

**ANKARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
AVRUPA TOPLULUKLARI ARAŞTIRMA  
VE UYGULAMA MERKEZİ**

**CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT  
AND A RENEWED TRANSATLANTIC  
VISION FOR THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

**PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17<sup>TH</sup> ANTALYA CONFERENCE ON  
SECURITY AND COOPERATION**

**Atlantic Council of Turkey  
and  
Ankara University  
European Union Research Center (ATAUM)**

**January 30-31, 2009  
Antalya, Turkey**

**Atlantic Council of Turkey  
and  
Ankara University European Union Research Center (ATAUM)**

**Changing Security Environment and a Renewed  
Transatlantic Vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century  
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## ÖNSÖZ

*Türk Atlantik Konseyi ile Ankara Üniversitesi Avrupa Toplulukları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi' nin ortak yayını olan bu kitap, 30–31 Ocak 2009 tarihinde gerçekleştirilen 17. Antalya Uluslararası Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Konferansı'nda sunulan tebliğlerden oluşmaktadır.*

*Adı geçen konferansın hazırlanmasında Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, NATO Genel Sekreterliği ve NATO nezdindeki Büyükelçimizin ve ayrıca konu ile ilgilenen üniversitemiz öğretim üyelerinin ve diğer uzman kişilerin görüş ve önerilerinden yararlanılmıştır.*

*Yukarıda belirtilen kişi ve kuruluşlara; ayrıca bu konferansın gerçekleşmesine finansman desteği sağlayan NATO Genel Sekreterliği Kamu Diplomasisi Bölümü' ne TBMM Başkanlığı'na ve Başbakanlık Tanıtma Fonu yetkililerine; tebliğ sunan ve soru ya da yorumlarıyla konferansın amacına ulaşmasına katkı sağlayan değerli katılımcılara sonsuz teşekkürlerimizi sunarız.*

**TÜRK ATLANTİK KONSEYİ YÖNETİM KURULU**



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**LETTER OF ABDULLAH GÜL  
PRESIDENT OF TURKEY**

Excellencies,  
Distinguished Guests,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I regret to be unable to attend the 17<sup>th</sup> International Security and Cooperation Conference due to my previously planned engagements. I would like to express, however, my appreciation to Ambassador Ömer Akbel, President of the Turkish Atlantic Council, and his associates, for the kind invitation extended to me, and congratulate them on the successful organisation of this important event which is hosting distinguished participants and guests. I am convinced that, as previous conferences, this 17<sup>th</sup> gathering will serve as an excellent forum for reviewing and analysing the latest developments in the international security agenda and for exchanging views and ideas through open and frank discussions.

The topic of this year's conference is of particular relevance as we approach to the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of NATO. The 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit in April this year will be a gathering of historic importance, which will offer us the opportunity not only to take stock of and celebrate the achievements of the Alliance, but also to chart the way ahead for NATO's future agenda in the light of the evolving security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Since its foundation in 1949, NATO has proven its value as the most successful alliance in the history of humankind. Binding Europe and North America in a unique defence and security alliance, NATO has provided for the collective defence of its members, and has been an essential pillar of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

In order to respond to the new circumstances of the post-Cold War era, NATO has embarked on a process of transformation, including taking on new missions both in and out of its own area and building security partnerships across Europe, through the Caucasus and into Central Asia.

NATO, entrusted with the political clout and equipped with necessary military and civilian capabilities, should continue to act, today and in the future, as a foundation of stability in the Euro-Atlantic area; serve as a forum for consultations on defence and security issues; deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state; contribute to effective conflict prevention and engage in crisis management; and promote partnership, cooperation and dialogue in the Euro-Atlantic area. Being a staunch ally over half a century, Turkey is determined to continue to make her contributions in pursuit of these objectives.

Being located in a volatile region and at the crossroads of diverse threats, Turkey gives primary importance to finding solutions to disputes through political and diplomatic means. Turkey's experience and knowledge of the region enables her to pursue sound and realistic policies and to play, whenever possible, the role of honest broker or facilitator in her neighbourhood and beyond.

One of the salient features of Turkish foreign policy is its multi-dimensional nature reconciling the West and the East and the North and the South. The multifaceted character of Turkish foreign policy is best reflected by Turkey's membership in a wide range of leading international and regional organizations.

Turkey is a founding member of the UN, the Council of Europe, OSCE, OECD and WTO. Turkey, being the only country in the world holding membership of both NATO and OIC, is also in the accession process to the EU.

In this vein, Turkey's strong democratic credentials constitute an indispensable asset for her region and beyond.

With her highest standards of democracy, I am convinced that Turkey's contributions to peace and stability will be further strengthened through her non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council.

All these characteristics render Turkey a valued partner in overcoming the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In conclusion, I would like to express my sincere conviction that this Conference will be as successful as the past ones and convey my best wishes to all the distinguished participants.

**LETTER OF R.TAYYİP ERDOĞAN  
(PRIME MINISTER OF TURKEY)**

30. 01. 2009

Sayın Ömer E.Akbel  
Türk Atlantik Konseyi Başkanı  
Papillon Ayscha Otel  
İleribaşı Mevkii  
Belek/Antalya

Daha önceden planlanmış bir programım nedeniyle nazik davetinize katılamıyorum.

Konferansınızın başta ülkemiz olmak üzere bölgemiz ve bütün dünya için yeni ufukların açılması açısından hayırlara vesile olacağına inanıyorum.

Başta konferansı düzenleyenler olmak üzere tüm konuşmacılara ve katılımcılara başarılar diliyorum.

**BAŞBAKAN  
RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN**



**LETTER OF ALİ BABACAN  
(MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS)**


Mr. Ambassador,

I would like to express my sincere thanks for the kind invitation extended to me to participate in the 17<sup>th</sup> International Antalya Conference on Security and Cooperation organized by the Turkish Atlantic Council (TAC) on 30-31 January 2009. I regret to inform you that I will not be able to attend the conference due to my previously planned engagements.

It is observed with appreciation that the Antalya Conference, which has been held since 1990, has gained international recognition as a prominent forum dealing with international security issues. I believe that this year's title of "Changing Security Environment and a Renewed Transatlantic Vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" will provide an important opportunity for exchanging new and creative ideas on how to carry NATO to the future as an effective political and military organization. I also believe that the conference will contribute to better understanding of today's risks and threats to security as well as to elaborating ways and means of coping with them.

I wish you a successful conference.





**İLKER BAŞBUĞ  
ORGENERAL  
GENELKURMAY BAŞKANI**

21 Ocak 2009

Ömer E. Akbel

Başkan

Emekli Büyükelçi

Sayın Büyükelçim,

Türk Atlantik Konseyi tarafından 30-31 Ocak 2009 tarihlerinde icra edilecek 17'nci Uluslararası Antalya Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Konferansı'na ilişkin nazik davetiniz için teşekkür ederim. Söz konusu konferansa diğer planlı faaliyetlerim nedeniyle maalesef katılamayacağım.

Türkiye'nin Batılı müttefikleriyle eşit statüye sahip olduğu tek uluslararası örgüt olan NATO'nun günümüz ve geleceğin dinamik güvenlik ortamında etkin ve işlevsel bir askeri ve siyasi örgüt olarak varlığını sürdürmesi aşîkardır.

“Değişen Güvenlik Ortamı ve 21'nci Yüzyıl için Yeni Bir Transatlantik Vizyonu” başlığı altında, itina ile seçilmiş, küresel ve ulusal açıdan önem arz eden konuların değerli Türk ve yabancı katılımcılar tarafından detaylı olarak inceleneceği bu konferansın, 03-04 Nisan 2009 tarihlerinde icra edilecek NATO Zirvesi çalışmalarımıza katkı sağlayacağı kuşkusuzdur.

Konferansın başarılı ve sonuçları itibarıyla yararlı geçmesi temennisiyle en iyi dileklerimi sunarım.





**FOUNDING MEMBER,  
MR. CEVAD ODYAKMAZ  
JANUARY 31<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

**Ömer Akbel**

Hello hello. Please have a sit. In the afternoon we'll start with question and answer section of the third panel. But before proceduring with the questioning and answering section I think we have a pleasent duty to fulfill as I had already stated at the initial intervison of mine; this year marks the 40th anniversary of the foundation of our association, the Turkish Atlantic Council.

We only have one found member who is still active and who is among with us today. He is also still very active not only during this conference but also during the favour of the association because he is one of the leading figure in our governing board team of the council. And not only that he also is one of the leading figures as far as Atlantic Association is concerned and he is the only remaining active patron of the Association.

And we thought that it will be fit to pay our tribute and to pay our respects and gratitude to this founding father of our Association. And with your permission we have to mark this occasion by presenting our be loved Cevat Odyakmaz a plate commemorating the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary.

Now I ask President Lamers to join me in adhering our eldest founding member.

**Karl A. Lamers**

Congratulations from our Assembly to this great honour. I think we all feel honoured that you are here, among us as a founding member of this great Atlantic Council. Thank you very much for all what you have in many many decades invested and spirit and a lot of works to take Council. We need personalities like you. We need your advice and we need your contribution in the future too. Thank you very much in what did you in the past times and thank you what you'll give us in the future. All the best, good healths. Thank you everyone.

### **Cevad Odyakmaz**

Sayın misafirlerimiz. Benim için tam bir sürpriz oldu. Arkadaşlarım lütfettiler. Biz bundan kırk sene evvel Türk Atlantik Konseyi'ni kurduk ve kırk senedir devamlı hizmet vermekteyiz. Bu cemilelerinden dolayı gerçekten çok teşekkür ederim. Fazla söyleyecek bir şeyim yok. İnşallah Allah hayırlı ömür verirse bundan sonra da devam edeceğiz. Sağolun.

### **Ömer Akbel**

Söylemeye lüzum yok. Tabiatıyla biz Sayın Odyakmaz'la kırk sene daha beraber olmayı, onun hizmetlerinden, yol göstericiliğinden yararlanmayı umuyoruz, Allah'ın izniyle.

## OPENING REMARKS

**Ömer E. AKBEL<sup>1</sup>**

Mr. Minister,  
Your Excellencies,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the Turkish Atlantic Council at the opening session of the 17<sup>th</sup> International Antalya Conference on Security and Cooperation. This year we are celebrating the 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of our Association. We are happy and indeed proud to have such a distinguished group of participants at our Conference on our 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary.

For the past couple of decades, the global geostrategical scene has witnessed the emergence of various new threats and challenges to the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently this situation has required the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as the pillar of transatlantic security architecture, to transform itself to meet these new realities. Now at the time we are celebrating its sixtieth anniversary, our Organisation is yet in another such process of self-adaptation. We have no doubt that, as has been the case in the past, NATO will again successfully tackle the challenges of the changing international security environment.

Today we are gathered at this Conference to share our views on these topics and related issues concerning the future of our Alliance. We think that the time is right for such a discussion and all the more so, since now we have a new administration in Washington while the preparations for the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit are fully underway in Brussels and other capitals. Our Conference is the first academic forum on NATO in the year 2009-the year of its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary-and I think this fact renders our forthcoming discussions all the more interesting and important.

Distinguished guests,

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<sup>1</sup>Amb.(R), President of Turkish Atlantic Council

Several institutions have helped our Association in the organisation of this Conference. We are particularly grateful to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkish Prime Minister's Office, NATO International Secretariat, and last but not the least the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Without their generous material and moral help, this Conference would not have been possible.

Before concluding, I would like to pay homage to our late President Ambassador Haluk Bayülken whom we lost since our last 16<sup>th</sup> Conference. Ambassador Bayülken was one of the founding fathers of this Conference and his vision and wisdom still inspire us. May I invite you all to stand up for a minute of silent respect in memory of Ambassador Bayülken.

I once again thank you all for participating in the Conference. My appreciation and gratitude go particularly to the speakers who have graciously accepted to share their views with us, thus animating the ensuing debates.

Thank you.

## KEYNOTE SPEECH

**Karl A. LAMERS<sup>2</sup>**

Mr. Minister,  
Monsieur Bureau,  
Your Excellencies,  
Ambassador Akbel,  
Pierre Lellouche former president of Parliamentary Assembly of NATO,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

First of all I would like to thank you for your invitation to this conference. It is a first conference I take part in as a newly elected president of ATA (Atlantic Treaty Association). I am very delighted that I have the opportunity to give the keynote speech to you on the occasion of this high class event here in Antalya. Please allow me to say a few words to our amiable guest state Turkey.

Mr Ambassador,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

Peace can not be achieved only by coexistence, but by cooperation. With other words, cooperation is not the option. It is the only alternative. We cooperate. Since 1952 Turkey has been a reliable and great ally in NATO. It plays an important role in our common fight against terrorism and participates in NATO, UN, and EU led missions. Since 2006, Mr. Minister, Turkey has operated a provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan which means an important contribution to the reconstruction of this country. There is the Kosovo, and the EU led mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina just to mention some close cooperation with your country. All this means doing a

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<sup>2</sup> Dr., President of Atlantic Treaty Association, Vice-President of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Deputy Chairman of Defense Committee of German Parliament

great job for more peace and security in the world. Especially for me as a German, Turkey plays a major role since my country gives the home for more than 3 million of Turkish people. We are proud to have established good and reliable relations to Turkey on all levels of social and political life. For me personally, it is a pleasure to come to your country Mr. Ambassador, to come back to Belek where I spent my holidays some years ago. I have got some very good friends here. I feel the spirit of friendliness and hospitality I have always experienced when I have come to your country. And I think all our guests feel today that you think that a guest is a gift of God. Thank you very much for your great hospitality.

Ladies and gentlemen...

Changing security environment and the renewed Transatlantic vision for the 21st century, the title of this conference could not have chosen better in 2009. We all know that the world has changed in the last decades. There were scenes of the cold war and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Science won your hope. But at the same time new dangers have arisen. Dangers that don't stop at the border of a country, dangers that have swept across the world. The terrorist attacks on September 11 prompted NATO to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in history. This was a unprecedented situation for every member state of NATO. The terrorists trained camps in Afghanistan. This was the starting point of terrorism. That is why we have to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. And that is why failure is no option. We must go on with our mission there and the reconstruction of this country. Progress has already been achieved. But I think we all must do more to lead this mission to success in a comprehensive approach, a combination between military power and civilian reconstructing measures.

Dear Friends,

Never again Afghanistan may become a recruiting center and training base for terrorists with global reach. We will prevent export of terror from this country to our countries. The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has made it clear that we must face new challenges. The proliferation of weapons and mass destruction, fail states, cyber war, drinking water supply, security of energy, the climate change, and poverty and violence that breathe the terror of tomorrow. New challenges need new answers. In the last few years, NATO has been in a transformation process. Today, NATO is as attractive as it ever was. Perhaps even more attractive... When NATO was founded in 1949, there were 12 members with countries from Western Europe. And after 1999 from Central and Eastern Europe too, joining NATO in the years that followed. In April, the North Atlantic Alliance will celebrate its 60<sup>th</sup>

anniversary and it has every reason to be proud to do so. At this summit, being the first to be held in two countries in France and in Germany, in Strasbourg and Baden Baden, at both sides of the River Rhine. Two new member states will join the alliance: Albania and Croatia. This development, ladies and gentlemen, is magnificent example of what can be achieved, so positive political relations, multilateralism and cooperation based and trust, and confidence. NATO has changed. According to the changes in the world, NATO has learned to think in a global context because the global citizenship binds us together. Partnership and cooperation is the only way to master all challenges. And that is why we can not afford to be divided.

Ladies and gentlemen,

10 days ago, the inauguration of the 44<sup>th</sup> president of the United States of America Barack Obama was celebrated in Washington. I had the honor to take part in this great and impressive ceremony. It was one of the most touching moments in my life. I am convinced that the new president of the United States of America stands for a change in the American defense and security policy. He stands for a policy of dialogue and reconciliation. He is aware that no nation, not even the United States, can master the new challenges alone. We must stand together, Americans and Europeans. We must do more not less in future. I am convinced that there is no challenge too big for people that stand together.

Regarding the next NATO summit here some personal comments... Our alliance NATO is strong. At the anniversary's summit in April, we will ensure to adopt the so called declaration on the alliance's security. This declaration has to appoint the most important items of security policy. However it should not be a pre-determination regarding the new strategy concept. 10 years after NATO has given itself of the political strategy of the summit in Washington 1999, I think now is the time to take these global changes into account of a new strategic concept for 2010. According to enlargement, I want to say that the door must remain open. This is policy of NATO and this is my personal conviction. And to make it clear, only NATO member states decide which states will become new member. There is no space for a veto for any other country. Moreover, we need to think about how to work together more closely with other countries. In the framework of NATO's global partnership like Japan, Australia, New Zealand fighting the future threats together countries which share our values and political interests. In our time I think we have to think about how global NATO might become. And last point turning to Pierre Lellouche is a very important member in his parliament and near to President Sarkozy. We are looking Pierre forward to returning France to the military structure of NATO. It's a benefit for NATO and for us all. And I think we all would be very thankful if

you would take care for this. And I am glad that my chancellor, the great chancellor, Angela Merkel was able to convince President Sarkozy to keep the important French-German & German-French brigade a contribution to our common security.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Trust and confidence, and common values are some of the characteristics of the Atlantic Treaty Association and of our Atlantic Councils' all over the world. For more than 50 years since 1954, ATA strengthens reliable transatlantic relations and it has helped to communicate about what NATO is and what it does. As president of ATA, I am convinced that ATA and that our national ATA chapters can and must play an important role in renewing the transatlantic agenda. In the past years, the Association has made great steps in developing relevant programs and supporting the work of its individual members. Nevertheless, there is much that remains to be done. In this volatile world, it has become much harder for our publics to understand what the Alliance is all about. ATA and our national chapters need to play a key role in helping our publics understand NATO and the Transatlantic Community better. We need to incorporate especially young people into this process. It is our task to improve and intensify our cooperation to strengthen the ties of young generation to combine efforts, to combine forces. We can win the young people by feeling them this enthusiasm and by making them curious. We encourage them to participate in shaping our common future. So we achieve more peace all over the world. ATA will intensify the use as we have to think how to reach the young generation. So we have to intensify the use of new media application like global web, chats or blogs. We have to think about spots and publication. We may not wait until young people knock on our doors. Being back from this great conference in Antalya, I will give an account on this conference and its decisions which is what we all should do. And I will give the order to publish this on our homepage and our Secretary General Troels Froling, a friend of mine will do this I know. So, all people all over the world can get information about that about what's going on here in Belek. My idea of ATA is we have to speak everywhere in schools and universities. We have to discuss current problems with pupils and students. We have to show presents. And we may not avoid in discussions in different meanings. ATA and our national chapters like this great one here in Turkey needs to become an umbrella organization that connects that interlinks that makes national and bilateral initiatives transparent (20:00). We need a new forum for a political transatlantic discussion. We need to unite and reenergize the activities of all national ATA chapters. Excellency Ambassador Akbel, I am very thankful that you have taken up the Antalya tradition of the Turkish



Atlantic Council. I am convinced that we will be a big step closer reaching this goal after this conference.

Dear Members of the Turkish Atlantic Council, thank you very much for your convincing engagement and all your work for values of Atlantic Community. Ladies and gentlemen, the vision of a world in peace in freedom and security, this is the vision of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This is the vision of ATA. In a world marked by turmoil and instability, strong ties between USA and its NATO allies and partners in Europe remain our best hope to protect and promote our common values and interest. By working closely together we have much to gain. Please allow me to end with John F. Kennedy, the former president of the USA, spreading confidence and hope. When he said, "Peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. Let it start now". Beni dinlediđiniz için çok teŖekkür ederim.

Thank you very much.



## KEYNOTE SPEECH

**Jean François BUREAU<sup>3</sup>**

Mister Minister,  
Excellencies,  
Dear Ambassador Akbel,  
Dear President Lamers,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

I am very much delighted to represent NATO at this prestigious conference today. As the NATO Secretary General could not attend due to previous commitments, he asked me to convey his best wishes for the success of this conference and his special thanks to the Turkish Atlantic Council for organizing this important event. He also asked me to express his appreciation for the support of the Turkish Government to this famous forum at a time when NATO is preparing to celebrate NATO's 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary in a very symbolic place, Strasbourg and Kehl. I would like to add my own thanks to all the teams who organized this conference in such an efficient way.

As this 17<sup>th</sup> conference coincides with NATO's 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary celebration, it is an opportunity to look at the Alliance's achievements, and, moreover, to look at the agenda of the forthcoming Summit which will shape the next period of time.

NATO has been a successful organization, which has been able to deal with the most serious challenge humankind has ever faced, the specter of collective destruction through a nuclear war which could have taken place in mid Europe, following the most destructive and global war History has had to register.

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<sup>3</sup> NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy

This still recent catastrophe is teaching that although our citizens may take freedom and security for granted, the Alliance, building on the lessons of the Second World War as well those of the Cold War, is right in not taking them for granted. By the way, the twenty years following the end of the Cold War, which we will also celebrate this year, have shown that war is never far away, even in Europe, when blind passions, intolerant nationalism, religious hatred and destructive will take the lead. The consolidation of Europe as an undivided and democratic security space is still at the top of our agenda.

To deal with these threats and challenges, the Atlantic Alliance has set up a unique organization which is as relevant for the future as it has been since its foundation in 1949, because the Alliance, which incarnates the very special transatlantic relationship, is a framework for political and military change, according to the values of the members, namely, democracy, human rights, rule of law and cooperation in line with the international community rules.

The agenda of the Strasbourg–Kehl Summit demonstrates the relevance of the Alliance as our Heads of State and Government will have to address three main issues, Afghanistan, Europe’s consolidation and the future of the Alliance’s strategic concept.

No need to say that those three main items really deal with the most decisive issues which will shape the future of all NATO members, and that of all our citizens. At a time where the financial and economic crisis can fuel a new wave of tensions, there is no doubt that the common vision the 26 NATO nations, and hopefully soon 28 with the accession of Albania and Croatia, will deliver at the Summit will be of key importance.

As Karl Lamers said some minutes ago, failure in Afghanistan is not an option. 2009 will also be of special importance for the Afghans, and, with them, for the international community. First of all, it will be, for the second time in this nation’s history, the electoral “rendezvous”. As the commission in charge of preparation decided yesterday, they will take place on August 20<sup>th</sup>. They must take place in a way which will renew the essential contract between the Afghans and their leaders. Under the international community’s auspices, ISAF will help to secure these elections as it has already helped the voters’ registration process, which has now permitted near four millions Afghans, among them one third of women, to be registered. It is the very firm will of the international community and, among them, the ISAF contributing nations to help this process as much as possible, in order to shape a new phase of stability and development.

For sure, the NATO nations' commitment to Afghanistan cannot solve all the challenges this country is facing. A very efficient comprehensive approach is needed to build together security and development, these two pillars which cannot be dissociated and which must be achieved in an ever more coordinated way. NATO is eager to work closely with all the international organizations in charge of the Afghanistan building process, among them the United Nations first-our relationship with UN being strengthened by the common declaration signed last September, but also with the European Union in charge of the police mentoring, the World Bank and all the specialized agencies and NGOs which provide assistance, expertise and support to the Afghan authorities, first of all at the local level, where concrete and lasting results can be achieved for the benefit of the population.

The recent developments of the Afghan situation have reinforced the need of a regional approach, as the Afghan issue is of much importance to all its neighbours, Pakistan first but not only, in order to bring stability at this level. In many ways, security and stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan are closely linked, and there is no doubt that the opposing forces threaten both states at the same time. All the initiatives undertaken to develop a better and constructive relationship between the two states are immensely important, and we know the very significant role Turkey has had from that point of view. But the regional dimension has also to include the Central Asian republics which are more and more ready to help stability at the regional level and, as the Secretary General has said some days ago, this process should also include Iran.

Last but not least, the Afghan ownership will, in the end, be the most efficient way to prevent this country from becoming again a safe haven for terrorist organizations, not only to the detriment of Afghans but also for international security. Stability is still at stake and the way Afghanistan will become a prosperous and peaceful society is of much importance for all of us. Stating that in a globalized world, interdependence is an ever increasing player, is not enough if we do not reaffirm our commitment to unite our will and resources to help Afghanistan to find its place in the international community and the Afghan coming generation to look at its future in an open and ever more confident way. The ISAF contribution to help Afghanistan create a disciplined and efficient Afghan National Army is of key importance, from that point of view.

If our security is at stake in the Hindu Kush, a lot has yet to be done to consolidate security in Europe. As the most recent events of 2008 showed, this continent is still not protected from the use of force, or from new kinds of tension, like that faced by many European nations at the beginning of this

year, freezing the people's homes as well as the trust which is essential to develop fruitful relations among all the European nations, and an ever deeper cooperative process. From that point of view, NATO's attractiveness cannot be considered as a destabilizing factor. The Bucharest declaration has paved the way for the future of NATO's relations with Ukraine and Georgia and, last December, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs have "reaffirmed all elements of the decisions regarding Ukraine and Georgia taken by our Heads of State and Government in Bucharest", and confirmed their will to pursue this process, in order to prepare the Euro-Atlantic integration of these nations, and "provide further assistance to both countries in implementing needed reforms as they progress towards NATO membership". The NATO Ukraine and NATO Georgia commissions will monitor these processes. By the way, the same kind of aspiration, coming from the Western Balkan nations, must also be considered as of much importance for the future. It is now crystal clear that the Western Balkans, turning their eyes to the future rather than to the dreadful legacy of their last 15 tragic years of wars, are also looking for Euro-Atlantic integration as the best way to develop trustful and peaceful relations, among themselves as well as with NATO and the European Union, for the benefit of their economic and social development. Again, the Alliance is considered by these nations as an attractive organization which will support their modernization process in a stable and secure framework, and with which they want to intensify their partnership.

Russia is surely not left aside from these main trends, as Ministers have agreed last December "on a measured and phased approach". On the basis of the fruitful cooperation which has been developed since 2002 in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council<sup>4</sup>, NATO is considering a positive and pragmatic agenda taking stock of the fact that NATO and Russia are stakeholders in European and global security. By the way, despite the very significant divergences which took place during this last year, beginning with the Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty and culminating with the August events and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, terrorism and Afghanistan have been two lasting domains of common work. NATO has very much changed since the Cold War, and portraying this organization as an old time body does not fit the common interest Russia and NATO have in addressing some of the key issues relevant to global security. In a globalized world, there is no room for a global confrontation, as interests are so enmeshed that areas of cooperation will always coexist with areas of divergence. That is the great difference with regard to the Cold War era

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<sup>4</sup> The document approved in 2002 in Rome was entitled : "NATO-Russia Relations : A New Quality".

when areas of cooperation were so scarce compared to the numerous conflicting interests.

NATO nations commit “to a common vision of how to meet existing security challenges in ways which contribute to lasting peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area”, to quote the last December communique. Among the existing structures (EU, OSCE, Council of Europe) which deal in a way or another with Euro-Atlantic security, the European Union is of increasing importance, not only because 21 NATO members are also EU members, but also because NATO and EU are shoulder to shoulder in Kosovo and Afghanistan; operations to which non EU NATO members as well as non NATO EU members contribute in a very significant way. Facing the same military risks in the field could require more shared views from the top. It is obviously a growing issue of concern for both organizations, and it has received a great deal of attention recently if we look at the nations’ contributions to feed the reflection, the Turkish one, the Nordic states one as well as the EU’s Presidency proposals of end 2008. Work has still to be done to move forward and we know where the main difficulties are. But there is no doubt that, from the NATO point of view, the situation is not satisfactory, and the next Summit should be an opportunity to make the progress our soldiers expect from their political leaders to fulfil their mission in a more efficient way.

