassador Firat Sunel stated that “promoting wedding tourism in India is

also high on our agenda”. In this regard, we conduct “marketing and advertising activities” in order to increase “the visibility and awareness” of Turkish wedding destinations among both wedding planners and Indian families (The Statesman 2022).

Also, Turkish TV series have an important place in tourism and are becoming more and more popular every day in India. Moreover, Turkey has reached an indispensable level for India where Turkish investors make most investments. Hazelnuts, dried apricots, lentils, and many other Turkish food products started to be more demanded in India. They gained a significant market share. The biggest increase in food and food industry products exports to India is in aquaculture, animal products, oil seeds, grains, and pulses (Trem Global 2021).

Moreover, the number of Turkish investments in India has been increasing gradually. He said, “We see an increasing number of involvement of Turkish engineers, technical consultants and constructors in EPC (Engineering, procurement and constructing) contracts in India in many government and private projects. Similarly, Turkey has been providing a convenient business environment for Indian companies and many well-known Indian companies have got investments in Turkey” (The Statesman 2022).

For the first time, Turkey has placed “orders for 50,000 tonnes of wheat imports” from India with Egypt. Turkey has started to buy wheat through private “electronic-mandi”. Sources in the ministry said Turkey agreed to import India’s wheat and a delegation of Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) visited the country to facilitate the process. Following this, electronic mandi Agri Bazaar has received “a confirmed order for execution of 50,000 metric tonnes of wheat from Turkey at an approximate value of 125 crore”. Many countries have already approached India for wheat imports, including Egypt, Israel, Oman, Nigeria and South Africa (Ghosal & Shambhavi Anand 2022).

### **Issues**

But India and Turkey have some issues that “keep overwhelming the perception of their bilateral relations”. Three issues will always be asked when it comes to deepening India-Turkey trade relations. First, how much Pakistan determines Turkey’s India perception, second, Turkey’s perception

of Kashmir, and third, what is Turkey's view of reforms in international institutions, which includes India in the United Nations Security Council as permanent member (Anas 2017). On the other hand, Pakistan "unconditionally supports" Turkey in international matters especially in the Cyprus issue; Turkey has kept "a reasonable distance" from India. Moreover, Ankara has encouraged Islamabad's arguments regarding "the Kashmir conflict" (Colakoglu 2012).

Further, New Delhi and Ankara also fell out over the issue of the Gulen movement of 2016. According to Erdal Sabri Ergen, the Turkish Consul General in Mumbai, Turkey found "connections" in Mumbai and India with "the perpetrators of the attempted coup". When Ankara asked that New Delhi act against "such connections", India demanded "evidence suitable to be presented in court" and refused to "close any of the schools in Delhi and other cities" affiliated to the Gulen movement. In October 2019, India had threatened to cancel "a \$2.3 billion project with Turkey to co-manufacture ships for the Indian navy, even as it finalised a \$40 million defence deal to supply military radars to Turkey's political opponent Armenia". The threat was in reaction to Turkish President Erdogan's criticism of New Delhi's "revocation of Article 370" on 5 August 2019, "a clause which had recognised the special status of Indian-administered Kashmir as an autonomous region". In his address at the UN General Assembly in September 2019, President Erdogan had called for "dialogue between India and Pakistan to solve the Kashmir dispute". Due to the constant "Pakistan factor", India has not been able to establish strong and sustainable ties with Turkey (Siddiqui 2020).

When President Erdogan raised the Kashmir issue at the UNGA, PM Modi responded by "holding meetings with the President of Cyprus and Prime Ministers of Armenia and Greece on the sidelines" of the UNGA in 2019. All of these states have "several disputes with Turkey". Later, PM Modi cancelled his expected visit to Turkey in October 2019. In the view of growing defense ties between Turkey and Pakistan, India cut its "defense exports to Turkey" and also "reduced imports from Turkey" (Marjani 2020).

India also responded diplomatically to Turkey's criticism of Kashmir by summoning the Turkish Ambassador to the Ministry of External Affairs. The MEA spokesperson Raveesh Kumar said that "the *Démarche*", means a diplomatic move which is usually in the form of a letter, was made by Indian

Secretary Vikas Swarup to the Ambassador of Turkey to India, Şakir Ozkan Torunlar. He said that the “strong *Démarche*” delivered to the Turkish envoy was chiefly about Erdogan’s remarks. Raveesh Kumar said, “These remarks reflect neither an understanding of history nor of the conduct of diplomacy. They distort events of the past to advance a narrow-minded view of the present”. In his speech to a joint session of the Pakistani Parliament, the Turkish President asserted that India’s recent steps “which aggravates the current situation and revokes the freedom and ... rights of the Kashmiri people, does not bring any benefit to anyone”. President Erdogan also compared the current situation in Kashmir to the 1915 Gallipoli campaign, when Britain, France and Russia had fought to bring down the Ottoman Empire”. He also claimed that “the plight of Kashmiri people meant as much to Turkey as it did to Pakistan” (The Wire Staff 2020). Further, President Erdogan clearly stated that Ankara would support Islamabad on the Kashmir issue (Basu 2021).

### **The Future Ahead**

In the era of globalization, the future of India-Turkey trade relations looks very bright because their geo-political and economic interests are converging, and in fact, both the leaders also envision increasing economic and trade cooperation in different fields. Today India has emerged as a huge populated country and a rising economic power at the global level. It also provides enormous opportunities for foreign direct investments. Many countries of the world are looking towards India with greedy eyes. In this environment, Turkish business companies can invest in India and reap the economic benefits. On the other hand, Turkey has also emerged as an economic clout for the Indian companies to invest in different sectors. As a result, India and Turkey have vast scope for economic investments in each other countries and soon they will hit the target of \$10 billion in near future.

But there are some issues between the two countries which hamper the momentum of India-Turkey trade relations. Turkey has ideological proximity with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Muslim factor is playing a key role between the countries. On the contrary, India and Pakistan have had animosity since the partition took place in 1947. And India does not like any development or strengthening the position of Pakistan in its neighbouring area with the help of a third country. This is the biggest hurdle in India and Turkey's trade relations which stops the rapid expansion of

economic development. Now, Turkey has to maintain a balancing act with India as far as Ankara's relations with Pakistan is concerned. India has always sought and demonstrated to strengthen trade ties with Turkey but when Ankara openly supports Pakistan against India, consequently, New Delhi feels disappointed. Moreover, Jammu & Kashmir is another factor behind the slow progress of the economic engagements.

India and Turkey have to develop trust with each other so that investment activities could be accelerated. In the globalizing world, economic interests are more important than political interests. India and Turkey should avoid this kind of situation in near future and pave the way for more trade and economic cooperation in the coming years. Tourism is another emerging sector where both the countries get equal benefits. Prime Minister Henry Palmerstone in the British Parliament in 1848 said, "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." For India and Turkey trade relations, this statement fit equally true even in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

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# RETHINKING TURKISH-INDIAN RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRESS (1924-1947)

*Bahar İZMİR\**

## **Introduction**

Newspapers are one of the primary authentic materials which shed light on the political landscape of a country. It is fair to say that they serve as a mirror to the political climate and reflect the various reactions of different social and political groups and their viewpoints of course. It can be claimed that they reveal different aspects which are not even publicly discussed to a formal extent. They took an active role in the course of interactions which remarkably promoted the bilateral relations, especially at first functioning as a propaganda device for Khilafat and later a way to organize political and economic support for Turkey and promote it. This paper, therefore, traces the course of bilateral relations from the view of newspapers of both countries between 1924-1947 which remarkably reflect the political climate and mutual character of foreign policy. It is preferred to deal with the ties between 1924 and 1947 broadly as the Khilafat issue dominated the center of relations before, thus the relations after the abolition of Khilafat can not be clarified without understanding the foundations of the relations at this period.

Because this study is based on the newspapers of both countries, it is necessary to give information about the character of the press in Turkey and India. During the period 1924-1947, a new republic was founded and fundamental reforms were carried out one by one which signaled the consolidation of the power for Turkey. The press was predominantly mirroring the Kemalist regime, thus the arguments and support of the press at that time can be seen as mainly equivalent to the Republican People's Party,

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the ruling party, in Turkey, especially after 1925. Moreover, the press would become even more homogenous after the press law in 1931.<sup>1</sup> *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, later *Ulus*, was the semi-official newspaper of the republican regime whereas *Akşam*, *Milliyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, and others were also reflecting the voice of the ruling party in one way or another. On the other hand, the newspapers of the Indian press had different characteristics including nationalist ones, the ones with religious concerns such as Muslim and Hindu newspapers, English newspapers such as *The Times of India*, or the ones that were published in different languages such as English, Urdu, Persian, Hindi, and other local languages. There were also newspapers launched by individuals such as Muhammed Ali, and his newspaper *Comrade*, indicating that the Indian press was not homogeneous at all.

This study aims to give an insight into the two countries' consideration of each other from the perspective of newspapers. Thus, this article will portray the Indian viewpoint towards the transition period of Turkey and in contrast, Indian reactions to the revolutions in Turkey. In this context, the main purpose of this study is to evaluate how the Turkish modernization process was pictured in the Indian press and on the other hand, what was the general outlook of the Turkish press towards the Indian national movement. Thus, the course of the relations between the two countries will be evaluated on the base of the character and the tone of newspapers which presents quite explicit signs of the political situation of the country. In addition, the reaction of Indian nationalists towards the Turkish modern state and change in the country will be investigated in light of empirical material. From the Indian perspective, this paper assumes that there was no regression in the course of bilateral relations after the abolition of Khilafat in contrast to the general idea. This paper also claims that the Indian independence movement gained exceptional ground in Turkey and India was not disregarded in Turkish foreign policy with the critical method of searching in the Turkish newspapers.

From the Indian perspective, the newspapers were obtained from the archives such as Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), Jawaharlal

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<sup>1</sup> Alpay Kabacalı, **Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın Sansürü**, Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayını, Ankara, 2001, pp. 110-130; Mete Tunçay, **Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931)**, Yurt Yayınları, Ankara, 1981, pp. 142-149.

Nehru University (JNU) Library, and National Archives of India (NAI) which I visited during my doctoral research for a year in India. In addition, the Turkish National Library, National Archives, and Digital Newspaper Archives were utilized for assessing the Turkish perspective. Distinctive Indian newspapers of the period were *Civil and Military Gazette*, *Times of India*, *Comrade*, *Aligarh Muslim Gazette*, *Al-Hilal*, *The Hindu*, *Muslim Outlook*, and *Star of India*. These newspapers were investigated to clarify how the Indian press portrayed the Turkish modernization process and how the Indian nationalists reacted to the secular nation-state.

In parallel with the Indian concern for Turkish political affairs, this study also attempts to portray the overview of the Turkish press towards India. Because the reaction of the Turkish newspapers to the Indian independence movement and its stages is equally significant for assessing the character of bilateral relations. Turkish newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, *Sabah*, *Vakit*, *Yeni Sabah*, *Son Posta*, *Tan*, and *Yeni Asır* were reviewed for assessing the Turkish viewpoint.

In this regard, the primary purpose of the study is to comprehend how the Turkish press pictured the Indian national movement and get a clear analysis of whether the general overview of the press was supportive or not. Additionally, how Indian independence movement and its stages were interpreted in the Turkish Press? And how the impressions of the press on India and Great Britain were? How the colonial rule of Great Britain was pictured in the newspapers? Besides, another purpose of the study is to reply to the questions such as what was the general idea towards the nationalist elements in colonial India such as the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and others. In addition, how India was situated in Turkish foreign policy despite all setbacks of the Khilafat issue. In this context, the main aim of the study is to investigate whether there was a decline in the course of the relations or the bilateral relations deepened with the new motives after the Khilafat issue with the help of newspapers published in both countries.

## Indian Viewpoint Towards Turkey

From the Indian viewpoint, it is better to begin with analyzing the reactions of the Indian press by categorizing it before and after the abolition of Khilafat, on 3 March 1924, as it was a crossroad in the bilateral relations. Before 1924, the concerns for Khilafat were the main focus of the Indian press towards Turkey. In other words, the protection and the permanence of Khilafat were predominantly shaping the relations for years, thus the reactions towards its abolition were perfectly reasonable considering the course of the relations centered on Khilafat.<sup>2</sup>

Besides, it is important to give a general background of the Khilafat issue between Turkey and India, before entering into a detailed discussion on the course of bilateral relations. The issue undoubtedly has deep roots dating back to the 19th century. With the consolidation of British Rule in India starting from the 1857 Civil Revolt and the collapse of the Mughal Empire in parallel, the “Khilafat” started to be regarded as equal to the political and religious rule of Islam. Thus, Ottoman Khilafat and the ideology of Pan-Islamism started to outstand as a “remedy” for rising Muslim rule in the world again, especially during the reign of Abdulhamit II in which it emerged as a reaction to British colonial rule and the collapse of Muslim rule in the Indian subcontinent. In other words, Ottoman Empire stood out as the last hope for the Indian Muslims under the umbrella of the Pan-Islam ideal. Thus, it should be clarified here that the essence of the support given to the Turkish independence war was mostly based on the institution of Khilafat at the turn of the 20th century.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, the deepening roots progressed with the effect of the religious and political authority of the Khilafat paved the way for the support of India even after the abolition of Khilafat. In this sense, it is very obvious that the abolition of Khilafat was a turning point for the Indian press.

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<sup>2</sup> **National Archives of India (NAI)**, Foreign and Political Department, External Files-Secret/34-X, 24 Haziran 1924, (The report of Indian Khilafat committee on 24 June 1924); “Indian Muslim Opinion”, **Civil and Military Gazette**, 9 March 1924, p.3; “Shock to Indian Moslems”, **The Pioneer**, 8 March 1924, p.4.

<sup>3</sup> Gail Minault, **The Khilafat Movement Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India**, Colombia University Press, New York, 1982, pp.5-7; Bahar İzmir, **Türkiye-Hindistan İlişkileri 1919-1947**, Ankara University, The Institute of Turkish Revolution History, Unpublished Phd Thesis, Ankara, 2022, pp. 22-28.

However, it can be claimed that this radical revolution had no effect on the course of relations even after the abolition of Khilafat. In line with this, Indian newspapers persistently continued to promote the radical reforms in Turkey which transformed the political, social, and cultural life. For example, *Muslim Outlook* was using a praising tone for the status of women in Turkey. The newspaper was presenting Turkish women as a role model for Indian women by standing up for the rights of women given in the Republican period by such words:

*The status to which the great majority of Muslim women in India were reduced today was a libel on Islam and a crime for which the Muslim Community, as a whole, had to suffer in increasing social degradation...Equality with men was women's right according to Islamic Law. The veiling of the face by women was not originally an Islamic custom...The modern Turkish peasant women did not use purdah and enjoyed the amount of freedom which would stupify an Indian Maulvi.<sup>4</sup>*

It should be stated here that this different reaction towards the abolition of Khilafat indicated that Indian Muslims would continue to promote to Turkish nation-state and its reforms. Regarding the temporary character of the reactions to the abolition of Khilafat, it was possible to assume that Indian Muslims would still sustain their support with different motivations such as the modernization path of Turkey and the reforms.<sup>5</sup> For example, *The Muslim University Gazette*, one of the newspapers which was the most prominent supporter of Khilafat, was also advocating the nation-state and the transition to the Turkish Republic. An article titled "Ataturk" in *Muslim University Gazette*, glorified the revolutionary path of Ataturk as well as his statesmanship and described his decisiveness in establishing and consolidating the Turkish Republic as astonishing achievements. A great admire for the leadership of Ataturk and the republican regime was expressed by such words:

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<sup>4</sup> "Women in Islam", **Muslim Outlook**, 3 February 1927, p.1.

<sup>5</sup> "Indian Muslim Opinion", **Civil and Military Gazette**, 7 March 1924, p.3; "Khilafa's Deposition", **Civil and Military Gazette**, 7 March 1924, p.3.