This Summit, last but not least, will also be the opportunity to decide on a “Declaration on Alliance Security” which the Heads of State and Government have considered at Bucharest should “further articulate and strengthen the Alliance’s vision of its role in meeting the evolving challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and maintaining the ability to perform the full range of its missions, collectively defending our security at home and contributing to stability abroad”. This Declaration, if decided by our political leaders, could then pave the way to the elaboration of a new strategic concept. It has still to be decided if this strategic concept will be a new one or an update of the previous one, adopted at the Washington Summit for the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Alliance (1999). Since that time, no doubt that the strategic framework of our security has much changed: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberdefense, energy security, piracy, asymmetric operations build a picture which is moving more and more quickly. With regard to the main tasks of the Alliance, it has to be decided in which way these threats and challenges come under NATO responsibility. In other words, the ways article 5 missions and non article 5 are and should be combined have to be decided. For an organization of 26 nations, this is a great challenge but it is the merit of the Alliance to be able to raise a common discussion on such demanding issues with a shared view

about their handling. The more NATO is dealing with security issues, the more its value-added has to be defined in order to be sure that NATO's commitments will be fulfilled with the proper resources needed. This collective endeavour highlights the ambition NATO would have in order to be able to face the threats and challenges of the XXI. century.

As NATO is preparing itself to deliver for the next decade, it must be able to reach out to those who will be in charge of public and private issues in the 2010s, namely the coming generation. Since the beginning of this century, the way people access information, and share it, has been significantly changed. The very powerful networks developed on the web are playing an ever greater role, and the organizations which are not keen to find their way on the websphere could well be ignored, whatever the success of their achievements. It could be the same for NATO if we do not pay attention to our Strategic Communications. Afghanistan, in a more striking way than during the Kosovo air operations, has shown that our opponents are very efficient in using the new information technologies, and that our democracies are facing more and more public doubts if we do not ensure that our citizens understand, in a balanced way, the achievements but also the difficulties we face in our mission. Information technologies provide the capability to engage on a wide basis with our citizens, beyond the limited number of specialists and experts. At Bucharest, we have been tasked by the Heads of State and Government to fulfil the "need for appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive communication with local and international audiences in relation to NATO's policies and engagement in international operations" and have underscored their "commitment to support further improvement of our strategic communications by the time of the 2009 Summit". This roadmap is striking and needs to be fulfilled.

It will be the aim of all our Public Diplomacy initiatives during NATO's 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary, to develop an interactive, modern and attractive network among all NATO nations' citizens, and beyond.

As a kick-off to this 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary, this conference illustrates successfully how it can be achieved, in such a kind and hospitable manner. Again, I would like to commend this very successful event which shows how our Turkish colleagues from the "Atlantic Council" are determined, with the support of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defense, to face the challenges NATO will have to address in this new era.



## KEYNOTE SPEECH

Vecdi GÖNÜL<sup>5</sup>

Mr. President,  
Dear Ambassador Akbel,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to congratulate the Turkish-Atlantic Council for the impressive organization of this important event. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Akbel and the staff for their wonderful hospitality. It is a privilege for me to address this respected forum. I believe that the discussions here will considerably contribute to our level of knowledge and in-depth understanding of the issues around the world.

Dear Guests,

Today, traditional territorial security threats sit alongside new threats to peace, prosperity and security. Challenges that include nuclear weapons proliferation, failed states that allow terrorism to go unchallenged, economic disorder, pandemics, energy security and climate change are common to everyone here today. These threats of an asymmetric nature are likely to occupy our agenda in the foreseeable future, whereas new ones might emerge if the current threats are not addressed properly. No nation has enough power and capacity to cope with them alone. Consequently, coordination and cooperation have become outstandingly important for international security, as never before in history. The developments after September 11 attacks proved once more that eliminating these new threats requires a multidimensional approach that cannot have a hope of success unless a genuine collective effort is undertaken.

Dear Colleagues,

The first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, declared the main goal of NATO in a funny and straightforward way. He said that “it was to

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<sup>5</sup> H.E.M., Minister of National Defence of The Republic of Turkey

keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.” This statement sounds a purely conventional way of stating the main goal of the organisation.

As the main actor providing security in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO is constantly taking on additional roles and responsibilities in order to meet continuously changing risks and prevailing instability. While it is preparing to celebrate its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary in April, enhanced cooperation with countries out of its conventional area of responsibility under the auspices of “Contact Countries”, “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” and “Mediterranean Dialogue” expanded NATO’s domain, considerably.

In the light of these developments, it has become now imperative for NATO to adapt itself to the new security environment, which requires revision of its roles and responsibilities. Therefore, I want to spend some time talking about NATO's transformation, now.

The essence of the Alliance is common defence as expressed in Article V; and the importance attributed to this has to be maintained throughout the change process. In this era in which the world has begun discussing the future of NATO, the alliance's transformation has gained importance in addressing the requirements of the new security environment by creating new structures and mechanisms. The changes in this environment since 1999 are to be reflected in the new Strategic Concept.

The Declaration on Alliance Security, which is due to be adopted at the 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit of NATO, is expected to articulate the Alliance’s vision of its role in meeting the evolving challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and maintaining the ability to perform the full range of its missions, collectively defending our security at home and contributing to stability abroad.

In this context, reference to the enduring value of the transatlantic link, to solidarity and cohesion, to the indivisibility of Allied security and to maintaining the collective defence as the main purpose and the most important task of the Alliance, should continue to be the core of the Declaration and updated Strategic Concept.

As you may be aware, there is an ongoing initiative in NATO, the so-called Multiple Futures Project, which is an important study aiming to explore what the future could possibly look like 10-25 years from now. The purpose of the Multiple Futures Project is to create a conceptual framework, which articulates plausible future environments facing the Alliance, and aims at identifying the relevant threats and their security and military implications. I expect the conclusions of this Project will also constitute an

intellectual contribution to the Alliance's Security Declaration and the eventual version of the Strategic Concept.

Currently, some significant tools of the Alliance are under review. As a fundamental tool for the Alliance, the NATO Response Force (NRF) is one of them. I think it should remain as the Alliance's key project for transformation. Nonetheless, as we reconsider its missions and the ways of its employment, we should be aware that the work on its transformation should not compromise its effectiveness and role as the most robust tool of the Alliance.

Another important issue of transformation is Defence Planning. The study on defence planning should include all missions and tasks of the Alliance, not only the current operations. Solidarity, cohesion, equitable burden sharing in developing and operating the necessary capabilities will all be determinant in the future success of the Alliance.

In the study of Headquarters Reform we attach great importance to the maintenance of the effectiveness and role of the Military Committee and the principle of consensus in the decision-making bodies of the Alliance.

As for the Peacetime Establishment Review (PE Review), we generally support the work being done. As it is known, additional North Atlantic Council political guidance directs the retention of the geographical distribution of the NATO Command Structure. Our main concern is the likely arrangement that runs counter to this political guidance.

The ongoing study on Missile Defence is a major step taken in the direction of consolidating the Alliance's security. Turkey supports studies like this one and closely monitors the developments related to the US Missile Defence initiative. Any future NATO Missile Defence structure must provide coverage for the entire Alliance territory without leaving any gaps. Only then can the principle of indivisibility of security be achieved. It should also address threats from the whole spectrum of ballistic missiles, primarily with a focus on short and middle range ones in the near to mid-term. As the NATO Secretary General Mr. Scheffer (*ŞEFİR*) mentioned "the indivisibility of security is key. When it comes to missile defence, there should not be an A-league and a B-league within NATO."

Distinguished Guests,

Today's challenges can only be faced through a comprehensive approach among all actors in the areas of operation. At this point, I want to dwell on the comprehensive approach to operations. Turkey strongly supports the development of that idea. It will facilitate the creation of a more sound framework. It will also contribute to better and more effective

planning and execution of current and future operations that involve interaction with a wide variety of actors and factors in the theater of operations. The long term success of a comprehensive approach is only possible if all major actors have the same understanding of this concept. Therefore, we are pleased to observe that other international organizations such as the UN are beginning to discuss the issue in the same vein as NATO.

NATO-EU collaboration is an important aspect of a comprehensive approach. We are in favor of this cooperation and collaboration between the two organizations, as long as it is within the agreed framework. As a non-EU European ally and an EU candidate country, Turkey continues to support the activities in the framework of the Berlin (+) arrangements and the Nice Implementation Document.

Turkey has recently handed out a non-paper during the meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs to overcome the difficulties in the framework of NATO-EU cooperation. We proposed some solutions in the paper, which can pave the way for better cooperation of both organizations. I hope that the initiative will draw sufficient attention from our colleagues in the EU.

Dear Colleagues,

Turkey endeavours to support all the tasks and roles assumed by NATO, to the maximum extent possible. Being a member of NATO for 57 years, Turkey has clearly demonstrated her commitment towards peace and security in the world. We will continue our efforts in this line on the basis of common values and aims adopted by all allies.

Turkey's contributions to NATO started with its accession into the Alliance. During the Cold War, Turkey was an indispensable ally that was contributing to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area via its well-trained and equipped Armed Forces. It shared a direct territorial border with Soviet Union, which was the longest among all allies.

In addition to our contribution to operations under the auspices of United Nations and the European Union, Turkey currently supports the NATO operation in Kosovo with five hundred and twenty troops. It has also a significant contribution to NATO mission in Afghanistan. So far, more than one hundred and fifty million Dollars has been given to Afghan government. That contribution includes training and logistic support to both Afghan military and civilian administration.

Turkey has recently contributed 1,5 million Euros to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. It has also pledged 2 million Dollars to the UK-France Helicopter Initiative.

Additionally, Turkey's contribution to the creation of a safe and secure environment in Afghanistan continues. She assumed the command of ISAF twice and currently running a PRT in Wardak province.

Currently, there are eight hundred and twenty Turkish troops serving in Afghanistan. The majority of them are in Region Center. In addition to an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team operating along with Afghani Army, the Turkish third Corps has reinforced the International Security and Assistance Force Headquarters with one hundred and sixty personnel.

This year's elections will provide an important opportunity to give a new impetus to the processes under way in Afghanistan and to enhance the Afghans' support to our joint endeavour. Turkey has earmarked five million Dollars to support the election process. We will also provide a medical team, a psychological operations team and a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) team to Regional Command North. We are also considering taking over the command of the Regional Command Center in August, and sponsoring the Afghan Defence University and Staff College.

Afghanistan's individual efforts to improve cooperation with their Pakistani neighbours would benefit both Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as broader regional security. To this end, Turkey is contributing to facilitate cooperation between these two countries. We have built on the Ankara Process which started in April 2007, with a second Trilateral Summit among the Presidents of Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan on 05 December 2008 in Istanbul.

Acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia constitute today a serious concern. To fight against piracy, in addition to our contribution to the studies in NATO platforms and NATO's Operation Allied Provider, we have committed one frigate to the newly established Combined Task Force one hundred and fifty-one. Combined Task Force one hundred and fifty-one is a multinational task force that conducts counter-piracy operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea and was proposed by the USA to create a lawful maritime order and develop security in the maritime environment. We believe that its establishment is a significant step in the right direction.

Distinguished Guests,

I would like to briefly touch upon the South Caucasus as well. As revealed by the conflict between Georgia and Russia, the unresolved conflict in the Caucasus continues to be a main obstacle in developing a favourable environment for peace and stability in the region. The existing mechanisms

to find solutions to these conflicts have not been able to achieve any substantial result. As the tension between Georgia and Russia developed into a hot conflict, we thought that it would be necessary to find a new approach to address the problems of the Caucasus region.

Dear Colleagues,

As one of the distinguished American diplomat said “by joining NATO, you don’t leave your neighbourhood.” Keeping this in mind, Turkey has always pursued an active diplomacy in order to come up with sustainable solutions to the problems in its region. Therefore, with the understanding that the problems in the Caucasus have to be solved by peaceful ways, with due respect for the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of states, Turkey has launched a new initiative, namely the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” (CSCP), to bring a new and fundamental impetus to the region. The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform aims to strengthen regional peace, stability and security, encourage regional political dialogue, enhance economic cooperation, and develop good neighbourly relations in the region. It is not an alternative to any institution, mechanism, or any international body which currently deals with the problems of the Caucasus. We believe that the CSCP constitutes a significant and forward-looking initiative to facilitate the creation of common platforms. We are pleased to observe the active contribution of participant countries at higher senior levels during each meeting.

The Black Sea is an area of great importance. Preservation of security and stability in the Black Sea region through regional cooperation has always been a priority of Turkish policy. Regional ownership, making use of the existing initiatives and mechanisms to the maximum extent possible, avoiding duplication of efforts, focusing on the requirements and priorities of the region, promoting complementarity and synergy among the efforts of the international actors and indigenous mechanisms, are all of utmost importance.

The existing mechanisms in the region, such as the “Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC)”, “BLACKSEAFOR”, “Operation Black Sea Harmony”, “Black Sea Coast and Border Guards Cooperation Forum”, Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center Initiative” and “Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea” testify to the fact that the spirit and tradition of regional cooperation have clearly taken root among the countries of the region.

Desiring to add a political dimension and establish an overarching mechanism for the security initiatives in the Black Sea, we recently launched

the idea of setting up a Black Sea Defence Ministerial Process which aims to establish a forum for good neighbourly relations, strengthening regional defence capabilities and confidence building interaction among the countries of the region. To this end, the first Defence Ministerial will be held from 25-27 March 2009 in İstanbul.

I also would like to highlight Turkey's election to the UN Security Council temporary membership for the 2009-2010 term. This election has added to Turkey's responsibilities. Being aware of her growing responsibilities, she is committed to boosting her efforts to help realize the goals and vision of the United Nations.

Distinguished Colleagues,

As I am going to finalise my words, let me express a personal observation. As we draw nearer to witnessing the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of NATO, the challenges we face are growing bigger and bigger. They are more complex and wide-scaled as well. But no matter how tough the problems, I have always been convinced by the ability of all NATO allies to come together and get the big things right. For so long, many of the problems of the world have seemed intractable. I believe, however, that there are many reasons for optimism. As we look to the future, we should continue to strengthen the cooperation among ourselves, to cast aside old animosities and work together in the spirit of friendship to forge in the end a better and brighter future for all of the peoples in the world.

Before concluding my remarks, may I reiterate my sincere thanks to Ambassador Akbel and his colleagues for the excellent organization and hospitality. I also believe that the panels to be conducted will provide a fruitful platform, and produce innovative and forward-looking ideas to build a more secure and stable future in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

Thank you for your attention.





## SESSION I: NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

**Yahya DOĞAN<sup>6</sup>**

President Akbel,  
Distinguished participants,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me start by expressing my gratitude for the opportunity to be the moderator of the first panel of the 17<sup>th</sup> International Antalya Conference on Security and Cooperation. It is indeed a great honour and pleasure for me to be a part of this prominent event and to address such a distinguished gathering.

This first panel of the Conference will be dealing with the characteristics of the new security arena with a special emphasis on;

- the security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century,
- the impact of the new security environment on NATO and other international organisations,
- its impact on Turkey and on Russia.

We have four distinguished panellists to discuss these topics. I am confident that their contributions will provide us with an insight into the latest developments in the international security arena, and also set the scene for discussions in the following panels of our Conference.

The end of the Cold War era has brought about hopes for a less confrontational and more peaceful security environment. However, this optimism was overshadowed by the emergence of new risks and threats of asymmetric nature. Coupled with globalisation and technological developments, these challenges have gained transboundary dimensions with grave consequences on our global security and stability.

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<sup>6</sup> Speaker and Moderator, Prof.Dr., Member of Turkish Parliament, Vice-Chairman of Turkish Delegation to NATO Parliamentary Assembly

In order to respond to the requirements of this new environment, NATO and other security organisations have embarked on a transformation and adaptation process. The urge to undertake new responsibilities and mandates also necessitates the acquisition of new means and capabilities for security organisations to better cope with the existing and potential challenges.

While Turkey's geo-strategic location makes her vulnerable to these risks and threats, it equally increases her importance and capacity to actively contribute to peace and stability in her region and beyond.

Now, after having made this brief introduction into our topic, I would like to turn to our distinguished panellists who, through their extensive knowledge and wide experiences, will provide us deeper insight into the developments in the international security domain.

Our first speaker is Prof. Mustafa Aydın, an esteemed Turkish academician whose assessments and analyses on international relations, foreign policy and security issues have always been taken as a reliable and valuable reference. Prof. Aydın is currently the Chairman of the International Relations Department at TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara. Prof. Aydın, you have the floor.

Our second panellist is Ambassador Jesper Vahr, Danish Ambassador to Turkey. Ambassador Vahr has vast experiences in security issues, and is a well known personality in NATO circles. In the past, Ambassador Vahr led the Reform Group launched by the NATO Secretary General. Through this Group, he has made valuable contributions on the ways of improving the efficiency of NATO Headquarters. I think the topic which he will talk about now is very much relevant to his experiences in the framework of this Group. Ambassador Vahr, the floor is yours.

Our third panellist is Ambassador Yusuf Buluç, Turkey's Permanent Representative to the OSCE. He is an esteemed diplomat who has extensive knowledge and experience in international security issues. Having also served in NATO, he is a well known personality in international security fora. Ambassador Buluç, we look forward to listening to you.

Our fourth panellist is Mr. Pavel Knyazev. He is the Head of NATO Section at the European Cooperation Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his presentation he will give an overview of the developments in the current security environment from Russia's perspective, with a particular emphasis on Russian initiative on European Security Treaty. Mr. Knyazev, the floor is yours.

I would like to thank to our panellists for their contributions. We have greatly benefited from the ideas and views they have shared with us in an

open and frank way. We have now enough food for thought to continue our deliberations. I now open the floor for questions and comments.

Once again I would like to thank to our panellists for their contributions. Also many thanks to all participants who contributed to our debates through their questions and comments. I believe that our discussions have been fruitful. We have now a good basis and enough food for thought for the following panels of our Conference.

Thank you.



## CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY

**Mustafa AYDIN<sup>7</sup>**

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I also would like to thank Turkish Atlantic Council and especially Ambassador Akbel and to inviting me here and giving me this floor. Most of the welcoming speeches have already listed what I wanted to say. And they already showed us the way that 21<sup>st</sup> Century security environment, what predicament we are going to face in 21<sup>st</sup> century. Under these circumstances, let me try to problematize and more questions onto the table regarding the 21<sup>st</sup> century environment.

Until the end of Cold War in the good old days, the security was defined in terms of power. It was some sort of a side kick to power. If you have power you had a security. That was a very easy definition, very understandable and it was easy to conceive, understand and accumulate. However since the end of Cold War, we are facing a situation where even the definition of security, even the discussion about the security itself the terminology is not easy to end. It is very difficult to come by a single definition that everybody in the literature or writing about security would agree. There are so many challenges even to define what security is. In the again good old days, absence of war was accepted as peace. Then some other people came around 1970s and late 1960s and they said, “Hang on, the absence of war should not mean peace itself. There should be some values added to that environment. Values that we cherish in order to call an environment as a peaceful one... The values such as justice, firmness, fairness, equality were added to the definition of peace and security.” Now we even question this, would this enough without War and with the addition of justice, fairness and equality. Do we still have a peaceful world? Do we have a secure world? Some people would argue otherwise. They would argue that in order to be secure we need to live in a world without fear. I would leave it to you to decide whether we can have a world a kind of a wonderful world, or wonder world, that we can live without fear, or free as a bird. If you, some of you might have already noticed that in the previous

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<sup>7</sup> Prof.Dr., TOBB University of Economics and Technology

session there was a bird here flying around. I wonder whether it felt free because it was contained within this room. It could fly but it was contained somehow.

The first challenge in this kind of environment regarding security is to understand what security is. The second challenge is security for whom. The most important question is security for whom? Whatever way we understand the security, we have to provide this for somebody or something. Again in the good old days the answer was very clear. The state... The state has to be secure then the state will secure its citizens. So the state and the citizens... Today this is not easy question to respond. Today we are talking about individual security, human security. We are talking societal security which individuals gather. Then we are talking about the state security. And beyond the state we have international society. And even then we have global society. So these are all different levels of security that we can provide to. The third challenge and the second question is security from what? Military attack was in the good old days the respond to this question. Easy again... But, today we have so much different threat perceptions whether existence or perceptive. We already have a list in the opening speeches and one of them is of course is terror. And this is on everybody's mind. Nowadays there are various definitions and versions of terror. But is this enough? Economic or social unrest, political collapse today is defined as one of the acute problems of 21<sup>st</sup> century. We have even a word, a definition for it. Failed state... Failed state is a threat for its own citizens and also countries around the world. How about social unrest, changes, revolutionary upheavals...

The upheavals we have faced for example few weeks ago in Athens. For example, my friends, my Greek friends are there. I was in Athens just 2 days ago and I saw people who are afraid of going into the midtown to have dinners. They are staying in their own localities. They are withdrawing from the center of the town. Why? Why are they intimidated? Should we feel intimidated about this kind of upheavals? How about scarcity of resources? Is it a challenge or is it a threat? If you don't have enough energy, enough water, enough food to feed our people, or other raw materials... I think it is a challenge and a threat. How about environmental challenges? Nobody talked about environment in the good old days except some environmentalist or greens. But nowadays even within the NATO a security structure formally a defense organization is now talking about environmental problems. Global warming, rising sea levels... But not only that...

Imagine a tanker trying to alleviate the problem of energy security, passing through the state, Bosphorus and exploding there. While trying to solve one problem, energy security creates another kind of security problem which is the environmental security. And how about information

vulnerabilities that we all have? Internet... It is a wonderful tool but I can feel inadequate if I live couple of hours without reach to internet. I can not do anything in my life nowadays without getting in touch with internet. Last year we had an example of cyber attacks, or possibility of cyber attacks. Information warfare...

These are new kind of challenges that we are facing in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Another question that I would put on table is security from whom? Not from what but from whom? Who is threatening us not as concept but persons, individuals or what? States were responsible in the good old days for the threats. They created the problems, they solved the problems, and they provided the security. But nowadays that's not it. Individuals think about alone and determined suicide bomber. He can or she can create a chaos in any time in any city. Is it a threat? It is just one single person. Yes, it is a threat. How about groups, identifiable groups? The terrorist organizations we can identify. The Minister of Defense has already mentioned about the pirates in high seas. We can identify them. We can try to contain them. How about groups unidentifiable? Networks, fuzzy networks... We are talking about fighting international terrorism mainly against Al-Kaida. What's Al-Kaida? Just yesterday there was a clash in Istanbul between Turkish Police and Al-Kaida operatives trying to rob a post office. Was Usama bin Laden aware of this? Definitely not... He had no idea that some people in Istanbul operating under the name Al-Kaida trying to rob a post office. But this is the kind of threat that we are facing today. Fuzzy networks... We don't know the connections, we don't know the structures, and we do not know their leader and their connections. But this is definitely a problem. And it is very difficult to handle by traditional security organizations like NATO with traditional security organization means like armies... Another question mark I would put is security with what concepts and means. How can we provide security against these threats from these organizations or units? Military built-up was again the response in the good old day. This is not enough today definitely. Think defending yourselves with thousands of tanks you have against a suicide bomber. What can you do with your tanks or planes against a suicide bomber? Again, just one person, you can not stop them with your tanks. But now we have to respond from different perspectives, with different means. Economic, social, political instruments we need today. Not only the military. We need cultural and ideological conceptions. There are number of projects nowadays running around with the money of NATO actually, supporting NATO countries about countering ideological terrorism. Apparently there is something called terrorism, there is something international terrorism and there is something called ideology of international terrorism. Now within NATO we are trying to counter the ideology of the international terrorism. How can we counter the ideology of

anything? Not with guns not with machine etc. We have to counter them with ideologies, with ideas, with new thinking and maybe emancipation from fear. How can we emancipate, how can we make people free from fear in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Of course these are all leading us to a new definition of security which is multi-dimensional, which is multi-leveled and very different understanding of security of today then yesterdays.

Let me try to highlight 2 specific security challenges for the year 2030 for this multiple future's project. The 2 challenges I believe that will be very important by 2030 are resource scarcity and dependency first, and the demographic challenges the second. Not Iran nuclear ambitions, not Iraq whatever Iraq would do, not democratization, but these two. Let me please a little bit open it up.

Resource scarcity... when we talk about resources we all understand energy resources, and mainly hydrocarbon resources. This is not so. This is only one side of it. But it is very important of course. All the estimates, I am not an energy expert but I read some of their analysis, all the estimates show that by 2030 energy sector will still be dominated by the hydro-carbon resources. Whatever we are doing or trying to diversify our energy resources, by 2030 we will still be dominated by the use of hydro-carbons. In fact, opening up of North Pole because of global warming might even create a new scandal for oil. Thus more competition and more conflict as well. But however there is a mismatch between energy resources in the world and their consumers. Most of the energy resources are located in certain parts of the world but the consumers are very diversified. And this creates a real problem. Biggest consumers are of course in Europe, US, China, India. Biggest producers are in the Middle East and the Caspian Region. Need for transportation creates another security problem. How to prevent check points? How to prevent pipelines being blown up? And these of course create dependencies both political and economic dependencies and we all know what dependencies between states and nations create. But this is not the whole picture. Think about the water. Most of the world, actually 2/3 of the world today is living with the experience of the water scarcity. By 2030 if the global warming continues, more than three quarters of the world will experience water shortage. More than three quarters of the world. There is already talk and books about the water wars in the Middle East, Central Asia and already in Africa. The experts define the threshold of water as 1000 to 2000 m<sup>3</sup> per person per year. 1000 to 2000 m<sup>3</sup> per person per year is the adequate water resource. Today more than 30 countries are living under the 1000 threshold and Israel is planning to survive with the 125 m<sup>3</sup> per person per year. 1/16 of the adequate water resources... So this is the shortage and scarcity that we are facing by the 2030. And how about food? This is not



much talked but last year we started talking about this before and after the economic crisis. In the last few years we have started to use increasingly bio-diesel in order to alleviate our dependency on hydro-carbon resources. And also in order to alleviate our problems of environmental concerns. However trying to solve these energy dependencies and environmental security problems we are creating another problem. Usage of food stock for creating bio-diesel is creating food shortages around the world. And we are living in the 21st century. Everybody who is interested enough to look around would know that we are living in a century and in a time that we can provide food for everybody who is living in this planet easily. We are playing with the genes of the food stuff and etc. We can do that. But even today, 2009 there are people who are dying from hunger. If this is not a threat, then I don't know what the threat is.

And the second challenge by the 2030 I would talk about is the demographic challenges. Population growths in general create resource shortages, heighten economic problems, increase potential for political and social unrest, induced global warming and create environmental degradation. But there are two faces two extreme size of these changes of demography. On the one extreme side you have developed countries with aging populations, facing problem of sustainability of social state. They are experiencing one sort of a problem but on the other extreme of the border you have developing countries with young populations, not enough resources, not enough education, not enough to go by. Of course this creates migration which induces xenophobia, which creates social tensions and political tensions and another kind of threat. Of course this is a problem that is very difficult to solve today's instrument and understanding of security.

Finally let me talk few minutes about the utility of the state and military power. I started by stating that the military is not adequate and the state is not the only object of the provider of the security and provider of threat. Let me challenge myself here. Whatever I had said and whatever the arguments that we are hearing nowadays around the world, by 2030 the primacy of state as a security actor will continue. The primacy of state might be challenged, has already been challenged. There are other actors but by 2030 I would argue that the state would still be the main provider of the security and main source of threat in the world that we are living. And again, by 2030 military power, both in its traditional meaning and its new areas of employment will still be important. To provide security and to create security... Most of the threats will still be related to the state behavior by 2030. And most of the challenges still need to be consorted as responds from states and organized military deployment. However, on the other hand, this is one side of the picture. We should not forget that we can not any longer ignore other aspects,

other threats nor their importance and we can not afford to ignore the other threats that everybody is talking about. In this kind of environment what would I advice to a leader. It is very confused environment not like in the good old days when everybody know who was the enemy and where the threat came from and how can we deal with it. Today it is very fuzzy and difficult to understand. My advice would be a rephrasing of Theodore Roosevelt's dictum more than 100 years ago. He said in 1901, when talking about security or diplomacy, speak softly and carry big stick. This is how you make diplomacy and how you provide security. Today I would advice speak softly and carry big stick while consuming less, preserving more and sharing fairly what you have.

Thank you.