*Mustafa Kamal completely revolutionized the world outlook and within a few years of wise administration of the affairs, he had made the Turks look ahead and walk shoulder to shoulder with the most advanced nations of the world...It is in Turkey alone that we find the stamps of Kamal Ataturk's reforms. Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, and other Islamic countries are walking in the footsteps of Ataturk and wherever we find progress and activity among the Mussalmans we can easily trace the source of its inspiration from the late Ataturk...Islam came to this world as a religion of peace, progress, and enlightenment and it continued to guide the world till its votaries kept up to its traditions.*<sup>6</sup>

Considering the Indian newspapers, it can be inferred that the Indian press was reflecting a devoted character to a great degree for the sake of the protection and continuity of the Khilafat before the 3rd of March, 1924, so the abolition of it brought a great shock to Indian Muslims, of course. Therefore, there were extensive reactions to this change at the beginning, however, these reactions did not last for long. On the other hand, some Indian Muslims such as Muhammed Iqbal supported the abolition of Khilafat by claiming that it was already outdated, thus the new path of modernization in Turkey should be underpinned.<sup>7</sup> The modernization process of Turkey, new reforms in various areas as well as political, economical, socio-cultural, and diplomatic interactions between Turkey and India attracted more interest in the Indian newspapers.<sup>8</sup> *Dawn*, for instance, was glorifying Turkish modernization, especially the social transformation of the country. The modern buildings and the new outlook of the country were highlighted and implied as a model for India by illustrating the new look of cities in Turkey such as a railway station in Ankara.<sup>9</sup> In addition, *Hindustan Times* was praising Turkey's first girls' high school in İstanbul by illustrating pictures of it.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> "Ataturk", **The Muslim University Gazette**, 16 November 1938, p.3.

<sup>7</sup> Muhammad Iqbal, **The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam**, Dodo Press, 2009, p.175; "Pan-Islamism Never Existed", **The Times of India**, 21 September 1933, p.11.

<sup>8</sup> See: **Comrade**, 17 July 1925, Vol.3, p.22; Also see "Kemal and Islam", **The Times of India**, 14 July 1931, p.6.; "The Moslem Outlook", **The Times of India**, 10 February 1926, p.15.

<sup>9</sup> "Modern Turkey", **Dawn**, 24 January 1943, p.5.; "The Maker and New Turkey", **The Hindustan Times**, 18 November 1938, p.12.

<sup>10</sup> "Turkey's First Girls' High School", **The Hindustan Times**, 20 May 1929, p.3.

Another impact of Turkey on India manifested itself in the issue of the emancipation of women in the pre-independence period. According to the Indian newspapers, it was essential to follow the path of Kemalist Turkey which presented equal rights to the women, thus taking Turkish modernization as a model for India could bring a solution to India by dissolving the seclusion of women and bringing them out of purdah<sup>11</sup> system.<sup>12</sup> On many occasions, Turkey's modernization steps for the emancipation of women were pointed out as a model for India. For example, it was stated at an international women's congress in İstanbul that there were admirable reasons for organizing women's congress in Turkey such as granting women equal political rights with men. At this congress, Atatürk's leading role in the equal status of women was also appreciated by referring to *what Atatürk has done for Turkey*.<sup>13</sup> Again, at a lecture given by Mr. L. C. Mousell, Consul for Turkey in India at Calcutta, the high and honorable place of women was emphasized by tracing back to the status of women during Turkish states. The most important developments in changing Turkish women's conditions were praised with a special tribute to the Kemalist regime.<sup>14</sup> *The Times of India* pointed out the Turkish model for fighting against the communal questions between Hindus and Muslims with a reference to Halide Edib's suggestion in India such:

*She asked Indians to follow the example of Turkey by allowing women to work shoulder to shoulder with men in the work of the regeneration of the country. She concluded with the slogan, 'No individual, but the nation. No rights, but the duties.'*<sup>15</sup>

Economic, diplomatic, and political developments between the two countries also contributed to the bilateral relations in those years. In this sense, bilateral relations were shaped by mostly individual or official visits between two countries which mostly became clear with the diplomatic visits even

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<sup>11</sup> The religious practice of secluding women from the society especially meaning to physical and cultural segregation which requires to cover the body of women. See Matima Mernissi, **Women and Islam An Historical and Technological Enquiry**, Trans. Mary to Lakeland, New Delhi, 1991.

<sup>12</sup> "Emancipation of India's Women", **Civil and Military Gazette**, 8 January 1935, p.8.

<sup>13</sup> "Woman At Istanbul", **The Hindustan Times**, 1 June 1935, p.5.

<sup>14</sup> "Women in Turkey of To-Day", **The Statesman**, 30 November 1938, p.13.

<sup>15</sup> "Turkish Women's Views on India", **The Times of India**, 13 March 1935, p.12.

under the British domination of India. It seemed that diplomatic interactions continued persistently even though the Khilafat had already been abolished. Accordingly, Turkish journalists visited India for three months from January to March 1943 arousing a keen interest all over the country. The interest of Muslims towards the Turkish editors' visit shows that Muslims' regard and admiration for the Turks maintained their value despite the systematic attempts of British hegemony.<sup>16</sup> Indian Muslims even demanded Turkey's help in the war against the British,<sup>17</sup> however, as it can be assumed, it was not that easy to interfere actively in the internal politics of India because of the British colonial structure. Given this factor, the relations sometimes proceeded at the indirect level such as the supportive tone of the press and the undeclared intention of imitating the Turkish pattern.

Another significant interaction was Halide Edib's visit to India from January to March 1935 which also aroused a great interest in mass media. She came to India with the invitation of Dr. Ahmed Ansari to deliver lectures at Jamia Millia, National Muslim University.<sup>18</sup> The Indian newspapers portrayed Halide Edib with great admiration, as it can be understood from the descriptions such as "Turkish educator", "novelist, historian," "Turkish intellectual", "a patriot, a nationalist" and "the liberator of Turkey". Her ideas on religion, independence, nation-state, women's rights, and democracy were reflected and attributed to great importance in the newspapers for days.<sup>19</sup> For instance, *Hindustan Times* focused more on her ideas about religion and politics which can be based on the idea of keeping religion free from politics and vice versa to protect it from internal corruption and decadence. Thus, the reforms of religion and its divorce from politics in Turkey were in a sense justified with a link to the Indian religious identities and their demands. In this

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<sup>16</sup> "Turkish Editors' Visit", **Dawn**, 12 January 1943, p.1.

<sup>17</sup> "Turkey Cannot Forget Indian Muslims' Sympathy", **Dawn**, 29 January 1943, pp.1-3.

<sup>18</sup> "Turkish Novelist", **The Tribune**, 11 January 1935, p.1; "Madame Halide Edib", **The Hindustan Times**, 10 January 1935, p.1.; **Hindustan Times**, 11 January 1935, p.1; **Tribune**, 11 January 1935, p.1.

<sup>19</sup> **NMML Archives**, Nehru Papers, File No. 19/1268/ 18 October 1935; "Halide Edip A Great Turkish Woman", **Hindustan Times**, 10 January 1935, p.9; "Turks More Truly Religious", **The Pioneer**, 20 February 1935, p.1; "Modern Turkey", **The Times of India**, 29 March 1929, p.25. "Turkish Woman Writer in Bombay", **Civil and Military Gazette**, 8 January 1935, p.4.; "Madame Halide Edib in Lucknow", **The Pioneer**, 20 February 1935, p.3.; "Halide Hanum's Lecture at Jamia Millia", **Hindustan Times**, 15 January 1935, p.1.

context, Indian newspapers were more inclined to attribute great importance to the Turkish modernization especially secularism for avoiding a fractured society shaped by Hindus and Muslims and a communal conflict.<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, diplomatic interactions continued with the visit of Turkish journalists to India in 1943, consisting of Falih Rıfki Atay, the head of the Turkish Press Mission and the editor of *Ulus*, Necmettin Sadak, the chief editor of Istanbul-based newspaper *Akşam*, Muvaffak Menemencioglu, the general managing editor of the Anatolian Agency and Burhan Belge who was a counselor and director of propaganda, Burhan Felek, and M. Arbel. The visit of the Turkish press mission was welcomed by large masses and interpreted as a keen interest of Turkey in Indian affairs by Indian newspapers.<sup>21</sup> During the diplomatic visit, Indian newspapers discussed Turkey's position in the war and, expressed her peace-maker role, in addition to these, an admiration for Turkey was expressed all over India. In addition to the sympathy of both Muslims and Hindus in the society towards Turkey, Indians demanded Turkey's help for the independence war and Hindu-Muslim conflicts.<sup>22</sup>

Economic relations were also spotlighted in the Indian newspapers by giving the accounts of aid between the two countries. The aid in these years also represented a significant advance in the relations because it proved that the economic ties were not confined merely to the motivation of the Khilafat institution.<sup>23</sup> Another dimension of the economic ties was commercial relations between India and Turkey. It appeared that both countries initiated new attempts to improve exports and commerce due to the war condition between 1939 and 1945.<sup>24</sup> Turhan Boray was sent to India with the mission of Commercial Representative of the Turkish Government to take steps in commercial relations. Notwithstanding the disadvantage of not having a direct

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<sup>20</sup> "That Bogey of Pan-Islamism", **The Hindustan Times**, 11 January 1935, p.9.; "Religion Divorced From Politics", **The Times of India**, 14 March 1935, p.6; "War Welcome to Turkish Press Mission", **The Times of India**, 20 February 1943, p.6.

<sup>21</sup> "Distinguished Turkish Journalists in India", **The Times of India**, 22 January 1943, p.1.; "Turkish Journalists in Delhi", **The Times of India**, 26 January 1943, p.1; Leonard Kirschen, "Turkish Journalists' Visit", **The Times of India**, 19 February 1943, p.6.

<sup>22</sup> "Turkish Editors' Visit", **Dawn**, 29 January 1943, pp.1-3.

<sup>23</sup> "Aid For Turkey", **The Times of India**, 3 February 1943, p.4.

<sup>24</sup> "Indo-Turkish Trade Agreement", **Hindustan Times**, 17 February 1935, p.10; "Denunciation by Turkey", **Hindustan Times**, 17 February 1935, p.1.

transport system, both countries tried to keep closer contact and increase mutual trade.<sup>25</sup> On another occasion, an Indian trade delegation consisting of nine members went to Turkey in 1947 to negotiate cotton textiles, iron and steel implements, jute and tea on the Indian side, and soil products on the Turkish side.<sup>26</sup> In spite of all the efforts, it can be concluded that war conditions, economic crisis, and export-import restrictions affected commercial relations adversely, however, the attempts came into prominence more throughout the course of bilateral relations.

In addition to all these accounts, Turkey was also referred to for various reasons with a specific attribution to the great leader, Ataturk, and the existence of Turkey.<sup>27</sup> For instance, *Al-Hilal* was centering Ataturk as “the leader of modern Turkey” and drew attention to his leading role in founding a modern and independent state and his leadership by centering his picture on the front page.<sup>28</sup> Again, the death of Ataturk invoked such great depression and grief in India that Indian newspapers reflected the tribute to the great leader.<sup>29</sup>

The Indian press revealed the extent to which the enormous mourning of Indian people for the death of the Turkish leader, focusing on his achievements and his role in the Turkish national movement. There were extensive hartals observed among predominantly Muslim communities such as closing educational institutions, some restaurants, and eating houses. Besides, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League issued a statement requesting the provincial branches all over India to observe Friday, November 18, as Kemal Day and to hold public meetings to express the deepest feelings of sorrow and sympathy for the Muslims of India. In addition, the Indian newspapers underlined the tributes paid to Kemal Ataturk at public meetings in various parts of India. Prayers were also offered in other mosques in Calcutta and suburbs and hartals were observed. In addition to the tributes to the memory of Kemal Ataturk, his achievements such as founding the

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<sup>25</sup> “Indo-Turkish Commercial Relations”, **Dawn**, 17 January 1943, p.4.

<sup>26</sup> “Indian Trade Delegation At Ankara”, **The Star of India**, 17 April 1947, p.5.

<sup>27</sup> **Hindustan Times**, 1 February 1943, p.1.

<sup>28</sup> The translation of Urdu newspaper “Al-Hilal”: “Revolution and Leadership”, **Al-Hilal**, 9 September 1927, p.3.

<sup>29</sup> “Father of Turkish People Dead”, **National Herald**, 11 November 1938, p.1; “Kemal Ataturk Dead”, **Pioneer**, 11 November 1938, p.1.

Turkish Republic, abolishing Sultanate, and reforms that transformed the Turkish nation into a modern and independent state were mentioned with great admiration.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, *Muslim University Gazette* described him as a leader who rekindled the torch of a nation's freedom by also giving special stress to his role as a guide to all Muslims all over the world.<sup>31</sup>

The general outlook of the Indian press during this period can be outlined with a supporting tone of the Turkish Republic in which its reforms, the path of modernization, and revolutionary changes were appraised and presented as a model for Indian modernization. As *Hindustan Times* stated, Turkish modernization was regarded as one of the momentous events of the century and the question of what India could learn from Turkey in her national war was discussed in detail. The transformation of Turkey and especially the separation of religion from politics were interpreted as a turning point for Turkey and Asia. This honorable position and transformation in Turkey were glorified with such words:

*It is no longer the land of religious superstitions, wooden dogmas of enslaved womanhood, of vague ideas of the brotherhood of Islam, Pan-Islamism, pan-Asiatic, of the licentious and deprived Turkey of the harem. But, now, it is the land of liberty, independence, and freedom of emancipated women of nationalism. She is now progressive like the living West and not stagnating like the dreaming east*<sup>32</sup>

Indian newspapers attributed great importance to the secular and modern steps of Turkey, and the transition from a religious-based state to a modern state was favored in India by focusing on its prospective impact on Indian affairs. Thus, it should be noted here that the new reforms in Turkey were followed with great admiration in India regardless of all radical shifts in bilateral relations.

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<sup>30</sup> "Mourning for Kemal Ataturk in India: Hartals in Many Cities Glowing", **The Times of India**, 12 November 1938, p.14.

<sup>31</sup> "Ataturk", **Muslim University Gazette**, 16 November 1938, p.4.

<sup>32</sup> "Japan and Turkey-What India Can Learn?", **The Hindustan Times**, 3 December 1924, p.8.

## Turkish Press Towards Indian Affairs

In parallel with the praising tone of Indian newspapers, the terminology of Turkish newspapers can be classified as exceptionally distinctive, subjective, and meaningful. That is to say, British rule in India was categorized or pictured as a “colonial rule”, “a tyranny”, “suppression”, and “a dominant power”. Turkish newspapers marked the British position in India as an unfair rule over India in Turkish newspapers. Thus, Turkish newspapers portrayed the British rule as a “British chain”, “British bond in India”, and described the British as a “power who exploits the sources of India, a barrier to independent India”, “a cruel authority”, “unjust manner” and “unfair treatment”. The British rule was a colonial power in the end according to the Turkish press, therefore the violence and conflicts among religious groups were more associated with the colonial power. In accordance, economic exploitation was another focus of the Turkish press which was implied by laying the blame on Britain and legitimizing the Indian national movement.<sup>33</sup>

It should also be noted here that Turkish-Britain relations were improving at that time, especially after the 1930s. Even after the close ties with Britain, Turkish newspapers preferred a tone that criticizes British hegemony and justifies Indian national resistance. This shows the extent of bilateral relations at those years. Thus, *Cumhuriyet* was describing India as “a barrier to independent India” and “a cruel authority over India”. The British rule was a colonial and unfair authority in India according to Turkish newspapers, hence the violence, inequality in the society, and the riots were more attributed to the colonial power.<sup>34</sup>

India was described as a country, oppressed and exploited by the British, so the stages of the Indian Independence Movement gained great support in Turkish newspapers. In respect to the articles and evaluations in the newspapers, Indian boycotts and resistance against the British were regarded as a legitimate, fair and legal process. For instance, Round Table Conferences

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<sup>33</sup> “Hindistan’daki İngiliz Keleçesi”, *Tan*, 18 August 1935, p.12; *Hâkimiyeti Milliye*, 10 June 1930, p.5.; “İngiltere ile İslam Alemi Arasında Bir İhtilâh Kalmamış”, *Vakit*, 27 November 1931, p.6.; B.L., “İngiliz Harici Siyasetine Dair Bazı Görüşler”, *Cumhuriyet*, 24 May 1936, p.1.; Ömer Rıza, “Hindistan Meselesi”, *Vakit*, 12 December 1929, p.4.; “Hint Ticareti”, *Akşam*, 14 October 1932, p.10.