## IT'S IMPACT ON NATO AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Jesper VAHR<sup>8</sup>

Excellencies, Ladies & Gentlemen

First of all let me commend the Atlantic Council of Turkey for staging this event, perfectly timed in view of the upcoming NATO Summit in Strassbourg/Kehl.

Secondly I would like to thank the organisers for inviting me to speak. I am honoured to do so.

Thirdly a disclaimer. I suppose that the invitation is due more to my earlier incarnations of NATO-nerd, than to my present one as Denmark's Ambassador to Turkey. This allows me to speak more freely. But I do so in my own, personal capacity, rather than as a representative of my government.

I have been asked to speak on "the impact on NATO ... of the changing security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century". It already begs the question "which new security environment"? Ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO has been speaking about the new opportunities and risks and the evolving nature of threats and challenges. During these many years the pendulum has swung back and forth; and the new "new", some argue, increasingly bears resemblance to the old security environment.

Anyway, I will make three points:

1) that in recent years NATO has been acting too rashly at times, which has contributed to both undermining the credibility of its article 5 dimension and Alliance cohesion

2) that it has taken on too many tasks in a rather haphazard manner, bringing upon itself a "sprouting disease" (as in Brussels sprouts.....). It has shied away from defining "what we do" and has instead focussed on the more manageable question of "who we are".

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<sup>8</sup>Ambassador of Denmark to Turkey.

3) that NATO must be careful not get carried away about the reassertion of Russian military power in addressing the “what we do”-issue in the context of Declaration on Alliance Security to be issued from the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit and a possible revision of the Strategic Concept.

The 1999 Strategic Concept is not bad. Far from it. But this decade the Alliance made mistakes on several occasions. A new concept may constitute a chance to remedy some of that. But there is a risk that the current security political climate is not conducive to it.

But first let me take you through a couple of the mistakes.

I'll start in September 2001. Not on the 11<sup>th</sup> – but on the 12<sup>th</sup>. The day when NATO declared article 5, subject to it being determined that the attack on the US was directed from abroad. I don't deny the force of the sentiment that somehow NATO had to act. I - like others in this room - was there, caught up in the atmosphere like everyone else. But few if any, I would argue, had any thing resembling a clear idea, what article 5 meant in this case. And still, no one seems to have. Which altogether contributes to undermining the credibility of the musketeer-oath of article 5.

The measures agreed a month later still read as a testimony of good intentions but little more. What do we do about the naval Operation Active Endeavour, which was designed to “provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve” - the only one of the eight art. 5 measures agreed that remains really visible. If Article 5 is “un-declared” it would send a signal regarding NATO's determination in the fight against terrorism. So it drags on, constantly lacking contributions from the countries that agreed article 5 in the first place.

Let me move on to the next mistake: October 7 2001. The day the phone didn't ring. That was the day the US commenced air raids on Afghanistan. Just 4 weeks after NATO declared art. 5 – the strongest pronouncement of solidarity imaginable. And what happened: The US went it alone. Didn't bother to convene the North Atlantic Council to let it know that now it took action. Instead we watched it on CNN!

The significance of this goes beyond the omission itself. It was a sobering testimony of how the US administration really saw NATO. A tool to be applied or not applied according to what served US interests of the day. Not the epitome of a transatlantic relationship that had to be nourished and where everyone sometimes had to sacrifice a little now to gain a lot collectively later. We saw more examples of that in subsequent years.

Simultaneously, and perhaps partly encouraged by the initial rejection and subsequently only gradual acceptance of NATO as a player in

Afghanistan, the Alliance slipped into the “gee, isn’t there somewhere we can do good”-approach. Combined with the US tool box approach the consequences of that were sad. The Cathrina Operation is the most glaring example. Symbolics for an American audience to demonstrate that at least NATO had some relevance. Little impact. And causing embarrassment to contributors when provisions finally arrived in the US, in many cases by ship many weeks after the disaster.

And more followed, such as the earthquake operation in Pakistan. Clearly on the fringes of indeed beyond what NATO should be doing, even according to the 1999 Strategic Concept. OK, I accept the perceived need to be “seen to be doing something” to mellow NATO’s image in a country whose cooperation we needed and continue to need in the conduct of our most important military mission, the one in Afghanistan. But I question the impact. And the race with other international organizations wasn’t pretty.

Other examples could be quoted. Together they are clear symptoms of what I call a “sprouting disease”: something pops up here; something pops up there and we act but on the basis of no overall conceptual approach.

We don’t seem to have a clear sense of the Alliance’s strategic rationale. Because NATO since 1999 has shied away from addressing the difficult issue of “what we do?”. We have just done it. Rather aimlessly. And instead we have focussed our conceptual energies on another important, but somewhat easier question, that could command the attention of world publics at Ministers’ meetings and Summits. Namely: “Who are we”: Enlargement and Partnerships.

Don’t get me wrong. I think the enlargement of NATO has been and is very, very important. Friends from NATO will know that I have devoted more energy to that particular issue than most. But what in 1997 and 2002 were fundamental strategic decisions, that deserved the attention the issue commanded, in subsequent years while still important but more routine to some extent was turned into a surrogate big headline issue that “justified” NATO not addressing the “what-we-do” issue. But one that was a marketable Summit deliverable.

So what is it that I am after? I am advocating a NATO that is more selective in its choice of operations. A NATO that focuses on the sort of operations where there really are no other security providers available. The EU is there, of course. But for a long time to come, I think we will see the EU in spite of its ambitions be confined to operations in the lower end of the scale, the traditional peacekeeping ones, if for no other reason than because NATO unlike the EU has the US as a member and because the EU simply has not yet developed a body-bag-acceptance culture as part of its security

policy identity. So NATO is destined to be doing crisis management operations in the sharp, relatively high risk end, of the scale. Afghanistan being the case in point and an operation where NATO simply cannot afford to fail if it is to retain its relevance. A genuine make-or-break challenge.

Therefore it is about time that NATO started addressing the “what-we-do”-issue, as it is now on the threshold of doing, with the upcoming Declaration on Alliance Security as a first step. I am worried about the timing of it, though. As I started out by saying, the pendulum now seems to be swinging back, to the new “new”, which looks old.

In 1999 the Alliance in its Strategic Concept outlined 5 fundamental security tasks:

- 1) security;
- 2) consultation;
- 3) deterrence and defence;
- 4) crisis management (including crisis response operations);
- 5) partnership.

But the Bucharest Summit Declaration, agreed in April 2008 i.e. before the Georgia war, stated that “a strong collective defence of our populations, territory and forces is the core purpose of our Alliance and remains our most important security task.”. In other words a clear hierarchy and a return to the strategic outlook of times prior to the 1999 Strategic Concept. And less than two months ago, Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Brussels hammered home this point even more emphatically.

So while a revision of the Strategic Concept to set out in clearer terms what NATO should do in my opinion is certainly desirable, I am worried that it will now be happening in a context that risks rolling back NATO’s *raison d’être* to the past, shifting again the weight of its feet from non-article 5 to article 5.

Certainly the traditional article 5 Allies feel re-emboldened. Some of this is due, I accept, to a genuine feeling of insecurity. Many of the countries that joined the Alliance as members in recent years did so, I am sure, first and foremost for the article 5 guarantee. Given their history who can blame them?

But other motives may also be at play.

One is related to infrastructure and Alliance financing. NATO in recent year, with a deplorable time lag, has significantly reprioritized its commonly

funded infrastructure to reflect the new (the old “new” that is) security environment. One consequence is that projects like runways that in the past may have been eligible for NATO funding have been far less likely to be so recently. Which again means that the individual Ally foots the bill, not NATO. But to the extent that a new strategic concept may entail a revival of the article 5 dimension and territorial defense, some of these projects may again become eligible for NATO funding. In other words less of a drain on the individual project nations own coffers, and more on NATO’s. Do some Defence and Finance ministers see opportunities here? You bet! But there will be clear consequences for NATO’s common funded activities supporting crises response operations. This is a zero-sum game!

Secondly NATO in recent years has sought to transform forces and capabilities so as to be able to develop and field modern, interoperable, flexible and sustainable forces that can carry out operations beyond Alliance territory with little or no host nation support. In some countries that has been a significantly harder sell than in others. Do reluctant nations with big and static forces focussed on territorial defence feel a whiff of spring air now that raises hopes that the constant pressure to go “lean and mean” will be reduced? You bet.

And so what, one might ask, if indeed a return to the age of article 5, the challenge of territorial defence and more traditional approaches to defence planning were justified. But I doubt that it is.

Will the construction of a few air fields or the elaboration by SACEUR of a couple of article 5 contingency plans for countries in Central and Eastern Europe deter anybody? Probably not. Measures will be interpreted for what they are: essentially symbolic action with the aim of bringing across the point that NATO means business. That article 5 is for real. But I think its fair to say that this is a message that needs to be brought across far more directly. By core world leaders in unequivocal terms. By avoiding watering down what article 5 is all about as we unfortunately saw on 12 September. And by refraining from viewing NATO merely in tool box terms.

Those are the real challenges.

There is always a risk, that in planning one looks back at the most recent events, not forward to the most likely and relevant challenges, mistaking the former for the latter. I hope that the Alliance will not make that mistake as it sets out to define “what we do”.

Thank you for your attention.





## IT'S IMPACT ON TURKEY

**Yusuf BULUÇ<sup>9</sup>**

Mr.Minister,  
Mr. Chairman,  
Distinguished Guests,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to begin by expressing my thanks to the Turkish Atlantic Treaty Association, which has been successfully organizing this traditional conference series on security matters for many years now. I would also like to thank all those who have taken part in and contributed to the organization of this prominent gathering which includes my mentors, seniors and peers. I have always valued highly invitation to these conferences. More so, I find it gratifying to have been allotted this slot to address the present distinguished audience.

We have heard from a series of eminent speakers their perception of the features and defining parameters of the security setting of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Arguably, I should be able to take the broad canvas they have put before us, as my starting premise and comfortably proceed to an analysis of it for Turkey on that basis. Not so easy. Because everything they said apply to defining Turkey's security environment and a bit more, as the setting for Turkey is far too complex.

Distinguished Guests,

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has been witnessing dramatic changes in terms of both characteristics and dimensions of risks and threats. The challenges and threats have become multidimensional in essence and trans-boundary in scope. As a downside, globalization and technological development have adversely contributed to the emergence of new risks and threats of asymmetric nature, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cross-border organized crime.

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<sup>9</sup> Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Turkey to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

In the context of a comprehensive definition of security, economic disparities, poverty and corruption are identified as sources of instability which result in demographic shifts, conflicts over natural resources, illegal migration, refugee flows and consequently fundamentalism, discrimination and xenophobia.

On the other hand, conventional threats to security, such as intra and interstate conflicts have not ceased to exist. The military intervention in Iraq in 2003, the Lebanon War of 2006, the conflict that erupted between Russia and Georgia in August last year and Israel's latest operations in Gaza Strip are just a few examples of inter-state conflicts that have caused unprecedented pain and distress for thousands of people even if these conflicts were eventually resolved, in human terms they will remain as open wounds for generations to come.

The changing characteristics of security risks and threats have two implications: Firstly, because of the broadened embrace and scope of the challenges we are forced to move beyond the geographical conception of security. Furthermore, their global and transnational nature makes it impossible for any single country or organization to attain and manage security entirely on its own. A broader approach to security, which encompasses a web of partnerships, coalitions and cooperation involving all relevant actors has become indispensable.

Secondly, in order to address the current questions of security states are required to develop and deploy a multitude of assets besides military power. Complex nature of challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century calls for multi-faceted solutions involving the application of political, social, economic and cultural resources and instruments. This is not meant to underrate the significance of military power, but to highlight the growing importance and effectiveness of soft security measures and its associated instruments.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Owing to her geo-strategic location straddled on the three continents and in the center of a spectrum of states with different political systems, socio-cultural backgrounds and varying levels of development, Turkey is a country which has been and continues to be directly affected by changes in the security environment.

With some ease of political jargon, let us characterize Turkey's environment as volatile one, that has hosted many conflicts in the recent past and continues to house several of the current ones. Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf war, the ethnic conflicts that erupted during the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,

the 2003 war against Iraq, the latest armed conflict between Georgia and Russia and the ongoing dispute between Israeli and Palestine, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the invasion of parts of Azerbaijan by Armenia; all have a direct bearing on its security. That three of the four so called frozen conflicts in the OSCE region are within the immediate neighborhood of Turkey must reveal a telling story of what volatility and unpredictability are about.

Apart from these more conventional forms of intra and inter-state challenges, Turkey has also been deeply affected by many of the asymmetric threats that have become more prominent in the post-Cold War era. The long list with terrorism at the top, comprises organized crime, drugs, arms and human trafficking, as well as proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

Being a country located at the hearth of “new” and “old” set of challenges, Turkey pursues a pro-active and result-oriented foreign policy so as to prevent conflicts and help maintain regional peace and stability. Indeed, the objective of Turkish foreign policy is to further enhance Turkey’s capability to project security and stability to its own neighborhood and beyond, while at the same time helping create an ever widening zone of prosperity stretching from the Balkans and Caucasus through the Middle East and Central Asia.

Turkey’s efforts towards this end can be grouped in four main areas, namely political, military, economic and cultural.

Firstly, Turkey in the face of pressing new challenges has upgraded and intensified its **political and diplomatic efforts** to secure a stable and peaceful neighborhood. While crafted in pursuit of carefully defined national interests Turkey’s foreign and security policies incorporate, in equal measure, balance, fairness and impartiality where applicable. Thanks to these qualities of its policies and effective diplomacy as well as close cultural and historical ties, Turkey is considered as a reliable and trusted actor in her region. This, in return, makes it possible for Turkey to play an increasingly active role through the application of a variety of diplomatic and political instruments.

Turkey’s efforts to bring Iraq back on its feet as a state with its territorial integrity intact politically united and economically prosperous deserve special mention and emphasis in this regard. In order to assist in the stabilization and reconstruction efforts of the country, Turkey launched the “Neighbors of Iraq” process in 2003, which later expanded to include significant international and regional actors such as UN, EU and OIC.

Unfortunately, the presence of the PKK terrorist organization in the northern part of the country continues to be a poisoning element in the Turkish-Iraqi bilateral relations. Here again, as a responsible member of the international community, Turkey continues its dialogue with both the Iraqi central government and the local administration in the north, besides making the full use of the tripartite mechanism among Turkey, USA and Iraq. Turkey is also contributing to NATO's efforts through NATO's Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I).

Turkey's fight against terrorism deserves elaboration more than a passing remark in the context of Iraq. Terrorism of the kind perpetrated by the PKK enshrines the most daunting definition of being transboundary, having direct links with organized crime and the fight against which must be collective and sustained. No cause or circumstance may justify it as this would result in safe heavens and political accommodation that the terrorists are looking for.

Afghanistan is another case I would like to dwell on. The word case might well be an understatement as it has the potential to seriously test the vitality of NATO and the credibility of its solidarity. Apart from its peace keeping and peace building efforts in the framework NATO's ISAF operation, which I will address later on, Turkey offers an extensive assistance package exemplary in its military and civilian interface to help the creation of a secure and stable Afghanistan. Since the security of Afghanistan and Pakistan is closely interrelated, Turkey has introduced and has been host of a trilateral process to contribute to the creation of the much needed atmosphere of trust and cooperation between the two countries.

Turkey also favors and works actively for achieving a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the critical problem arising from Iran's pursuit of a nuclear capability. Turkey, respects the right of Iran to access nuclear technology under the provisions of NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), while at the same time urges Iran to address fully and in a transparent manner the concerns of the international community as to the nature and aim of Iran's nuclear programme. With the goal of helping to improve the dialogue between the parties and supporting their efforts to arrive at a peaceful and viable solution to the problem, in addition to our close and critical engagement with Iran, we hosted a meeting in 2007, between the Iranian Chief Negotiator and the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, an event which created a certain momentum in the process.

Another tangible example of a Turkish initiative designed for preserving peace and security concerns the South Caucasus region. We

believe that the lack of confidence among states in this region hinders the resolution of the so called frozen but otherwise potentially explosive conflicts. That is what we had in mind when we introduced the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) initiative. We hope that by bringing together five countries of the region, CSCP will help in developing political dialogue and good-neighborly relations in the region. It seeks to create a new format untried before but with no ambition to substitute or subsume any of the existing platforms for conflict resolution.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thanks to the advances in communication and information technologies, our knowledge of each other expands and our world shrinks. Consequently, it becomes even harder to close our eyes to the unfolding developments in the other parts of the world and to the sufferings of others. This fact is particularly relevant in the face of deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

This crisis has unfortunately spoiled the somewhat improving and relatively propitious political atmosphere that has been evolving in the framework of the Middle East Peace Process. Israeli-Syrian indirect peace talks which had been undertaken upon Turkey's initiative have also suffered from this recent conflict. If this crisis is not brought to an end and a reliable and sustainable quality is not achieved for the existing but fragile arrangement it will become more detrimental to both regional and international peace and stability. As much as it is the obligation of the parties to bring to an end the hostilities, it is equally the responsibility of the international community to facilitate a solution and remedy the humanitarian tragedy in Gaza. Turkey, being an active contributor to the stability in this region, has been employing all available means of diplomacy to ensure the implementation of all aspects of Resolution 1860.

In 2008, after a gap of some years, in recognition of the credibility and effectiveness of its political and diplomatic efforts, Turkey has been elected with the support of an overwhelming majority of member states as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. This crowning achievement is a testimony to what we have been doing is right, fair and balanced as such with exhorts us to do more and better.

NATO and its collective security and defence commitments under its founding act, represent the bedrock of Turkey's contribution to peace and security in the military. Need for brevity obliges an abbreviated list of such endeavours. Afghanistan is a good example at hand to start off. Turkey assumed the command of ISAF operation twice and the command of the Regional Command Capital between April-December 2007. Turkey is slated

to reassume this command in the course of the current year. Turkey's man power contribution to this operation, so critical to the security of regions well beyond central Asia, is not negligible, at just under 1000. Convinced that security and stability in Afghanistan can only be established provided that military efforts are accompanied by endeavors to achieve sustainability in the political and economic development of the country.

Turkey has put in place a comprehensive development assistance package involving projects in health, education, construction and investment, civilian-military capacity building and humanitarian aid.

In view of the significance of self-sufficient, well-equipped and well-trained security forces for a sustainable peace and stability in Iraq, Turkey also contributes to the training of Iraqi security forces, with two officers currently employed in the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Furthermore, since 2005, more than 110 Iraqi security personnel have attended in various courses at the Turkish Partnership for Peace (PfP) Training Center and Center of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (CoE-DAT)

Turkey has been doing her utmost for the success of KFOR operation in Kosovo. From May 2007 to May 2008, we assumed the command of the Multi National Task Force South. Currently, Turkey has 525 soldiers under KFOR and deployed 10 personnel under the NATO Training Team in Kosovo.

Turkey's military contributions to global peace and security go far beyond NATO framework and dates back to Korean War of early 1950s. Since the Cold War era, Turkey has strongly supported international efforts from Somalia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, East Timor and Lebanon by contributing troops, material and observers to UN, NATO, EU and OSCE missions. To date over 10 thousand Turkish troops have participated in numerous international peace-keeping operations.

In view of the increasing urgency to develop collective responses to new threats, Turkey has been a staunch supporter of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) from the beginning and has made substantial contributions to its development. Moreover, Turkey is currently the biggest non-EU contributor to the ESDP missions and operations.

I would also like to mention regional security initiatives which Turkey has pioneered, such as Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe, the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) and Operation Black Sea Harmony.

Distinguished guests,

We believe that **economic cooperation** is the corner stone of both regional and global security and stability. In that sense, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) is a successful Turkish initiative bringing regional countries together for 16 years. Ankara forum is another significant project which aims to bring peace through economic cooperation and integration. Turkey's memberships in diverse economic organizations such as OECD, D-8, G-20 and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) provide a valuable link between developed and developing economies. Furthermore, Turkey's contributions in this area also include successful hosting of the Summit of the Least Developed Countries in 2007 and Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in 2008 as well as high level meetings with Pacific Island states and Caribbean countries.

Increased humanitarian and development assistance has become another prominent feature of the Turkish foreign policy. Indeed, Turkey is now recognized as an "emerging donor country". The total amount of public and private sector assistance provided by Turkey over the recent years has reached to 3 billion dollars. Its commitment to Palestinian Authority and Afghanistan might be worth mentioning in this regard. In support of the social and economic development projects, Turkey has committed 150 million dollars for the former and 200 million dollars for the latter.

Owing to her strategic location which is in close proximity to nearly 70 percent of the world's proven energy resources and the main transport routes going through her territory, Turkey plays a key role in the diversification and security of energy supplies. Realized or planned projects such as Bakü-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Bakü-Tbilisi-Erzurum and Nabucco are important examples of regional cooperation which enhance global security and stability.

**Cultural efforts** constitute another tool of the Turkish foreign policy in promoting peace through better understanding of each other.

The first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has witnessed the danger of polarization along religious and cultural lines. Some of us have made the serious mistake of associating terrorism with a particular religion and region. So as to prevent the emergence of new cultural divisions and to enhance mutual understanding and tolerance, Turkey hosted in 2002 the first ever joint forum meeting of the EU and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). In 2005, it assumed the co-chairmanship together with Spain the "Alliance of Civilizations" initiative under the auspices of the UN, which aims at promoting better dialogue among different cultures, as well as countering extremism of all types through collective efforts. Turkey is also a

participant in the G-8's "Broader Middle East Project" and a co-chair of the "Democracy Assistance Dialogue".

Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished Participants,

In such an unstable neighborhood, with its deep-rooted attachment to universal values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights as well as its democratic and secular state tradition, Turkey stands as an island of peace and stability. By means of its multi-dimensional foreign policy, it helps build a peaceful, stable and cooperative regional and international environment. In this endeavor, Turkey draws strength from its traditional ties with its allies and friends in the West and its membership of Western institutions. Still being the backbone of its defence and security policy, NATO, has a unique and irreplaceable place in this regard.

Thank you for your kind attention.



## **RUSSIAN INITIATIVE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY**

**Pavel KNYAZEV<sup>10</sup>**

Nearly twenty years have elapsed since the end of the Cold War. We are not challenged with ideological confrontation anymore. But when it comes to ensuring the security of the Euro-Atlantic states we are still relying on the arrangements and instruments of the long gone decades. To a large extent the development of the Pan-European hard security structure has been frozen, stuck in the times of the late “cold war” period. If we can overcome this tunnel vision in terms of ideologies, we should be able to achieve a new kind of collaboration between States in the area of hard security.

The August events in the Caucasus had far-reaching consequences, including for Euro-Atlantic politics. Indeed, as President Sarkozy said, “the cards were redealt.” They showed as clearly as ever the flaws of the existing mechanisms in the security field in the Euro-Atlantics. Tbilisi's armed gamble has buried the illusion that the existing security arrangements could be sufficient and effective to maintain peace and security in Europe. Fragmented, with a pretension to NATO-centrism, it was unable either to avert the August crisis or provide an immediate response to stop the unwarranted military attack against a sleeping European city or to evaluate these tragic developments appropriately. After the Caucasus crisis, it obviously will not be possible to carry on in Euro-Atlantic politics as if nothing happened.

Europe still has no collective security system which would be open to everyone and would provide equal security for everybody. The European Union, NATO, CIS, CSTO by their institutional character are focused on ensuring security exclusively for their member states and do not fundamentally coordinate their agendas which quite often overlap and even contradict each other. OSCE, though based on a comprehensive approach to

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<sup>10</sup> Head of NATO Section, Department of European Cooperation, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

security, has been focused, unfortunately, mostly on achieving progress on the so called "Second" and "Third Baskets", effectively neglecting for a long time the "First Basket" - thus is fading lately into irrelevance on hard security issues.

Europe needs a positive rather than a negative agenda. President Medvedev came up with the initiative to conclude a European Security Treaty which should ensure a truly universal system of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area, provide it with a new quality-a universal "golden security standard" without isolation of any state and without areas with different levels of security.

The system "upgraded" in this way, which is based on the principles of multilateralism and priority of the international law, of the UN Charter, that excludes arbitrary interpretation of their provisions, will unite the whole Euro-Atlantic area on the basis of common "rules of the game", will provide for guaranteed and legally binding solution of security problems for many years ahead.

It would be necessary to start with a review of whether the formerly created structures and mechanisms are adequate today to the previously collectively agreed principles or if it is necessary to think of building a new European security architecture that firmly guarantees the inviolability of postwar frontiers and at the same time takes into account the realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It will be also required an honest discussion on why the Russia-NATO Council principle of the inadmissibility of ensuring one's own security at the expense of the security of others is not complied with, along with examining the problems that have arisen in relation to the CFE crisis, caused the refusal by some to ratify its adapted version under different pretexts, and plans to deploy elements of a US global antimissile system in Eastern Europe without proper-consultations with all those affected by it and agreeing on uniform standards in approaches to conflict settlement.

There is no false bottom in the idea of EST. Russian initiative does not contemplate the "marginalization" or alienation of any countries or international organizations. On the contrary, from the outset it provides for the participation of all the states of the Euro-Atlantic region and the multilateral security associations operating here the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the European Union (EU) and NATO- in the elaboration and conclusion of the treaty. No one is aspiring to close down NATO or other structures in which Russia does not participate. We just want all states and the security organizations in the Euro-Atlantic area to jointly examine the situation, analyze the problems that keep accumulating in this

sphere, which no one denies, and jointly devise ways to overcome them on a mutually acceptable basis. There is nothing anti-Western here; there is the sole desire that we should all be pro-European.

We all have to agree on common rules of the game, to gradually restore confidence, the undermining of which lies at the root of all our problems. Concluding a Treaty would ensure a new quality of politico-military protection for all our States that would also be extremely cheap. This is a positive alternative to a further build-up of mutual suspicions and fears, to a succession of unilateral decisions giving rise to the same symmetrical or asymmetrical answers and to a new spiral in the arms race.

Through the EST it should be possible to achieve a new kind of collaboration in the field of hard security. We are proposing an updated system of Euro-Atlantic security that should be long-lasting since it will be based on legally binding reciprocal commitments. Herein will be the obvious "added value" of the treaty compared to the provisions of previously agreed documents within the CSCE/OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council. Naturally, such a format is also conditional on agreement on mechanisms that would ensure compliance with the Treaty, including, inter alia, -if necessary- urgent consultations and instruments for the elaboration of a collective response to a particular situation.

We see key thematic blocks of the future Treaty roughly as follows:

- Legally binding confirmation and consistent interpretation and implementation of the basic principles of the security of States and of the relations between them in the Euro-Atlantic area, including the inadmissibility of the use of force;

- Guarantees ensuring equal security for the States of the Euro-Atlantic area by refusing to ensure one's own security at the expense of the security of the other Parties to the Treaty, which is in full accordance with the Charter for European Security;

- In line with the commitments under the same Charter, the genuine rejection of claims by individual States or groups of States to an exclusive right to maintain peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area; (This applies fully to Russia as well.)

- Identification of the basic principles for the development of arms control regimes, confidence building, restraint and reasonable sufficiency in military development;

- Imparting a new quality to co-operation in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime;

- Elaboration of uniform approaches to the principles, procedures and mechanisms for early warning and conflict prevention and resolution.

All of this is reflected in the non-paper on the key elements of a European Security Treaty circulated by us.

Negotiations on the European Security Treaty should be launched by a Pan European high level meeting with the participation of Heads of States and Government and Heads of the intergovernmental organizations operating in the security field in the Euro-Atlantic area. We expect that it will approve basic guidelines for the future work and define a relevant platform for negotiations. It goes without saying that such a summit meeting needs to be well prepared. We are not in a hurry and do not intend to set artificial deadlines. Among other interesting ideas we note the proposal by the OSCE Chair-in-Office to organize this year an informal high level thematic meeting in the OSCE framework in order to continue discussions on the new European security architecture.