<sup>34</sup> “İngiltere Hindistan’ın Yakasını Bırakmıyor”, *Cumhuriyet*, 13 December 1930, p.3.

were stimulated and described as a *non-violent revolution* by *Vakit*. The newspapers ascribed such significance to the conferences that they expressed their admiration for the unique and effective path of Indian resistance with such words: “*a great success against British colonial rule*” and “*revolution with no blood*”.<sup>35</sup> Again, the improvements in legislation and constitution were also mentioned as great steps towards the independence of India.<sup>36</sup> The tone of the Turkish newspapers proves that Turkey was still favoring the Indian national resistance against the British despite the path of Turkish foreign policy-oriented more toward the Western world.

On the other hand, the Indian national movement was justified to an extent that stages of resistance such as the non-cooperation movement, non-violence, Simon commission, and reactions against it were glorified in the newspapers. In addition, the moves which paved the way for an independent India such as the Simon Commission, Nehru Report, Round Table Conferences, Civil Disobedience Movement, and 1935 Government of India Act were manifestly underpinned by *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, *Akşam*, *Vakit*, and *Cumhuriyet*, etc.<sup>37</sup> Besides, concrete steps towards the Indian independence movement during World War II were spotlighted from the Turkish viewpoint. On the other hand, the conflicts between Hindu-Muslim were linked with the British rule, and therefore they were described as a barrier to a unique and independent India.

Additionally, the leaders of the Nationalist Movement like Gandhi, Nehru, Mevlâna Abul Kalam Azad, and Cinnah, were attached of great importance in the Turkish newspapers.<sup>38</sup> For example, the newspapers pictured Gandhi as a great leader and compared him with Atatürk. He was even described as the greatest leader of the world and the founding leader of India. His rightful resistance was underlined and even glorified to an extent that *Vakit* claimed that he has Turkish roots in his family. According to the article, such a great leader

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<sup>35</sup> “Hindistan’da Kansız İhtilal Başladı”, *Vakit*, 1 April 1930, p.1.

<sup>36</sup> “Hindistan İçin Bir Kanunu Esası”, *Haber*, 22 November 1934, p.1.

<sup>37</sup> “İrk Mahşeri Hindistan”, *Cumhuriyet*, 16 August 1937, p.7.; Zeki Mesut, “Hint Konferansı”, *Hâkimiyeti Milliye*, 24 November 1930, p.1; “Hindistan Meseleleri”, *Milliyet*, 10 November 1929, p.1.

<sup>38</sup> *Vakit*, 18 May 1932, p.2.; “Hindistan’da Galeyan İsyân”, *Milliyet*, 1 February 1932, p.5.; “Hindistan’da İşler Yine Karıştı”, *Milliyet*, 24 November 1930, p.2.; “Hindistan Meselesi”, *Son Posta*, 30 January 1931, p.5.

must have been related to the Turkish nation.<sup>39</sup> So his success was associated with having Turkish ancestral background which is, of course, an exaggerated comment reflecting the nationalist tone of the Turkish press at that time. Besides, the nationalist figures leading the society to independence such as the Indian National Congress were remarked on with great enthusiasm. Following this, Congress was presented as a legal representative of a suppressed society and legitimized with its legal and historical roots.<sup>40</sup>

Turkish press was laying more stress on the similarities between Turkish and Indian modernization by using a supportive tone for the national resistance in India. Accordingly, the participation in the national resistance was blessed and anti-British feelings and initiatives were interpreted as the awakening of Indian society against enslavement. Furthermore, the reforms practiced in Turkey such as the emancipation of women, social life, breaking the link between religion and politics, and other socio-cultural revolutions were presented as an ideal form for the modern and independent India.<sup>41</sup> Supporting this, in the process of national war, Indian nationalists also frequently referred to the success of Turkish modernization, and they openly expressed their trust in Turkey by interacting with Turkish leaders and politicians. For example, in a letter sent to Prime Minister İsmet Pasha by the leaders of the Indian Independence Movement on October 18th, 1928, articles and publications on Turkish modernization were invited to be published in the magazine *Forward* which served as the publication organ of the national movement. This document also stated that Turkish modernization would shed light on the independence of the Indian people.<sup>42</sup> Additionally, cultural and historical ties were also specified with the course of relations as well as the economic, diplomatic, and cultural relations between 1924 and 1947.<sup>43</sup> It can be deduced here that the national resistance of Turkey and India against the British were characterized as identical paths in terms of the anti-British sentiments, the revolutionary nature, and the unique methods led by the people.

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<sup>39</sup> “Gandhi Türktür”, *Vakit*, 3 July 1932, p.1.

<sup>40</sup> “Hindistan’da Büyük İstiklal Mücadelesi”, *Tan*, 18 January 1934, p.4.

<sup>41</sup> “Hindistan Kadınlarının Yaptıkları Nümayiş”, *Vakit*, 10 April 1931, p.5.

<sup>42</sup> **Republican Archives (BCA)**, 30.10/258.736.5, 18.10.1928 (The article published in *Forward* which was the official publication of Indian Independence Movement).

<sup>43</sup> Halide Edib, “Bugünkü Hindistan”, *Tan*, 16 March 1938, p.4.

The ideological dimension of the relations between Turkey and India was predominantly built on the common rhetoric of “the national independence war”.<sup>44</sup> As Vedat Nedim, a columnist from *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*, claimed, India and Turkey were “identical and two leading countries on the path of the independence”. For him, India was pursuing a national economy policy by taking Turkey as a model.<sup>45</sup> *Cumhuriyet* reported that India was also adopting Turkish national war, especially in the resistance against the colonial rule which could be understood from all segments of society fighting for freedom and shouting the slogans such as “Long Live Revolution and Independence”.<sup>46</sup> In addition, Turkish newspapers praised the Civil Disobedience Movement which was a unique method of national resistance including boycotting British goods, avoiding paying taxes, and protesting workplaces.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, Aka Gündüz claimed in an article published in *Cumhuriyet* that the method of the civil resistance had a similar character to the Turkish resistance in the sense that Turkish independence was achieved with weapons and active fighting whereas the Indians’ was a unique pattern of resistance without any violence, however, at least as effective as the Turkish path.<sup>48</sup> It can be reasonably concluded that the national war of India was regarded as identical to the Turkish model, thus there were numerous attempts to link its method with the Turkish national war in the name of different motives which was mostly correlated with the resisting against the anti-imperial power.

Another focus of the Turkish press was the partition of India into two states. Evaluations of the partition plan were a bit different from the other stages of the national movement. Partition was more associated with becoming weaker on the brink of independence. Accordingly, Turkish newspapers laid emphasize on the independent and powerful India rather than two separate states, thus it is relevant to note that an independent, unified and united India was a priority at that time.<sup>49</sup> Supporting this, another issue

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<sup>44</sup> **Ulus**, 30 November 1934, p.4; “Müstakil Hindistan Mefkûresi Gittikçe Güçleniyor”, **Cumhuriyet**, 3 January 1930, p.1.

<sup>45</sup> Vedat Nedim, “Devletçilik Milli Kurtuluş Hareketinin Manasına ve Gayesine Muhalef bir Akidedir”, **Hâkimiyeti Milliye**, 29 September 1930, p. 4.

<sup>46</sup> “Hindistan’da Amele ‘Yaşasın İhtilal’ Diye Haykırıyor”, **Cumhuriyet**, 17 January 1930, p. 3.

<sup>47</sup> **Akşam**, 18 February 1932, p. 3.; **Vakit**, 5 April 1931, p.4.; Muharrem Feyzi, “Tuz Mücadelesi”, **Cumhuriyet**, 26 April 1930, p.2.

<sup>48</sup> Gündüz Aka, “Peştemallı Kahraman”, **Cumhuriyet**, 11 September 1931, p. 2.

<sup>49</sup> Halide Edib, “Hintliler Bir Tek Millet Olabilir mi?”, **Tan**, 23 March 1938, p.6.

highlighted in the Turkish press was Hindu-Muslim conflicts all over India. It seems that there was a great concern in Turkish newspapers for Hindu-Muslim conflicts which were interpreted as a barrier to the unity of India, in this regard the conflicts were criticized very directly.<sup>50</sup>

This motivation behind supporting the Indian national movement can be attached to a common sense of affinity to the Eastern civilization. The independence war of India was described as “the awakening of Asia in the footsteps of Turkey”. In this regard, Turkish newspapers emphasized the political awakening of Eastern societies against colonialism which set a revolutionary move for freedom.<sup>51</sup>

### Conclusion

From the Indian standpoint, according to all these newspapers, the abolition of Khilafat can not be unquestioningly classified as a drawback or barrier to the persistence of the relations. Contrary to the general belief, which claims that the interactions came to a standstill after the abolition of Khilafat, bilateral relations showed a continuous character even after 1924. For the Indian newspapers’ part, bilateral relations were persistent and rebuilt with different motivations in accordance with the new dimensions such as the success of the modern nation-state, the stability of independent Turkey, and the modernization process of the republican regime which stood out as a model for India.

In other words, the center of the bilateral relations was shifted to the modern and independent Turkey and its stability and success against the imperialist powers, rather than the reactions to the abolition of Khilafat or religious concerns, Thus, it can be inferred that the Turkish independence struggle and its success as a modern, independent state started to gain more followers in India which is clear from the newspapers of the period. This is, most probably, closely related to the resistance against British rule in the same years. Therefore, the resistance against British hegemony became the common character of the Turkish and Indian national movements. It should be clarified here that there is a sharp division between the two countries that Turkey never

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<sup>50</sup> **Hâkimiyeti Milliye**, 13 August 1930, p.3.; **Vakit**, 18 May 1932, p.2.; “Hindistan’da İşler Yine Karıştı”, **Milliyet**, 24 November 1930, p.2.; “Bombay Alevler İçinde, Kan Gövdęyi Götürüyor”, **Cumhuriyet**, 18 May 1932, p.3.

<sup>51</sup> **Ulus**, 30 November 1934, p.4.

became a colony or dominion in contrast to the Indian colonial period and, only got invaded at the end of the First World War.

Regarding the evaluations and comments in the Turkish newspapers, the independence movement and anti-colonial resistance gained great support in Turkey. It was pictured as a fair resistance to the defense of rights and their land from a colonial power. In other words, the Turkish press showed remarkable sympathy for the Indian national movement, so most of the evaluations in the newspapers were in a manner that justifies the Indian resistance and national movement. In this context, it can be inferred that religious motivations started to dissolve and the center of the relations was substituted with the common rhetoric of “national movement”. To sum up, bilateral relations showed a persistent character regardless of what happened during the period of 1924-1947. In other words, the interactions proceeded with different motivations even after the abolition of Khilafat, which would be more centered around a modern and secular state.

Additionally, the supportive tone of the Turkish press can be defined as beyond expectation for the fact that Turkey had already gone through a shift in Turkish politics and it was supposed to be more-western oriented. Despite this cooperation with Britain in those years, it should be deduced here that this interest and support towards India is not a coincidence at all, in contrast, it is a preferred act of not only the press but also the ruling party. It can be claimed here that India was not overshadowed in Turkish foreign policy regardless of its western-centered character.

In conclusion, it can be inferred that the concerns for Khilafat were replaced by the support for the reforms practiced in Turkey and the inspiration for the new look of Turkey. This was a sign of a shift in the viewpoint of Indian people towards Turkey in a positive way. This uptrend in bilateral relations can be associated with the anti-British feelings in Indian society which also constituted the ideological base of the national movement. This proves that the relations with Turkey were shaped by new drives such as anti-British feelings and nationalism after the abolition of Khilafat. Taking into account the support of Turkey during these years, it was evident that the national resistance of India invoked great sympathy in Turkey which, from two perspectives, also refers to a consistent character of bilateral relations.

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## **INDIA-TÜRKİYE DEFENSE COOPERATION: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES**

*Javed ZAFAR\**

India is the second largest country in population after China and has the second largest military after China. Historically India has fought wars with its neighbors, and still, there are many disputes between them. India is also emerging as an important partner in the Asia Pacific with the US and other regional countries. As the world is changing and the multipolar world is evolving, India needs to more strong in all dimensions of security, including the military. India is also the fifth largest economy in the world and has the potential to emerge as the second and third largest economy in the near future and to protect its trade and economic interests; where needs a strong military but also need global and regional security partners.

Despite its colossal modernization and indigenes program of defense industries, India depends on imports to fulfill its entire defense requirement. India is one of the leading arm importers in the world. Historically, since it's independent India is heavily dependent on Russia in military hardware. India stated weapons imported from USSR in 1950 with lyushin Il-14 cargo transport aircraft and MIG 21. Later India emerged not only leading weapon importer from Russia but became dependent on Russia, from small weapons to aircraft carriers, fighter jets, main battle tanks, and missile and air defense. Cold war security also pushed India to USSR as the main rival Pakistan was in the American camp (Kartik, B and Sameer,P, 2022).

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
Table 1: Types of weapons imported from Russia (1999-2021)

Types of weapons	Weapons/Equipment
Missile systems including missiles and missile launcher and artillery systems	<p><b>1999-2005:</b> R-27ERI-40 R-27ETI-36 R-73E-100 RVV-AE 30, Uran 3M 24 E, Uran 3M 24E combat missile, Uran 3M 24E NH practice missile, Klub missile, combat, Klub missile, practice, Containers for Klub missile, Launchers for RVV AE missile, Club Anti-Ship Missile Launcher</p> <p><b>2006-2011:</b> Air to Air missiles, SAM (3M 24E), Missile system of large calibre 9A52-2t Launching system Smerch MLRS, Transponder Loader Vehicle, 9A52-2T MLRS “Smerch”, 9T234-2T Transport Loading vehicles, SAM (9M38M1), SSM (3M54E), Land attack missiles (3M14E), Missiles R-73E, Anti-ship missiles</p> <p><b>2012-2016:</b> Anti-aircraft guided missiles for Strella 10M (Army), RVV-AE missile, Konkurs Missiles, Invar Missiles, Smerch Rocket Projectiles, 122 mm Rocket projectiles, GRAD (BM)</p> <p><b>2017-:</b> S-400 Triumph missile defence systems, 9M114 Kokon Anti-Tank Guided Missiles, Smerch rocket launcher systems, 3M-54E Klub cruise missiles, R-27R, R-73 and R-77 air to air missiles</p>
Aircraft and helicopters	<p><b>1999-2005:</b> SU-30 ac, Aircraft SU-30 MK1, MIG-21 UM, Kamov-31, MI-17 IV, IL-38</p> <p><b>2006-2011:</b> CSU 30MK1, Su-30MK1, MiG 29K Ship-based fighter aircraft (Navy), MI-17 V5 Medium lift helicopters (Air Force), KA-31 Ship-based helicopter (Navy)</p> <p><b>2012-2016:</b> MiG 29K Ship-based fighter aircraft (Navy), MI-17 V5 Medium Lift Helicopter (Air Force), KA31 Ship-based helicopter (Air Force)</p> <p><b>2017:</b> MiG-29K naval fighter aircraft, Su-30MKI fighter aircraft kits, Ka-31 naval helicopters</p>
Ships, submarines and naval systems	<p><b>1999-2005:</b> Kilo Class Submarine, Krivak class guided missile frigates</p> <p><b>2012-2016:</b> Follow on ships 1135.6 (Navy), INS Vikramaditya (nee Gorshkov) Aircraft Carrier</p> <p><b>2017-:</b> INS Chakra nuclear submarine (on lease)</p>
Battle Tanks	<p><b>1999-2005:</b> Battle tanks (T-90S/T-90SK)</p> <p><b>2006-2011:</b> T-90C, T-90CK, T-90, S &amp; SK tanks</p>

Source: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, SIPRI Arms Transfer database:  
<https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-arms-imports-from-russia/>

India not only imported the majority of weapons from Russia during pre-cold war but even after the collapse of the USSR and its closeness to the US, Russia was still a major weapon supplier to India. As Russia and China strengthen their ties, India is trying to find new ways to diversify its weapon import and reduce its dependency on Russia. Significantly during 2017-2021, 85% of weapons supply came from three countries with Russia (46%), France (27%), and the USA (12%). Israel is India's emerging leading weapon supplier with 12% of the total supply during 2016-20, but the US, during 2018-21 supply US, and replace Israel. Still, despite diversification, 85% of Indian military equipment is from Russia (Pieter D. Wezeman, Alexandra Kuimova and Siemon T. Wezeman, 2021). To diversify and reduce dependency on Russia, India is turning towards Europe, the US, and Israel (Picture: 1). In diversification, there are some compulsions and some geopolitical calculations, like France and Israel. Though India is replacing Russia with western countries, it will again create the same problem of creating or shifting dependency on western countries and Israel. Dependency on western countries will be more costly economically and politically. Russia has regional ambitions but global ones like the US and the west; therefore, India will have to continue to support the western agenda; consequently, India needs to diversify its weapon import and defense partner with more reliable touch.

Picture-1: Source of India Arms Supplies



Source: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/India-s-arms-import-embargo-hits-makers-in-Russia-US-and-Israel>

Aircraft, missiles, air defense system, engines and armed vehicles are major part of Indian defense import


(Picture: 2).

Picture-2: Major area of India Arms imports

## India's major arms imports

(In percent of total)

■ 2002-07 ■ 2008-13 ■ 2014-19



Source: *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*


Source: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/India-s-arms-import-embargo-hits-makers-in-Russia-US-and-Israel>

**Indigenization of Defense Industry:** India has been running self-reliance drive since 1992 and set the target from Self-Reliance Index (SRI) 0.3 to 0.7 SRI up to 2005, but despite many efforts, it could not be achieved (Singh.Bikramdeep,2013). Therefore India launched a new drive, “Atamnirbhar (Self-Reliance),” by a new nationalist government led by Narendra Modi in 2014. Through this drive, India banned the import of many defense equipments, but it will take time to reduce the import dependence significantly. In December 2021 ministry of defense of India announced to ban on 2,851 defense items (Bhalla,Abhishek,2021). In April 2022 Indian government released another list of 100 main defense items. Through these and other lists, India is planning to ban major defense export till 2025 (Banerjee, Ajay, 2022). These lists include artillery guns, missile destroyers, ship-borne cruise missiles, light combat aircraft, light transport aircraft, long-range land-attack cruise missiles, basic trainer aircraft, multi-

barrel rocket launchers, assault rifles, sniper rifles, mini-UAVs, specified types of helicopters, next-generation corvettes, airborne early warning and Control (AEW&C) systems, tank engines and medium-range surface to air missile systems to indigenize (Times of India, 2020 August 9). India is the leading country in nuclear weapons, satellite communication, long and short-range missile, and different type of radars. Despite the banned and indigenization program, many weapons systems need to import because of price and advanced technology. The US and many other advanced countries also import some weapon systems despite being the largest exporters.

**Turkey Defense Industry:** Turkey started to develop its defense industry very late because of historical and political reasons, but it ménage to take some concrete steps in the 1950s. Turkey has specially focused on aircraft manufacture and maintenance. After joining NATO, Turkey's defense industry received foreign aid and supply but also focused on developing domestic weapons. Turkey faced tough challenges after the Cyprus war and an international embargo on procuring foreign weapons. Because of its close relationship with the US and NATO, Turkey was not encouraged to develop its domestic weapon industry at a large level; only some small weapons like rifles were produced under German license. Turkey's defense industry developed multifold in the last 15 years and emerged as the leading exporter of many weapons. Up to mid-2022, Turkey had exported nearly 2 billion USD, and according to the Turkish Exporters' Assembly (TIM) expects, it will cross billion USD by the end of 2022 (Bekdil, E. Burak,2022). In recent history, Turkey emerged as a prominent military drone manufacturer and supplier at the global level. During the Ukraine and Russia war Turkish drone Bayraktar TB2 played an important role against the more powerful Russian army. According to many reports, it is now three years of waiting for supply.

## Top 10 Importers of Turkey's Defense Products From January to September 2019



Source: Turkish Exporters Assembly (TİM)

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Source: <https://newlinesinstitute.org/turkey/turkeys-defense-industry-in-the-covid-age/>

US, Germany, and Oman are the Turkish weapon system's top importers; UAE recently ordered more than 100 drones (Dangwal, Ashish, 2022). Though India was emerging as a good importer of Turkish defense equipment, because of some political misunderstanding, India withdrew from the shipbuilding project, but later India resumed that project. There are seven Turkish defense companies, including Aaselsan, Turkey Aerospace Industries, STM Savunma, BMC Otomotive, and Roketsan A.S are in the global top 100 weapons manufacturers (Daily Sabah, 2020 Aug 17).

**India-Turkey Nuclear Technology Cooperation:** India is established nuclear power in terms of energy and weapons. India is also a close partner of US in nuclear energy and technology. India is currently generating 3 percent of its total energy from nuclear sources and plans to touch 26 percent of total energy consumption by 2052 (McDonald. Alan, 2008). India is operating 18 nuclear reactors. India is also an emerging nuclear weapons state with a variety of weapons, including long-range missile systems. India has trained human resources and local technology in many areas of nuclear energy. Turkey is one of the most non-nuclear states in the world and has not

even a single civilian nuclear reactor despite its efforts in science in the 1970s (IAEA,2022). Russia is cooperating with Turkey to establish nuclear reactors, and China and France are also willing to cooperate further in the future. India and Turkey's cooperation in nuclear energy can open a unique window in their relationship as their geographies can complement each other to increase influence in global affairs. There are some political barriers, especially Pakistan and Turkey's close relations, but they can be managed because Pakistan is not in a position to offer Turkey something significant. Though Pakistan is also a nuclear state, India's close cooperation with the US in nuclear technology gives India an edge.

**Long Range Missile (LRM) Cooperation:** Turkey is a NATO member and dependent on NATO for any threats; therefore, Turkey did not develop a long-range weapons system, including missiles. But internal drift in NATO and emerging security threats even from NATO members, including Greece, challenged Turkey's stability in the security circle. The behavior of leading NATO members, including the US and France, is not so supportive and tilts towards Greece. The sudden exclusion of Turkey from the F35 program indicates Western countries' low confidence and respect level towards Turkey. In any security emergency with Greece, it is unclear how NATO will react. Therefore there is a need to work on a long-range missile program that will reduce Turkish dependence on NATO and give Turkey new status. India is a leading country in the development of a 5000 km range missile system named Agni. It has long-range supersonic missiles, Brahmos, with a range of more than 1500 km. However, Turkey is a signatory of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on long-range missile systems. According to that, signatory countries can keep only a 300 km range missile (Kasapoğlu, Can, 2019). According to the news, regional and global security order, especially after Ukraine war Turkey should come out from this discriminatory control regime. Turkey is struggling to make long-range missiles, and Europe and the US will not like and favor the long-range missile program. China may be a partner, but China West's poor relations are a problem for Turkey, so India may be the best partner in cooperation with long-range missile development. This cooperation will not only benefit Turkey, but India can also emerge as an essential player in Eurasian and African security affairs.

**Cooperation in Drone Technology:** India is facing severe and long-term security challenges with China and Pakistan. China's threat is more serious because of its size in terms of military and economy. Recent clashes in Laddakh indicate that India needs new technology to fight against numerically superior enemies in distant terrain. India has an indigenous drone program but it is not at an advanced level like Turkey. Turkey is running one of the most advanced and successful drones industry. Many recent wars and military conflicts proved the supremacy of Turkey's drones. Especially in the Ukraine war, Turkish drone 'The Bayraktar TB2' single-handedly rattled down Russian superior military hardware. Experts globally praised its performance in recent Nagorno-Karabakh and Ethiopia military conflicts. Recently, Indian technology company DCM Shriram announced in Turkish nonmilitary drone company Zyrone Dynamics (Ergocun, Gokhan, 2021). However, this engagement is essential but not substantial in defense sector. India and Turkey can come together for a joint drone venture in India and Turkey as well. Indian engagement in the Turkish drone sector will allow Turkey to work with one of the largest army in the world. India is working on electronic warfare with different types of radars, and before the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, India supplied many made-in-India radar systems to Armenia, but India's Radar system failed to protect Armenia against Turkish drones. Indian engagement in the Turkish drone industry will help to enhance Indian capability in electronic warfare. India is strengthening its defense cooperation with Armenia, but like Turkey, Armenia's relations are relatively good, and Turkey and India can both enjoy good relations with Armenia.

**Naval Vassals:** Turkey is one of the leading military ship manufacturers in the world. Turkey's defense industry has developed many systems for combat management, Platform track management, Integrated Navigation, and platform management, Torpedo and torpedo countermeasures, and different fire control and radar system. India and Turkey are already cooperating in military shipbuilding. Turkey is manufacturing four fleet support vessels (FCVs) for India; Turkey will also transfer the technology to India to strengthen and reinforce the Indian navy in the future. Recently India launched its made-in-India aircraft carrier, but there are many criticisms about the advancement and quality of the carrier; this means India needs more advanced technology and training (Aljazeera, 2022 September 2). Further cooperating in naval shipbuilding with Turkey

will give India a different opportunity. India is emerging as immense power in global affairs, so India needs a quality and big navy and geographical cooperation. Turkey is also restructuring its strategy for Asia and Asia Pacific. So deep and expanded naval and defense cooperation will give an edge to both countries.

**Small Weapons:** India not only has a big army but its paramilitary forces are also one of the largest in the world. Sometimes many exporters deny supply because of political reasons. Recently Germany and Holland denied supplying India with some important small weapon system on the eve of India's clash with China. Turkey is one of the top importers, including 68 countries of small weapons. In recent history, Turkey emerged as a top small weapon exporter to the US (Daily Sabah, 2022). India and Turkey can make collaboration on small weapons, which can reduce Indian of unreliable West.

**Conclusion:** India and Turkey are both emerging influential poles in the multipolar global order. Both countries belong to different geographies and may complement each other to fulfill their responsibilities and interests in regional and global politics. Though both countries cooperate in defense sectors, it is not significant in amount; therefore, both countries need to take extraordinary steps. Cooperation in naval vessels needs to be continued and expanded. Nuclear cooperation is where both countries can open the door despite international reservations and other political difficulties. India is one of the few countries in the world which has developed medium and long-range missiles, but Turkey is far behind in that, and cooperation in this area may open new doors of cooperation. Drone technology and small weapons are one of the most potent areas of cooperation. Turkey is already building ships for the Indian navy, and as India expands its naval ambition and infrastructure, cooperation between both countries is also wide open.

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## **OTTOMAN-KERALA RELATIONS AN ANALYSIS OF SUFI, POLITICAL, TRADE, AND DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES**

*Saifudheen KUNJU\**

Kerala Muslims always respond accordingly to the global Islamic movements and bear the transnational sensitiveness to the Muslim world. This religious-political consciousness helped them to be connected to the world Islamic changes. They have accepted the hegemony of the Ottoman Caliphate and they did not bother to sacrifice their lives for the cause of Islam and the Caliph. Islam played significant factor to bond the caliphate and people of Kerala, down southern state of India. Kerala Muslim community has been recognizing religious political legitimacy of Ottoman Caliphate of the different parts of the historical eras. Unlike other states of India, Kerala Muslim kept cordial contacts and commercial and diplomatic relations in those periods.

The narrating history of India's freedom struggle is so problematic because of the mindset of regional biasness. Most of the Indian historians focus on the north Indian history narratives and they seem to prioritize north Indian history. Even when they engage in heritage of history of freedom fighters they only rely on stories and anecdotes of northern states of india. Arakkal dynasty the one and only Muslim monarchy of Kerala, Mampuram Sayyid Fazal Thangal whose leadership of religious-political area helped Kerala Muslim community to take firm stand against the colonial era and social inequalities, Khilafath movement of anti British imperialism and print media such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and journals which contributed Muslims awareness in the political and religious fields. These are most significant factors that connected Kerala Muslim community to the Ottoman Caliphate. Even though the caliphate had no direct contact with them in proper way, Kerala Muslims kept contact with the Ottoman Empire

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in a symbolic way. Accepting religious-political authority of the empire made the community connected to prevalent strong political system.

In fact, Muslim influential figures and their own print media has significant role in creating Islamic consciousness and transnational viewpoint among Kerala Muslims. Khilafath movement could also ignite the pan-Islamic consciousness among the Muslims. Through the symbols, other religious centers and institutions like *masjids*, *madrassas* and *maqbaras*, Kerala *ulema* and Muslims' activism functioned properly. They expressed their dedication without any hesitance and participated in the armed struggle against imperialists and colonial power, in that their belief and staunch following to the caliphate and their Islamic concerns caused to associate with world Islamic case. Here this study explores Kerala Muslims' active engagement with the Ottoman Caliphate and presents the heritage of transnational relations through different periods of time.

### **Arakkal Dynasty**

Arakkal dynasty established in 1545 was sole Muslim monarchy in Kerala. This dynasty had enough influence and far reached acceptance in the region. Their political alliance to the Ottoman Caliphate is another significant chapter of Kerala history. Their diplomatic transactions to the Ottoman Empire and correspondences show the strong cordial relationship that existed between both groups. Arakkal dynasty had many political diplomatic engagements with the Ottoman Caliphate. In 1777, Arakkal sultan Ali Raja sent a royal representative to sublime Porte to request military alliance against British army. But the Sultan was not in the position to help the dynasty because of ongoing conflict with Russia (Ozcan, A. 1997). After 2 years in 1780, when Arakkal Beevi sultana was coroneted Sultan Abdul Hamid I sent royal message praising her and commanded to preserve safety and protection of Islam and Muslims in Kerala. In the letter, the caliph said to Beevi that 'she shall never fail to protect Muslims either by word or deed as far as possible' (Kurup, 1973). In the same year Beevi sultana sent two letters to sublime Porte for military assistance the British and Portuguese. These historical documents show us that this Muslim dynasty of Kerala kept significant political and diplomatic relationship with Ottoman Caliphate and recognized the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate.

## Mampuram Sayyid Fazal Thangal

Mampuram Sayyid Fazal Thangal who was staunch anti- British wrote many books on the necessity to be with the Islamic consciousness of supporting the oppressed and steadiness against the injustice. He was one of greatest Muslim leaders has in depth influence within the Muslim community of Kerala. His leadership and charisma impacted in several spheres of Muslims' life in Kerala. His *udathul-umara* and his father SayYid Alavi Thangal's *saiful- bathar* (Bang, 2003) were popular among Kerala Muslims particularly in Malabar region. Mampuram Thangal sent the copy of *saiful- bathar* which was published in Istatnbul to Kerala Muslims secretly. But the British army confiscated that collection of fatwas of Mampuram Thangal. This book was a collection of eight questions' answers in regarding to the engagement of a Muslim to a non- Muslim ruler. This fatwas encouraged Kerala Muslims to fight against the British imperialism. As the representative from the Kerala Muslims, Thangal continued his support and concern to the independence from the foreign invasion and freedom from the oppressors. His attempts to pursue his political and religious leadership even after the exile from kerala by the British government was to such extend very successful. There is a letter from vice counsel at Jidda to the political agent of Aden that dated 31<sup>th</sup> October 1856 shows his eagerness to the cause of Kerala Muslims. In this letter the vice counsel says:

“The influence of this man (Fadl Tangal) among his co-religionists, especially the pilgrims from Malabar Coast and Hadramouth, can scarcely be credited. These classes are the most fanatical of Mohamedan and I am convinced that his power for good or evil is rather increased than curtailed by his residence here especially when it is borne in mind that we have at least 2000 pilgrims annually arriving from Malabar coast, all of whom consider it incumbent on them to pay their respect to the Syed and receive his benediction; that the most unbounded confidence is placed in his words, that therefore any desire manifested by him would be almost certain to be carried out if possible on their return to their country” (Correspondence on Mopla Outrages in Malabar (CMO), 1855).