We are not trying to impose anything on our partners and are ready to discuss other constructive ideas which would bring our common more secure future earlier. But for the moment we haven't received any concrete proposals, only hear about unfounded fears that our initiative for a new Pan-European Security Treaty might be aimed at undermining NATO or at substituting the comprehensive character of security as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, by consigning the humanitarian basket to oblivion. This is absolutely not true. We have publicly explained from the outset that we invite for participation in the Treaty elaboration not only all countries, but also all security-related international organizations in the Euro-Atlantic area, including NATO, EU, OSCE, CSTO, and CIS. We by no means want to cast doubt on the agreed (including humanitarian) foundations of OSCE activity. We are simply convinced that, in the sphere of what is called "military-political or hard security," too many explosive problems have piled up. First of all we need to address the problem with the non-application in the day to day practice of the principle of indivisible security that has been thus severely undermined. We are convinced that it is necessary to give top priority to this issue.

We must concentrate on ensuring that we all reach a common understanding of the tasks facing us in the field of hard security. But at the same time it is crystal clear that the launch of negotiations would itself have

an immediately useful effect, helping to improve the politico-military security situation in the Euro-Atlantic area.

We consider very useful to invite international experts and political scientists to join in the work on the themes to be discussed and endeavor to suggest new ideas that could enrich the future Treaty.

It is only by working together that we shall be able to determine the shape of the future Treaty. No one will be able to impose anything on anyone. The final product of the negotiations should be the result of joint brainstorming. Only collective effort will be possible to respond to the concerns of each and every State Party to the future Treaty.

We have no illusion that it's going to be easy, but the common problems are there and they need to be tackled with.



## SESSION II: FROM BUCHAREST TO STRASBOURG/KEHL SUMMIT

**Troels FROLING<sup>11</sup>**

Let me first of all once again to thank our hosts Ambassador Akbel, Professor Serin, The honouring treasure Cevad Odyakmaz and Prof. Zehra Odyakmaz. Also I see Pelin from the Youth's Atlantic Treaty Association of Turkey. Also it is a great pleasure to see you and to know that you are moving along in your professional career. I do pay a tribute as ATA Secretary General, but also in personal basis to Ambassador Bayülken. This has been said before a strong close friend former president of the Atlantic Treaty Association and colleague of us all. Now in the 42 ATA and YASA organizations you can say that the globalization of security has already been going on for years. We have as an example been running networks with our colleagues in the West Balkans set up three networks comprising some 500 participants of future leaders and DO's and young researchers. And the purpose of this has been together with our national associations of these countries to stimulate, develop civil society dimension, to challenge and to call for discussion of security political affairs and link with like my did persons and organizations in the other EU and NATO countries. I think you can do this as a proactive public opinion building. Now we are also developing this contact with our colleagues in Ukraine. In Bucharest last year we organized the Young Atlanticists Summit. We... that is a Euro-Atlantic Council of Romania and IC's president Alex Serban here. He is also the Vice President of the ATA. Together with the Atlantic Council of United States, with public diplomacy division of NATO, and of course with our young colleagues in the Youth's Atlantic Treaty Association and its president Mr.Giuseppe Belardetti. We got some more than 200 young students and professionals running their Atlantic Summit. And we reach out globally as well because we have had participants from for example Afghanistan Kabul University. I could also mention the national associations who organize activities that involved participant from countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the Shaihigh group. I should of course mention our host the Turkish ATA, Turkish YATA.

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<sup>11</sup> Secretary General of Atlantic Treaty Association

I can mention the Greek Euro-Atlantic Council with its chairman Theodosios Georgiou, former President of the DGE and the Italian Atlantic Committee with its Chairman who have just spoken the honorable Enrico La Loggia and its director Fabricio Lucioli. By pointing just giving this as an introduction is to say that in the civil society dimension of NATO the non-governmental organizations of the Atlantic Treaty Association, a lot of activities are going on that reach out beyond the traditional countries as well. At the same time the interest is being stimulated in the national countries and such. We look forward to the Strasbourg Kehl Summit in a couple of months in cooperation with the public diplomacy division who is the key organizer of this and the Atlantic Council of United States. The theme is NATO 2020 and the purpose is to stimulate discussion and debate among young people from of course the 26, but also from a number of countries from other continents than our own. Now the discussions today come to this afternoon's agenda. The discussions so far visualize the huge challenges for civil society in our member countries as to what is security, what shall be the functions of NATO as to security. And this is of course also we question that ATA associations are dealing with. Now it is my pleasure to introduce to this afternoon we have three speakers. Mr. Steven Sturm, director from the Policy and Planning Division of the NATO, we got Ambassador Tomur Bayer from the International Security Affairs Department and the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs in Ankara, and we got Major General Mehmet Çetin, from the Turkish General Staff who is the Chief of the Strategy Department. So we have three key figures here who will look in to not only to the calendar but a bit out into the future as well. The title is "From Bucharest to Strasbourg Kehl" and I call on Director Steven Sturm whose title is NATO's Partnership and Enlargement.



## NATO'S PARTNERSHIPS AND ENLARGEMENT

Steven STURM<sup>12</sup>

I would, first of all, like to thank the organisers of the Antalya Conference for their kind invitation to me to be a part of this distinguished panel. I believe that exchanges of this sort greatly contribute to enhancing our understanding of today's challenges and our combined efforts to deal with them.

It is also a particular personal pleasure to have been invited to Antalya. I use the word "personal" intentionally: a certain amount of disorder descended on my home over the recent holidays, not least due to the presence of all three of our children, two of whom had come back from their universities. One aspect of this disorder was a map that had fallen out of a recent National Geographic magazine and lain for many days unattended on a table. In the course of tidying up several days ago, my eyes fell across the map, and I noticed that it depicts this part of the world, under the title of the "crucible of history." I noticed on it in particular the city of Antalya.

I do not know whether the next NATO Summit will, in the judgment of future historians, have the significance of the events that have made the eastern Mediterranean the crucible of history, but that the Alliance is of historical importance I have no doubt, and that importance that continuing importance justifies careful thought, as at this conference, about its future course.

In my presentation today I hope to offer you a brief overview of NATO's transformation, including the importance of partnerships and enlargement, as we prepare to celebrate the Alliance's 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in two months' time. As I am a member of the Defence Policy and Planning Division in NATO Headquarters, let me start with the defence aspects of transformation before moving to the sensitive questions surrounding partnership and enlargement.

### NATO's Transformation

At the core of NATO's post-Cold War strategy lies the notion that the Alliance should be ready and able to tackle a wide range of possible security

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<sup>12</sup> Director, NATO

challenges, starting with collective defence but extending to crisis management operations potentially at great distance from Allied territory. This approach has been most recently set out in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, which was endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government at the Riga Summit in November 2006. It provides a vision for NATO's ongoing transformation, at least with respect to its defence capabilities, for the next 10-15 years. It is based on the premise that NATO will have to be able to meet challenges to the security of the Allies' populations, territory and forces irrespective of where those challenges may come from. It also stipulates that NATO, anticipating as well as it can future threats, risks and challenges, will need forces and capabilities that can conduct the full range of missions and operations, from low to high intensity, and in a multitude of geographical settings.

Let me offer two personal remarks about these familiar demands.

The first is that we should be under no illusions about our ability to foresee all the challenges to our security. I think we can agree on the broad outlines of our current and future situation. Today we find ourselves in a rapidly-changing international security environment where our nations face complex, interconnected threats. These include terrorism, extremism of various kinds, trans-national crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and instability due to failed or failing states. These challenges to our common security will not disappear—in fact, they are likely to grow in importance. The growing demand for energy, the scarcity of resources, our societies' increasing dependence on immensely complicated and vulnerable computer networks—these are trends that will stay with us for the foreseeable future, and bring with them their own particular security consequences. Therefore, we need to recognise and draw the implications of such security challenges and prepare to cope with them when and where they arise.

But the point I want to emphasise here is that the traditional and probably inevitable process of trying to anticipate the future and then, on that basis, of establishing policies and programmes and setting goals for our capabilities should not inadvertently foster the comforting illusion that the future can be accurately foreseen. We have had too much painful experience of strategic surprise to permit that mistake, and there is good analytical reason to believe that we will be surprised, harshly, again. In my view, this argues for a judicious measure of over-insurance in the realm of defence as well as, I am afraid, for some degree of fatalism.

The other point I would make about the Alliance's current strategic guidelines is that we will need, at least for a time, to abandon the rather casual, almost thoughtless, way in which we refer to the "full range of

Alliance missions.” We require capabilities for collective defence and capabilities for remote crisis response operations. Our analysis at NATO Headquarters indicates that these are, for the Alliance at large, much the same. Allies on the periphery of the Alliance, for example, can only be defended if other Allies have deployable forces, and in this sense there is no fundamental tension between the demands of collective defence and those for peace support operations at great distance. In any case, we are not engaged in remote operations out of a misplaced taste for adventure but because, after cold and careful calculation, we have reached the conclusion that highly important interests for all the Allies are at stake.

Nevertheless, Allies that over the last several have come to feel a degree of exposure, of risk to their territorial integrity and political independence, will insist on looking at this kind of reasoning more critically than they have in the past. As a related matter, I would anticipate a subtle shift at a conceptual level—in a new Strategic Concept, for example—in the relative weight given to collective defence on the one hand and crisis management operations on the other. We will then see whether such an adjustment has implications for our forces and capabilities.

Whether we collectively arrive at a new balance in this respect or adhere to the old one, we will need to continue with the process of transformation. In brief, NATO will continue to require interoperable and flexible forces that are well equipped, trained and exercised and able to be deployed at short notice, including well beyond Alliance territory. We need to increase our ability to provide strategic lift. And we need to make sure that we allocate adequate resources to meet these demands. As I say, these measures will be necessary whether we face inter-state conflicts, the spill-over effects of failed states, or large-scale terrorist attacks.

But transformation is expensive, takes time and steady application and needs sustained political support from Allied governments and parliaments. The current economic climate will only make this more difficult. It is also for these reasons, among others, that NATO continues to act as a catalyst for military transformation, ensuring that nations have a common understanding of what is required and that they can proceed on the basis of common military standards.

NATO has a number of ongoing efforts in this regard. Let me highlight only a few of them. The force planning process is the first and foremost instrument employed by NATO to identify the capabilities it will need in the future, and to promote their development and acquisition by the Allies. Turkey has historically been among the most vigilant Allies in demanding that we do not lose sight of the great advantages to collective endeavor

stemming from the force planning process. We are in the process of reforming the broader defence planning process of which it is a part to ensure greater coherence and focus and to lessen the burdens it imposes on capitals.

We have in addition established the NATO Response Force with two aims in mind: providing a highly ready, robust force for employment in a wide range of Alliance operations, and providing a spur or catalyst for further transformation. Many of you will be aware that we continue to wrestle with the difficulties stemming from inadequate commitment of forces to NRF rotations on the part of the Allies.

Other efforts focus on improving the ability of Allies to conduct and support multinational joint expeditionary operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support and to sustain them there for extended periods.

While I have spoken about NATO and its Allies, the trends and challenges I have described also apply to many non-NATO nations, as well as to other organisations. We recognize that no one organisation, let alone any one state, can deal with the new and evolving challenges by itself. NATO is fully aware of the importance of ensuring close cooperation with all actors in order to be successful in operations, in conflict resolution and in promoting defence and security sector reform in interested non-NATO countries. We cannot afford to waste the limited resources available to the international community through duplication or insufficient collaboration. That is why cooperation between NATO and its partners and between NATO and other international organisations will continue to be critical in meeting all these challenges.

#### Partnerships

Let me say a word now about our partnerships and the related matter of enlargement.

A fundamental aspect of NATO's broad approach to security an approach I would expect to see reiterated in a new Strategic Concept is the quest to replace, to the greatest degree possible, the traditional security dilemma of reciprocal suspicion between nations and alliances with a network of cooperation founded on shared values. As you know, the Allies have elaborated an array of mechanisms for this purpose the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO Russia Council, the NATO Ukraine Commission, the NATO Georgia Commission, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and relations with the so-called contact countries. It is fair to say that these have become instruments through which

the Allies seek to advance a significant part of their collective interests and the exceptional attention they receive at NATO Headquarters testifies to the seriousness with which the Allies do so. One can foresee even greater attention to these vehicles at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit and thereafter since they have proven their value in an increasingly inter-connected world.

It is important to bear in mind in this context the dependence of our operations on the support of countries that are not Allies. Currently some 17000 troops from non-NATO nations are engaged in NATO-led missions and operations in different parts of the world. The contribution of our partners to these operations is both militarily and politically important for us. While some partners contribute forces, others help us with military bases and transit rights, or provide us with information or expertise.

And our cooperation is not confined to operations. Political dialogue also plays an important role in deepening our understanding of one other's views, concerns and interests. Our partners, too, benefit from this broad dialogue and cooperation. We are in addition providing practical support to a wide range of partner countries in support of their own defence reform programmes, with an emphasis, as for the Allies, on modern, interoperable expeditionary forces.

NATO will also continue to reach out to Russia and to strive to intensify its cooperation with Russia based on common interests, in areas such as terrorism, proliferation, piracy and stability in Afghanistan. The course of the NATO-Russia relationship has been a difficult one at times the conflict in Georgia was a case in point but it is important not to lose sight of the value in helping overcome these difficulties of a formal relationship of the kind we have established. In all events, a viable Euro-Atlantic security architecture cannot be constructed without the inclusion of Russia. NATO will always take into account Russia's legitimate security interests but will oppose any attempts to establish spheres of influence in Europe or to prevent European countries from exercising their right to seek NATO membership, if they so wish.

I would be remiss if in remarks on partnership I did say a brief word about the NATO-EU relationship. I understand Turkey's deep concerns about this relationship, and I look forward, as I am sure do all of you, to the time when those concerns have been resolved in a way that allows the potential of what is meant to be a strategic partnership to be fully realized. NATO seeks a strong NATO-EU partnership not only in operations in which both are engaged but also in what should be a broader strategic dialogue, a dialogue which, for a number of reasons, has developed much too slowly. In developing the NATO-EU relationship, it will be important to avoid

unnecessary duplication, especially in the development of capabilities, in order to make the best use of our common resources and capabilities.

#### Enlargement

This brings me at last to the question of enlargement. Since the end of the Cold War NATO's door has always remained open for new members seeking to join. At the Bucharest Summit, Allies invited Albania and Croatia to start accession talks, and agreed that Ukraine and Georgia will one day become members of NATO too. At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, we very much hope to be able to welcome Albania and Croatia into the Alliance. Whether we will be able to do so depends on the swiftness of the national ratification processes in each of the NATO states.

Turning more specifically to Ukraine and Georgia, we are now, as agreed in Bucharest, in a period of intensive engagement at a high political level with both of these countries, to address the outstanding questions pertaining to their applications for the Membership Action Plan. With respect to Georgia specifically, in December, Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their governments' commitment to the Bucharest decisions regarding its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. They further agreed to support Georgia in a number of areas where Tbilisi has asked for assistance. We are at the moment focused on carrying out these assistance efforts in order to help Georgia, including through the newly-established NATO-Georgia Commission.

Any decision to admit a new member is a political one, based on the political judgment of each Ally. I should also stress that enlargement has always been and remains a performance-based process. The prospect of NATO membership has proven to be a stimulus for comprehensive defence and political reform in countries aspiring to join the Alliance. This was true in the case of the newest NATO Allies in Central and Eastern Europe; it is true now in the case of the Balkan nations, and I believe it is also proving itself to be true in the case of Ukraine and Georgia.

#### Conclusion

In conclusion, NATO is continuously adapting to the evolving security environment. It has done so by embarking on a process of deep, thorough transformation, by reaching out to Partners, and by enlarging its membership. As we celebrate the Alliance's resilience over six decades, we must also ensure that it continues to be as relevant to the security of its members in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as it was for them in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Thank you for your attention.

**NATO AND OTHER  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS  
(UN, EU, OSCE AND THE  
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH)**

**Tomur BAYER<sup>13</sup>**

Mr. President,  
Ambassadors and Generals,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to start by expressing my gratitude for the opportunity to address such a distinguished gathering. Let me also congratulate the Turkish Atlantic Council for their efforts in making this conference a traditional event which serves as a prominent forum for discussions on international security affairs.

I should note that the topics we are discussing in the framework of this year's conference are very relevant and opportune as we are approaching the 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit of NATO. This Summit will not only be a gathering of symbolic and historic importance, but also be the scene of significant decisions. In this regard, I should highlight the Declaration of the Alliance Security, which is envisaged to be adopted during the Summit. This Declaration will set the scene for further articulating and strengthening the Alliance's role in meeting the evolving challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Furthermore, it will prepare the ground for updating the Strategic Concept of the Alliance.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The strategic environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is characterized by a number of features that are quite different than we have witnessed in the past. As the presentations and discussions of our morning panel have indicated, new risks and threats such as terrorism, failing states, regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile proliferation, cyber attacks are increasingly prevailing our security environment. These

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<sup>13</sup> Ambassador, Director General for International Security Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs

risks and threats are also accompanied by sources of instability such as climate change and related food, water and energy scarcities, global competition for energy and natural resources, cultural intolerances, which, if not remedied, can easily jeopardize our security in global dimensions. These risks and threats of asymmetric nature are likely to occupy our agenda in the foreseeable future, whereas new ones might emerge if the current challenges are not addressed properly.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The increasing multiplicity and complexity of challenges require a holistic approach to security. As no single country or international organization is capable of managing security by itself, concerted efforts among relevant actors have become more important and relevant. Experiences from post-Cold War peacekeeping and peace building actions clearly point to the need of coherence and coordination. In order to address this requirement, various agencies, governments and organizations have started exploring, independently from each other, with a range of models and mechanisms aimed at improving the overall coherence, cooperation and coordination of their conflict management systems. This effort to pursue greater synergy, harmonization and complementarity in the international peacebuilding system has become generally known as the comprehensive approach. The assumption of the comprehensive approach is that a more coherent system-wide (security, governance and development) effort, will have a more relevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impact on the peace process. Under this new approach, which is named as Integrated Approach in the UN system, the focus has shifted from the old bi-polar civil-military coordination concept to system-wide coordination across the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions.

The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence is widely accepted today in the international multilateral governance context. There is now broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programs entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately, of a reduced capacity for delivery.

Since early 90s, we have been witnessing a transition from traditional peacekeeping (characterized by high consent and low capability) to peace enforcement (characterized by much lower levels of consent and much higher levels of capability). Internal armed conflicts constitute the majority of today's wars. Experience has shown that intrastate conflict is cyclical and will reoccur if the underlying causes of conflict are not addressed. Therefore, beyond the cessation of hostilities, peace and state building phases have



become a part of modern peace operations. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the venue of the first example of such an operation where military, political, humanitarian and economic aspects have been handled in parallel through actors such as UN, NATO, EU, OSCE, World Bank and NGOs working side by side. The list of such operations has expanded with Somalia, Sudan, Kosovo, Afghanistan where each of these actors are bringing in their added-value, sometimes filling the gaps, sometimes duplicating each others' efforts.

It is clear that the future up to 2015 will see an increasing involvement of organizations in peace operations. That means; more multilateral operations are likely to generate more interoperability and coordination challenges.

Distinguished Guests,

After having made a rather theoretical introduction into the subject matter, let me move on to the reality on the ground, that is the challenges to implementing a truly comprehensive approach. By doing so, I will try to focus on the specific aspects of the issue from a Turkish and NATO point of view.

How we, international actors, name such an approach, what we understand from it and how we implement it continues to differ tremendously.

Some name it "counter insurgency", others call it "comprehensive planning". United Nations call it Integrated Approach. The term we use in NATO is comprehensive approach and at least, with that term, I guess I know more or less what we mean.

First of all, we believe that it is not in NATO's responsibility to coordinate efforts of all other actors in an operational theatre.

That is a role that we deem should fall on the United Nations. Do we think that the United Nations are able to do that? Are they willing to do that? We should be able to frankly discuss these questions at our panel.

An element of comprehensive approach is definitely about different actors working in synergy for the same goal. Can we use the term "complementarity" for this purpose? My humble view is that "complementarity" is something we should have as a result of the comprehensive approach, but we cannot aim for just "complementarity". There should be a general agreement on the political end-state and how we will reach that aim. This requires agreement on modalities for cooperation as well.

Let's be more specific and take the concrete example of fight against piracy.

NATO has taken some action on the issue and is still pondering on a longer-term role for the Alliance. The EU has launched an operation. There is a new Combined Task Force-151. And finally there is a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1846).

What does "complementarity" mean in such a complicated picture? I am afraid almost nothing. Every organisation decides on which aspect it deems to act and, in principle, it should not preclude any other organization or actor to act on the same aspect as well, in line with the decision-making autonomy.

In that case, "complementarity" can, to the best, mean non-duplication of efforts.

On the other hand, if we want all actors to work together, we should accept that the UN is our main framework of action. Under this umbrella, any cooperation between relevant actors should be based on agreed modalities. The rules of the game should be known and acceptable to all.

Comprehensive approach, on the other hand, cannot be limited to an element of coherent action among all actors. There is the aspect of coherent and effective use of all civil-military instruments at our disposal from the very early stages of a mission or an operation until its finalization.

Ladies and gentlemen,

NATO is undergoing a transformation. Transformation is and should be a natural part of every organization. However, the 60th Anniversary Summit and our move to a new Headquarters will serve us as additional incentives for taking transformation to a higher paste.

Thus we have a unique opportunity before us to make this Alliance work better, in a coordinated, comprehensive way.

Defence transformation and the review of the defence planning should be seen as important elements of this work. Do we need to create civilian capabilities within the Alliance in order to render the internal aspect of the comprehensive approach more complete?

Once again, my view, for what it takes, is that we do not need to develop civilian capabilities within the Alliance. However, we should act in full cognizance of the fact that when the security situation does not allow others to act, the Alliance will be called for action on civilian areas as well. That is an area we should not shy away from being active.

Therefore, the pool of civilian experts we have through the Civil Emergency Planning and NATO's vast experience in responding to disasters are of crucial importance.

Can we make better use of them? I am encouraged by the fact that there seems to be a new study initiated for making best of what we have in this domain.

The headquarters reform is in fact another important element of the comprehensive approach from within. Ways of looking how different committees can work, and whether their numbers, reaching to 300 now, can be reduced, is another interesting area of work.

In that, our driving force should be increasing efficiency and getting complete advice for the Council, and not only cutting off number of committees.

More effective ways of IS and IMS working together should be encouraged as well. Collocation is an idea that we can work on. I am looking forward to receive the results of a trial initiated in the Headquarters for this purpose.

Our aim is to get an advice on all relevant aspects of a topic. We should not thus let the pure military advice to fall victim to our reform efforts. I want to draw your attention, in this respect, to the role of the Military Committee as the provider of an agreed common military advice.

One important aspect of the comprehensive approach is that it should not be limited to operations. In fact the current and still changing security environment requires that we deal with all topics of common interest through a comprehensive approach. It is true that the comprehensive approach has made considerable progress thanks to our presence in Afghanistan, but we would be making ourselves a big injustice, if we limit our look to a comprehensive approach to operations. Every actor of the international system should be able to plug and play with the actors of the system on all topics. This could be Afghanistan today, energy security, climate change and cyber defence another day.

Such an approach requires a long-term commitment from the side of all actors concerned. NATO cannot realize a comprehensive approach on its own, it can only facilitate implementation of such an approach. We all need the willingness of other nations, international organizations, NGOs and even private sector for reaching lasting peace and stability. Nonetheless, I have to say we notice either a lack of interest or a tendency to focus on internal coordination on the part of other international organisations than NATO when it comes to issues pertaining to comprehensive approach.

Distinguished Guests,

Security today is much more complicated than what it was during the Cold War years. Comprehensive approach is the name of only one of the challenges we are faced with. But, it can serve as a valuable tool if defined and used coherently and properly.

Our partners must prove that they are up to this challenge as much as we are.

Thank you very much for your attention.

## **NATO OPERATIONS, MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES**

**Mehmet ÇETİN<sup>14</sup>**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Mr. Minister of National Defense, Ambassadors, Generals, Admirals, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I pay my respects and greetings to all of you.

I am glad to be here today and to address such a distinguished audience.

I would like to thank Ambassador Akbel for his kind invitation to this occasion.

I would also like to convey my appreciations to Mr. Akbel and his staff for the efforts they have made for organizing such an excellent and timely gathering just before NATO's 60th anniversary.

I will talk to you today about "The NATO operations, missions and capabilities."

The aim of my presentation is to inform you about Turkey's contributions to ongoing NATO operations and its capability improvements.

As known, the scope of the NATO operations has increased significantly since its involvement in restoring stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s.

Since then, NATO has committed itself to several peace support operations. In this context, NATO:

- \* Helped to stabilize Balkans,
- \* Has led the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan,
- \* Has Established a training mission in Iraq,
- \* Provided logistical support to the African Union in Sudan,

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<sup>14</sup> Major General, Turkish General Staff, Chief of Strategy Department

\* Has fought against terrorism and piracy.

The widened scope of the NATO military operations has radically transformed the military requirements of the Alliance ..

In my presentation, I want to focus on what Turkey has done so far and what Turkey is doing now in support of ongoing NATO operations and how we improve our capabilities to meet the demands resulting from them.

I would like to start by presenting you a short film taken from the theaters of ongoing NATO operations to set the scene for the rest of my presentation.

(An 8-minute film regarding Turkey's contributions to NATO operations)

"Mankind is a single body and each nation is part of that body. We must never say what does it matter to me if some part of the world is ailing. If there is such an illness we must concern ourselves with it as we are having that illness. M.Kemal ATATÜRK"

Based on this guidance from the founder of the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK and as seen throughout the film, Turkey has been participating in all NATO operations to contribute to the peace, security and stability and improving its capabilities to meet the military requirements in its capacity.

### **NATO OPERATIONS**

Now I would like to go into details of our contributions to NATO operations beginning from Afghanistan.

#### **International Security Assistance Force**

Through the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO is assisting to the Afghan Government in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country creating the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction.

ISAF commands around 55.000 troops from 40 states, including all 26 NATO countries.

Turkish units have been engaged in Afghanistan since the very beginning of this operation.

#### What Turkey has done so far:

Turkey commanded ISAF II, ISAF VII along with Kabul International Airport and Kabul Regional Command..

Turkey provided 154 million US dollars of military and civilian assistance to Afghanistan (54 M \$ military + 100 M \$ civilian).

What Turkey is doing now:

At present, 819 Turkish personnel are serving in Afghanistan. The majority of the Turkish units are in the Kabul province.

Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) has been working in the province of Wardak.

NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey staff is reinforcing ISAF Headquarters.

What we are planning to do in the future:

Turkey plans to lead Regional Command-Capital again starting from August 2009. Turkey plans to be sponsor or partner to Afghan Defense University or Command and Staff College.

Turkey decided to allocate 5 million dollars for Afghanistan elections.

While retaining all our mentioned contributions, Turkey plans to offer one Civil Military Cooperation, one information Operations and one Medical Team for the elections support.

In addition to them, Turkey has recently offered significant logistical donations to Afghanistan, including training helicopters, communications equipment and troop garments.

Turkish Foreign Ministry has recently contributed 1,5 million Euros to Afghanistan. Turkey will contribute to the helicopter initiative with 2 million dollars.

**Kosovo Force (Kfor)**

As to Kosovo, the objective of the NATO-led international peacekeeping force, KFOR, is to ensure peace, stability and public order in Kosovo.

Currently 32 states with approximately 14.750 peace support troops participate in KFOR.

Turkey has also been actively involved in KFOR since the beginning of Kosovo crisis in 1999.

The Turkish Battalion Task Force forms the core of Turkish contributions in Kosovo. Turkey currently participates in KFOR with 526 servicemen.

The headquarters of the Battalion Task Force and one motorized company is stationed at the Sultan Murat Base Camp in Prizren.

The remaining two motorized companies are operating in Dragas and Mamusa. Turkish staff officers serve in the KFOR Multinational Headquarters in Pristina.

### **Operation Althea**

Besides Kosovo in the Balkans, Turkey contributes to the EU-led Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well, which is the continuation of the NATO-led Stabilization Force.