In 1852 he was exiled to Arabia by the British alleging anti-governmental activism. Fazal Thangal proclaimed himself ruler on behalf of the Ottoman Caliphate in Zafar. Two powerful tribes al-Gharahs and al-

Kathiris, supported him in ruling Zafar. Sayyid Fazal could enjoy strong position in Zafar on the behalf of the caliphate (Ilias, 2011). In 1880 he became main adviser of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and later his minister. Thangal was known as Fazal Pasha in Ottoman Caliphate. He could influence Sultan's policies towards Arab- Islamic world and Islam itself. In august 1880, Sultan Abdul Hamid II awarded Sayyid Fazal the rank of *Vezir* and kept him in Istanbul (Buzpinar, 1993). Sultan could benefit from Sayyid Fazal's extensive knowledge of Arab affairs. He pursued the Sultan to expand into southern Arabia and red sea. Sayyid Fazal Thangal used to refer Sultan Abdul Hamid II as the caliph of Islam and praised his rule. In his *Tanbih al-Uqala* he quoted two traditions about the necessity of obedience to the Caliph: whoever despises the sultan is despises by God, whoever betrays the sultan is betrayed by God" (Buzpinar, 1993). Sayyid Fazal encouraged pan-Islamic idea of the Sultan. He argued for Islamic unity to protect Muslim lands from foreign interferences. In 1900 he took his last breath. He was the torching figure to enlighten the pan Islamic approach of Sultan Abdul Hamid II with prominent scholar Jamaluddin Afghani. Azmi Ozcan, Tufan Buzpinar and Anne K. Bang elaborated the role of contributions to the Ottoman Caliphate and his political life.

### **Khilafath movement and Kerala Muslims**

The Khilafath Movement was the result of strong transnational association of Indian Muslims mixed up with the consciousness of independence from the British imperialism. In 1911 Italian invasion on Libya caused strong reactions in Kerala, especially Malabar region, the predominantly Muslim majority territories. While Indian national congress leaders took the Khilafath Movement as an anti- colonial struggle, Indian Muslims observed it as religious duty to participate in the freedom struggle. They thought it was their duty to protect the Ottoman Caliphate and preserve the holy places and maintain the stability of the Empire. The District Magistrate C.A Innes reported that Muslims organized forty days' continuous prayers in 1912 at Perinthalmanna Mosque in malappuram district for the cause of Caliphate In 1920 (P. Salahudheen, 2007). The first Khilafath committee was formed in Kerala under the leadership of Hidros Kunhikoya Thangal. By the 1920 June 20 around 200 Khilafath committees were formed across kerala (P. Salahudheen, 2007). In 1920 april 25, Khilafath committee convened a conference. *Tarke-muwalat*, fatwas of

central Khilafath committee translated into Malayalam and was distributed to local Khilafath committee and mosques. There were some important resolutions were presented such as:

1. It is unlawful to serve in the British army
2. It is unlawful to join government service
3. It is unlawful to pay taxes
4. Muslims should boycott all government aided institutions
5. Every recipient should relinquish all honorary ranks and titles awarded by the government” (Maulawi, 1985)

On 18<sup>th</sup> August 1920 Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Shaukat Ali addressed a massive conference of 20,000 people and they could collect 2500 rupees for Khilafath fund. In that conference, Maulana Shaukat Ali opined that “If you are strong and capable, then it is your bounden duty so long as you Musalman breathe, to fight the unjust King, the unjust government that proved to be an enemy to your faith and to your God. If you are weak, then it is incumbent for you to go, migrate to another country” (P. Salahudheen, 2007).

On 4<sup>th</sup> October 1922 Muslim Podujana Sabha held a meeting at Calicut beach under the leadership of Qazi Attakoya Thangal. In the meeting they decided to inform Gazi Abdul Majid Khan the new Caliph of their happiness and celebrate the victory of caliphate over Greeks (Parappil, 1994). "In Malabar, the Muslims are in a jovial mood because of the victory of Turkey in Asia minor. Besides special prayers in mosques, ornamental lamps were lit in all shops in Calicut city' (Malayalam Manorama, 1922). Active workers of Khilafath movement and soldiers of Variyan Kunnath Kunjahmad Haji used Turkey caps with crescent and khaki shirts and full trousers. Special prayers were conducted at mosques in Kerala for the cause of ottoman Khilafath's victory. A notice issued by P.Moideen Koya, who was state secretary of Khilafath committee dated on 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1923, criticized Muslims who lived in luxurious life style while their brothers suffered in Smirna. This notice exhorted Muslims to pray for Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his army during the Friday congregations (Robert L. Hardgrave, 1977). Another request by P. Husain, who was joint secretary of state Khilafath committee asked to contribute to the plan of giving an airplane as gift to Kemal Pasha (A request to Kerala Muslims (malayalam), 1998). A resolution of same district Khilafath committee informed Muslims about the succession of Abdul Majid Khan as the new khalifa of the Caliphate and it

requested to all local Qazis to include his name in the Friday sermons (Parappil, 1994).

Another peculiarity of the Khilafath committee was that there was a cooperation of Hindu Muslim community in their freedom struggle. There were many non-Muslim leaders on for front of the committee. For the Kerala Muslims, freedom from British imperialism meant stability of Ottoman Empire and their sustainability of their religious political authority. Kerala province of Indian subcontinent was excluded from the yoke of the Mughal Empire. All historical documents show that the religious- political obedience of Kerala Muslims was towards the Ottoman Caliphate. Throughout the history, Kerala Muslims kept this political view. As being of part of transnational society, they were keen observers of the global Islamic changes. Financial and physical help to the Ottoman Caliphate were unconditional. The donations which were collected by Khilafath committees and leaders of Kerala Muslims in different times show sincerity of their firm stance to the Islamic faith and its institutions and nationalistic mentality. Kerala Muslims collected the funds and donated to the Red Crescent Society and the Indian Mission under Dr. Ansari which was sent to caliphate during the Balkan war (Salahudheen, 2006).

Muslims dedicated their *Eid* festivals, *Zakat* and *Miladunnabi* to the Ottoman Caliphate. They collected funds for Khilfath soldiers who suffered in Smirna in the wave of ottoman Greek war (Resolution of Kerala Ulema Sangam (KUS) Conference at Ottappalam., 1921). This support and anger can be seen in E. Moidu Moulavi, who was the secretary of the Kerala *Ulema* Conference: "All are aware of the fact that our rulers, the British and their allies fought unjustly and unlawfully against the Sulthan of Turkey, our *Kalifa* who had been for the past several centuries protecting our sacred religion as well as holy places like Mecca, Madina, Baithul Muqadis, Bagdad, Karbala Najf etc. sanctified by our religion, wrested those places from His Majesty and divided them amongst themselves and their allies. They have done all these with the wicked intention of wiping out from the face of the world the religion of Islam which stands in opposition to Christianity. We of course consider our religion to be dearer than our lives. Is it possible for any Muslim that has the best '*Iman*' (faith) in him to help in any way a Government that tries to steal in and cunningly pull our hearts after having charmed us by means of smiles and sweet words? I believe that

every Muslim having the least Islamic virtue in him will answer this question in the negative” (Mangad, 2021).

Messages of Khilafath committee and the *Muthafiqa* fatwa signed and issued by 500 *ulema* were conveyed to Kerala villages through the pamphlets issued by the central Khilafath committee. The resolution of Karachi Khilafath conference was translated to Malayalam and circulated throughout Kerala especially in Malabar region. Many Urdu pamphlets like *Nusrathul Islam*, *Taramai Khilafath*, *Dard-i- Khilafath* and *Muhimmathul Mu'mineen* famous work of Abul Kalam Azad which translated by Aminummantekath Pareekutty Musliyar, who was the Secretary of Tanur regional Khilafath committee into Malayalam were spread out to Muslim areas. In this work by quoting Quran and Hadith, Azad tried to prove that British were the enemies of Islam and a Muslim who support and cooperate with them was a *fasiq*. Azad asserted that the Ottoman Caliphate was the continuation of *Khilafah al-rashida* and therefore each and every Muslim must obey and recognize them as the sole authority of Islam (Mangad, 2021)

After pointing out the pathetic situation of Smirna, Moidu Moulavi suggested Muslims collect Zakat and send to the Ottoman Caliphahte. 41 prominent Muslim scholars of Kerala signed this resolution (Maulawi, 1985). The Khilafath Patrika published an article under the title of British government and Indian Muslims. With powerful words, the journal criticized the british: "A government that unhesitatingly trifles with their conscience and throw overboard their own solemn promises and assurances, who put dust in our eyes and made us tools with which to destroy our own religion and religious head. Is it with such government that we should cooperate? If even a drop of sacred blood of those veteran ancestors who sacrificed their lives and worked unselfishly for the establishment of Islam, is running in your veins, how can you co-operate with the government, which is now proved beyond doubt to be the bitterest enemy of Islam” (Khilafath Pathrika, 1921).

Although tremendous oppositions had placed in Kerala, there were some exceptional incidents. The approach towards the Caliphate was not monolithic. There were some Muslim scholars who tried to justify their loyalist attitude by arguing that the British government was not directly in war against the Ottoman Caliphate. In 1914 a group of Muslim scholars gathered at Himayath sabha Hall in Calicut and decided to send a telegram to

the Ottoman caliph requesting him not to fight the British army and they requested all mosques committees to conduct special prayers for the British victory (Parappil, 1994). Another interesting incident was that on 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1921, a group of the British loyalist *ulema* under the leadership of Thattangara Kuttiamu Musliyar assembled in Ponnani and published a treatise in Arabi-Malyalam entitled *Mahaqul Khalafath ala Ismil Khilafath* (the truth about the Rebellion in the name of Khilafath). In this writing, they argued that it is compulsory for a Muslim to obey the government in authority. They clearly viewed that: “though the British has been ruling India for two centuries, it has not caused any trouble to Muslims, nor it has prevented *Kaffirs* from embracing our religion and if any *Kaffir* objects to such conversion, the government takes action favourable to Muslims in such cases. Hence this 'non-cooperation' is a capital sin and is as obnoxious a sin as murder by poison or *sahr* (witchcraft)” (Mangad, 2021).

Criticizing this pro- British tract, E.Moidu Moulavi and K.M Moulavi wrote a critique titled *Da'wathul Haq* both in Malayalam and Arabi-Malayalam, on this account the former was arrested (Maulawi, 1985). *Nadil Masmoi ila Ma'nal Khilafath Kama Hiyal-Mashuri* (a call to those who wish to know the meaning of Khilafath) a pro- British fatwa of K.M. Adullah Kutty Musliyar stated that “the Khilafath that existed in Turkey was only kingship and the destruction of such a Khilafath would not cause any harm to the Muslims of the world” (Mangad, 2021). But these fatwas could not alter the popular Muslim attitude towards to the British imperialism.

## **Media**

Kerala Muslim Community's eagerness reflected in various manifestations of the supports to the caliphate. They bravely published anti imperialistic ideas and assured their wholehearted cooperation to the caliphate. While northern Kerala Muslims participated in active armed struggle, most of the Muslim intellectuals from south Kerala found out their way of cooperation in publishing journals, magazines and newspapers to disclose the world news particularly news related to caliphate. Many magazines were exclusively for the ottoman news and empire's regional developments. These intellectual contributions of Kerala Muslims accelerated common Muslim s' awareness and interest in the international politics. Binary of orthodox and modernity among the Kerala Muslims did not matter in the participation of anti-imperialist approach and full support to

the Islamic cause. Through different media that Kerala Muslims used to convey their messages to the Muslim mass traditionally like print media, religious classes and public speeches at nights.

In 1900, Turkey-Egyptian boundary issue and in 1920s Anglo-Russian treaty had been major issues of Muslim publications of the time. The circulations of newspapers and other print media that produced enough insightful views and messages of the Khilafath committee and other individual publications helped the Kerala Muslim community to interact with their remote religious and political sovereignty. These print media and their active involvement in the Khilafath struggle across Kerala region prepared the common people to engage actively in the freedom struggle. In spite of less number of educated people within the community as subscribers of the print media, all views and news of significant transitions of the global arena were read out to many others. The news was used to spread out all over the village by even single subscriber of the newspaper. This was how the Muslim community kept their channel of association open. The Simon Commission has observed: "Vernacular paper can be and are read to illiterate villagers by their literate fellows in towns, villages, railway carriages, public meetings and so on" (Indian Statutory Commission , 1928).

Many journals that published by Muslims like Kerala Chandrika (Kollam), Malabar Islam, Khilafath Patrika (Cochin), Muslim (Alleppy), Turkey Samacharam, Muslim Sahakari played its role in generating pan-Islamic awareness across Kerala region. And their unique interest in global Islamic affairs led to increasing circulation of these journals especially when the Ottoman Empire faced crises like Graco-Turkish war of 1897, the Balkan war of 1911-13. Through the Arabi- Malayalam literature, (the unique language Kerala Muslims created to sustain their religious percept to Arabic language and anti-British imperialistic social engagement) they spread Caliphate history and the caliphs' benevolence to the world Muslims.

In 1909 Sanaullah Makthi Thangal started Turkey Samacharam from Cochin. It was an evening newspaper in which he published articles dealing with social, religious and political reforms of the Ottomans. Malabar Islam started by Abdul Hamid Haji from Cochin, dealt Caliphate news exclusively. Salahul Ikhwan an Arabi-Malayalam journal published by C.Saidali Kutty Master from Tirur was another newspaper in which many Caliphate related articles were published during the time span of 1899-1919. Even Muslims

gathered condemning the Italian aggression in Calicut and other places of Malabar in 1912. Mentioning this protest, West Coast Spectator wrote:

We are afraid that a certain section of Muslim community is creating an unnecessary fuss about Turkish war. This section seems to think that Turkey deserves their allegiance much more than any power, we do not say, Great Britain. When speaking about Turkey and war, they adopt a spirit and attitude certainly not advisable. In this town [Calicut] there are not wanting people to incite the religious passions of illiterate militant Moplas. Our office is daily besieged by mussalman anxious to hear the latest war news. The other day a Mopla has been asking us whether there are any Italian or Bulgarians in Calicut city, so that they may be taught a lesson; yet another calmly told us that a *Jihad* was expected sooner or later and then they would all march on to Isthambul killing *kaffirs* on the way... They expect Britain to step in and stop war. Menon, M. G. (1989).

The print media owned by Muslims gave extensive coverage to details of the war and they condemned the infidels' aggression on the Muslim lands. Muslim publishers expressed their concern both in prose and poetry about Caliphate affairs. In 1914, reporting developments of Khilafath committee Malabar Islam wrote that: "At Chirayinkizhu, hearing the speeches of Vakkom Abdul Quader and G.P. Nayar about the plight of Muslims due to war in Turkey, the Muslim ladies donated their ear rings to the Turkish relief fund with the pledge that they would keep their ears ornament free till death as a mark of sympathy with the toiling Muslims in Turkey" (P.A. Sayed Mohamed, 1969). Through the various means of the expressing their concerns, Kerala Muslims considered it a religious duty to struggle for the Khilafath 'till the last Muslim is done away with' (Khilafath patrika, 1921). Kerala Chadrika published an article entitled 'Muhammedans and Khilafa', a metaphor taken from Indian epics Rakshasa Mareejan to describe the cruelty of the British Government (Kerala Chandrika, 1921).

### **Conclusion**

Kerala Muslim community has always showed the dynamic transnational relationship. Islam came to Kerala at the age of the Prophet Muhammad. Since then, the legacy of international connection of Kerala

Muslims was marvelous. As has been the legitimate Caliphate of world Muslims, the Ottoman Empire's influence reached out Kerala Muslims. They recognized the Caliphate's legitimacy and accepted its religious-political authority. Though the Caliphate had no direct contact with them in proper way, Kerala Muslims were ready to dedicate their life to the cause of the Caliphate. By the different periods of time, Kerala Muslim community sustained this approach to the Caliphate. Arakkal dynasty's diplomatic relationship shows us the significant chapter of the cordial relation with the Ottoman Empire. Mampuram Sayyid Fazal Thangal is another glorious episode of powerful connection of Kerala Muslims to the Caliphate. Legendary incidents of days of the Khilafath Movement and sacrifices of lives of Kerala Muslims remind how they dedicated their submission to the cause of the Islamic Caliphate. Role of their ulema and print media were undeniable in the history of India's freedom struggle and their pan-Islamic consciousness. Still Kerala Muslims keeps vibrant religious-political connections with Islamic world particularly with fresh tremendous transformations that happen in new Turkey.

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# CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC SIMILARITIES BETWEEN TURKISH AND HINDI-URDU

*Quabiz MOHAMMAD\**

## **Introduction**

Hindi-Urdu, the common language of India, belongs to an Indo-Aryan branch of the Indo-European family of languages. Hindi, the official language of India, is written from left to right in Devanagari script, and Urdu, based on the Persian-Arabic alphabet, is written from right to left. Both languages are very similar in phonology, morphology, syntax and grammar.

Hindi is spoken mainly in northern and central part of India. It is the state language of the following Indian States: Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh and Himachal Pradesh. Urdu, which emerged and developed in the Indian subcontinent is very similar to Hindi, spoken in northern India, especially in places where Muslims are living in the majority. The interrelated Hindi-Urdu share almost the same basis and are very similar to each other. Therefore, both languages are defined as sister languages. However, they are different in terms of vocabulary and writing styles. Hindi-Urdu are one of the two standard written forms of the Hindustani language. Grierson (1903) also describes Hindustani as the only language with two specific forms, Urdu and Hindi. Words from other languages have been entered into Hindi-Urdu. For example, mostly words from Arabic, Persian and Turkish have been documented in Urdu, later from English and other languages. Similarly, words from Persian, Arabic, Turkish and especially Sanskrit entered Hindi.

Hindi originated from Sanskrit, while Urdu is a mixed language consisting of different languages such as Sanskrit and Turkish, especially Arabic and Persian. In fact, the word "Urdu" has a similar meaning to the Turkish word "Army" (armed forces).

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Urdu is the official language of Pakistan. Urdu is the recognized language under schedule 8 of the constitution of India and the official language of Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (Nomani et. al, 2020). It is recognized as an "additional official language" in some states of India naming; Bihar, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Telangana, as well as a "second official language" in other states (Wasey, 2014). Until 1947, Urdu remained the official language of India along with Hindi but after independence Urdu lost its status as an official language. Currently, Hindi is the official language and English is the associate official language of India. Hindi is widely spoken in India and by a certain segment of society in countries like, South Africa, Mauritius, Trinidad, Fiji, Guyana, Bangladesh, Yemen and Uganda. Some groups also speak Urdu in the United Arab Emirates, Great Britain, the United States and Canada.

In India, where there are hundreds of local languages and dialects along with Hindi-Urdu, the Turkish language also has an ancient history. The Turkic language, the largest branch of the Altaic language family, is a language that starts from the Arctic Ocean and extends to India, China and Europe. Turkish is one of the most ancient languages in world history and the largest of the Altaic languages in terms of both spread and number of speakers. The oldest written documents of Turkish which can be traced back to the 7<sup>th</sup> century, show that Turkish is spoken by approximately 200 million people in 10,955,840 areas today (Akar, 2005: 36). Turkish is the most common and the most spoken language of the Altaic branch with nearly thirty dialects (Akar, 2005: 19). Turkish is an agglutinative language belonging to the Ural-Altaic language family. It spread widely from Turkey to Mongolia, Mongolia to the Balkans, China to Eurasia and Anatolia to Iran. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the famous Turcologist A. H. Vambery saw the expansion of the spread of the Turkish language during his travels. He said that a person who knows the Turkish language could travel from the Balkans to Manchuria very easily because the most valid language in this geography is Turkish (Akalin, 2009, 196: 197).

### **Language and Culture**

Language is an essential tool for communication. Ever since human civilization developed, people communicate through languages for various reasons. Language is not only a link to connect with people in the same community or the same geography but also a link to establish contact between people in other communities and geographies. Language is a medium of communication so that people can create verbal and written dialogues with each other.

People convey their feelings and thoughts to others through language and carry the past to the present and the present to the future. When we look at history, we find that language played a vital role in connecting people from one continent to other. Language has been human beings' most effective communication tool from the past to present. Language is the means of communication, which can be defined in many ways. According to Ergin (1998: 3) language is a natural means of communication between people, a living being that has its own laws and develops only within the framework of these laws, a system of secret agreements whose foundations were made at unknown times and a social institution woven from sounds. Language is a means of understanding, communication and a cultural transmitter. People transfer the culture of society from one generation to another by communicating through languages.

Talking about language, the first thing that comes to our mind is undoubtedly culture. Culture is an integral part and transmitter of language. It symbolizes society, the sum of its material, moral and national values. Hence, language and culture nourish each other. When we look at the relationship between language and culture, we encounter the fact that language is the most important protector and transmitter of culture. Culture and language are two important elements that are interconnected and inseparable. As both are so intertwined with each other, it is almost impossible to think them separately. According to Jiang (2000: 328), language is the body; culture is blood. Without culture, the language dies; without language, culture cannot be formed. Language and culture are interrelated and can not be measured separately. Language and culture are an important tool that makes a society and reflects the culture and lifestyle of that society. In short, culture is the whole of the material and spiritual characteristics that a society produces and transfers to other generations in the historical process, and it is unique to a society and reflects the religion, lifestyle and way of thinking of that society (Çakır, 2011: 2).

### **Turkey-India Relations**

Relations between Turkey and India goes back to ancient times, as it is well known that Turks have migrated from Central Asia to many regions of the world. Undoubtedly, India come under one of these regions. Along with Saka, Kushan, White Huns, Mahmud of Ghazni, Babur and other rulers have ruled India. Turkish domination in India started during the reign of Mahmud of Ghazni and lasted until the British invasion. India, which was under this long-term domination, was greatly influenced by the Turks in terms of language, culture, literature and architecture. The influence of the Turkish language is mostly seen in Urdu and Hindi in India and the influence of its

culture is seen mainly in its architectural works. Architectural works built by the Turks in the Indian region are Red Fort, Qutub Minar, Jama Masjid, Humayun Tomb, Safdarjung Tomb, Buland Darvaza (Door of Victory), Panch Mahal, Mecca Masjid, Taj Mahal, Agra Fort, Fatehpur Sikri Fort and many palaces, mosques, shrines and minarets are the result of cultural interaction.

The presence of Turks who ruled in Indian territories can be traced to 8<sup>th</sup> centuries. During this era, the Turks left many magnificent works in this region. These architectural works show not only in certain regions in India but also in other regions. Based on this, it can be argued that the dominance of the Turks was effective almost all over India.

When we look at the magnificent architectural works of Turks in India, it is easy to understand that they wanted to make it as their "homeland". They have no thoughts of burning down and plundering the lands of India. On the contrary, they tried to make this new home more livable (Demirel, 2007: 96). The main developments in the works of Turkish architects in India were during the Mughal period and the Pre-Mughal Delhi Turkish Sultanate. During the Mughal period, the periods of Akbar Shah and his grandson Shah Jahan had great importance. In addition to the works that are magnificent examples of Central Asian Turkish architecture, most of the works that reflect the magnificence that we can call the peak of art were built by Shah Jahan. In particular, these two Sultans built many palaces, castles, madrasas, water tanks and wells (Uçmaz, 2013: 56). The reign of Shah Jahan is known as the golden age of architecture in India. Many monumental works related to the empire, such as palaces, castles, gardens, and mosques were made in this period. (Macun, 1990: 355).

Along with the architect, the cultural and literary interactions are also seen in idioms and proverbs, tales, traditions, customs, habits and celebrations in both countries. There are even too many similarities in both countries' celebrations and marriage ceremonies. These similarities between Turks and Indians are not limited to culture and architecture but are also seen in both languages.

### **Linguistic Similarities between Turkish and Hindi-Urdu**

The existence of Turks in Indian geography started with the Saka period and continued with Kushan and Akhuns as well as Mahmud of Ghazni, Mughals and other Turkish emperors. Since ancient times, Turks and Indians have influenced each other through culture and language. The long-lasting Turkish dominance in the Indian region also affected the language. The administrative language of the Turks in India was Persian. Although Persian was the official language of the state. Turkish was widely spoken in the palace especially by the elite Turks (See Bilkan,


2004: 163-166). Even if Turkish was not accepted as an official language in Indian geography, it has always maintained its importance in the palaces of Turkish sultans and the regions under the rule of Muslim kings. The presence of many Turkish words in both Urdu and Hindi is a result of this importance" (Bilkan, 1998: 17). There are thousands of common words of Persian and Arabic origin between Turkish and Urdu-Hindi. Dictionary and academic research have been done on these common words. (See Hamid, 2006; Khattak, 1987; Mohammad, 2020). Some common words used in high frequency are kalem (pen), kitap (book) etc. There are many words that belong to different categories, such as names of food and beverage, names of fruit and vegetable, name of clothes and household goods, names of the place, names of flowers, names related to kinship, names of animals, names of parts of the body, names of diseases, names of colour, names of spices, names related to law, military service, religion, life, death etc. are similar in these languages. The common vocabulary between these languages are the results of language and cultural interaction. These languages share common idioms and proverbs. For example, Turkish: *Bugünün işini yarına bırakma*. Hindi-Urdu: *Aaj ka kaam kal pe na daal<sup>latin</sup>*. Turkish: *Bir elin sesi çıkmaz*. Hindi-Urdu: *Ek haant se tali nahi bajti<sup>latin</sup>*. Turkish: *bir taşla iki kuş*. Hindi-Urdu: *Ek teer se do nishana<sup>latin</sup>*. Turkish: *Kan ter içinde kalmak*. Hindi-Urdu: *khoon paseena ek karna<sup>latin</sup>*. Common fairy tales are also between these languages. For more examples, see Özenç, 2019; Uysal, 2006; Mohammad, 2020).

There are also common similarities between Turkish and Hindi-Urdu in terms of grammar, syntax, sentence structure, verb conjugations, adjectives, adverbs, predicates, conjunctions, prepositions, infinitive suffixes, tenses and idiomatic expressions.


### 1. Grammar and Structure of Sentence

There are surprising similarities between Turkish and Hindi-Urdu languages in terms of grammar and structure of sentence. In Hindi-Urdu, as in Turkish, the subject comes first, followed by the object and finally the verb. Along with Urdu and Turkish, Persian syntax, sentence structure, possessive and adjective structures are similar to each other (Türkmen, 1986: 9).

For example, in Turkish: *Ben kitap okuyorum*.




Hindi-Urdu:




As it is shown above, there are similarities in sentence order and verb conjugation in both languages. While there is only one gender in Turkish, whereas Hindi-Urdu has two genders.


For example, in Turkish: Ayşe/Ahmet yemek yiyor.



Hindi-Urdu:



Hindi-Urdu:



While there is no grammatical gender in Turkish, there is no gender difference, as is shown in the example of “*Ayşe ve Ahmet yemek yiyor*”. However, in Hindi-Urdu, the verb conjugation is “*rahi hai*” for Ayşe and “*raha hai*” for Ahmet. While the *rahi* suffix is used for the feminine and the *raha* suffix is used for the masculine gender. Only the last vowel changes in the suffixes *rah(a)* and *rah(i)*. It can be averred; changes are made in both languages according to their vowels.

## 2. Infinitive

In Hindi-Urdu, the infinitive suffix is used as (“نا” – na) after the root of the verb, while in Turkish, this suffix is used as -mak/-mek according to the (front and back) vowel harmony. When the infinitive suffix in these two languages is removed, the verb root is used as an imperative mood for the singular person and its conjugation for the plural person is the same in both languages. In addition, there are three different forms of the imperative mood in Turkish and the same forms are also present in Hindi-Urdu. For example, write (yaz-likh<sup>latin</sup>/ लिख/ لکھ), write (likho<sup>latin</sup> /yazın/ لکھو), write (yazınız/ لکھو). See the example of the infinitive suffixes:

Singular: yaz → (likh<sup>latin</sup>/ लिख/ لکھ, likho<sup>latin</sup>/ लिखो/ لکھو) yazmak  
(likhna<sup>latin</sup>/ लिखना/ لکھنا)

git → (ja<sup>latin</sup>/जा/ جا, jao<sup>latin</sup>/जाओ/ جاؤ) → gitmek (jana<sup>latin</sup>/जाना/ जानا)

Plural/ formal: yazınız → yazın → (likhiye<sup>latin</sup>/ लिखिए/ لکھیے) → yazmak (likhna<sup>latin</sup>/ लिखना/ लکھना)

gidiniz → gidin → (jaiye<sup>latin</sup>/जाइए/ जाईے) → gitmek (jana<sup>latin</sup>/जाना/ जाना)

In Hindi-Urdu, imperative of *yaz* (write) is used in both ways “likh or likho (लिखो/ लکھو)”.

**3. Suffix That Makes Noun Adjectives:** The suffix “kâr”, which is of Persian origin (makes nouns adjectives and creates names of professions) in Turkish, is the same in Hindi-Urdu. See the example that makes nouns adjectives and creates names of professions: In Hindi/Sanskrit, and there are some words named “chitrakar” and “kalakar”, words with the same suffixes are present in Turkish, “sanatkâr”. Words like Turkish: “günahkâr”/Hindi-Urdu: “gunahgar”, Turkish: “perhizkâr”/Hindi-Urdu: “parhezgar”, Turkish: “sitemkâr”/Hindi-Urdu: “sitamgar”, Turkish: “bekâr”/Hindi-Urdu: “bekar”, Turkish: “riyakâr”/ Hindi-Urdu: “riyakar”, Turkish: “talepkâr”/Hindi-Urdu: “talabgar” (Mohammad, 2020: 50).

**4. Suffix added to Noun/Profession:** The suffix – *çi* (*chi*), which is added to the noun and makes the name of the profession in Turkish is also used in Hindi-Urdu.

For example, *taklitçi* is used for imitators in Turkish and *nakalchi* is used in the same context in Hindi-Urdu. Similarly, words like *aşçı: bawarçi, sanatçi, davulcu: tabalçi* which take same suffix. Many suffixes derive from *-çi* in Urdu-Hindi (Mohammad, 2020: 5).

**5. -baz Suffix:** The other suffix between Turkish and Hindi-Urdu is the Persian suffix "*-baz*". This suffix means "one who plays" in Persian. In Turkish, this suffix is used as "*cambaz*" and has the same meaning. In Hindi-Urdu, this suffix has usually used the meaning "one who can do or make". There are many words that end with the suffix *-baz* in Turkish. Similarly, there are many words between Turkish and Hindi-Urdu that end with the suffix *-baz*".

For example, Turkish: *cambaz* (one who play with oneself) Hindi-Urdu: *jaanbaz* (*jaan par khel jane wala* <sup>latin</sup> / *جان پر खेल जाने वाला* / *جانے والے پر کھ* والا), Turkish: *şahbaz* (brave man) Hindi-Urdu: *shahbaz* (*bahadur aadmi* <sup>latin</sup> / *بہادر آدمی* / *آدم (عہدہ دار)*). There are also words that are not common in both languages but have the same suffix. For example, Turkish: *kumarbaz*, Hindi-Urdu: *sattebaz* (*सट्टेबाज़* / *سٹے باز*) Turkish: *hilebaz*, Hindi-Urdu: *dagabaz* (*دغا باج* / *دغا باز*) Turkish: *sihirbaz*, Hindi-Urdu: *kalabaz* (*کلا باج* / *باز کلا*) Hindi-Urdu: *dhokebaz* (*دھوکے باج* / *دھوکے باج*) *baithakbaz* - (*بٹھک باج* / *بٹھک باج*), Hindi-Urdu: *mukkebaz* / *مککے باج* / *مککے باز*, *ballebaz* (*بالے باج* / *بالے باج*), *nashebaz* (*نشے باج* / *نشے باج*).

**6. -dâr Suffix:** Another similarity between Turkish and Hindi-Urdu languages are *-dâr* suffix. The suffix "dar" is added to the end of the word, giving the meaning of "owner or possessor".