At the moment, Turkey contributes two maneuver companies and staff officers (a total of 254 personnel) to the operation Althea.

### **United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (Unifil)**

Turkey has also been supporting the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon-UNIFIL with its forces and capabilities [one Engineer Construction Company and Naval Assets in the Maritime Task Force (MTF) total personnel 488, one frigate with helicopter] to help Lebanon ejure humanitarian access to civilian populations and voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.

### **Operation Active Endeavor**

As for Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), the purpose of this Article 5 operation is to demonstrate NATO's solidarity and resolve in the fight against terrorism and to help detect and deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea.

Turkey also participates in this operation with one Turkish frigate dedicated to Standing Naval Maritime Group (SNMG), which periodically provides the main surveillance assets to Operation Active Endeavor.

Turkey additionally allocates one corvette, on an "on call" basis, which is also supported by a submarine and an oiler (Auxiliary Oil Replenishment) assigned for certain periods.

Turkey is sharing all the intelligence with NATO commands to contribute to the success of Operation Active Endeavor.

### **Piracy**

Turkey also contributes to fighting against piracy. In this context, Turkey provided a frigate to NATO's Operation Allied Provider.



For piracy, Turkey has already offered a frigate equipped with a helicopter and a Special Boat Squadron to the initiative launched by the Contact Group in accordance with the UNSC 1851.

We also consider participation in TF 151 under the Combined Maritime Force (CMF). We await the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly for the deployment of this asset to the region.

#### **NATO Training Mission-Iraq**

As to the NTM-I, the function of this mission is to assist with the re-development of the security forces of Iraq.

Turkey contributes staff officers to the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, which was established by NATO in November 2004.

#### **The African Union Mission in Sudan (Amis)**

As the last item in operations, I want to talk about The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

The African Union Mission in Sudan aimed to end violence and improve the humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003.

From June 2005 to 31 December 2007, NATO helped the African Union (AU) expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for the transport of additional peacekeepers into the region and by training African Union personnel.

Alliance support ended on 31 December 2007 when AMIS was transferred to the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Turkey participated in AMIS with one C-130 aircraft.

#### **Capability Development**

Now I would like to talk about the national capability development to meet the demands of ongoing and new military requirements.

For Alliance capability requirements, Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) emphasizes the need to be able to conduct expeditionary operations and improve key enablers and support capabilities.

To fulfill its present and future operational commitments, Turkey, in alignment with NATO, continues to improve its capabilities in eight fields. These are:

- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense

- Intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition
- Air-to-ground surveillance
- Command, control and communications
- Combat effectiveness
- Strategic airlift and sealift
- Air-to-air refueling
- Deployable combat support and combat service support units,

In this context, Turkey's ultimate objective is to establish a smaller, but more robust force, which is more deployable, responsive, rapid, sustainable and technologically superior. Such a force will be better able to serve both our national and Alliance interests.

Ambitious major programmes will significantly enhance in a range of military capabilities.

Our procurement and modernization plans include CBRN and self-protection equipment

As for the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance areas, procurement and development programs for mini, tactical and Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles will significantly improve our Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities.

These will be supplemented by satellite imagery systems and advanced tactical reconnaissance capabilities,

Airborne early warning and control aircraft will also be introduced in a few years into the Air Force inventory.

Majority of our efforts go into combat effectiveness area.

We aim to acquire weapons and equipment for homeland security (anti-terrorism) operations, with the highest priority.

For the Land Forces, the upgrade of existing main battle tanks continues and a contract has finally been signed for national production of a new tank.

Acquisition of modern artillery is ongoing.

New attack helicopters will be procured in the mid term (2013-2017). Plans are also in place to procure tactical vehicles.

Our procurement ARLD modernization plans for the next decade include air defense assets and fire support systems, Our plans also include the acquisition of modern air and sea platforms and improved precision-guided weapons.

Turkish Navy focuses on the procurement of advanced frigates, submarines with air independent propulsion, a submarine support/rescue ship, major amphibious ships, an additional replenishment ship, a considerable number of maritime helicopters and Maritime Patrol Aircraft {MPA}.

For power projection, Mine Counter Measures (MCM), Anti Air Warfare (AAW), Anti Surface Warfare (ASUW) and Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities will be improved with the Landing Platform Dock (LPD), Turkish Air Defense Frigates (TF-2000) and The New Type Corvettes (MILGEM).

Plans continue for the modernization of F-16s and procurement of high altitude surface to air missile systems.

For strategic airlift capability, we participate in the A-400M programme and have ordered 10 aircraft and we also modernize our C-130 fleet.

These capabilities will be further enhanced by more agile, responsive and deployable logistics capabilities. In this context, plans are in place to procure deployable Role-2 hospitals.

All these will significantly improve the contribution of Turkey to the Alliance by both increasing the employability and effectiveness of our forces.

For the improvement of NATO's capabilities, new NATO command arrangements and the NATO Response Force play an important role as well and Turkey actively participates in all these establishments.

Turkey is one of NATO's six countries with defense expenditures rating more than 2% of the GDP. Of those six countries, Turkey has the highest ratio in equipment spending in relation to Its total defense expenditures.

Being very well aware of the importance of Peace Support Operations to security and stability in the world, Turkey will certainly continue to contribute to all of the activities that Support peace, as in the past and at present.



### SESSION III: LOOKING BEYOND THE 60<sup>th</sup> ANNIVERSARY OF NATO

**Tacan İLDEM<sup>15</sup>**

Distinguished Guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Welcome to the 3<sup>rd</sup> panel of our conference. Our topic is “Looking beyond the 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of NATO” and I have the pleasure to welcome very eminent speakers for this panel. In order to leave time to our speakers, my intention is to make a short introductory remark to stimulate the debate before turning to them.

The Cold War is over. It has been so far some time now and there is a general understanding that the world cannot afford another one. Enlargement processes of Euro-Atlantic institutions have largely contributed to the consolidation of peace in Europe and, through partnerships, NATO is trying to expand the cooperation beyond its members’ territories. But these are not enough, because increasingly dangerous risks and threats exist and will be with us for the foreseeable future.

Many risks and threats related to the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and terrorism, but also to prejudices, intolerance and trends of polarization are causing serious concern. The situation in the Balkans is still fragile and does not afford us the luxury of complacency. The crisis in Georgia last August clearly displayed that we cannot be complacent about frozen conflicts either. The recent problem between the Russian Federation and Ukraine had severe implications for many of our Allies. In Afghanistan we still have a lot to do together with the Afghan people and authorities. Meanwhile we need to help and continue working with Pakistan so that this country stays on the right course. I don’t think the gravity of the situation in the Middle East needs to be explained. The impact of the global recession and its potential implications for security are also self-evident.

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<sup>15</sup> Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO

This is to say that the years ahead may not be quiet and we should be ready to address diverse problems of global nature, to the best of our capacity. I did not use the word “capacity” by chance. We, as Allies, have to prepare for difficult times by all means. In the sense of conceptual readiness, one can refer to the Multiple Futures Project that ACT is developing, to the much expected Declaration on Alliance Security, to a renewed Strategic Concept, as well as many policy documents that our experts are working on. As far as having the right capabilities is concerned, let me highlight the transformation work within NATO. Lastly, I wish to point out HQ reform efforts aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Alliance.

The potentially imminent and in any case unpredictable nature of contemporary risks and threats require that all this work be accomplished as soon as possible. On the other hand, reality is that these are all highly complicated issues and in practice, we are talking about an open ended transformation process, enabling NATO to continuously evolve and adapt. Quick fixes may at times appear to be the easiest way but are not necessarily the best. We need to make sure that the proven strong points of NATO, such as consensus based decision making; indivisibility of security; solidarity; cohesion and fair burden sharing are preserved, while NATO is also made more able in providing flexible and efficient, effective responses to new challenges. In providing these responses, NATO will, as is the case today, have to work with its partners and cooperate/coordinate with other actors. Likewise, it will need openness and transparency from others, including respect to agreed modalities of openness and cooperation.

Moreover, it is not only risks and threats shaping the new conditions. A sense of renewed commitment on the part of the US to working with partners and Allies, as well as the declared intention of France to return to the integrated military structure of the Alliance are notable developments. These two issues and the way they play out will have significant implications for and beyond the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit; and I think we will hear about them from our speakers.

Hoping to have been provocative enough, let me give the floor to our first speaker:

**Mr. Giuseppe Belardetti** is the President of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association and the President of the Italian Youth Atlantic Treaty Association. You all know that ATA together with YATA is a very valuable bridge between NATO and the public opinion. In this context both Associations are playing a very important role. Furthermore, as one of those who is struggling shoulder to shoulder with all Allies at the forefront in Brussels, I feel confident for the future, when I see the young generations,

represented here by Mr. Belardetti, coming for support. Mr. Belardetti the floor is yours.

**Mr. Semih İdiz** is an experienced and prominent columnist at the Milliyet newspaper. He regularly addresses foreign policy and international security related matters. Since Turkish foreign policy is rich in content, mainly due to historical accumulation and its geographic location, I am confident that Mr. İdiz will not find it difficult to intrigue us with interesting ideas.

**Ambassador James Jeffrey** is a career member of the Foreign Service. He previously served at the National Security Council, as the Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor. He was appointed as Ambassador to Turkey by the then President Bush in June 2008. We are very pleased to welcome him to Turkey for his fourth assignment. Ambassador, you have the floor.

**Monsieur Pierre Lellouche** is a prominent member of the French Parliament where he assumes many responsibilities. One of them and maybe the most relevant for all of us today is his role as the Head of French delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Taking into account the intentions of his country, la France, to return to the integrated military structure of NATO, I am very much interested to listen to him. Monsieur Lellouche, vous avez la parole, s'il vous plait.

**Mr. Murat Mercan** is a member of the Turkish Parliament as well as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. He currently holds the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Turkish Parliament. As you are well aware, public diplomacy and strategic communications are very important instruments for the Alliance to explain its activities to public opinion and national Parliaments indisputably have a tremendous role to play as they represent our peoples. Mr. Mercan, please take the floor.

**Dr. Onur Öymen** is also a member of the Turkish Parliament but at the same time he is a retired Ambassador. Dr. Öymen's latest positions were Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Permanent Representative at NATO between 1997-2001. I am therefore very pleased to welcome him among us. I believe Dr. Öymen's vast experience stemming from his diplomatic and parliamentary background will be very useful for all of us at a time when we are trying to see beyond the 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit of NATO. Ambassador Öymen, you have the floor.

**Mr. Alex Serban** is the Vice President of the Atlantic Treaty Association and also the Executive President of the Euro-Atlantic Council of

Romania since 2002. He is known as a keen supporter of NGO activity, having dedicated a lifetime to social work for the benefit of the civil society. At the same time, he is also Advisor to the Prime Minister of Romania, focusing on NATO issues. I believe Mr Serban has a lot to share with us today, as he was the General Rapporteur of the 54<sup>th</sup> ATA General Assembly meeting held in Berlin on 12 November. 2008. Mr. Serban the floor is yours.



## ATLANTICISM IN THE XXI CENTURY

**Giuseppe BELARDETTI<sup>16</sup>**

Mr. President of the Turkish Atlantic Council, President of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Delegates, distinguished guests,

It is my distinct honor to take part in this relevant International Conference and to represent the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association. YATA is a lively transatlantic association, bringing together 39 countries in Europe, Asia and North America with the aim of promoting among the successor generation the transatlantic values and spirit fostered by the all of you and ATA over the last 60 years.

In few months we will celebrate the North Atlantic Treaty 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary. The Treaty laid the foundation of the most solid Alliance of the past century. It granted peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and we, the young Atlantic generation, are ready to take over the effort you carried out over the last 60 years in order to continue, and if possible, to reinforce and expand in the future of your achievements.

It is important that the Atlantic successor generation looks ahead with a renewed commitment able to meet the present challenges of the new generation as well to prevent future shortfalls.

Over the last 60 years why to be an Atlanticist was easily understandable: to protect democracy, individual freedoms, and rule of law. In the past, few doubts could be raised on who was an “Atlanticist” and who was not.

In recent times, the profound changes experienced by the international community in the last decades have been used by somebody to question the Atlanticism as a constriction of the past and a relict of history.

YATA is here to testify that this is not the case. In the past twenty years many changes took place: Alliance membership, increased missions, new partnerships changed the Alliance. However, the Atlantic values and goals remained the same and peacefully conquered new people.

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<sup>16</sup> President of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association

Given this scenario, there is the need to clearly re-assess to the broader youth public why to be an Atlanticist today.

To those belonging to the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association it is clear: true Atlanticist are all those who regardless of their nationality, religion or ethnic group believe that the Euro-Atlantic values are the bedrock of peace and stability and breed from an active cooperation between democratic institutions. To us, the Atlantic values are embedded in the Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty and are represented by the transatlantic link.

Issue of concern for the young Atlanticist is becoming also the misleading concept that likes to place Europeism and Atlanticism in competition. Europe and North America share many political, cultural, and social aspects, and this appear evident to the young generation and the students that are growing with the feeling of belonging to a single community. The vision that try to put Europeism verse Atlanticism or vice versa, does not reflect the reality and must be rejected. Rather than in the political declarations, the true spirit of Europeism lays in the feelings of the young Europeans that don't want to live in a Euro-Atlantic hemisphere where physical, cultural and social barriers are created and maintained without a reason.

Europeism and Atlanticism can go together if NATO and EU go together. It is wise to recognize the added value that the Atlantic Alliance can bring to development of a European Security and Defense Policy while NATO needs a stronger and more responsible European Union.

As you, Senior Atlanticist, committed yourself in promoting the Atlanticism as a guiding principle of your national foreign policies, today a similar engagement should be carried out by us, the young Atlanticists.

In our times of fast growing and fast consuming world, information has never been so easy to access and so vast. However, we must keep dialogue alive and information correct and reliable.

In recent years YATA contributed in keeping the dialogue open between young North Americans and Europeans. Moreover, YATA expanded this dialogue to our friends in the East, in the Caucasus, and we launched new relationships with youth association in the Middle East. We learned that leading a correct and effective communication constitutes a winning tool to reach the hearts and mind of new generation. Motivation, partnerships, and joint initiatives are the key elements for a successful information strategy, able to stand up from other international educational activities and web international platforms.

It might be wise for me not to point at my age to support my assertions. I am in my mid twenties and some years ago, when I stop watching cartoons and tuned on news channel, the Soviet Union was barely disintegrated and Germany biggest threat were the Eastern plumbers and not Soviet Army. My generation born in times of changes, not in static ones. The feeling of growing interconnections, expanding opportunities almost unlimited choices and open doors is vivid and welcome not as a threat but as an opportunity.

However, in spite all these changes and new opportunities, we have to keep in mind what a NATO Secretary General once said “Paradoxically peace is still the cause we are fighting for”.

Thank you.



### SESSION III: LOOKING BEYOND THE 60<sup>th</sup> ANNIVERSARY OF NATO

**Semih İDİZ<sup>17</sup>**

Thank you very much Ambassador İldem. First of all, what an honor it is to me to be the second speaker in such an eminent panel given that I am just the mirror journalist at the end of the day. But thank you very much and I am very grateful to the God that arranged the alphabet in this way.

But anyway, as Ambassador İldem started to say initially, of course the Cold War is over. We do really live in a completely different world today where some of the traditional risks continue but we are faced with a whole cost of new risks. Many of which perhaps NATO not made for or engineered to cope with or deal with. When we consider these risks, of course the risk of war being the primary one is still there and we have seen this from the Yugoslav crisis until recently to the Georgia crisis and the Middle East. So there is a war situation in the world that still has to engage our minds and has to be attended to as an international community.

But in addition to this traditional risk, we have new risks of course which are affecting us on a daily basis and in different ways threatening our people and our nations. Obviously number one on this list is terrorism. This is a threat that Turkey has been actually highlighting since the mid 1990s being the one of the NATO countries that was suffering consistently and persistently from this threat. In this sense I suppose it is a degree of indication for Turkey that the threat of terrorism has climbed up in the list of priority of issues that have to be addressed by NATO.

A second risk is of course the threat of organized crime. I don't think we are in a position in this world of ours is to belittled this threat. Perhaps to put it in a humors but not so humors perspective is one might say that James Bond factor is actually coming into play where we can possibly have gold finger type figures coming up in the world who have the resource and the money, who want to perhaps start projecting some power for the sake of crime or by other sakes by assembling tactical nuclear weapons whatever. And we know that this is a major threat in the world today and it will

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<sup>17</sup> Columnist, Milliyet Daily

probably concern NATO more as the time passes because it overlaps with the organized crime issue.

I don't think the environment issue can be belittled in any way because this tising so much that concerns us today from the Tsunami in Southeast Asia to Hurricane Katrina we have seen kind of devastation that global warming and climate change can weak and how this can cause situations of that will require intervention not only for the sake of humanitarian reasons but also environment for a securing the environment for providing security in a place where security has collapsed and whatever.

These are issues that I think in the next period, as we look in to the future of NATO we will inevitably address one way another. These are all in many ways out of area issue for NATO but they all have to be incorporated into the general corpus, if we want this environment of stability to spread in the world. Already NATO is involved in Afghanistan and from a traditional NATO perspective, unless there was the Russian dimension this possibly would have been considered out of area but now we see that it is very much in area. Now this brings me to the question of Article 5.

Article 5 remains the core of NATO. It is what I call the one for all and all for one article. And it is what makes NATO appealing in an attractive meaning to its members. But in the world that we are moving we are living in a direction that we are moving in, one cannot fear but perhaps could turn out to be one of the main problems also in the future. It made a lot of sense within the cold war environment because all the members of the NATO felt a mutual threat and therefore this all for one and one for all mentality was significant. But the fact is, and I think this is a fact that we really have to consider, there are fewer people in Europe or possibly even in Turkey who want to see the soldiers in world in wars and in conflicts far away from their lands and for which they see no immediate benefit to themselves or to their countries; and our face nevertheless with the loss of their own soldiers.

Ironically Afghanistan is the casing point in the sense that there is difficulty in getting commitment from nations to contribute to their Afghanistan project. The Secretary General has to go around and lobby very actively to get the support. And he gets it but it is not a willing support in many cases. It is a begrudging support that we find simply because governments are responsible to their publics and have to explain some of the missions that their soldiers are embarking on. And that is not always clear for the man on the street in a NATO country. So I think the real challenge for the future will be to come up with formulas that show the public that contributing to NATO is good for the well being of humanity and the world in general. This is a very idealistic concept.

But then as the previous speakers mentioned, NATO is based on idealistic concept on the idea of democracy and law whose natural extensions I think like human rights. So, in other words we have to be able to come up with formulas with NATO that show our publics that even if it is an apparent sacrifice for the part of our troops and our involvement, this is one that is well-worth. The sacrifice within the context of a stable world and a more humane world then we find ourselves in. This is the key challenge. What makes the challenge even more important perhaps is the fact that a need for an organization a multi-national organization like NATO is growing all the time. Ironically this has become even more apparent after the cold war. NATO's involvement was requested in so many areas some of which it hasn't been able to respond to. So the key challenge is to re-energize NATO and to put it again in the center stage with a broader outlook, going beyond the area that it may be concerned itself with. And this involves also a dimension whereby the public is informed that this is good for world and therefore that is good for individual countries.

Thank you very much.





### **SESSION III: LOOKING BEYOND THE 60<sup>th</sup> ANNIVERSARY OF NATO**

**James JEFFREY<sup>18</sup>**

Thank you very much Tacan Bey. First of all, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it's a pleasure to be both in Turkey and here at this conference. I would like to thank Ambassador Akbel for the wonderful organization and for the people who are in the Turkish Atlantic Council for supporting this and giving us the opportunity to gather here today.

On the first day of President Obama's administration of the 20<sup>th</sup> January he sent a letter to the NATO Secretary General and through our NATO Ambassador to all of the NATO countries stressing America's commitment to NATO. This was perhaps the very first diplomatic step that the President took. And it was appropriate given the importance that we place in NATO. In the letter the President in particular highlighted two things. First of all, and we have talked about this much in the last 24 hours, our shared political values and need for shared security. Secondly, of the various tasks that we have before us and we have talked about so much, ranging from Russia to completing transformation, the President raised in particular 2 issues. One is Europe and working to integrate the countries to NATO's south and east into Europe's institutions; and secondly, Afghanistan. And whatever I would like to do is to focus on these two.

Bearing in mind as we must admit NATO has many other missions today and there may have many other missions tomorrow. That's the nature of the organization. On Europe is a variety of to some degree linked challenges and opportunities in front of us. First of all, those we have been doing for a while, remember how obsessed NATO was with the Balkans in the last decade. That is a great success story. At one point when I was involved at that time Ambassador Holbrick about which more later, NATO put 60.000 troops in a few weeks into Bosnia to secure the peace after date. There was after years of debate in small steps from no fly zones to the bombing campaign to actual ground commitment. In much of this was

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<sup>18</sup> Ambassador of the United States of America to Turkey

repeated, less than 4 years later in Kosovo. All and all this has been an extraordinary success. And we see it in the fact that most states in the region have been becoming EU member states and members of NATO. We still have some problems particularly in Kosovo where NATO has over 15,000 troops. But, we are moving to resolve these problems and their political nature, many of them involved beyond the can of the alliance itself. For example not all NATO countries recognize Kosovo, though the 50 countries around the world do. But, nonetheless until a final working out of these problems can be achieved.

NATO will need to keep its troops there backing up the UN's mission and backing up the efforts by the local communities to work out solutions.

Another area is of course the countries to the east. At Bucharest and at the NATO ministerial in December there was much discussion of the Ukraine and Georgia. This is a very sensitive issue but nonetheless, NATO has committed to taking these countries into the alliance. And at the end of the day, what kind of alliance are we if democratic countries in the European periphery, and we already have three NATO countries around the Black Sea. One to join in for outside regions can not join. We need to consider that carefully as we move forward in a very complex situation.

Other issues... we have already mentioned several times are France's integration. We have a colleague from France here today. We see this as a very important step and we certainly welcome it. Finally there is the question of NATO USDP, EU relations. This is of particular concern to our Turkish colleagues because of various issues ranging from Berlin plus to other niche agreements that at the technical level have been discussed and debated by many of us for many years. But it is a serious issue. Within NATO and between the two alliances it is one that we follow very closely and we think more close work. Again, and this is after the case with our issues, question outside of the NATO's specific responsibility, political questions in this case, a solution on Cyprus will help resolve problems within NATO. But while we are awaiting for that it is very important to move forward on the ESDP NATO agenda. Let me return very briefly to Afghanistan.

As many people have mentioned this is primary challenge. NATO is at the end of the day a military alliance and commits its military forces, it is crucial that it succeed. There is for ICFE a strategic vision that encompasses working outside of the country, working inside the country with the government and people of Afghanistan and the lead at strong short term and long term NATO commitment and a comprehensive approach by the international community that will encompass not just military but also civil

and economic and political steps. One such step is of course the elections now will be taking place in August. Nonetheless, Obama administration is moving and we have the Bush administration moving before it is towards concentration on military steps to more effectively deal with the Taliban threat. Of course we need a comprehensive solution. But our experience elsewhere importantly in Iraq has showed us that some of these steps need to be within in the military context and security. The first rule is before you can do anything, political or economic, diplomatic whatever, you have to secure the population. Secondly you have to deter, defeat and deny areas to your foe. That is as well an offensive and a defense side two of these requires military forces. No matter what we call it war, a peace operation or whatever, which depend upon the political situation inside individual NATO countries, for the soldiers on the ground, this is a combat operation. And we need to do more. And let me sketch some of the ways that we do more.

First of all, we have already decided the United States to send another combat brigade and we are looking at further troop reinforcements to bring up the force to force to population ratio in a country twice as size of Iraq with much more rigid terrain and much poor of transportation system.

Secondly, we are working very very hard to increase the size of the Afghani army from 80,000 to 134,000. Our experience in Iraq has shown that the first responders theoretically in any town or insurgency the national police often are not the best choice in a situation such as in Afghanistan or in Iraq. While the tendency of military leaders including our own has been to look into the police for that internal security function, in fact for many many reasons again and again the police are not able to do this at this stage in their development at the stage of a combat operation. Therefore the Afghani army just like the Iraqi army before them has to step in. That is our extra strategy to a significant degree. Thus we not only need to increase commitments to the NATO trust fund, but also provide more trainers to the Afghani army while at the same time contributing more troops and releasing caveats. These troops must engage in combat operations. Protecting the population at the strategic level is a defensive mission but at the local tactical level it looks a lot like an offensive combat operation in some conditions and we must have troops that are capable of doing it and doing it effectively.

Another area we are looking at where we have had experience in other conflicts including in Iraq and Vietnam and where the Turks have had experience in southeast is in arming civilians. This is a very controversial and a very sensitive question. But it has been effective elsewhere in people looking very closely at that in Afghanistan as well to assist in protecting the population. Once you have the population protected, once the population has their own army to protect them that they can feel pride in that provide

themselves for growth of economic and political institutions. So we will be putting a lot of weight into that. We are very happy for example with our recent talks with the Turkish military on steps that the Turkish military is considering. It is a good example particularly when you consider that Turkish military has very large forces committed to surgency in security operations in its own country, nonetheless it makes major contribution that were very appreciative of.

Finally, a few thoughts on the subject that we have debated again and again over the past 24 hours which is NATO's various Chapter 5 and other missions. My only thoughts on this are personal. Revolve around the fact that if it is true as Klaus said that war is the continuation of politics by other means then it is even more true that a political military alliance is going to be a continuation of politics by other means. As Sami said, the role of a democratic nations are publics, is very important in determining what is perceived as a threat in what tools we will use with what priority with what degree of intensity to deal with those threats. This changes over the time from defending the fall of the gap through putting 60.000 troops into Bosnia, the bombing camp in Kosovo.

Now Afghanistan are training mission in Iraq and new consideration of possible Chapter 5 missions. All the time this is normal. This is not illegal, unyielding, unmoving phenomenon is a living organic institution with all only two core values. One is the security alliance, and the second is, as the president said, the values that we all share. Thanks to this alliance, we in North America at heights in Europe. We can see no other way that we can jointly face the security challenges we have today; we had yesterday and will have in the future.

Thank you very much.

### **SESSION III: LOOKING BEYOND THE 60<sup>th</sup> ANNIVERSARY OF NATO**

**Pierre LELLOUCHE<sup>19</sup>**

Well, ladies and gentleman let me first extend my thanks to Ambassador Akbel for receiving us here in Antalya. One word also to my colleague Calamos, with whom I worked many years in the NATO Parliament; colleague in the CDU in the Bundestag and I know that he will do a great job as the Head of ATA. I have lessened to 12 minutes to tell you a story of 43 years out of 60 of peculiar French position in NATO. So it's not just doable. It is unfortunate but it is not doable. And yet if you don't understand, if you don't have in mind the events since the World War II, and the development of French defense policy, nuclear weapons, and so on, you can not understand where we are now including the political dynamics that worked in my own country and the dynamic with various other nations. So it is a little frustrating for me to address such a, I think important issue in a very compressed time.

Let me stress a few impressionistic kind of ideas. Number 1, you may or may not know, given the history that France actually was with Britain at the origin of NATO back in 1945. After the War, the first reflex of the goal was in fact to go to Moscow in 1944 to sign a Franco-Soviet Alliance against Germany. When it became clear that Stalin wanted to unify communist Germany, the goal then moved on with other leaders of the fourth republic to create with Britain what was to become The Washington Treaties started with Dunkirk Treaty in 1947 then what became WEU Treaty (Western Union Treaty) in London in Brussels and then we French went along with the British to get the Americans in Washington. Hinderburg Declaration and so on to create NATO in The Washington Treaty in 1949. Now that's very important to understand because the problem for France was how to defend itself and avoid another war and occupation after 3 wars with the Germany in less than a century.

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<sup>19</sup> Member of French Parliament, Chairman of French delegation to NATO Parliamentary Assembly

The relationship with the NATO under the 4<sup>th</sup> Republic was not easy compared to what people believe, it was not the goal we started the problem with NATO there were a lot of problem under the 4<sup>th</sup> republic. Particularly the insistence on the part of the French to have a co-management of the alliance with Americans and the British which led at the time to the creation of something called the “standing group” which was in Washington, composed of US, British and French senior military leaders. This is not forgotten. But the standing group mostly worked all the way through 1966.

The second thing that happened during the Fourth Republic... two other things happened that were very important: one was the creation of the German Federal Republic in 1949 and its rearmament, which the French wanted to do in a form of multi-national army in order to avoid the specter of German re-militarization. And that led the famous debate on the so-called European Defense Community, which was defeated in the summer of 1954 in the French Parliament. Ironically the rearmament of Germany which was supposed to be done in Europe actually was done by the US in the framework of NATO. And you can say this is a very amusing ironical part of history that the Rome Treaty, the birth of the European community in 1957 was based on the foundation of security through the rearmament of Germany in NATO. So in a way and the French of course hate to hear that the EU is the daughter of NATO and German rearmament inside NATO. Denuclearization and forth integration of the Bunderwehr inside NATO, this was the base on which the EU is built.

Third thing that happened during the Fourth Republic was Suez. Suez was like the Gulf War in reverse. The Americans, despite the fact that Soviets threaten nuclear weapons on Paris and London, The America actually pushed out France and England from Middle East once and for all and fourth withdraw from Suez. By the way, by using the UN Security Council with France and the UK using a veto right against the American resolution... Does this remind you something? This reminds exactly of Iraq in reverse. This is what happened in 1956. The result of Suez was very important. It brought the British nuclear force totally into NATO integrated command. And it brought the French to do nuclear weapons totally outside NATO integrated command. And the root of the divorce of 1956 was the birth of French nuclear force under the Fourth Republic. So when the Gour came in power in 1958 the roots of the problem was there. And it is actually it revolved around three problems.

Who would have the finger on the nuclear trigger? Obviously French refused all the offers and negotiations by the Eisenhower at the time. Second was the nuclear doctrine of the US credible, it was massive retaliation, and the answer was no. The third principle was the notion that the French forces

would be used under national command and not remain integrated in peace time. Because at the time the defense of the German territory if you use the French forces you would use also the nuclear weapons with it. And that gave the rationale for the 1966 decision by which we left not the alliance, because we maintained complete presence in the political bodies. But we left the military command while keeping a number of military offices in the system.

As early as in 1967 which is the following year a number of military agreements called the Agreement were signed by which a lot of military cooperation was actually maintained in order to permit, if war came said French forces would fully participate in the maneuver under American command. Because it was agreed that the moment political decision was taken to actually take parties in war the command would be integrated.

I have no time to summarize the 25 year period that followed 1966 all the way to the fall of Berlin Wall. But under President Pompidou, Giscard, and Mitterand until 1990, what you see is a pattern of rapprochement between France and NATO establishment both on the nuclear and on conventional level. The theological warfare around flexible response and the use of the first French Army as a reserve force with the Third American Core in a maneuver to protect Germany and French border all of the gradually came down and by the time the Wall came down the two doctrines became compatible especially with beginning of Franco-German cooperation and the elimination of technical nuclear weapons. Because, the French and the American technical nuclear weapon at that time had a bad habit of falling on German territory which was rather problematic in terms of relationship with Germany.

So that is the story until the end of the cold war. After the end of the cold war, NATO became essentially an expeditionary force. The first few years after the fall of Berlin Wall, there was a lot of hope that you could build European alternative. In fact a lot of people in Europe in France and President Mitterrand believed that the days of NATO were finished and that you could build something pan-European system. Very quickly with the war in Balkans, it appeared that there was no European alternative. When we tried to bring WEU in Bosnia, the British did not want to go, so Germany did not want to go, and we let the war go on in Bosnia 4.5 years and 250.000 people were killed. It took Chirac election in 1995 and the quick reaction force created by Chirac with John Major to actually intervene defeats of Serbs and bring the NATO our force to bomb all that brought the date and agreement. So the turning point in terms of French new and NATO was Bosnia. The inability of Europe to exist as a military force, and Bosnia with full French participation, on the ground and in the air, fill out later by Kosovo in 1999. Same thing, the French participated in the bombing

operation in Yugoslavia. Having said this, the other key moment at that point was following Bosnia was Jack Chirac's attempt in 1996 to rejoin NATO. There was a formal offer made with the Clinton and its ration to exchange reintegration for France in exchange for the southern command in Naples. That did could not fly because it could not fly simply because the Sixth Fleet was part of the southern command. There was no way in the world if you know how NATO operates that the Americans would leave the command of six fleet to anybody else than the American enroll. On the part of France the difficulty was to have aircraft courier called Charles De Gaulle operate under American command. So in the end it did not work out.

By 1997, the negotiation was broken with the reelection of the socialist. And then Chirac moved British which was the beginning of the USPD and the Berlin prueze and the new agreement between European component and the NATO. The problem with the European component as you know that the Helsinki headlight go to adopt the following year in 1996. We are not actually fulfilled and we are far from filling the 60.000 soldiers.

So where we are now very quickly I am folding... Today as a result of the decision of 1996 in particular, France actually occupies every position possible inside NATO all the seats are taken except the nuclear panning group which essentially is obsolete. Because NATO is no longer are our nuclear alliance, like it or not, and I do not. It is a fact nobody talks about nuclear weapons any more in the alliance. And it is a denuclearized alliance to the MPG's out. What is left is a military committee which is the only committee in which France does not participate. But as you know the military committee is being overtaken by events by the new command structures, transformation command and Norfolk and the role of shape.

So in the NATO machinery the French ally essentially present of course at lower numbers. To give you an idea, we have about a hundred military officers inserted into NATO machinery compared with 2500 Germans, 2500 British and 2000 Italians. So there is room for progress. The second you have to know is that France already serves as a financial contributor to the NATO budget. And, the second, the third depends on you, military cooperator to the NATO operation. There were years even where French general were commanding major operation both in Kosovo and in Afghanistan under French generals, under secure command.

Now what are the problems? The number one problem is that the French people do not know about this. Well, I have just told you, this kind of process of rapprochement over the years is not known by the French body politics. And the problem for the French president will have to be a lot of pedagogy to get the French accept these changes. Second, the issue is



Afghanistan. What is going to happen in Afghanistan? I heard the reporter of the French parliament on the subject, I do not want to discuss this in 2 seconds here. Maybe we will go back to it. But one president Sarkozy last year in Bucharest decided to move French forces into combat situation in Capica and Sirobi. He boosted the number of forces there. There was a danger of disbanding inside NATO with the decision particularly of the Canadian actually to move out of Afghanistan followed by the Dutch. So now a lot is being discussed at the moment as we near the summit. How do we reorganize this?

I have my own personal view as to where NATO out to go in the future. In a nutshell I really believe that in the world of 8–10 billion people in 25 years time, if you look at the alliance between the two sides of the Atlantic, it seems to me it's going to have to be broadened to include at some point the Russians. You can not have a NATO without having a proper policy with a view of Russia. So we will have to focus on that. We have to focus on the capability problem. I am worried of the fact that the difference between Europe and America is such now that the alliance is in danger of becoming relevant to American military deployment. You may or not know, less than 8% of US forces are earmarked in NATO. So it is becoming a minor operation militarily for the US. So we in Europe have a major effort to boost capabilities. And that is essentially what Sarkozy is trying to do. Sarkozy is saying a message to the French people "let's stop the hypocrisy. We are already part of NATO." The message to the European is "let's do more about collective defense".

And we, the French, are not doing this true under my NATO. And the message to the Americans is "you must accept a stronger European component it is in the interest alliance to have a stronger European component.

I really believe that if we can not bring the Europeans to do more in the alliance, the alliance will do in other way and that's by the way one of the problems in Afghanistan. The Ambassador mentioned the American search in Afghanistan. If you look at the numbers now, the level of American forces in Afghanistan compared to level of European forces and combat European forces, the differential is going to be anywhere between 1 to 8 or 1 to 10. This means that the Afghan War is going to be more and more an American war, less and less a NATO war. And that's much of a problem for all of us.

Thank you for your attention.



**SESSION III: LOOKING BEYOND THE  
60<sup>th</sup> ANNIVERSARY OF NATO**

**Murat MERCAN<sup>20</sup>**

Mr. Chairman,  
Distinguished Guests,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin by expressing my congratulations to the Turkish Atlantic Treaty Association, which has been successfully organizing this traditional conference on security matters since 1990. I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to the organizers for giving me this opportunity to address such a prominent forum.

I should note that the topics we are discussing in the framework of this year's conference are particularly relevant and timely as we are preparing to celebrate the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of NATO. Following the 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit which is going to be held in 3-4 April 2009, some issues are expected to become high on the agenda of the Alliance. NATO operations, especially the ISAF operation, Strategic Concept, Comprehensive Approach and Headquarters reform are most likely to occupy our agenda. Due to time limitations, today, I would like to dwell upon the Strategic Concept and NATO's ISAF operation in Afghanistan.

Distinguished Guests,

As we have already discussed in the different panels of this conference, the security environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has been witnessing dramatic changes in terms of both characteristics and dimensions of risks and threats. The emergence of new risks and threats of asymmetric and transboundary nature, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime; as well as new sources of instability such as climate change, energy scarcity and cultural intolerance has created a new strategic environment to which all actors of international relations have to adopt themselves.

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<sup>20</sup> Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission Turkish Grand National Assembly

So as to remain relevant to the security needs of its members and to preserve its unique and prominent position among the security organizations, NATO should also adjust itself to the new realities. In this regard, the new challenges that are different from those NATO faced in the past should be reflected in the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, which sets the broad policy framework for the Alliance's work.

NATO's first Strategic Concept which was agreed in 1950 has been revised in 1991 and the last time in 1999. Although the last version of the Concept reflects a new vision and strategies with regard to the post-Cold War circumstances, new elements such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and the Iraq war justify a new update. Moreover, in 1999, the Alliance's operational experience was largely limited to the Balkans. In the following years, however, NATO has undertaken additional missions and operations, beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, ISAF in Afghanistan and the Training Mission in Iraq being the most significant examples.

There is no doubt that the new features and requirements of the evolving security environment and NATO's vision of its future role need to be reflected in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. On the other hand, we believe that the current one still involves relevant and valid aspects which should not be lost. Therefore, our aim should be to update the 1999's Strategic Concept instead of drafting a new one.

At this point, I would like to highlight the Declaration on the Alliance Security, which will be prepared for adaptation at NATO's 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit. Such declaration will provide a useful framework and reference for updating the current Strategic Concept as well as setting the scene for a new strategy to address the existing and potential challenges.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We believe that the primary aim of the said Declaration and the updated Strategic Concept should be to explain to both our national publics and the international community the fundamental values and principles that NATO is based on as well as the achievements of the Alliance in contributing peace and stability. In this regard, the said Declaration should reaffirm the principle of collective defence, which has been and continues to be at the hearth of NATO's success and credibility.

Other fundamental values and principles which have contributed to the success of the Alliance throughout the Cold War era and beyond should also be highlighted in both documents. In this regard, indivisibility of Allied security, consensus-based decision making, Alliance's cohesion and

solidarity, equitable burden sharing and the enduring value of the transatlantic link are the essential elements to be highlighted.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Since taking over the ISAF operation in 2003, NATO has been substantially contributing to the international efforts aiming at preserving security and stability in Afghanistan. In its largest out of area operation in this country, NATO is leading more than 50.000 troops from 43 countries, including partners from all over the world, and 26 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) under ISAF.

Indeed, being the first operation of NATO outside the Euro-Atlantic area and with the largest number of troops deployed, ISAF has become the most important operation of the Alliance. We often hear arguments which identify this operation as a litmus test for the success, credibility and the viability of the Alliance.

Although NATO Allies and its partners have allocated enormous resources and capabilities in the interest of peace and stability in Afghanistan, there is still much to be done. In this regard, I want to underline the importance of two factors which will be determinant in the success of NATO in Afghanistan, as well as in the fate of this country.

- a) Winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan population and
- b) Adopting a regional approach and establishing cooperation particularly with Pakistan.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

There is no plan, policy or strategy that can be successful without the support of the local population. This argument is particularly valid in the case of Afghanistan. Therefore, efforts to find a solution in this country should also concentrate on provinces and address the local people with a view of winning their support.

On the other hand, civilian casualties caused by military operations continue to be an obstacle in reaching out the Afghan people. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to do our best to minimize civilian casualties.

Developing an effective public diplomacy strategy for Afghanistan is the most essential instrument in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan population. We should take into consideration their perceptions and expectations as well as their sensitivities. In reaching the Afghan public opinion, choosing the right means is as much important as the messages

given. In all these endeavors, we need to work in close cooperation with the Afghan government.

As military approach alone would not bring quick solutions to the problems in Afghanistan, international community should deal with this country with a wide spectrum of different collective instruments ranging from economic to social. Civilian reconstruction of the Afghan society is a prerequisite for success of the international community in Afghanistan.

Thus, we should make contributions to improve the living conditions with a view to reaching the ultimate objective of the sustainable development of the country. Reconstruction efforts, projects especially in the fields of education, health and agriculture have particular importance in this regard. I should also underline the necessity of creating alternative livelihood if we want to curb poppy growing and drug trafficking once for all.

Turkey, for its part, puts great emphasis on economic, social, agricultural and educational development of the Afghan society and extends technical, economic and financial aid to complement its contributions in the security dimension. International community should also increase its economic and technical assistance to this country.

Furthermore, Afghanization and Afghan ownership of the security realm is key for the sustainable peace and stability in the country. Efforts towards training and equipping the Afghan security forces are of primary importance in this regard. We believe that this would increase local ownership and professionalism in the country. This is also a priority task for NATO and for the Allies, among the other areas.

Distinguished Guests,

We should also not lose sight of the fact that Pakistan is one of the major actors not only in Afghanistan context but also in the whole region. It is also the most seriously affected country by the deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan. We cannot view the security situations in Pakistan and Afghanistan separately from each other. Therefore, NATO should adopt a regional approach and improve its dialogue and cooperation with Pakistan at all levels.

Taking into account the importance of adopting a regional approach and establishing cooperation with Pakistan, Turkey launched the Ankara Trilateral Summit Process in 2007 among the Presidents of Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since its inception, this process has substantially contributed to the creation of the much needed atmosphere of trust and cooperation between the two countries.

Mr. Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In April this year, we will be celebrating the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Alliance. Throughout these 60 years, NATO, based on shared values and principles, has been at the core of the Euro-Atlantic community. Thanks to the ongoing transformation process, it will continue to serve to the collective interest of the Allies in projecting peace and stability in Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. I want to finish by referring to the Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's words: "More than ever, NATO is in demand and NATO is delivering."

Thank you for your kind attention.





### SESSION III: LOOKING BEYOND THE 60<sup>th</sup> ANNIVERSARY OF NATO

Onur ÖYMEN<sup>21</sup>

Mr. Chairman, honorable guests... It is a particular pleasure for me to address you this morning to share with you my views. But before doing that I would like to express also my thanks to Mr. Ambassador Akbel, my old friend and my colleagues for organizing this important meeting.

I was this morning planning to share with you my views on success stories of NATO, our achievements, our really very positive activities that we have realized in the last 60 years. And I have a long list of such stories. But I have noticed that yesterday and this morning so many such stories have been told that it is my duty now to tell you a little bit about the shortcomings, the problems that we have faced in the past. Not to repeat them in the next life of NATO, that's to say I need to raise one or two problematic areas. But before doing that, still I want to stress one or two success stories that have not been perhaps presented at least from that different angle.

A number of people present NATO as a Christian organization, as an imperialist organization and so forth. Particularly in Arab world there is a concern regarding NATO. So we explain them that NATO as an organization composed mostly of Christian nations with the exception of Turkey, vote for against the Christian nations Serbia to protect the Muslims of Albania. That's why everybody should understand NATO is not religious bias. This is the first point I would like to mention. Second, NATO's efforts in Macedonia, although some called them (Former Republic of Yugoslavia) but Turkey has always preferred to use the original constitutional name and in all documents, it is said that Turkey recognizes Macedonia as such. So in Macedonia NATO played extremely important role in coming down and stopping emerging terrorist activities.

Thirdly, NATO also played an extremely important role in Unitarian relief in Albania and by the way Turkey was the first NATO country to

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<sup>21</sup> Dr., Member of Turkish Parliament

provide humanitarian assistance to Kosovo. So, dear colleagues, having said this positive aspects, I would like to stress on one or two problematic areas.

Even during the cold war period, there were some serious problems within the NATO. Mr. Lellouche has mentioned Suez crisis and how the United States have put pressure on France and Britain to leave Suez together with Isreal. What has not been perhaps mentioned that Americans were so keen in that they even accepted to compromise to cooperate with the Soviet Union in the United States to force France and Germany. So for NATO's solidarity it was an interesting example that was remembered afterwards. Second point that was not mentioned was Jupiter Crisis.

During the cold war period, Jupiter missiles were placed at Turkish Soviet border. But as a result of a compromise between Americans and Russians, Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin Agreement those missiles were removed from Turkey without an advance notice to the Turkish government. The PM İnönü said that he was not aware of the decision of the removal of the Jupiter missiles so that created also across this problem. Later on we have seen a few embargo cases imposed by some NATO countries against other NATO countries which was quite peculiar in a military alliance. This country, particularly my country Turkey was the deprived for more than three years of all source of military equipment, material and spare parts from our bigger ally, as a result of the ambargo of the congress on Cyprus issue. And I believe that American administration spent a lot of efforts but it was the decision of the Congress. It was a decision of government in another NATO country, our good friends Germans. German government decided to impose an ambargo on Turkey claiming that Turkey was using German weapons given to Turkey within the NATO framework of assistance in combating terrorism. So it was a sort of crime to use NATO material combating terrorism. Those are some problems that we have lived in NATO.

More recently we have lived another problem during the second Gulf War. We were asking patriot missiles from NATO to counter possible missile attacks of Iraq. Then one NATO country opposed it until the end. This country blocked the decision of NATO Council. The NATO Council was unable to provide Turkey these patriot missiles. Thanks God, at least for that time, this country was not a member of DPC and we were able to pass this decision and DPC defense planning committee. Then we got on temporary basis these patriot missiles. Those are some stories that we should remember to not repeat them in the future because the keyword we are talking about, the changes in NATO, the transformation, adaptation of NATO to new conditions, new NATO whatever. But what should not be changed in all these processes at least could be resumed by one word: "solidarity". If we miss our solidarity we miss everything. Therefore we

have to be very keen on that. Are we able to keep our solidarity? Not always. Sometimes we have standards in NATO countries and my NATO countries are applicable in one, and some NATO countries not so applicable in other NATO countries. Let me give you an example. For instance newly established Homeland Security Department of the United States has a strategy saying that they will not allow terrorist to step foot on the American territory. They are going to eliminate terrorist attacks before they reach to America. We appreciate that it is a correct decision and correct strategy. They do this in Afghanistan across the ocean they operate and combat terrorism. It is correct and it is not critical. We should not criticize that. But the same should apply to other countries. Turkey also should be able to stop terrorist activities before they reach to Turkish soil. It means that nobody should object Turkish across the border operations to combat terrorism. So, one standard should be applicable for everyone. If we use double standards we will also reduce the credibility of our alliance. I have a lot of other things to tell you as regards to problem areas. But I would say one thing on terrorism and also short remark on Turkey EU relations.

As regards to terrorism we worked hard throughout years to introduce in NATO agenda a concept of combating terrorism. But during my function in NATO, during my job in NATO, I do not remember one single NATO Council meeting before the September 11 before the attacks of terrorist against twin towers in USA, referring to terrorism. There was no reference, zero reference to terrorism until the attacks against twin tower. But after that I do not remember one single NATO Council agenda where combating terrorism was not number one item. So it means that we have changed our concept. Curiously enough, in 1999 Washington Summit, we pressed hard to introduce in the new NATO strategic concept terrorism as a threat to be covered by Article 5. We were not successful. Our allies considered that terrorism could be an item to be considered under Article 4 which necessitates only consultation and not over all answer. But what is curious is that for the first time in the history of NATO we have decided an Article 5 situation to combat terrorism after the attacks of twin towers in New York. So those are some paradoxical situations which means that we have to be more careful in preparing future documents.

Talking about documents, I believe that in NATO documents are like bibles. We remember documents their names, their references and everything in some cases not only documents but also international agreements. In a NATO meeting for instance my Greek friend was opposing a reference to Turkish straights. We were talking about Turkish straights, and he said "No, no we have to only mention straights not Turkish straights." I asked, "Why, what is wrong with Turkish straights?" He said, "We are

very much keen very much with Lausanne Treaty. In Lausanne Treaty there is a reference to straight not to Turkish straights." I said, "I disagree with the representative of the head of Hellenic Kingdom." He said, "We are not a kingdom we are a republic." I said, "Well in Lausanne Treaty it is written Hellenic Kingdom so we have to observe that." So we have such stories in NATO but talking about documents although some remember very well some documents we do not remember always other documents.

For instance in one NATO document it is said that there should be a broad congruence between membership to NATO and membership to European Union. Do we believe that document? Who believes that document? Some countries today say that Turkey should never join European Union because it is not a European country. The countries who say this today were those who accepted that document of broad congruence. Perhaps at that time they were not fully aware of the geographical location of Turkey. So Mr. Pierre Lellouche said that European Union is a daughter of NATO. IT may be true but I wonder whether European Union considers NATO as her father or as her step father. The reality is that for a long period there was absolutely no contact, no cooperation between NATO and EU so much so that high level officers, diplomats of NATO and EU were severely criticized for having a private lunch in a restaurant. So those organizations were totally separated from each other. Even today we don't have enough cooperation.

Another curious story is that we have a cooperation scheme between NATO and Russia on combating terrorism. But we do not have such cooperation despite our proposal between NATO and EU. There is no frame of cooperation between these two organizations in combating terrorism. Having said all this, I believe that we have to look to the future with hope and with expectations. We are among those who support NATO. We are among those who continue to believe that NATO is relevant, NATO will play very important function in the future not only in the military field. A colleague mentioned a moment ago democracy as one of the basic principles of NATO and also there was a reference of Jim Jeffrey to the public opinion. Indeed democracy and public opinion are two key elements that we have to focus on very carefully. Particularly we should be aware that so far no war has been raised among democratic countries. In case we have to expand the democracy in the critical periods and areas of the world like the Middle East and Afghanistan. We believe that we will be more successful in fulfilling our mission of spreading stability and piece in these regions. For that matter Turkey can be used as a springboard of democracy towards these regions. The NATO has also has excellent cooperation with Middle Eastern countries but sometimes we turned a blind eye to open conflicts in the Middle East like what has happened in Gaza recently. Everybody hurt everyone but few

references were made to NATO interest involvement in such a situation, such a human tragedy. We have several other examples of missed opportunities but we hope that we will in the future be more careful and more successful.

Ladies and gentlemen in the success stories of NATO I must end my remarks by saying that in the success stories of NATO diplomats are playing extremely important role. And I would like to pay tribute to our American diplomats who lost their lives in searching a solution in Bosnia. I would like to pay all so tribute to Turkish diplomats who lost their lives as a result of terrorist attacks. Some of these diplomats had played extremely important roles in their NATO missions. It is sad that some people recently undermined the role of diplomats and they minimize them by calling “Mon chers”. We believe that it is time to praise diplomats who sacrifice sometimes their lives for the success of and for the interest of their countries and for our common interest in NATO.

Thank you very much.



**NATO AND ENERGY SECURITY?  
(CAN NATO ENHANCE ENERGY COOPERATION?)**

**Alex SERBAN<sup>22</sup>**

Mr. Chairman,

Your excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen, Mesdames et messieurs,

Dear ATA and YATA Friends,

It is an honor to address you during this final session of the Antalya Conference on Security and Cooperation. It is here in Turkey where my country Romania and six others joined the Alliance as full members of NATO in 2004. Indeed a crucible of civilizations. I join the previous speakers in thanking and congratulating the organizers the Turkish Atlantic Council for continuing this tradition.

Members of NATO and the European Union were faced recently with the potential of energy shortages in the middle of the winter season. Lives were affected; economic activity was damaged in the middle of the global economic crisis, prompting us to vigilance. Can and should NATO have a role in the future in preventing this from happening? Can and should NATO enhance energy security cooperation?

In this first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, energy security has emerged as one of the key topics on the global agenda. High prices, scarcity of hydrocarbons and political use of energy assets have drawn attention to the energy issue, fuelling competition for access to resources, whereas raw materials like oil and natural gas used to be considered strictly economic goods. Numerous fossil fuel-rich countries which struggle with political instability and new security risks are threatening the suspension or shortage of global energy resources. Energy supplies face disruption in the face of the Russia-Ukraine standoff in January 2006 and again this month, or the Russian-Georgian conflict which could have drastically affect BTC pipeline operation, or from terrorist attacks in Turkey or the Persian Gulf. We have

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<sup>22</sup> Vice President, Atlantic Treaty Association President, Euro Atlantic Council of Romania–Casa NATO

witnessed the use of resources as a strategic weapon by undemocratic states. Anti-Western energy-producer alliances have formed, for example between Venezuela and Iran. Not least, we face the global environmental problems that result from the use of fossil fuels.

When geostrategic considerations are so relevant for energy policy, international organizations implicitly come into play. In addition to the UN and the EU, NATO has also placed energy security on its agenda. In the late 1990s, NATO, as the organization in charge of safeguarding the security of its members, started to address the problem of energy security. NATO's 1999 strategic concept stated that the alliance's security interests could be affected by the interruption of critical resources. In 2006 alliance member states were tasked to "begin consultations about the direct risks of energy security" in order to define the areas in which NATO might be relevant to the energy security interests of its members. In Bucharest member states agreed that NATO must become active. In particular they have agreed to five areas:

- *information and intelligence fusion and sharing;*
- *projecting stability;*
- *advancing international and regional cooperation;*
- *supporting consequence management;*
- *supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure and transportation*

The NATO Council has been tasked in Bucharest to prepare a consolidated report on progress achieved in the area of energy security for consideration at the 2009 Summit in Strasburg-Kehl.

What has emerged from NATO's internal debate is the Alliance's determination to cope with emerging energy challenges in a focused and complementary way. At the same time, NATO members consider it crucial to enhance their efforts towards energy diversification, by pushing for deeper cooperation with the petroleum and gas-rich Caspian states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and countries in the Black Sea region. While the Caspian and Black Sea regions are a valuable target for the West's energy diversification, it should not be considered or seen as a replaceable alternative to Russia which will continue to protect its status as Europe's and Turkey's main energy and natural gas provider and intends to use its naturally given monopoly position in the region even if when it has to buy resources from other countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan)

Statistics speak first on this front. Most European countries are heavily reliant upon imported energy. EU countries as a whole import 50% of their



energy needs, a figure that is expected to rise to 70% by 2030. Russia is a key supplier of oil and natural gas. Germany imports 32% of its energy from Russia and Poland imports two-thirds of its natural gas needs from Russia, and 97% of its oil. In one estimate, by 2030 EU countries will import 40% of their gas needs from Russia, and 45% of their oil from the Middle East. In addition, oil in particular is found largely in unstable areas of the world such as the Middle East, a factor in U.S. and European concerns over energy security.

Hence, in European community the view about energy security issues primarily seen in an economic and political context. The EU is floating a proposal meant to build interdependence between EU members and Russia to secure reliable energy supplies from Russia. But this is European policy, and a transatlantic dialogue, within NATO or outside the alliance, is badly needed. There is an initiative by the Atlantic Council of the US to more debate and, particularly among policymakers and business leaders, with a focus on Caspian and Black Sea energy challenges and opportunities in the region. A welcomed initiative.