For example, Turkish: *dindar*, Hindi-Urdu: *din-dar* <sup>latin</sup> / *دین-دار* / *دیندار*, Turkish: *hükümdar*, Hindi-Urdu: *hukmdar* <sup>latin</sup> / *حکم-دار* / *حکم دار*, Turkish: *alemdar*, Hindi-Urdu: *alamdar* <sup>latin</sup> / *آلام-دار* / *آلام دار*, Turkish: *hazinedar*, Hindi-Urdu: *khazanadar* <sup>latin</sup> / *خزانہ-دار* / *خزانہ دار*, Turkish: *mihmandar*, Hindi-Urdu: *mehmandar* <sup>latin</sup> / *مہمان-دار* / *مہمان دار*, Turkish: *hissedar*, Hindi-Urdu: *hissedar*, Turkish: *tahsildar*, Hindi-Urdu: *tehsildar* <sup>latin</sup> / *تہسیل-دار* / *تہسیل دار*, Turkish: *berhudar*, Hindi-Urdu: *barkhurdar* <sup>latin</sup> / *برخوردار* / *برخوردار*, Turkish: *havadar*, Hindi-Urdu: *havadar* <sup>latin</sup> / *ہوا-دار* / *ہوا دار*, Turkish: *iktidar*, Hindi-Urdu: *iqtidar* <sup>latin</sup> / *اقتدار* / *اقتدار*, Turkish: *namdar*, Hindi-Urdu: *namdar* <sup>latin</sup> / *نام-دار* / *نامدار*, Turkish: *serdar*, Hindi-Urdu: *sardar* <sup>latin</sup> / *سر-دار* / *سر دار*, Turkish: *bidar*, Hindi-Urdu: *bedar* <sup>latin</sup> / *بے-دار* / *بے دار*, Turkish: *didar*, Hindi-Urdu: *didar* <sup>latin</sup> / *دی-دار* / *دیدار*, Turkish: *dildar*, Hindi-Urdu: *dildar* <sup>latin</sup> / *دیل-دار* / *دیدار*, Turkish: *zimamdar*, Hindi-Urdu:

*zimedat*<sup>latin</sup> / *ज़िम्मेदार* / دار ذمّے Words that are not common in Turkish and Hindi-Urdu but have the same suffix: *gaddar, talabdar, candar, haberdar*.

**7. -ki Suffix:** “Ki” is the suffix that creates adjectives denoting place, time and existence by adding the suffix to the words of noun root. It is used with the case suffix “-de” by deriving adjectives that indicate location. This suffix is also used as a genitive suffix or in the sense of belonging.

For example, in Turkish: *bugünkü parti*, Hindi-Urdu: *aaj ki party*<sup>latin</sup> / *आज की पार्टी* / *پارٹی آج ک*, Turkish: *bu yılki kazanç*, Hindi-Urdu: *Is saal ki kamayi*<sup>latin</sup>, *इस साल की कमाई* / *کمائی یک اس سال*, Turkish: *sabahki namaz*, Hindi-Urdu: *subah ki namaz*<sup>latin</sup> / *सुबह की नमाज़* / *صُبح کی نماز*, Turkish: *bahçedeki koku*, Hindi-Urdu: *bagh ki khushboo*<sup>latin</sup> / *बाग की खूशबू* / *خوشبو ی باغ ک*, Turkish: *etraftaki kirliliği*, Hindi-Urdu: *aas paas ki gandagi*<sup>latin</sup> / *आस पास की गंदगी* / *آس پاس کی گندگی* / *ی گندگی*, Turkish: *Köydeki aramız*, Hindi-Urdu: *Gaun ki zameen*<sup>latin</sup>, / *गाँवों की ज़मीन* / *ن یزم ی گاؤں ک*, Turkish: *onunki*, Hindi-Urdu: *uski*<sup>latin</sup>, / *उसकी* / *اسکی*, Turkish: *sizinki*<sup>latin</sup>, Hindi-Urdu: *aapki*<sup>latin</sup> / *आपकी* / *آپکی*, Turkish: *kiminki*, Hindi-Urdu: *kiski*<sup>latin</sup> / *किसकी* / *کی کس*.

**8. -cik-cik Suffix:** The suffix “*cik-cik*” in Turkish is used almost in the same way as “*can/ci*” in Hindi-Urdu. While in Turkish, “*dedeciğim veya anneciğim*” is used, where in Hindi-Urdu, it is used as *dadacı* (dadacan) and *ammici* (ammican). It is even used as “*ci*” after the name to give someone this additional respect and value. For example, *Sayın Muhammet and Sayın Ahmet* are used in Turkish, while in Hindi, it is used as *Mohammadci and Ahmadci*.

**9. Prepositions:** There are common prepositions between both languages. For example, Turkish: *Deniz tarafındaki evler güzeldir*. Hindi-Urdu: *Samundar ki taraf ka ghar khoobsurat hai*<sup>latin</sup> / *समुंदर की तरफ का घर खूबसूरत है* / *کا طرف یک سمندر بے خوبصورت گھر*. Türkçe: *Bugünlerde onun o kadar düşmanlar var ki anlatamam*. Hindi-Urdu: *Aaj kal uske itne dushman hain ki main bata nahi sakta*<sup>latin</sup> / *आज कल उसके इतने दुश्मन हैं की मैं बता नहीं सकता* / *یہ دشمن اتنے اسکے کل آج* – So “*ki*” is also used as preposition in both languages.

**10. Conjunctions:** *Ne...ne, ki, çünkü, keşke, eğer, lakin, ya...ya, hatta, meğer, yani*. For example, Turkish: *(ne...ne) ne dün geldi ne de bugün*. Hindi-Urdu: *(na...na) na wo kal aaya na aaj*<sup>latin</sup> / *ना वो कल आया ना आज* / *آج وہ نہ ای کل وہ نہ*. Turkish: *(ki) ona söyle ki eve çabuk gelsin*. Hindi-Urdu: *(use) use kaho ki wo ghar jaldi aaye*<sup>latin</sup> / *उसे कहो की वो घर जल्दी आए* / *آے ی جلد گھر وہ مک کہو اسے* ! Turkish: *(çünkü) Ben artık seninle konuşmayacağım çünkü dinlemiyorsun*. Hindi-Urdu: *(kyunki) main ab tumse baat nahi karunga kyunki tum sunte hi nahi ho*<sup>latin</sup> / *मैं*

تو مہ سے بات نہی کہے گی کیوں کہ تو سننے ہی نہی ہو! / Turkish: (*keşke*) seninle önce tanışsaydım. Hindi-Urdu: (*kash*) *kash* main tumse pahle mila hota<sup>latin</sup>/ کا ش میں تو مہ سے پہلے ملا ہوتا تھا! / Turkish: (*eğer*) *eğer* bir problem olursa hemen haber et. Hindi-Urdu: (*agar*) *agar* koi pareshani ho to fauran khabar karo<sup>latin</sup>/ اگر کوئی پریشانی ہو تو فوراً خبر کرو! / Turkish: (*lakın*) biliyorum o bana aşık değil *lakın* onu çok seviyorum. Hindi-Urdu: mujhe malum hai ki wo mera aashiq nahi *lekin* phir bhi main usse behad mohabbat karti hun<sup>latin</sup>/ مجھے معلوم ہے کہ وہ میرا عاشق نہیں لیکن پھر بھی میں اس سے بہت محبت کرتی ہوں! / Turkish: (*ya...ya*) bu işi *ya* sen hallet *ya* ben halledeyim. Hindi-Urdu: ise *ya* to tum anjam do *ya* phir main deta hun<sup>latin</sup>/ اسے یا تو تم انجام دو یا پھر میں دیتا ہوں! / Turkish: (*hatta*) seni çok aradım *hatta* evine kadar geldim. Hindi-Urdu: maine tumhe bahoot dhoonda *hatta* yahan tak ki tumhare ghar bhi aaya<sup>latin</sup>/ میں نے تمہارے گھر تک آنا چاہا تھا! / Turkish: (*meğer*) evde olduğunu sandım *meğer* yokmuş, Hindi-Urdu: mujhe laga ke wo ghar pe hoga *magar* wo tha nahi<sup>latin</sup>/ میں نے سوچا تھا کہ وہ گھر پر ہوگا مگر وہ نہیں تھا! / Turkish: (*yani*) bunların hepsi bir tiyatroydu *yani*. Hindi-Urdu: *yani* ye sab khel tha<sup>latin</sup>, یانی یہ سب کھیل تھا! / اتھلی کی سبھی عنی

### 11. Adverbs: *herhâlde, belki, aheste aheste, güya, surf, ziyade*

For example, Turkish: (*herhâlde*) o *herhâlde* buraya gelecek. Hindi-Urdu: wo har *haal mein* yahan ayega<sup>latin</sup> / وہ ہر حال میں یہاں آئے گا۔ Turkish: (*belki*) bu işte sadece onun parmağı yoktur *belki* diğer insanlar da vardır. Hindi-Urdu: *is kaam mein sirf uska hi haant nahi hai balki aur log bhi hai*<sup>latin</sup>/ اس کام میں صرف اس کا اس سے ہے۔ Turkish: (*aheste aheste*) *aheste aheste* ilerliyoruz. Hindi-Urdu: *ahista ahista* hum log badh rahe hain<sup>latin</sup>/ آہستہ آہستہ ہمارے ہاں۔ Turkish: (*güya*) öyle konuşuyor ki *güya* herşeyi biliyor. Hindi-Urdu: *wo to aise bolta hai goya* har cheez janta ho<sup>latin</sup>/ وہ تو ایسے بولتا ہے جیسے وہ سب کچھ جانتا ہو! / Turkish: (*surf*) sen *surf* beni üzme için bunu yapıyorsun. Hindi-Urdu: *Tum sirf mujhe naraaz karne ke liye aisa karte ho*<sup>latin</sup> / تو صرف مجھے ناراض کرنے کے لیے ایسا کرتے ہو! / Turkish: (*ziyade*) kötülükten *ziyade* iyilik yapmalıyız. Hindi-



## 14. Tenses

The future tense suffix used as *-ga/-ge* in old Anatolian Turkish is also used as the same suffix (ga/ge, गा गे गी/ गा, گے, یگ ) in Hindi-Urdu. This suffix has changed over time and is used as *-acak -ecek* in today's Turkish. (Ozkan, 2003). The structure formed by adding the suffix *-gay* and personal pronouns to the verb is used for the future tense in Uyghur Turkish (Gültekin, 2006: 36).

For example. Uyghur Turkish	Turkish	Hindi-Urdu
tegin -gey men	varacağım	गाभंज्वा / गाभंज्वा

The past tense suffix of Turkish is very similar to the past tense verb suffix in Hindi-Urdu.

There are phonetic similarities in Turkish and Hindi-Urdu, along with grammatical, lexical and structural similarities. For example, the words pronounced as *kara, akul, ahir, and canavar* in Turkish are pronounced as *kala, akal, akhir, and canvar* in Hindi-Urdu.

**15. Sound and Pronunciation:** The sounds and pronunciations of most common words between Turkish and Hindi-Urdu are very similar. When we look at the origins of common words, it is seen that these words are mostly passed from Arabic and Persian to Turkish and Hindi-Urdu. Some vowels and consonants in Turkish are pronounced like; e<a, (*helva* - *halva*), p<b, (*edep-adab*), t<d, (*barut - barood*), h<kh (*hatun-khatoon*) in Hindi-Urdu. Common words given below are not limited to these. Along with these, other common words are found among these languages. For more examples, (see Mohammad, 2020). Examples of words that are similar in sound and pronunciation are given below.

For example, Turkish: *ananas*, Hindi-Urdu: *ananas/ अनानस/ انانس* - Turkish: *bülbül*, Hindi-Urdu: *bulbul/ बुलबुल/ بلبُل*, Turkish: *dükân*, Hindi-Urdu: *dukan/ دکان/ دکان*, Turkish: *gargara*, Hindi-Urdu: *gargara/ गरगरा/ غرغره*, Turkish: *helva*, Hindi-Urdu: *halva/ هالوا/ حلوه*, Turkish: *ilaç*, Hindi-Urdu: *ilac/ إلاج/ علاج*, Turkish: *kemer*, Hindi-Urdu: *kamar/ कमर/ كمر*, Turkish: *kilo*, Hindi-Urdu: *kilo/ كیلو/ كیلو*, Turkish: *kişmiş*, Hindi-Urdu: *kishmish/ کیشمیش/ کیشمیش*, Turkish: *mahalle*, Hindi-Urdu: *mahalla/ महल्ला/ محله*, Turkish: *mal*, Hindi-Urdu: *mal/ مال/ مال*, Turkish: *meydan*, Hindi-Urdu: *maidan/ मैदान/ میدان*, Turkish: *nal*, Hindi-Urdu: *nal/ नाल/ نال*, Turkish: *nehir*, Hindi-Urdu: *nahar/ नहर/ نهر*, Turkish: *numune*, Hindi-Urdu: *namuna/ नमूना/ نمونه*, Turkish: *perde*, Hindi-Urdu: *parda/ पर्दा/ پردہ*, Turkish: *pijama*, Hindi-Urdu: *paijama/ पैजामा/ پیجاما*, Turkish: *rengârenk*, Hindi-Urdu: *rangarang/ रंगा-रंगा/ رنگارنگا*, Turkish: *sabun*, Hindi-Urdu: *sabun/ साबुन/ صابون*, Turkish: *satranç*, Hindi-Urdu: *satranc/ शतरंज/ شطرنج*, Turkish: *sebze*, Hindi-Urdu: *sabzi/ सबزی/ سبزی*, Turkish: *şerbet*, Hindi-Urdu: *sharbat/ शर्बत/ شربت*, Turkish: *tava*, Hindi-Urdu: *tava/ तावा/ تـاوا*, Turkish: *tez*, Hindi-Urdu: *tez/ तेज/ تیز*, Turkish: *top*, Hindi-Urdu: *top/ तोप/ توب* -

## Conclusion

This study strives to draw attention and highlight the close relationship between Hindi-Urdu and Turkish. In Indian continent, the Turks have maintained their dominance for years. The influence of their language, culture, history and interaction remained effective for centuries. Thus, the cultural and linguistic interaction that started during the supremacy of the Turkish states has augmented until today. This study highlighted language, culture and relation of both countries, and further explained the grammatical similarities between Turkish and Hindi-Urdu languages.

As a result, it can be argued that the cultural and linguistic similarities between Turkish and Hindi-Urdu have historical significances. When we look at the academic studies on language in India and Turkey, it is seen that the number of studies on Turkish and Urdu is higher. It can be understood that Urdu is closer to Turkish than Hindi in its vocabulary and other characteristics. But there is not much difference in the spoken language of these two. In India, Hindi-Urdu is known as a single language with more or fewer word additions, especially in spoken language. Just as Turkish and Urdu are culturally and linguistically similar, Hindi shares almost the same. All the grammatical and cultural examples given above have the sameness and meanings among Turkish, Hindi and Urdu. If there is such a relationship, closeness and similarity between Turkish and Hindi-Urdu, it would be beneficial to include in academic studies. As it has been mentioned above in this study, both Hindi-Urdu are the two standard and common forms of Hindustani. Therefore, considering these, Hindi is also included in this study with Turkish and Urdu. Adding Hindi with Turkish and Urdu is because of their common similarities and usage rather than emphasizing the origin of these language. I have put Hindi before Urdu in a chronological order which nothing to do with the significance of Hindi over Urdu though there is more vocabularic commonness sees between Turkish and Urdu more than Hindi. The aim of this study to add Hindi with Turkish and Urdu is to show the commonness between these language without focusing the root of these languages. Because common similarities between languages help learner to learn target language. This study has emerged as a result of the historical, cultural and linguistic relations between both countries. Similarities between these languages are main finding of this study.

As a conclusion, this study will be an important resource for students from South Asia, especially India, Pakistan and other Hindi-Urdu speaking countries want to learn Turkish as a foreign language. The studies will simplify and make learning and teaching Turkish as a foreign language as much easier and more effective. This will make it easier for both the learners and the instructors. This study will help the researchers who are interested in cultural as well as linguistic studies.

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# A BRIEF HISTORY OF TÜRKİYE-INDIA RELATIONS FOCUSED ON CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

*Yalçın KAYALI\**

## **Introduction**

Relations between the Turks and the Indians have deep roots in history, dating back to the days of the incursions of Mahmud Ghaznavi into India in the early eleventh century. From that time up to the middle of the nineteenth century, large parts of the Subcontinent were ruled by different central Asian Turkish dynasties, with the exception of the Sayyids (1414-1451) and the Lodis (1451-1526). Therefore, it can be concluded that the histories of both people are closely interrelated and have many common aspects.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Indians were not strangers to the central Asian Turks, the first direct relations between the Indian Muslims and the Ottoman Turks were established in the late fifteenth century, and then progressively developed. It was from the late 1870's onwards that the Indo-Muslim interest in the Ottomans reached its peak and assumed a dramatic character. In the face of western encroachments on the Muslim lands, the Ottomans appeared to represent all that the Indian Muslims aspired; they viewed Türkiye as the pride of Islam and the Sultan-Caliph as the symbol of universal fraternity and the protector of all Muslims. It was this assumption that later stimulated the Indian Muslims to do all they could to maintain the Ottoman Empire, until the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, ironically by Turks themselves. Meanwhile, apart from the historical and religious links between the two peoples, the fact that India was under British rule added an unavoidable political dimension to these relations.