NATO member and EU aspirant member, Turkey, is also dependent on Russian gas as well as on Iran. As we have seen, Turkey's security interests lie in successfully balancing its role as an energy transit country between producers and consumers, but this strategy is being challenged by what some analysts say are Russia's active designs to put a "choke hold" on Caspian energy. The Russian-Georgia fighting temporarily halted the flow of BTC and projects actively being promoted such as Southstream are actively competing with alternative projects such as Nabucco. Turkey's reliance on Iranian gas and cooperation in the energy field, an awkward alternative, also represents an unreliable solution plaguing Turkey with shortages and production shutdowns during the wintertime. Turkey's energy portfolio, coal, hydro and natural gas, amidst its plans to develop several international pipelines and become an energy hub for the region, needs to address its own dependency on foreign resources and growing domestic needs in the years to come. Over the next decade, Turkey's energy needs will more than double to 222 million tons of oil per year. Between 2005 and 2007, oil and gas imports increased by 80% to nearly \$35 billion US, and nearly 70% of its oil and gas needs will be coming from abroad. Of this Russia supplies 64% and Iran 17%.

Given NATO's involvement within the region and the means available to deal with local governments, the intervention of the Alliance is destined addressed to specific niche tasks. So although NATO can legitimately aspire to play an active role in the Caspian and Black Sea region, its attempts to enhance energy cooperation with and within regional actors need to be

gradual and focused, and must acknowledge Russia's enduring position and influence in the region.

Concern over energy security, mainly caused by the growing demand for hydrocarbon supplies and the exorbitant increase in oil prices, rapidly mounted because of certain actions on Russia's part that Western leaders did not always consider fair. The Russia-Georgia conflict, which broke out in early August 2008, and the recent Russia-Ukraine gas standoff once again confirmed Western anxieties over energy security. Polish President Kaczynski recently asked if there is a relationship between the Russia-Georgia war and the Russia-Ukraine standoff. Indeed, through its power-based actions in South Ossetia and Georgia, the Kremlin clearly set limits to Western interference within Russia's neighborhood, threatening the regular flow of energy towards Europe and highlighting NATO's inability to act effectively (though not only in the energy security field) in the region.

Within the alliance some forces are pushing for a tough commitment on this issue, while others are more reluctant to accept a leading role for NATO. The idea of an active NATO role was stressed by US Senator Richard Lugar raising both the level of the threat posed by energy vulnerability and the extent of necessary answers. He recommended that the transatlantic community support democratic transformations in the Caucasus by reaffirming the NATO Membership Action Plan with Georgia and also by going ahead with NATO's eastward enlargement, extending formal invitations to supplier and transit countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Clearly, Lugar's proposal went far beyond the limited role envisaged by the Riga Summit Final Declaration.

In the Final Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government gathered in Bucharest, the Allies finally identified five distinct fields for NATO energy security activity previously mentioned. Perhaps this is a beginning for future summits to build upon, however, the Declaration underlined once again the complementary role of NATO within a coordinated international institutional framework.

Indeed, the Alliance could "add *value*" to the work of International Organizations and specialized bodies focused on energy security.

What is also evident is that the Caspian - Black Sea region is beginning to become a "*priority*" in the energy security plans of the transatlantic community. This interest is not new, but recently Western have countries speeded up various activities to deepen their influence in the region because they believe that Russia is playing its energy card to attain political goals and they consider the Caspian basin an effective energy alternative to the Kremlin. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, in fact, have huge gas

and oil reserves, and some exist in the Black Sea. Moreover, local governments have recently demonstrated a new and encouraging attitude towards both regional and international dialogue. NATO's members are thus seeking to achieve deeper cooperation with and between those states, in both military and energy fields, in order to guarantee a secure East-West corridor for Caspian natural resources.

However, attainment of Western goals in the region is impeded by the economic, social, commercial and political circumstances that prevail in the region. It is not clear, therefore, if the Alliance, with the limited means available to it, would be collectively able to enhance energy cooperation and deepen its influence in the region, as advocated by some of its member states.

NATO needs to:

- examine the threat posed by the current energy situation and the emerging alternative strategies elaborated by Western countries to tackle it.
- evaluate the feasibility of the diversification plan aimed at coping with increasing energy-related risks, and in particular its practicability in the Caspian region.
- assess its role and the means it has to reach the Alliance's security goals in the region.

On the basis of these considerations it may be possible to determine whether NATO's involvement in the Caspian and Black Seas could be useful for its members' energy security.

As already stated, the NATO Summits in Riga and Bucharest broadened the debate and confirmed rising concern, while reaching compromise solutions on the matter. What effectively emerged from the institutional discussions and consultations was a "*limited, complementary role*" for the Alliance in energy security. This role cannot be "*a lead role in the field of energy security*". However, this does not rule out the potential for NATO to act in a number of niche sectors where it might "add value" to the attempts (both of its members and of other international actors like the EU) to protect the West's energy security. Since energy security is a complex issue with several geopolitical aspects, NATO's approach has necessarily to be multifaceted. Military tasks, such as the protection of critical infrastructure or crisis response activities, would be only a part of a wider strategy that ought also to include political initiatives, dialogue and cooperation with supplier and transit countries.

There are several fields in which NATO can play an important role in energy security: NATO could be important in the protection of energy resources and their transportation routes. Currently, there are no

international organizations or institutionalized cooperation mechanisms expressly responsible for this. Sea routes are particularly important for the transportation of unrefined oil. Pipelines, which account for nearly 40 percent of transportation, are no less susceptible. NATO could be particularly useful in intelligence gathering by coordinating national intelligence agencies and making relevant information available to all member states.

Another way to involve the alliance would be in the form of a political committee to rally international solidarity in the event of the interruption of essential energy deliveries. In the aftermath of the winter 2005-06 gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Poland suggested establishing a kind of "Energy NATO." The Polish proposal envisioned a solidarity clause in the event of threatened energy security, as well as the creation of common gas and oil reserves. Perhaps the best way to address energy security is within the parameters of NATO's Partnership for Peace program (PfP) since it includes numerous energy-producing states. One possibility would be the construction of pipelines with NATO participation. Another is to place greater weight on energy infrastructure security in the PfP training program.

It is however important to observe what kind of actions NATO will actually assume in energy security in the near future. For one, many countries believe that the involvement of a military alliance in energy security would send out the wrong signals. It might, for example, give rise to the impression that in the event of a shortage of vital resources, the West is prepared to protect its resources militarily at the expense of others.

The Alliance also has political and military instruments designed to promote dialogue and cooperation with countries involved in energy security issues. First and foremost, NATO maintains political and military contacts with many of the producer and transit countries in the Caspian and Black Sea regions. Secondly, through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the NATO-Ukraine Council, the Alliance maintains constant dialogue with these two countries within a well established framework, even if recent developments in Georgia and Russia's have damaged constructive cooperation. Third, through PfP/IPAP programs, the Alliance could elaborate a policy of military support and training, providing technical assistance and expertise (linked to energy security goals) to the armies and police corps of supplier and transit countries. Finally, NATO could engage its troops in a wide operation of defense and protection of sensitive energy targets from terrorist attacks, employing its military capabilities to escort oil and LNG tankers, or securing key energy infrastructures such as pipelines and refineries in precarious regions. However, this option presents potential problems and has to be handled with care. Non-NATO suppliers or transit

countries are not always ready to accept the Alliance's interference on their soil. Even in Turkey, a NATO member, and Azerbaijan, a close partner of the Alliance, local governments have expressed deep reservations about the deployment of NATO troops to protect pipelines and energy infrastructures. In addition, instead of protecting potential energy targets, NATO troops could risk becoming the effective objective of violent terrorist attacks in energy transit areas.

NATO's political efforts to enhance energy security in the region are limited by both internal and external factors. On one hand, the Alliance itself is not politically cohesive on the issue, and most of its members do not want to push for a deep collective involvement in the region. They still consider energy security a national issue and often have different (and sometimes diverging) energy strategies. On the other hand, Moscow has clearly expressed its disapproval of the Alliance's attempt to extend its influence eastwards. *"NATO cannot guarantee its security at the expense of other countries' security,"* said then President Putin in Bucharest. Moscow's opinion has been backed even by Germany, France, Italy and Spain, who have clearly confirmed their opposition to any imminent NATO enlargement towards the East.

The Alliance's realistic options for intervening in the region are primarily those provided by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and IPAP programs, which offer political tools to enhance international and regional cooperation, improve information and intelligence sharing and promote confidence in the Alliance within energy supplier countries. The political commitment envisaged by PfP/IPAP, while broad and essentially abstract, could enable the Alliance to deal with local government on a regular basis, enhancing straightforward dialogue and enabling deeper cooperation, without arousing Russian anxiety about security.

A successful example of this approach is the regional dialogue promoted by NATO between Azerbaijan and Georgia. In recent years, NATO has supported political talks and practical cooperation between the two countries, and has helped Baku and Tbilisi to face both internal and external challenges to their participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which provides the overall framework for cooperation between NATO and its Partner countries and to related practical activities. In exchange, the Alliance and its members managed to obtain the deep involvement of both Caucasian states in energy security. Thanks to Western support and their determination to be politically and economically linked to the West, Azerbaijan and Georgia agreed to the construction of two main pipelines: the BTC and the BTE, paving the way for the implementation of the East-West energy corridor connecting Europe to the Caspian region.

At present the Alliance and its members hope to enhance such cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan as well, although this plan is less likely to succeed, because the two countries are involved at different levels in the NATO framework.

### **Conclusions**

Recent events in the oil and gas sector confirm the growing importance of energy as a crucial element of international stability. Emerging concern about current energy challenges suggests that NATO members need to increase common efforts to guarantee higher levels of energy security. Starting from these key assumptions, I conclude with the following points:

The Alliance, at least theoretically, has responded to the challenge and has started to discuss the topic in the framework of the Washington Treaty, expressing publicly its engagement in energy security in Riga and Bucharest. However, even if some policy makers or analysts are speculating about a leading role for the Alliance in energy security, NATO has firmly reiterated that its role in the sector is limited and complementary. Although NATO members clearly understand the importance of energy security, current plans to deal with the issue are still driven by "national interests". Because of this lack of coordination, there is a risk that the alternative strategies for tackling the energy challenge will be essentially ineffective. To ensure the success of NATO efforts, therefore, Alliance members will need to find a common ground. To achieve more valuable results, the Alliance should try to promote broader international cooperation by encouraging political and economic institutions such as the EU, the OSCE and the financial institutions such as EBRD/IEB to operate actively in the region.

NATO members are right to pursue a strategy of energy diversification: alternative types of energy, suppliers and routes could help reduce Western anxieties about energy. The Caspian region is, after all, a realistic target for the West's energy security strategies. However, NATO members and Western policy makers must understand that a gradual energy strategy towards Caspian states also needs to take into account Russia's interests in the region and not view this in a zero-sum game. Moscow is still a leading regional player in both energy and security fields, and with the current price of oil it is also affected economically. In view, therefore, of limited Caspian energy sustainability (reserves, contracts and transit routes), it would be unwise for NATO allies and European countries to act in the region in a way that could damage the prospects of a constructive energy dialogue with a potential Russian partner.

Thank you.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Çağrı ERHAN<sup>23</sup>

Thank you Mr. Chairman for your really kind words about me. In fact there is a lovely weather outside and I'm sure nobody wants to lose an opportunity to have an early lunch and spend more time in Antalya. So rather than present a summary of who said what in this one and a half day event, I just wanted to bring together a set of ideas and conclusions and some common concerns which were depicted in our conference.

First of all, I must underline that one of the most important conclusions of this conference I think that the need for continuous transformation of NATO. I have been participating these conferences in Antalya over than a decade now. And it coincided with the very early days of and end of Cold War. Since then I always see that many participants, contributors and speakers underline the need for transformation in NATO. So after 10 years once more we see the changing dynamics of international environment, the changing perceptions of threat and the changing political geography of Transatlantic region necessitates us to put more emphasis to transformation. So, most of the speakers emphasized the difference between today and the "good old days". I just take it from my colleague Mustafa Aydın, the cold war and the current international dynamics. Indeed, the threats are widespread as they were 20 years ago. Of course fighting with the new threats brought a fast transformation in the alliance and a serious of out of area or non Article 5 operations in the region. But the new international environment also triggered a still ongoing debate. And for 10 years I also witnessed in this conferences and in other conferences related to NATO issues, the very hot debates over the questions which I will set forth now. The most important question which was also asked here yesterday in the morning: What are the new responsibilities of NATO? We still did not decide it actually. That's why we are preparing a new strategic concept in 2009 to actually renew out threat perceptions. Should we care about the threats like global warming, epidemics, ethnic conflicts in Africa? Are they our responsibility fields? This is a security organization. Or to what extent should we involve in Afghanistan and Iraq? What is the scope of out of area?

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<sup>23</sup> Prof.Dr., University of Ankara, Member of Governing Board, Turkish Atlantic Council

Where is the new Atlantic area? These are all questions which were openly asked and mentioned in this two-day-conference and this clearly shows that NATO after 20 years of the Fall of the Berlin Wall, still did not decide where to take this organization. Should we stand still as a security organization in the transatlantic area or should we evolve one step forward to become a global security organization maybe under UN auspices or UN umbrella. These are all questions to be asked and to be answered actually.

Over the past 5 years we witnessed NATO has involved with some of these new problems and new areas. However it is not easy to say all NATO members equally committed these new areas of NATO. Many say NATO is a security organization at the end should not play the UN role. However what if the UN can not play any important role to cope with new challenges? Should we as in the Kosovo conflict ten years ago, should we just stand by and watch what's going on? In this conference some speakers affirmed that the new definition of threats necessitates a holistic approach to security issues. That is completely true. The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that without changing social cultural and economical situation in a positive way, it is almost impossible to control terrorism and other threats. But on the other hand one should not forget that a holistic security approach covers multi-dimensional cooperation among different international actors and organizations as well. It is also true that the cooperation between NATO and the EU has been improved since 2001. The so-called LEAKEN Summit. However there still remains a set of serious problems to be solved on the table and some speakers highlighted this subject in this morning's session as well.

Another point frequently referred in the conference was enlargement. From the speaker's views I understand that there is a consensus in NATO to continue accepting new members. However we need to find some fast and reasonable solution for some problems in enlargement process such as how we can include Macedonia and what kind of solutions can be found for the problems of Ukraine and Georgia. In this conference some speakers and contributors said that the new strategic concept of the alliance should be a document in which political dialogue with other organizations, cohesion, burning sharing of members, holistic approaches towards the threats must be highlighted. While there are various references to the new strategic concept, there was also some, only one actually, clear reference to the necessity to the Washington Treaty's modification or change of Washington Treaty.

NATO–Russia relations was another topic in the conference. It is seen once more that Russia wants to start a new, if I may say, Helsinki Process to restructure Transatlantic Security within new understanding. A NATO platform is always open to Russia and Russian view and this is a clear



indicator that NATO is in favor of future cooperation with Russia. Finally the importance of increasing public awareness about NATO's activities was highlighted here in Antalya. 2009 is a year of anniversaries actually. So our activity in this January-February 2009 coincided with many of these anniversaries. And during the opening speeches some of the speakers underlined this reality. For instance if I might give a list of these anniversaries, I see it is the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of NATO. It was mentioned many times but I think it is the first time I mention. This new logo of NATO, I mean the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary logo officially used first time in this conference. Because just a few days before the conference if I am not mistaken. It was officially approved by the Secretary General. So maybe this conference may also be remembered by this first usage of this logo. This is 2009 also the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall, 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Kosovo Operation which was one of the most hot debate issue of NATO after the cold war. It is also the 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Turkish Atlantic Council and 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the famous post cold war enlargement as well.

And, for me personally this conference also is as Ambassador Akbel underlined, of importance.

Because I first participated this Antalya conference in 1999 when I was a young Ph.D candidate that time. I just listened to the conference from the desks you sit now. And then starting with my Ph.D in 2000 I always participated conferences as speaker, panelist or contributor. After 10 years of my first attendance to this conference I am happy to attend this conference with my new title as Professor. And this is my personal history. This is also clearly important. Because this is the first international conference in which I attend with my new title "professor". So at the end I have to thank to contributors to this conference. Because without their contribution their generous contribution I have to underline that it can not happen. First of all Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Grand National Assembly Parliament, and NATO and some of the other contributors I would like to thank. NATO public diplomacy department and especially special thanks to Ms. Yeter Yaman, Turkish YATA and all people take part in organizing this event and especially all the contributors and speakers in the conference. I think many more thanks will be sent by Ömer Akbel after me.

So once again I hope this conference will be remembered as the previous ones as contributions to NATO's future and all this valuable presentations and contributions will be published in the new future so everyone can benefit from it academically or politically. Once more, thank you very much for participating in this conference and I hope to see all of you next time in Antalya.

Thank you very much.



**Enrico La LOGGIA<sup>24</sup>**

Dear President, Excellencies, distinguished guest and colleagues, firstly let me express my sincere thanks to the Turkish Atlantic Council for the opportunity given us to be in the charming city of Antalya and to share our views on the new NATO challenges on the eve of its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary.

The 17<sup>th</sup> International Antalya Conference on Security and Cooperation—today more than yesterday - represents a privileged observatory of the changed geo-economic and strategic landscape where Turkey plays a crucial role.

The 2009 marks the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall when new security dimensions required a historical *internal* and *external* adaptation of the Alliance.

Ten years passed since the first post-cold war enlargement and we are ready today to welcome Albania and Croatia, while the door remains open to our partners in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

In few weeks in Strasbourg and Kehl we will celebrate the Alliance's 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary and France and all Allied will be called to provide NATO with new impetus in order to effectively meet the new security challenges.

From the Middle East to Afghanistan, through the pipelines of the Caucasus, new global threats are jeopardizing peace and the stability and challenging the Euro-Atlantic Security.

Given this new and interconnected security scenario, the Euro-Atlantic community and the international organizations are called for a more effective and comprehensive answer.

However, in this new global security scenario we should shape our relations also in a new and wider perspective, deepening the cooperation with our Partners, launching concrete programs with the so called Contact Countries sharing our values and threats.

Definitely, a new relation needs to be settled between NATO and the European Union – as Kissinger noted – still living on the same planet but in

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<sup>24</sup> Hon. Prof., President of the Italian Atlantic Committee

two different worlds. We must go beyond the Berlin Plus concept, as today is not a question of demarcation of competences or *sequencing* in operations.

NATO and European Union are today present in the same theatres and we need both, working together, in order to provide a comprehensive and decisive answer to the needs of stabilization and reconstruction.

New Allied, new Partners, new Relations should also be based on the values stated on the article 2 of the Treaty that were further developed in 1956 by the Three Men Committee, chaired by Italian Minister Gaetano Martino. Their Report on the NATO Non-Military Cooperation envisaged a closer political, economic and cultural cooperation. It is in this relevant strategic document that the Atlantic Treaty Association has its *raison d'être*.

Finally, we don't have to lose sight of our core missions, primarily article 5 and the Transatlantic Link.

After 60 years, a balanced burden and risk sharing is needed.

In addition, the Transatlantic Link is not anymore merely a useful tool for a more effective collective defense, as considered in the present NATO Strategic Concept. Today the Transatlantic Link represents a value itself, to be preserved and to be considered among the Purposes and Tasks of the Atlantic Alliance, usually listed in Part One of the Strategic Concept.

The ideas I am sharing with you today are some of the outcomes of the High Level Group on the New NATO Strategic Concept set up by the Italian Atlantic Committee. An initiative that is already in synergy with other Study Groups created by some ATA National Chapters.

The Strategic Concept initiative and this extraordinary International Conference yearly organized by our Turkish colleagues, testify the enduring value of the lessons of the Three Men Committee and the crucial role of ATA in this respect.

İnsan, dünyaya, tabiatın yarattığı kanunlara göre gelir, hayatta kalmayı ise, toplumun oluşturduğu yaşam tarzlarına ayak uydurmakla başarabilir. Çünkü insan hem doğal hem toplumsal bir varlıktır. Toplumlaşmanın ana nedeni korumadır. Hayatta kalma mücadelesi verirken, yaşamın güvenliğini sağlamak zorunluluğu var insanoğlunun. Benimsenmiş yaşam tarzları üzerinde oluşturulan toplumsal birliklerin inşa ettikleri insanlararası ilişkiler, biçilmiş toplumsal değerlerin koruma mekanizmalarının oluşumlarına yön verirler. Güveni sağlama amaçlı savunma mekanizmalarının oluşumları, tepki içeriği taşımaktadırlar. Ama, tepki verme anlamı, doğal oluşumuyla, birilerin saldırılarından savunma içeriği taşıdığına göre, aynı toplumsal oluşumun, hem savunma için tepki gösterme, hem başkalarını etkilemek için müdahale etme haliyle mevcut olabilen bir unsur olduğunu söylemek gerek.

Defence-offence niteliğini taşıyan savunma güçleri, toplumsal yaşamın güvenliğini sağlama bağlamında, insanlararası ilişkilerde özel bir rol sahiplenmişlerdir. Oluşturulan yaşam düzeniyle biçimlenen toplumsal birliklerin doğrultusunda şekillenen savunma güçleri, zaman zaman aşırı boy gösterileriyle, toplumsal yaşama şekil vererek, insan gruplarının hayatını biçimlendirmeye koyulmuşlardır. Toplumsal yaşamla özleştirilen değerler üzerinde örgütlenen güvenlik güçleri, belirlenmiş değerlerin savunma sahasını tanımlarken, benimsenmiş yaşam değerlerine farklı boyutlar getirerek, değerleri savunmaktan öteye giderek, değer üretmeye uzanmışlardır. Toplumsal araç olmaktan çıkma olanağı, ve toplumsal yaşamı biçimlendirme olasılığı, savunma güçlerinin rolünü belirlemede ciddi sorunlar yaşatmaktadır. Evrimsel süreç içinde gelişen toplumsal birlikler, bu sorunları karşılamaya ne kadar özen gösterdi iseler de, bu sorunlardan bütünüyle kurtulmayı henüz başaramamışlardır. Geçmişin akımı içinde, tarih oluşturan olaylara bakıldığında, insan grupları, fazlasıyla, askeri güçler himayesinde belirlenmişlerdir. Bugün ise, yeni dünya düzeni oluşturulmasında, güç kullanımı farklı boyutlara uzanmıştır.

Kültürel değerlerin yansımalarıyla oluşan medeniyetler, toplumsal yaşamı kolaylaştırma için oluşturdukları insani ilişkilerle belirlenmişlerdir. Bugünün medeni hayatını yaşayanlar, benimsenmiş yaşam tarzlarını uzun bir süre korumayla başarmışlardır. Medeni yaşama ulaşım, tarihi bir süreç içinde

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oluşturulan değerlerle bütünleşmiş, inşa edilen savunma mekanizmalarıyla yaşamını sürdürmüş, insanoğlunun benimsemesiyle kanıtlanmıştır. Belli koşullarla şartlandırılmış yaşam tarzları kapsamında benimsenmiş toplumsal hayata değer biçerek, insanlararası ilişkiler belirlenmiş, kabullenilmiş şekliyle onu yaşatmak için, savunma mekanizmaları oluşturulmuştur. Böyle inşa edilen toplumsal birlikler, anlamlı oluşum biçimleriyle güç kazanmış, dolayısıyla savunma mekanizmalarını haklı kılarak onların da güçlenmelerini sağlamış. Toplumsal olgunun hali dışında, güç kullanarak, dayatmalarla oluşturulan toplumsal düzenler, gücün bittiği anda yok olurlar.

Benimsenmeyen yaşam biçimlendirmeleri, her ne kadar yararlı olurlarsa olsunlar, değer imajına ulaşamazlar, dolayısıyla, kabul görülmedikçe de, hayatları uzun süreli olamaz ki, medeni toplumlar oluştursunlar. Kısa ömürlü toplumsal yaşam biçimleri, kültür oluşturacak yaşam tarzlarını inşa edemezler ki, medeniyetler meydana getirsinler. Biz, dünya medeniyetini oluşturma yolunu seçmişsek ve insani değerler üzerinde bir dünya kültürü oluşturma girişiminde bulunmak istersek, demokrasi yolunu seçmekle yükümlüyüz. Buradan yola çıkarak, herkesin kabulleneceği değerleri tespit etmek imkanını yakalayarak, akabinde, onları benimsenmiş şekilleriyle insanoğluna mal etme girişiminde bulunarak, gereken savunma mekanizmalarını oluşturmakla başarabiliriz.

İnsana insani bir yaşam sağlamak için, onu yaşam değerleriyle bilgilendirmek ve kendi iradesi üzerinden ona benimsetmek gerekir. Değer üretme veya değerleri kabul etmenin yolu, insanın özgürlüğünden geçer. Değerlerin tanımını ancak hür olan yapabilir, sadece kendi iradesiyle onları kabullenebilir. Bu bağlamda, herkesin güvenliğini sağlayacak bir örgüte ihtiyaç duyulur. Değer biçmek için oluşturulan kurumlar, kuruluşlar ve çeşitli sivil toplumlar, yazıp çizdikleri değerler, resmiyet sağlamış görüşleriyle, insani değerleri ifade etmez. Şahsi hayatını kendi belirlemeyi hak eden insana, başkalarının değer biçmeleri kabul edilemez.

Değerlerin başında, dünyaya gelen herkesin yaşama hakkı, insanoğlunun en doğal hakkı olması gerek. Bunu herkesin kabullenmesi gerektiği gibi, hayatını nasıl yaşayacağını da kişiğlunun iradesine bırakmak lazım gelir. Dolayısıyla, doğanın belirlediği hayatı, insanların farklı biçimde yaşamalarının, doğal hukuka dayanan insan hakları olarak garanti altına alınması gerekir. Hayat hakkı kadar, farklı yaşam biçimleri de, insan hakları içeriği taşımaktadır. Bunu sadece kabul etmek yetmez, kabullenmek de gerekir. İnsanın insani yaşamı, benimsenmiş yaşam tarzlarını ifade eder. Belli merkezlerde standartlaştırılmış yaşam biçimleri, her ne kadar insani yaşama yakın olsa da, zorlamayla yaşam tarzını hayata geçirmek, gayri insani bir eylem olarak nitelendirilmelidir.

“İnsan hakları” denildiğinde, kelimeler kısılır, sözler biter, cümleler daralır. İnsanın zenginliğini ifade eden, insani değerlerin bütününe içine alabilen bir kavrama, ne eklenebilir ki? Ama gerçek yaşadığımız hayata bakıldığında, insanların sahiden insan muamelesi gördüğünü kanıtlayamayız. Çevremizde olan bitenlere göz atıldığında, günde bir dolarla yaşayan insanları görüyoruz; insanların insanlar tarafından sömürüldüklerine rastlıyoruz; tekkutplulu yapı olgusunun, dünyayı tekkültürlü oluşuma sürüklemesine göz yumamıyoruz; tek dünya medeniyeti oluşumunun, herkesin kapısına dayandığı bilinci içinde, duygusuz kalamıyoruz; küreselleşme süreci batılılaşmayla eşit anlama getiriliyor, ve daha nice olumsuzluklar gözler önüne sergiledikçe, susmamalıyız. Sözlükte değer anlamı taşıyan sözler, gerçekte insandışı olayları önümüze getiriyor. “Demokrasi”, “insan hakları” ve sözde benzeri değerler adına, bombalar yağdırılıyor; demokrasi rejimini kabullendirme adına, bağımsız devletlere saldırılıyor, insan hakları namına, insanlar öldürülüyor.

21. asır, dünyada güvenliği, barışı ve istikrarı sağlayacak değerler üreterek, onları savunacak mekanizmalar oluşturmakla belirlenmeli. Bu bağlamda atılacak adımların ilki, insan değerlerini hukuken savunacak en kapsamlı dünya yazılı belgesi niteliğini taşıyan, İnsan Hakları Evrensel Beyanamesi'ni (Universal Declaration of Human Rights), herkesi bağlayıcı haliyle, Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından (Res-UN 217, A/III) tasdik edilmiş şekliyle, gerçekte yaşatmaktır. Çünkü, bu süreç içinde, sözü edilen ulusüstü hukuk belgesi, beklenen ürünü vermemiştir. Vermemesinin nedeni, onun eksikliğinden değil, onun hayata girmesini tıkayan güçlerden kaynaklanmaktadır. Tüm doğal haklara sahip çıkan bu Beyanname, günümüzde de geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Onun için onu değiştirmek değil, yaşatmak gerekir. Elbette ki, bu Beyanname doğrultusunda, doğal hukuk çerçevesinde, insanı evrensel seviyede tutacak, insan haklarını savunacak, daha nice insani değerler üretme yolunda yürümek lazım gelir.