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## **Historical Background of Diplomatic Relations**

In 1453 the Ottomans conquered Istanbul, the capital of the Byzantine Empire and the last stronghold of Christianity in the East. This won the Ottomans great fame and evoked veneration in the entire Muslim world. It is probably for this reason that from this date some of the Muslim rulers of South India sought to establish diplomatic relations with them thereafter. The first recorded, as far as is known, diplomatic missions between the Muslim rulers of India and the Ottomans took place in the years 1481-82, between the Bahmani kings Muhammad Shah III (1453-1481) and Mahmud Shah (1482-1518), and the Ottoman Sultans Mehmed the Conqueror (1451-1482) and Bayazit II (1482-1512) through the exchange of embassies, letters and gifts. The correspondence was mainly in the nature of courtesy exchanges between the Muslim rulers, and there is no evidence of any attempt being made to foster military or political alliances.

The second stage in the relationship of the Ottomans and the Indian Muslims was the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 and the Sultan's assumption of the universal Caliphate. It was this assumption that gave a new dimension to Ottoman rule and indeed served as the most important instrument in forging relations with other Muslim countries, including India.

Under Selim I, because of his conquests, the Ottomans became the largest Muslim Kingdom in the world, extending its prestige beyond its own territories. This was demonstrated by letters from Muslim rulers of Southern India, who not only accorded the Sultan their usual congratulations and felicitations, but also accepted his supremacy. In the following years, the rise of Portuguese power in the Indian Ocean posed a serious military threat to the Muslim states and their seaborne trade with ports in the Mediterranean. The pilgrim route of Indian Muslims to the Holy Places of Islam had also been endangered by Portuguese attacks. Thus, in the face of such a growing threat, the Indian Muslims turned for help to the Ottomans as the strongest Muslim power of the age and the guardians of the Holy Places. The Ottoman success against the Portuguese attack raised the confidence of the Indian Muslims in the Ottomans.

Evidently, Shah Jehan (1627-1658) was the first Mughal ruler to set up regular diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. In pursuance of Jehangir's idea of a Sunni front, he, too, wrote a letter to Murad IV that was sent

through an envoy called Mir Zarif Ispahani. During the reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707), official contacts between the Mughals and the Ottomans appeared to be at their lowest ebb. This continued to be so in the following years as well.

After the death of Aurangzeb, Mughal power declined and gradually disintegrated. Soon the empire was reduced to the lands of Upper India around Delhi as independent rulers began to emerge in different parts of the Subcontinent. This facilitated the advance of the British. The establishment of British power undoubtedly made a great impact upon the Indo-Muslim mind. For the first time they had to experience how to live as the subjects of an alien power. However, the Ottoman Empire, their co-religionists, was still strong enough, or at least the Indians thought so. Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, in the midst of growing despair and confusion, the Indian Muslims were developing a kind of attachment to the Ottoman Sultan as the most prestigious Muslim ruler and even as a Caliph.

Thus, it was, perhaps because of this gradual consolidation of the supremacy of the Ottomans, that the Muslim rulers of South-West India sought help from the Ottoman Sultan and even felt the need to obtain the Caliphal investiture from him. Hereafter, the pattern of relationship between the Ottomans and the Muslim rulers of India was to change. Among those who approached the Ottomans for help were the rulers of the Malabar and Mysore kingdoms. By that time the British, too, aware of this growing attachment, were sensing that their interests in India were somehow related to their relations with the Ottomans, relations that might have an effect upon the Indian Muslims.

The Eastern crisis in the 1870's was the turning point for the Indian Muslims in their realization of the real strength of the Ottoman Empire. Until then they had believed that the Ottomans were as strong as other European states. In this belief they found some degree of consolation for their own loss of power and prestige in India. The weakness of the Ottoman State, as revealed by crisis, had a shocking effect upon the Indo-Muslim mind. Hence they followed the events in the Balkans and Eastern European with keen interest and anxiety. Their main concern was to defend and to support the Ottomans. The extent of the pro-Ottoman stand and sentiments was reflected in the newly developing Muslim press. All sectors within the society, the educated as well as the illiterate, were eager to receive the latest information

on day to day developments in the Ottoman Empire. Such interest led to the start of many journals which exclusively devoted space to the publication of Turkish news and at the same time urged Muslims to give aid or relief to the Muslim soldiers, widows and orphans. Amongst such anxiety and excitement some section of the Indian Muslim community linked their future with the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Türkiye was symbolized in the person of the Sultan Caliph and his Empire was viewed as a source of Islam's pride.

### **An Outline of Bilateral Relations during the National Struggle**

The Indian Muslims had followed the first developed of the First World War with a sense of foreboding and fervently reacted as its course unfolded. Towards the end of the war this interest reached its climax and the organized from December 1918 on what is known as the famous Khilafat Movement. The main objective was to save Ottoman integrity and sovereignty in the face of the threatening ignominy. They were hopeful of achieving some success in their endeavor because their plea was based on several reassuring pledges given by British statesman lenient in their treatment of Türkiye and on the fact that they had served the British during the War.

The first expression of proto-Turkish sentiment were made in December 1918 at the annual session of the Indian Muslim League in Delhi. The intention was to organize a popular movement for the Turks before the peace conference that would decide the fate of the Ottoman Empire. By then the Hindus had also shown an interest in the Committee and gave their support. Mahatma Gandhi presided over the Delhi meeting and the initial resolutions that were passed were cautions. They asked for Indian representation at the peace conference and said Istanbul should remain in the hands of the Turks. Finally, the Khilafat question was taken up by the three main representative bodies of Indian society; the All India Muslim League, the newly founded Central Khilafat Committee and the Indian National Congress.

On June 22 Gandhi wrote his famous letter to the Viceroy protesting the treatment of Türkiye and asking him to resign because he had failed to meet the expectations of Indians. Türkiye, the national liberation struggle had already started and was going on relentlessly. To show their support, the Indian Muslims carried on their pro-Turkish activities and worked hard to collect subscriptions for the Turkish Relief Fund. By 1922, Rs. 375,000 had been remitted to the Turks.

Despite all the efforts, appeals, protest and even threats from the Indian Muslims, nothing was to change in Türkiye where a process of secularization had already been inaugurated. The abolishing of the caliphate also dramatically changed the political situation in India. The Khilafat Movement lost its political force and mass appeal. The unity of various groups representing all occupations and different sections of the community was no more be. The leaders of the movement were even divided among themselves. More importantly, it contributed to the deterioration of Hindu-Muslim rapprochement. The struggle against British supremacy in India, another important characteristic of the Khilafat Movement, had served to cement the two communities together. With the end of the Khilafat Movement, the Hindus began to stand aloof from the Muslims and communalist organizations among both groups began to gain ground. The leaders of the Khilafat Movement in their frustration and disillusionment chose either to remain silent or to join one of these communalist organizations. In this way the ambitions Khilafat Movement, though it lingered on for some time, slowly died.

### **Republic Period and Nowadays**

After the establishment of the new world order, India and Türkiye became independent republics, they continued their bilateral diplomatic relations at full speed. Türkiye recognized India right after its declaration of independence on 15 August 1947 and diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. Bilateral relations between Türkiye and India are developing through high level visits in recent years.

In 2008, H.E. Erdoğan, the then Prime Minister of Türkiye and in February 2010 former President H.E. Mr. Abdullah Gül paid official visits to India. Former President Gül's visit to India was the first visit at presidential level from Türkiye to India after 15 years. Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, paid an official visit to India on 18-19 August 2016. On the occasion of the visit, the "Road Map between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye and Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India" was adopted.

Former President H.E. Pranab Mukherjee visited Türkiye on 5-7 October 2013 upon the invitation extended by the then President H.E. Mr. Abdullah Gül. This has been the first visit at the Presidential level from India

to Türkiye after an interval of 15 years. Furthermore, then Minister of External Affairs H.E. Sushma Swaraj paid a working visit to Türkiye on 15-16 January 2015. The most recent high level visit from India to Türkiye was the visit of Prime Minister H.E. Mr. Narendra Modi to participate in the G20 Summit held in Antalya on 15-16 November 2015.

President H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid an official visit to India on 30 April-1 May 2017. Moreover, a number of political, economic and cultural partnerships and cooperation opportunities were negotiated and “The cultural exchange program between the government of the republic of Türkiye and the government of the republic of India for the years 2017-2020”, whose articles will be detailed below, was signed and entered into force by being published in the official gazette.

The Government of the Republic of Türkiye and the Government of the Republic of India; Pursuant to the provisions of Article of the Cultural Agreement signed between the Government of the Republic of Türkiye and The Government of the Republic of India, on 29<sup>th</sup> June 1951. Desiring to strengthen and deepen the ties of friendship between their countries and peoples through exchanges and cooperation; by promoting the understanding in each of their respective countries of the main traditions, achievements and vacations of the other Party in the fields of culture and arts, youth and sports and mass media. Aiming to join efforts, wherever possible, in particular for concrete projects, within the framework of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and of other relevant international organizations. It has agreed the following programme for the implementation of their Cultural Agreements.

*Art and Culture:* I. The Parties shall exchange theatre, opera and ballet artists and experts in the areas of acting, design and literature to conduct training programs and to meet and interact with experts through joint seminars. The Parties shall exchange orchestras, choirs and group artists. II. The Parties shall exchange information regarding international theatre festivals, celebrations and various cultural activities to be organized in their respective countries. They shall also mutually encourage the participation of directors, artists and theatre groups the festivals to be organized in their respective countries. III. The Parties shall exchange faculty members and students between the similar theatre institutes of each other’s country. IV. Both Parties

shall support the strengthened of relations among publishers and associations in the field of book publishing, promote the translation of literary works of their eminent authors and poets, and exchange information about the organization of book publishing and trade in the two countries. V. The Parties shall support the translation of their classical and contemporary literary works with the aim of developing respectively the awareness and understanding of their literature and culture, as well as mutually promoting their programmes to support translation. VI. The Parties will exchange children's paintings. The participation of children from Türkiye in the Shankar's International Children's Competition shall be facilitated. In the same manner, children from India shall be invited to similar competitions in Türkiye. VII. The India side shall send an exhibition of contemporary art if science level artists duly curated and accompanied by two experts and receive an exhibition of Turkish culture accompanied by two experts for a period one week. Both Parties' exhibitions shall consist of non-historical works. VIII. The Parties shall exchange an exhibition of non-historical art consisting 30 works of 15 artists for a period of 10 days accompanied by two officers on reciprocal basis. During this period, the Host Country shall arrange slide lectures of the accompanying persons in relevant institution/organizations. The Parties shall provide the insurance of the exhibits estimated by experts. IX. The Parties shall exchange an exhibition of contemporary art in reciprocal basis. X. The Parties will exchange books, journals, microfilms and archival sources to help scholars on their respective fields of research. To this end, the national archive administrations of the two Parties will promote their international practices for signing a separate Cooperation Protocol. XI. The Parties shall promote direct contracts and cooperation between the National Libraries of the two countries, namely the National Library of Türkiye and the National Library of India, for the purpose of exchanging information materials and other publications as well as microfilms and manuscripts to enrich their collections, as far as provided by their respective national legislation. XII. The Parties shall encourage exchange of experts in the field of librarianship between their public libraries and invite experts to book fairs organized in their respective countries. XIII. Both Parties shall mutually invite two expert librarians every year and shall

exchange scientific publications source and documentation between their countries' libraries. XIV. The Parties shall strive to establish a "Turkish Library Section" in a central public library in India and an "Indian Library Section" in a central public library in Türkiye. XV. The Parties shall facilitate exchange of cultural anthropologists. XVI. The Parties shall cooperate in the fields of archaeology, history of arts, museology and restoration of historical works, and they shall exchange publications and experts in these fields. XVII. The Indian side shall exchange books, scholar and materials with museums in Türkiye for joint survey, documentation, translations and dissemination of objects, sites and sources of mutual interest in artistic, literary and historical heritage of India and Türkiye. XVIII. The Parties shall cooperate in preventing illegal trafficking of cultural heritage and shall take all the necessary measures within the framework of related covenants of UNESCO and other international covenants and agreements to which they are party. XIX. In order to achieve a better acquaintance between the countries, activating promoting cultural tourism shall be supported and essential promotional events shall be organized.

Engaged in dissemination of information related to government activities. XXI. The Parties shall encourage cooperation between their respective News Agencies, namely Anadolu Agency (AA) and United News of India (UNI). XXII. The Parties shall organize film weeks and participate in milö festivals/expositions organizes in their respective countries.

After that, H.E. President Erdoğan and H.E. Prime Minister Modi met regularly in the margins of BRICS and G20 Summits between 2015-2019. Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu met with his Indian counterpart H.E. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 2019. In conclusion, it is hoped that these deep-rooted and increasing political relations from the past to the present will form the basis of future strategic partnerships.

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# INTERNATIONAL PANEL TÜRKİYE-INDIA HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY RELATIONS

Date: 29<sup>th</sup> March, 2022

Time: 14:00 (Türkiye Time) 16:30 (India Time)

## PANEL PROGRAMME

### OPENING SPEECHES

Prof. Dr. A. Merthan DÜNDAR

Prof. Aftab Kamal PASHA

### I. ECONOMIC RELATIONS

**Moderator:** Tevfik DÖNMEZ / MUSIAD Board Member.

14:15-14:30 Hülya GEDİK / Head of DEIK - Türkiye-India Business Council.

**Türkiye-India Business Relations: How to Enhance the Trade Volume between Two Countries.**

14:30-14:45 Dr. Saleem AHMAD / Amity University, Gwalior, India.  
**India-Türkiye Trade Relations.**

14:45-15:00 Dr. Altay ATLI / Atli Global, Boğaziçi University, İstanbul.  
**India's Economic Transition and New Horizons for Turkish-Indian Economic Relations.**

### II. BILATERAL RELATIONS

**Moderator:** Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yalçın KAYALI

15:00-15:15 Dr. Omair ANAS / Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, Ankara.  
**India-Türkiye Relations through the Ottoman Archives.**

15:15-15:30 Prof. Aftab Kamal PASHA / Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

**India-Türkiye Relations in the Context of Tipu Sultan-Ottoman Diplomatic Exchanges.**

15:30-15:45 Dr. Bahar İZMİR / Ankara University, Ankara.

**An Overview of Türkiye-India Relations in the Discourse of Press.**

### **III. SECURITY & DEFENCE RELATIONS**

**Moderator:** Dr. Omair ANAS

15:45-16:00 Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vakur SÜMER / International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Turkish-Kazakh University, Eurasian Research Institute.

**Central Asia as a Catalyst: New Horizons in India-Türkiye Relations.**

16:00-16:15 Assist. Prof. Dr. Haluk KARADAĞ / Başkent University, Ankara.

**Türkiye and India Military Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges.**

16:15-16:30 Dr. Javed ZAFAR / Non-resident Fellow, CIWAD.

**India-Türkiye Security and Defence Relations.**

### **IV. HISTORICAL & CULTURAL RELATIONS**

**Moderator:** Prof. Dr. A. Merthan DÜNDAR

16:30-16:45 Prof. M.H İLYAS / Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala.

**India-Türkiye Cultural and Intellectual Relations.**

16:45-17:00 Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yalçın KAYALI / Vice-Director of APAM, Ankara University, Ankara.

**A Brief History of Türkiye-India Relations Focused on Cultural Interaction.**

17:00-17:15 Dr. Mubashir AHMAD / Research Fellow at CIWAD.

**Cultural and Intellectual Ties between India and Türkiye.**

17:15-17:30 Assoc. Prof. Dr. Cemil KUTLUTÜRK / Ankara University, Ankara.

**The Unfading Bond between India and Türkiye: Sufistic/Mystic Interaction.**

17:30-17:45 Assist. Prof. Qabiz AHMED / Turkish Language, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

**Language and Education Relations between India and Türkiye.**