Doğal hukuk kuralları üzerinde oluşturulacak insan hakları, insani değerleri, farklı kültürler anlayışı içinde biçimlendirilmeli. Bu bağlamda, soyut biçimiyle tanımlandırılan insan hakları, somut şekilleriyle insanlara hizmet sunma olanağı yaratmakla, bunları yazıdan yaşama aktarma, propagandadan gerçeğe dönüştürme gereği hissedilmektedir. Herkese kutsal olan hayat, farklı yaşam biçimlerinde gerçekleşmesinin bir mazuriyeti yoksa, insanların bir bütün içinde, benimsedikleri renkli yaşam tarzları biçiminde, beraberce farklı şekilde yaşamalarına bir engel olamaz. Bunun aksi, toplumsal yaşamın oluşturduğu kültürler ve kültürel yaşam biçimlerinin oluşturdukları farklı toplumsal birlikler üzerine oluşturulan çeşitli yaşam tarzları, insani değerlerin tipleştirilmelerine yol vermez, buna göre de, toplumsal hayatın güvenliğini sağlayacak, değerleri savunma mekanizmaları

oluşturmakta gereken ittifaka varmak da zor olur. Kaldı ki, bir şeyi genelleştirmek de, onu tipe tip aynı kılmak anlamına gelmez, farklılıkları mozaikleştirip, çeşitlilikleri biraraya getirerek, renkli bir oluşumu meydana getirerek, bir bütünü oluşturmakla ifade edilebilir. Evrensellik, içine çeşitlilikleri sığdırabilen, karşılıklı anlayış üzerinde farklılıkları hazmettirebilen bir oluşumu izah eden bir kavramı ifade eder.

Bir şeyi koruma girişiminde, savunulacak değerlerin muhasebesini yapmaz mı insanoğlu? Kendine mal etmediği değerleri niye savunmaya kalkışsın ki? Demek ki, savunma mekanizmaları oluşumunun alt yapısını, toplumsal birliklerin benimsedikleri yaşam değerleri oluşturmaktadır. Tabii ki bu değer biçme girişimleri, keyfi bir oluşum anlamına gelmez; insanın doğa biçimine aykırı yaşam tarzları değer olarak kabullenilemez, her ne kadar insanlar bu keyfi değer oluşumuna boyun eğmiş olsalar bile. Ancak, doğal hayatı, farklı biçimlerde; farklı koşulların oluşturduğu şartlar bağlamında, belli zaman ve zeminin yarattığı imkanlar içinde; yaşamaları ayrı bir olguyu ifade eder, dahası, gerçekleri sahneleştirmek olarak algılanabilir. Mekanın, zamanın ve diğer etkenlerin şartlandığı toplumsal oluşumların doğrultusunda belirlenen farklı yaşam şartları, kendiliğinden insanları birbirinden uzaklaştırmaz; aksine, aynı nedenlerden, eşit biçimde, başkalarının da, kendi şartları doğrultusunda, belli yaşam tarzlarını benimsemelerine yol gösterici olabilir. Farklılıklarda eşitlik, ayrımcılığı değil, insanlararası bağlılığı ifade etmelidir. Bu anlamda oluşturulacak savunma mekanizmaları, farklılıkları eşit biçimde koruyarak, bütün beşerlere sahip çıkmakla, insanlığı savunmuş olurlar.

Ulusüstü değerler, ulusdışı değerler anlamını getirmez, getirmemeli. Bir milletin tanıdığı değerleri ihmal edercesine, üstün bir değer biçecek kurum ve kuruluşlar oluşturulması, ulusüstü bir ulusu temsil etmek anlamına getirilir ki, var olmadan yok oluşu belirlenmelidir. Bu, ulusüstü değerlerin varlığını inkar etme anlamını taşımaz, ulusüstü değerlerin tanımlandırılmasının yolunu gösterir. Binaenaleyh, tüm mevcut toplumsal birliklerin yarattıkları beraberlik yaşamına özen göstererek, oluşturdukları savunma mekanizmalarına saygı göstererek, farklılıklara özgürlük sağlayabilecek, ittifaka dayalı genel bir güvenlik örgütü inşa etme olasılığı sağlıklı olur. Tüm farklılıkları güvence altına alabilecek bir toplumsal unsur, ulusüstü değerleri savunacak bir mekanizma oluşturabilir. Farklılıklar arasında eşitlik sağlayabilecek genel bir toplumsal oluşum, ulusüstü değer olarak tanımlandırılmalıdır. Sözü edilen “48-li Beyannamenin” içeriğine bakıldığında, farklılıklara eşit mesafe öngörmesiyle, insan haklarını evrensel seviyeye yükseltme başarısını yakalamış, tüm dünyanın kabul görebilecek anlamıyla, Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından kabul görmüştür.



Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Teşkilatı, Birleşmiş Milletler' in ruh ve lafzına uygunluğunu, Antlaşmanın önsözündeki gibi, 1., 5. ve 6. maddelerinde, dile getirmiştir. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Antlaşmasının Washington (4 Nisan 1949) metni (üye devletlerin Meclislerince tasdiklerinden sonra, 24 Ağustos 1949 yürürlüğe girmiştir), Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) ilkelerine saygılı davranması, bu askeri örgütlenmenin meşhur kılınması zorunluluğu doğrultusunda algılanması gerekir. Dünyanın bütün ülkelerini topyekün ifade eden bu devletler asosiyasyonu, devlet üstü bir kurum özelliğiyle; ulus-devletleri, bölgesel birlikleri veya çeşitli ittifaklar üzerinde oluşan devletler birleşimlerini; BM kararlarına uymaları mecbur kılma kabiliyetiyle bilinir. Dünyada güvenliği, barışı ve istikrarı sağlamak adına, ulus-devletlerin, kısmen bağımsızlıklarını BM'ne emanet etmeleriyle, hukuken, BM' den, tüm ulus- devletlerin ve diğer toplumsal birliklerin eylemlerinin denetimini yapması istemini hak etmişlerdir. NATO' yu da, böylece, BM tarafından denetim altında tutmak gerekmektedir.

NATO, oluşum biçimi itibariyle, ulus ötesi bir örgütü teşkil etmediğine göre, ulusüstü bir kurumu ifade etmez. BM'nin kuruluşu ulus-devletlerin menfaatleri temeline dayalıdır. Amacı, toprak bütünlüğünü, bağımsızlığını, kültürel değerlerini ve diğer ulusal değerler diyebileceğimiz varlıkların güvenliğini sağlamlaştırmak için, bazı devletlerin bir araya gelmeleriyle, yenilmez bir güç oluşturmaktır. Sözü edilen örgüt doğu bloku oluşumunun yansımasını da ifade eden bir kurumdur. Üye devletlerin dayanışmaları bağlamında oluşturulan bir savunma mekanizması olarak bilinmektedir. Ulus-devlet çıkarları üstü bir bağlantıyı yansıtmaz bu örgüt. Her üye devlet, kendi milli çıkarlarının savunucusudur; kendi benliğini, haysiyetini büyük bir onurla korumaya devam eder, aralarında kültürel ve diğer özellikleriyle bilinen farklılıklara da özen gösterirler.

NATO Konseyi'nin, 1952'deki Lizbon Toplantısı'nda alınan önemli kararlardan biri, savunma programlarının milli kaynaklarla bağdaştırılması ve masraflarının üyeler arasında imkanlarına göre paylaşılması idi. Gayri-askeri işbirliği ile ilgili meseleleri görüşen Komitenin raporunu, sözü edilen Konseyin, üç günlük Paris Toplantısı'nda (11-14 Aralık 1956) kabul ederken, bu Batı Güvenlik Örgütü üye devletlerine, aralarındaki olası anlaşmazlıkların barışçı yollarla halledilmesini öngörmüş, halledemediklerinde, herhangi bir uluslararası kuruma baş vurmadan önce, bu Örgütün arabuluculuk yapmasına karar alınmıştır. Bu iki hatırlatmadan anlaşılabilirliği gibi, Kuzey Atlantik Savunma Birliği'nin ulusüstü bir karakteri yoktur. Buna, NATO Konseyinin ve BM'nin Genel Sekreteri'nin başarısız arabuluşları girişimleri neticesinde (İngiltere ve İzlanda arasındaki balıkçılık anlaşmazlığı) sorunun BM'e taşınmasını katarsak, sözü edilen görüşü tamamen kanıtlar.

Batı kültürel değerleri koruma amaçlı girişimler, İngiltere, Fransa, Belçika, Hollanda ve Lüksemburg devletlerini, 17 Mart 1948 tarihinde bir araya getirerek, Brüksel Antlaşması olarak adlandırılan dökümanı imzalayarak, demokrasi dünyasının müşterek savunma yolunda atılan ilk adım olmuştur.

George Washington'ın vasiyetnamesine göre, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin (ABD), Avrupa devletleriyle herhangi bir ittifakta bulunmak, aykırı olduğunu bilerek, demokrasinin bekçisi bayrağını alan ABD, Senatoya, 11 Haziran 1948 tarihli toplantısında, NATO'ya dahil olmak teklifini kabul ettirdi.

Komunizm rejimine karşılık olarak, demokrasi kavramı yeni bir ivme kazanmıştır. Dönemin oluşturduğu kutuplaşma „yeni dünya” konjonktüründe, devletlerin sistemlerini ideoloji kavramlarıyla belirlemiştir. Toplumsal oluşumlara bu pencereden bakıldığında, kültürel farklılıkların arka bahçeye itildiğine göre, Batı kültürel değerleri yaşamayan devletler de, komunizmden savunacak NATO güvenlik örgütüne üye olmak rahatlığını hissetmişlerdir. Belli çıkarlar karşılığında, iki Balkan devleti: nüfusun çoğunluğu Ortodoks dinini benimsemiş Yunanistan, ve %99'u Müslüman olan Türkiye, NATO Konseyi tarafından, 17 Ekim 1951 tarihli kararıyla, bu örgüte kabul edildiler. Batılı olmak şartını yumuşatan ABD ve Avrupa devletleri, din, dil ve diğer farklılıkları aşarak, Batı yanlısı olmakla yetinmişlerdir.

Komunizm kutbunun düşmesiyle, dünya sahnesinde yeni oluşumlar olasılığına neden olmuştur. Onun başında, çift kutuplu bir olgudan, tek kutuplu bir oluşuma geçiş gelir. Akabinde, Batı güçlerin başı ABD, tek güç halini alarak, süpergüç statüsüne yükselmesi takip eder. Dahası, Batı devletlerini arkasına alarak, sözü edilen güçlü devletlerin başı, bu gelişmeleri fırsata çevirmek ereğiyle, yeni dünya düzeni oluşturmaya kollarını sıvayarak, geçmiş imparatorlukların hayallerini gerçekleştirmek hislerini gündem ederek, küresel bir dünya inşa etme sürecini sergilemekle tanımlanması belirler. Varılacak nokta, küreselleşme süreci içinde yeni dünya oluşumunun yolu ile belirlenmiştir: egemen hale getirilen Batı kültürü üzerine, diğer mevcut dünya kültürlerini homojenleşme çarkına koyarak, tek bir dünya kültürü oluşturmaktır.

Yeni dünya konjonktürü, dolaylı veya dolaysız şekliyle, insanlararası ilişkilere farklı boyutlar sergileyerek, toplumsal şekillenmelere çeşitli hamleler getirmektedir. İdeolojiye dayalı toplumsal biçimlendirmeler, yerini, farklı kültürlerle yoğrulmuş medeniyetlere bırakıyor, daha doğrusu iade ediyor. Ama, şunu da gözden çıkaramayız: ideoloji biçimli devlet kurumları, yerlerini koruyarak, rollerini değiştirmekle hayatlarını sürdürmeye çalışırken, yeni yaşam tarzlarında derin boşlukların oluşumuna sebebiyet yaratıyorlar.

Her kesilen evrim yolunun işaretini devrim belirlerse, çalkantılı toplumsal olaylar, hayatı alt-üst eder. Bu olgu, toplumsal kuralların kaçınılmaz sonucunu çoktan belirlemiştir. Yeni dünya düzeni mimarlarının aşamayacakları bir olgudur bu. Hayata yeni kurallar belirleyicilerinin yazıp çizdiklerini dinlemeyen bir toplumsal etmeni ifade eder, devrimsel oluşumlar.

Hayat sözle değil, gerçeklerle yaşarsa, görünen o ki, küreselleşme süreci içinde inşa edilmeye çalışılan yeni dünya düzeni, emperyalizmin emperyalistleştirmesinden öteye götürmez. Görülen şey için kılavuz gerekmeseydi, yaşanan belirtilerin sonucuna bakarak: Batı kültürüne evrensel yüz verilerek, dünya değerler biçimiyle, küreselleşme olgusuna belirsiz bir süreç tanınarak, farklı kültürel coğrafyaları içine alarak, batılılaştırılma girişimlerinin sessiz sedasız şekliyle gerçekleştiğini, görüyoruz. Diğer yandan, Batı kültürünü kabul etmeye yanaşmayanlara meydan okuyarak, onları zoraki dünya düzenine koyacaklarını söyleyerek, savaş sahnelerine de rastlıyoruz. Şimdiki küreselleşme sürecinin, bu iki yolda yürüdüğünü kanıtlamanın zor olmadığı gözüküyor.

Emperyalizmin seçtiği her iki emperyalistleştirme yolu, devrimsel oluşumlara neden oluyor. Binaenaleyh, batılaşma yolunu kabul edenler, alışlagelmiş yaşam tarzlarına darbe getirerek, yeni toplumsal hayata yaşam biçiminde büyük zorluklarla karşı karşıya kalıyorlar. Neticede, oluşan toplumsal düzen yaşama yansımıyor, yaşanan hayat ise düzensiz kalıyor. Batılaşma tehdidiyle karşılaşan toplumsal birlikler ise, tepki verme adına oluşturdukları savunma sahasına, bütünüyle Batı karşıtı bir hava estirerek, insana yarayan Batı kültürünün oluşturduğu değerleri bertaraf ederek, devrimsel girişimlerle, toplumsal hayata yeni yaşam tarzları biçimlendirmede bulunuyorlar.

Bloklararası gerginlik bittikten sonra, Batı kültürünü tehdit eden Varşova Paktı'nın yok oluşu, NATO'nun yaşamına yeni anlamlar getirmektedir. NATO'nun geçmiş haliyle devamı, şimdi hangi değerlerin savunmasını yapmakla görevlendirildiğinin, sorusuna cevaben, Batı değerlerini savunma doğrultusunda belirlenen bu örgüt, şimdi belli güçlerin çıkarları doğrultusunda, Batı kültürünü tek değer olarak dünyaya empoze etme girişimiyle tanımlayabiliriz. Bu bağlamda, NATO, savunma mekanizmasından fazla, dayatma gücü olarak dünya sahnesine çıktığını belirlemeyi de ihmal edemeyiz. Böyle bir anlamlandırma, mantık içeriğiyle, NATO'nun eski şekli, yeni dünya düzenini uygulamadaki rolü, yeni sorunlara sebebiyet yaratacak. Yine, bu bağlamda mantık yürüterek, varabileceğimiz sonuçlardan biri: Batı çıkarlarıyla bütünüyle dengelenen bu örgüt, içinde bulundurduğu diğer kültürel değerlerin savunmasında, yeni güçlüklerle karşılaşacak.

Toplumsal yaşamı sağlamakta oluşturulan değerler, yeni dünya konjonktüründe, yerlerini yeniden değiştirerek, kültüre dayalı yaşam tarzları yeniden ön plana çıkarılıyor, ideoloji biçimli sistemsel hayat tarihe gömülüyor. Bu temel üzerinde olagelen toplumsal gelişmeler, insanlararası ilişkilerini yeni boyutlara taşıyor. Batı kültürü anlayışıyla oluşturulan demokrasi kavramı, tüm toplumsal oluşumların ana kaynağı haline getirilmeye çalışılırken, onun üzerinde oluşan serbest piyasa, laissez-faire ilkesi dışında, başka biçim ekonomi ilişkilerini dışlayarak, batının kabullendiği değerleri sıralamakla, insanın üretebileceği değerlerin son aşamaya geldiğine kandırmaya çalışılıyor. Buna inandırmak için, Francis Fukuyama'nın "Tarihin Sonu ve Son İnsan" kitabını bestseller seviyesine kaldırarak, dünyaya okutma gayretinde bulunuluyor. Bunu kabul etmeyenler için, "siz istediniz" anlamında, medeniyetlerin çatışmasını kaçınılmaz göstererek (Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order), dünyayı yeni kutuplaştırmalara sürüklüyorlar. Bu biçim çatışma kaçınılmazlığıyla NATO'ya yeni bir savunma sahası açılıyor.

Bu savunma sahası, NATO birliğinin kuruluş ilkeleriyle bağdaştırılamaz. Bağdaşmadığı siğnelere de; Bosna olaylarına farklı bakış açılarını aleni ifade eden Batı müttefik devletlerini: Yunanistanı, Sırbistan'ın tarafını tutmakla, Türkiye'yi ise Müslümanlar yanında saf almakla suçlarcasına, Samuel Huntington (sözü edilen eserinde) gibi, yeni dünya düzeninin oluşumunda söz sahipliğiyle bilinen, Batı stratejisinin oluşumunda payı geçen bilim adamları, gelecekte bu iki devletin NATO dışı edilmelerini öngörülerle veriliyor. Dahası, medeniyetler üzerinde, ulus-devlet sınırlarını aşarak Katolik Batı Ukrayna ile Ortodoks Doğu Ukrayna'yı ayıracak şekilde, Beyaz Rusya ve Ukrayna'nın içinden geçmekte, Romanya'da güneye ve daha sonra batıya yönelerek, Transilvanya'yı ülkenin geri kalan bölümünden ayırarak, sonra da Slovenya ve Hırvatistan'ı, eski Yugoslavya'dan ayıracak şekilde geçmektedir (bkz. William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe, London, 1990, p. 16- 19). Yeni toplumsal birlikler belirleme (Rusya'nın önderliğinde Ortodoksluk kültürünün nüfuz ettiği bölgeler ile Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun nüfuz ettiği bölgeler üzerinde. Doğu-Batı ayrımı, bkz. a.g.e) girişimleri doğrultusunda, yeni coğrafyalar oluşumları, dünya barışı ve istikrarı bakımından, düşündürücü olması gerekir. Aslında, Batı Hristiyan diniyle, Batı medeniyetini özleştirme çabaları, yeni dünya düzeni oluşumu adıyla, yeni Doğu- Batı çizgisini çekerek, kültür farklılıkları bağlamında, yeni kutuplaşma yolu oluşturuluyor.

Toplumsal yaşam değerleri tartışılmadan belirlenerek, tanımadan tanımlandırılarak, Batı kültürü dünya değerleriyle eş anlama getirilmesine,

yeni oluşumlarla biçimlendirilen hayata ayak uydurma aşamasına küreselleşme adı verilerek, yeni dünya düzeni oluşturma içinde bulunuyoruz. Bu süreç içinde, farklı değerleri savunmayla yükümlü çoğu mekanizmaların gerksinmelerini anlamsız hale getirme girişimleri, Batı kültürünü herkese yeter göstermekle sürdürerek, tek bir savunma mekanizması oluşturma amacına varmak hedefleniyor. Bu hedef içinde, NATO' ya böyle bir yetki vermekle, yeni bir güvenlik mekanizması oluşturmak gereğini de ortadan kaldırmaktır. Yeni dünya düzenin tekçilik üzerinde oluşumu, Batı medeniyetini dünyaya hakim kılmakla anlaşılırsa, NATO' nun rolü bir katına artırılır: hem Batı değerlerinin güvenliğini sağlamak, hem de dünyayı batılaştırmaya mecbur etmek.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı' nın dehşet verici nedenlerini ebedi olarak kaldırmak girişimiyle oluşturulan BM ve onun kuruluşuyla meydana gelen Güvenlik Konseyi'nin dünyada barışı ve istikrarı sağlayacağı ümitleri; Doğu-Batı rejimleriyle sıfatlandırılan devlet grupları arasında yaratılan gerginlikler sonucu, defalarca kullandıkları veto ile, hukuk üstünlüğü üzerine, yeni bir dünya düzeni oluşum hayalleri, kırıklığa uğramıştır. Bu arada (1945 yılında, San Francisco' da kuruluşundan bu yana) dünya çapında bir savaş vuku bulmadı, ama dünyada savaşlar durdurulamadı; büyük devletlerin çıkarları doğrultusunda sınırlar çizilerek, güçlüler dengesi üzerinde, iki kutuplu bir dünya yönetimi zühur buldu. BM, dünya örgütünden fazla, iki tabura bölünmüş dünya güçlerinin çıkarları paylaşımında herhangi bir çatışmayı önlemek için, arabuluculuk yapmakla da betimlenebilir. Global dünya barışı bu dengeler üzerinde sağlanmışsa, BM' in de bunda payı olduğu söyleyenebilir. Lakin dünyaya adaletli bir barışı, insanların insanlara insani davranışlarını sağlayamamış, lafı edilen bu örgüt. Adaletsiz barış olarak adlandırabileceğimiz bu dünya oluşumu, güçlülerin çıkarları doğrultusunda, güçsüzlerin susturulduğunu, gelişmiş ülkelerin zenginleşme yolunda yükseldiklerini, gelişmekte olan ülkelerin fakirleşmeye yönlendiklerini, zengin- fakir uçurumların derinleştiğini, aralarındaki bağlılığın artmaya devam ettiğini; akabinde, dünyanın ikinci bir bölünmeye: Kuzey-Güney kutuplaşmasına sürüklendiğini görüyoruz.

Dünya sahnesinden çekilen komünizm, beraberinde Doğu-Batı gerilimini ortadan kaldırmadı; çünkü var olan gerilimin yerine, yeni farklı değerler gündeme getirilerek, kutuplaşmış dünyanın gerginlik haline yeni biçimlendirmeler oluşturarak, bölünmüş dünyanın "öteki" kavramıyla yaşama devam etmesi girişimlerinin şimdilik başarılı olduğunu saptayabiliriz. Doğulu medeniyetleri Batı medeniyetine tehdit olarak göstermekle, yeni dünya oluşumuyla bağdaşmazlığını öne sürerek, medeniyetler çatışmasını kaçınılmaz hale getirerek, yeni gerilimin dünya sahnesine baş gösterdiğini kanıtlayabiliriz. Hem de eskisinden daha büyük gerilimlere yöneltildiğini;

çünkü, bu defa, vazgeçilemeyen değerlerin birbiriyle zıtlaştırıldığını görüyoruz. Felsefi dünya bakışları, başka bir felsefe bakışıyla değişir, fakat belli kültüre dayalı oluşan medeniyetler, birbirlerinden etkilenerek gelişebilirler, ama kendi özünden vazgeçmezler. Onun için, bu değerler üzerinde oluşturulan kutuplaşmanın, dünya barışı ve istikrarı için çok daha büyük tehlikeler getireceğini göz önünde bulundurmak gerekir. Tek bir kültür üzerinde, bütün diğer kültürlerin aleyhinde, küresel bir dünya düzeni oluşturma girişimleri başarılı olamaz, ancak büyük çatışmalara neden olabilir.

Siyaseten biçimlenen toplumlar bağlamında oluşturulan kutuplaşmayı sakinleştirmekle yükümlü BM'nin, Doğu blokun sona ermesiyle, yeni dünya oluşumların sorunlarını gidermeye yönelmesi gerekir. Küreselleşme süreci içinde, yeni oluşumları iyice takip ederek, gelecek dünya düzeninin inşa edilmesinde baş rolü yüklenmelidir. Aksine, gereksinmelere aykırı, çoğu halk ve devletlerin iradesi dışında, dayatmalarla, bazı güçlerin dar çıkarları yoluna yönlendirilirse, dünyadaki halkların ve devletlerin temsilcisi olmaktan çıkar. Ortak değerler ortada yoksa, bir bütünü ifade edecek dünya örgütüne de ihtiyaç kalmaz. Tek çıkarlar üzerine değerler örülmez. Şimdiki yapısıyla; kültürel farklılıklar üzerinde bölüştürülen dünya, küresel süreci adıyla, Batı kültürü ifadesiyle, evrensel bir olgu ötesi içeriğiyle, yeni dünya sistemi oluşturma girişimlerini; BM karşılayamaz. Eski biçimiyle, yeni dünya oluşumuna ayak uydurma imkansızlığı, bu dünya örgütünün reforme edilmesi sinyalini veriyor, veya yeni bir küresel örgütün teşkil edilmesi gereğini belirliyor.

Reformlaşmış BM'nin , veya yeni bir dünya örgütünün öyle bir yapısı olmalı ki, yeni dünya düzeni yapısının değerlerini belirleyerek, bu değerleri savunacak mekanizmaların şekillendirilmesine hukuk boyutu vererek, eylemlerini doğal hukuk çemberine alabilecek yetkiyi sahiplenmeli. İnsanın doğasına ters düşen eylemlere (suni) değer biçme girişimlerini kınayarak, onların savunmasına da izin vermemeli. Değeri olmayan bir olgunun, veya değerini yitirmiş bir toplumsal biçimdirmenin, savunma mekanizmasına ihtiyacı olmaz. Komünizmin çöküşüyle ortadan kalkan Varşova Paktı bunu en iyi bir biçimde kanıtıyor.

Kuzey-Batı bölgesinde, Euro- Atlantik devletlerine yönelik bir düşmanca saldırıyı ortadan kaldırmayı kendi görev alanı olarak saptayan NATO'nun, Soğuk Savaş'ın bitmesiyle birlikte, yeni dünya oluşumu bağlamında, görevini ve anlamını yeniden tanımlaması gerekir. Herkesin güvenliğini sağlayacak bir örgüt olarak tanımlandırılması, şimdiki biçimiyle kabul edilemez. İnsan Hakları Evrensel Beyannameyle belirlenen evrensel değerlerin ulus-üstü karakteri, yeni dünya oluşumu bağlamında, yeni bir dünya örgütü tarafından savunulmasına ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Şimdiki bölgesel özelliğiyle, NATO küresel bir savunma mekanizması olarak

algılanamaz. Ulus-devlet çıkarları temelinde oluşturulan savunma birliđi, ulus-üstü deđerlere sahip çıkması kabullenilemez. Dayanışma temelli, üye devletler arasında işbirliğini öngüren bir örgüt olarak, devletler üstü operasyon yapmayı hak edemez. Onu teşkil eden ülkeler bağımsızlıklarıyla belirlenirken, her halükarda egemenliklerini ön plana çıkarırken, her pahasına toprak bütünlüğünü ve diđer devlet çıkarlarını korumaya hazırlığını belirlerken, bu devletler birliđi, evrensel insan haklarını savunma adına, diđer devletlerin bağımsızlığını incitmeye, egemenliklerini zedelemeye, hak edinemezler, edinmemelidirler. Buna binaen, evrensel insan haklarını savunacak bir dünya bekçisi oluşturma geređi (küreselleşme süreci içinde oluşumların yansımaları bağlamında) hissedilmektedir. Aksi takdirde, küresel bir dünya oluşumunun, kendi çıkarları çizgisinde, büyük güçler tarafından yönetilmesi devam edecek ki, akabinde, daha nice devletlerin işgal edilmelerinin önü kesilemeyecek.





<b>ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF TURKEY</b>		
<b>17TH INTERNATIONAL ANTALYA CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION</b>		
<b>Antalya, January 30-31, 2009</b>		
<b>“Changing Security Environment and a Renewed Transatlantic Vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”</b>		
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Adil	AYAZ	Colonel
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